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

The Leader and the Crowd

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE, 1880–1941

Daria Frezza Translated by Martha King

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THE LEADER AND THE CROWD

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THE LEADER AND THE CROWD

Democracy in American Public Discourse, 1880–1941

DARIA FREZZA

Translated from the Italian by Martha King

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA PRESS

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In memory of my grandmother Sophie Gordigiani Carpenter

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I have used sources from four different fields: history, anthropology, social psychology, and political science. In some cases I have also added literary works, either because they could illuminate the themes that had been the object of scientific analysis, or because the writers, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, often carried out investigations in order to "document" unexplored aspects of American society and did so in a manner that was similar to what the social scientists were doing.

The list of those I should thank is too great to record in full. I shall begin with the west side of the ocean, remembering with gratitude professors Eric Foner, Tom Bender, Alan Brinkley, and Don H. Doyle, who encouraged this translation. Among the circle of Americanists but also of people of letters on the Old Continent, I thank those who have followed the writing of this book and have been generous with their advice and stimulating criticism: Alessandra Lorini, Giovanni Falaschi, Nando Fasce, Mario Corona, Daniela Rossini, and Raffaella Baritono. More generally, I am grateful to the entire research group that worked on the subject of the public and private, beginning with Maurizio Vaudagna, for profitable occasions of debate and discussion. I also acknowledge with gratitude the Roosevelt Study Center of Middleburg, Holland, directed by Cornelis Van Minnen, for the interesting opportunities to meet with European colleagues at meetings sponsored by the center. I would like to extend special thanks to Martha King, who has translated the book with great skill and intelligence, and to Veronica Park of the Biblioteca

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THE LEADER AND THE CROWD

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Introduction

> The eloquent voice, on which the souls of the listening audience had been borne aloft as on the swelling waves of the sea, at length came to a pause. There was a momentary silence, profound as what should follow the utterance of oracles. Then ensued a murmur and half-hushed tumult . . . a shout. . . . Beneath the sky it pealed upward to the zenith. There were human beings enough, and enough of highly wrought and symphonious feeling to produce that more impressive sound than the organ-tones of the blast, or the thunder, or the roar of the sea; even that mighty swell of many voices, blended into one great voice by the universal impulse which makes likewise one vast heart out of the many.
> —NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, *The Scarlet Letter*

The behavior of crowds in their alleged unpredictability or presumed rationality has been a subject of interest to social scientists as well as to historians for the past two centuries. And although a suitably scientific theory of crowd behavior was formulated by the end of the nineteenth century in France and Italy, nineteenth-century writers and poets had already anticipated such theories in their works. The epigraph that opens this chapter, from Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* (1850), is one example of a literary description of crowds.[1]

The recent attention by historians to this theme was part of a more general interest in cultural exchanges on both sides of the Atlantic at the turn of the nineteenth century.[2] The historian Daniel Rodgers called the circulation of ideas and cultural movements from the Old World to the New World the "Atlantic crossings." He analyzed the influence of European social and economic politics on American society in the final decades of the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth by examining the "reconstruction of American social politics which was of a part with movements of politics and ideas throughout the North Atlantic world that trade and capitalism had tied together."[3] Recently, Victoria de Grazia analyzed how America's consumer culture has advanced through

bourgeois Europe since the beginning of the twentieth century to the present.[4] Working within the same framework of mutual influences between Europe and America, studies by Arnaldo Testi highlighted the way the European social scientists James Bryce and Moisei Ostrogorsky analyzed American political parties and warned their European colleagues of the risks of a similar political participation of the masses.[5]

A less well-known aspect, but one of great interest, involves the influence of European theories of crowds and dynamics of collective processes on American social scientists. The Americans' interest was not just theoretical, considering the significant impact such sociologists as Edward A. Ross, Charles H. Cooley, and Robert E. Park had in conditioning public discourse about the distinctive characteristics of democratic citizenship. They not only taught in universities but participated on numerous state and federally sponsored commissions to address socioeconomic problems; because their writings reached a broader audience, and were not limited to the more narrow academic scene, they gained particular relevance in the public arena. I shall also concentrate my analysis on minor figures such as Boris Sidis, a student of William James's, and William Ripley, an expert anthropologist and professor of economics at Harvard University, as they played an important role in articulating the discourse about racial hierarchies and the psychological mechanisms of suggestion present in crowds.

Dorothy Ross's fundamental study, *The Origins of American Social Science,* mentions these subjects but does not fully develop them in her reconstruction of that complex cultural milieu at the turn of the century in which the first schools of social science were formed. And yet all the important scholars of those early years were interested in both spheres of investigation, race and the nature of crowds and the public, and were moved by their different interests and disciplines to redefine the notion of democratic citizenship, one of the important issues of public discourse.[6]

As Eric Foner has observed in his book about the history of American freedom, "enhancing the power of the state made it all the more important to identify the boundaries of political participation." In the public arena discussion focused on a drastic reduction of the electorate to the disadvantage of the poorest social classes, recent immigrants, and African Americans.[7] In this sense the paradigm of rationality had become a basic instrument for defining the boundaries of the new democratic society,

as emphasized by many social scientists. The distinction commonly accepted in progressive circles between the "rationality" of the white, male democratic public formed by the mass media and the "irrational" masses, reelaborated from European theories of the French school of Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, was colored by racial traits elaborated by the anthropological theories then in vogue. Such theories served as scientific support in heated public discussions about the question of inclusion/exclusion in the circle of U.S. citizenship of the great waves of immigrants pouring into American society in the 1890s.

The social scientists Edward A. Ross and John R. Commons took up the theme of the "race suicide" of white Anglo-Saxon stock; paradoxically, Ross and Commons were also well known for their progressive and advanced opinions about working-class problems. In this sense, according to Gary Gerstle's point of view, they emblematically represent that complex intertwining of the two American traditions of civic nationalism on the one hand and racial nationalism on the other.[8] In this cultural scene the new science of eugenics, which was a popular subject in public discourse, acquired particular significance in its various aspects, from the prevention of disease and hereditary defects to practices for the betterment of the species.

In these same years the stereotype commonly used to define the crowd in revolt, the *mob* (whose behavior was compared with that of "women, savages, children"), was gradually undermined once women acquired higher public status. Meanwhile, John Dewey's new educational principles led to a greater understanding of children's behavior, and Franz Boas's school of anthropology studied the "savages" scientifically, shedding light on their behavior and social structures.

Interest in the primitive came to dominate the artistic and cultural scene of that time. Researching "the primitive" involved not only exotic South Seas adventures but also the first great sociological investigations of the metropolitan "jungle," which was populated by crowds described according to criteria of race and class. Psychological research into "the primitive" also delineated those personality traits underlying rationality and were based on the notion of race. The element of race, though, was primary in destroying the paradigm of rationality/irrationality in notions of the public and the crowd. The terms of the question were overturned, once crowds of white Anglo-Saxon men and women—the possessors par excellence of the characteristics that had forged the modern democratic

society—used lynching as a "normal" instrument for terrorizing African Americans in the southern United States into subjugation.[9]

Along with the study of crowds, social scientists critically reexamined the notion of individualism, which no longer evoked the characteristics of competitiveness and aggressiveness in a society that was increasingly marked by new elements of interdependence and complexity. The historian Casey N. Blake has highlighted the cultural public space that figures such as John Dewey and Jane Addams critically built into their analysis of industrial society within both a liberal democracy and the radical evangelical tradition of the nineteenth century. Within this framework emerges an interesting issue concerning the definition of the features of the public sphere to which social scientists paid particular attention.[10] According to the historian Jonathan Hansen, such intellectuals as William James, Jane Addams, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Horace Kallen "repudiated liberalism's association with acquisitive individualism and laissez faire economics delineating a model of liberal citizenship," which Hansen has labeled "cosmopolitan patriotism . . . a middle ground between universalism and cultural pluralism."[11]

In analyzing the issue of the "social self," social scientists were extremely aware of the risks of mass standardization in the growing society of consumers but at the same time were careful to redefine and emphasize an aspect of critical and conscious rationality by constructing a new notion of the democratic citizen. In fact, the latter was Anglo-Saxon, male, and had the ability to rationally acquire through new mass media the information necessary to exercise his rights and duties as a citizen. The public of a democratic society was articulated according to rational parameters around the concept of the "group" in its most diverse meanings: from the "primary group" of Charles H. Cooley to the "interest groups" of Arthur F. Bentley to corporations. The concept of collective behavior subsequently formulated in the 1920s by Robert E. Park went beyond a negative and destructive vision of the crowd and aimed to show a "continuum" between the crowd itself and the public.

In studies of the diverse characteristics of the Progressive Era, however, the theory of crowds and groups can elucidate cultural paths that have remained outside the studies of the construction of the American democratic identity, although these theories were largely present in the techniques used by the rising consumer industry to condition the masses.[12]

After the First World War the political and cultural environment underwent a drastic change in comparison to the prewar years. Liberal appeals for reform no longer found a place in public discourse. The racial theories, with the aid of eugenics, along with the studies undertaken by Franz Boas and his followers, gave rise to two opposing visions of the development of American democracy, which became evident in the debate about restricting immigration quotas.

During the 1920s, with the rapid expansion of mass media and the advertising business, new experimental methodologies in tracking public opinion came from the fields of both psychology and sociology.[13] New lines of inquiry concerned possible compatibilities between traditional basic democratic values and the development of ever-more-sophisticated techniques of conditioning mass consumer attitudes in a modern society. John Dewey and Walter Lippmann investigated the characteristics of a mass democratic public and the more specific notion of groups. In elaborating their theories, they bore in mind the studies of the crowd begun by European scientists and reformulated by their American counterparts.

At the end of the decade the stock market crash of 1929 plunged American society into a dramatic economic and social crisis that also resulted in a crisis of basic American democratic values. In the wake of the economic and social upheavals caused by the Great Depression and in the heated political climate and strong opposition met by Franklin Delano Roosevelt's legislative measures, many diverse protest movements spread across the United States, from General Art Smith and his Khaki Shirts to Father Coughlin's blatantly anti-Semitic radio show, "The Golden Hour of the Shrine of the Little Flower." Some conservative groups—traditionally averse to federal government interference—were deeply concerned about the risk of an authoritarian shift by Roosevelt's administration. A broad political debate sprang up on the political right as well as the left concerning the future of American democracy, though for different reasons.[14]

On the international scene the European dictatorships on the one hand and the Soviet regime on the other represented alternative solutions to the economic and social problems of the times. The advocates of U.S. democracy felt called upon to respond to this challenge.[15] For instance, using the tools of social psychology, the social scientist Hadley Cantril gave an interesting interpretation to the social movements spreading on American soil and of the German Nazi Party.[16] Moreover, German,

Hungarian, Austrian, and Italian scientists who were among the intellectuals forced by European dictatorships to emigrate to the United States were also keenly interested in shedding light on European authoritarian regimes.

It is interesting to note how the themes of crowd psychology, almost following a circular movement, in the 1930s were projected onto the European scene, where, in a different context, they had been formulated at the beginning of the century. In fact, they constituted one of the principal interpretive canons that the American scholars adopted in analyzing European authoritarian regimes, contrasting Nazi "crowds," bound to their leader by irrational drives, to a democratic and participative public. Nevertheless, some aspects of an authoritarian system, for example, the techniques of mass conditioning practiced by dictatorships, were the subject of great interest and close study by such political scientists of the Chicago school as Harold D. Lasswell and Thurman W. Arnold of Yale University, who also took the ritual and symbolic aspects into account.

Closely connected to this subject is the leader-masses relationship. Before becoming one of the most important themes in the study of authoritarian regimes, it had constituted a topic of particular relevance in American society since the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, the concept of "group" and that of "leader" had given rise to interesting research in diverse fields, with the support of experimental data, from education to working-class conditions, beginning with Elton Mayo's famous studies.

From the standpoint of the leader-masses relationship the leader's function acquired crucial relevance as organizer of the consensus, allowing the possibility of defining such a concept in a democratic sense and of extending the meaning from the factory to the whole society.[17] President Franklin Delano Roosevelt seemed to embody the prototype of the democratic leader. His charisma, which appeared to be a natural endowment, was actually carefully constructed by means of the new techniques of opinion surveys, in addition to the instruments of mass communication, such as his famous use of the radio.[18]

On the eve of World War II many quarters urged an "ideological rearmament" of democracy. Getting the country behind the war effort required a clear definition of democracy's basic principles, which led to proposing democracy not only as an "ideal process" but also as an anthropological model for democratic behavior, which scientists such as

E. Pendelton Herring, Hadley Cantril, as well as John Dewey, brought to wide attention.

In this context the theme of race was reintroduced into public discourse with all its disruptive power, acquiring a double meaning. The race issue became crucial in the international construction of the democratic discourse opposing Nazi Germany and fascist countries. However, this offered progressive associations and individual intellectuals in the United States the opportunity to point out the great distance between the racist and exclusionary practices confronting the most disadvantaged groups in American society and the country's democratic and egalitarian principles.

The relevance of these themes cannot be fully understood without taking into account the cultural and social context of the Progressive Era, and of the years between the two world wars, when such broad questions formed a public discourse open to many points of view as Americans tried to grapple with the hard choices imposed by international events.

My analysis stops here because circumstances were radically altered after World War II. While in the 1930s social scientists' analyses of democracy were fragmented and revealed contradictory points of view, in the Cold War years, instead the widely accepted notion of democracy was that of a coherent combination of principles and values in contrast to the communist regimes. At the same time, however, these same values proclaimed on the international scene were strongly questioned at the national level by the disadvantaged, such as the African Americans, giving rise in the following years to the civil rights movement.

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CHAPTER 1 American Democracy in the Gilded Age: The Individual, the Crowd, and the "People"

The Tyranny of Crowds, the People, and the "Infusible Identity" of the Individual in the American Cultural Tradition

In 1901 in the *Atlantic Monthly* the ex-Congregationalist minister Gerald Stanley Lee warned his readers about the risks of a new tyranny that was threatening American society, "the tyranny of crowds," an obvious play on the phrase "the tyranny of the majority," around which Alexis de Tocqueville had built his critical arguments.[1] A little more than ten years later, in a book that became a best seller, the same author, an advocate of the importance of "preaching" the new values of consumer democracy, described an ideal crowd—active and participatory—gathered around the new president, Woodrow Wilson. Like an artist, Lee wrote, Wilson touched peoples' imagination, thus helping the nation to become more conscious of itself, more self-aware.[2]

The *crowds* to which Lee's book refers in a positive and celebrative sense were those not only imagined within the political boundaries of the nation but defined in a more general sense by the characteristics of modernity, crossed by electromagnetic currents of attraction-repulsion, to use the metaphor then in vogue. The crowds targeted by the growing consumer industry were those that filled the places newly designed for leisure-time entertainment, symbolically represented by Coney Island and Atlantic City. Mass-consumer industry, with its growing publicity apparatus and tools furnished by the new "crowd psychology" coming from Europe, aimed to condition the public's taste and behavior.[3]

Mass consumerism was only one part of the public discourse on the subject of crowds. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, following the socioeconomic changes caused by industrial development, American society had undergone, as one contemporary critic has put it, "the most profound and rapid alteration of material conditions of life that human society had ever experienced."[4] This was also the opinion of many scholars living at that time. John Dewey himself observed in 1899: "One can

hardly believe that there has been a revolution in all history so rapid, so extensive, so complete."[5]

The economic depression that struck the United States from 1873 to 1877 brought national attention to the impact and possible deleterious consequences of industrialization. Among those consequences were growing numbers of unemployed, the formation of local and national unions and dissident political parties, and increasing strikes and violence—all phenomena that affected the nation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, beginning with the railroad workers' strike in 1877 and lasting until the Progressive Era.[6]

In addition to industrial conflicts, there were the movements of the Green Back Party, the "single-tax" advocates, the Granges, and the Farmers' Alliances—in short, all those groups that were united under the banner of the Populist Party.[7] They testified to the presence of a radical indigenous tradition based on the Jeffersonian ideal of the small, independent farmer or craftsman, on the ideal of republican citizenship, and on a sort of evangelical-millennialist community cooperativeness alongside a deeply engrained tradition of anticapitalism.[8]

The profound social changes brought on by the mass urban-industrial society stimulated social scientists to investigate new epistemological categories in order to understand the rapidly changing reality. Interest came not only from the fields of sociology, political science, psychology, and social psychology but also from advertising and public relations. Moreover, before joining academic institutions, scholars such as Lester F. Ward, Albion W. Small, Edward A. Ross, Charles H. Cooley, and Robert E. Park were directly involved with social and political activities, refusing to confine themselves exclusively to speculation. Their formulations influenced public opinion on the important questions at the core of public discourse.

More than any other factor conditioning the urban middle class's perception of crowds was the steady influx of immigrant workers coming from the poorest rural parts of Europe, filling the urban ghettos, and voicing their protests in big-city demonstrations. Moreover, post-Reconstruction migrations from the southern states into the big cities also provoked growing fears, as African Americans joined the polyglot crowds coming from the other side of the Atlantic and Asia.

"Crowds," "people," "mobs," and "masses": each term had a distinctly different meaning in the American public's perception. Nineteenth-

century public discourse distinguished between the "mob," which implied popular revolt, and the "people," as stated in the Constitution.[9] The term "crowd," somewhere between the two, with its more neutral sense of gathering, had both positive and negative connotations. The federalist conservative Benjamin Russell, in 1840, harshly condemned the "riotous mob," while he considered exemplary the gathering of a "crowd" organized by the Whigs at Worcester, comparing its order and decorum to all the great civil demonstrations held in the city of Boston. Russell wrote, "It was no mob meeting. The people feel the wrongs of their tyrannical oppressors, and when they raise their voices to proclaim them it is the voice of God."[10] "Vox populi vox Dei" was actually one of the slogans of the Boston crowd during protests against the tax laws in the years immediately preceding the American Revolution.[11]

The meaning Benjamin Russell gave to the "crowd" put it on a par with the "people," understood as a population with the rational wherewithal to exercise its citizens' rights but also with the ability to arouse emotion. This view of the people as inspired by God, similar to Nathaniel Hawthorne's description in *The Scarlet Letter*, which I use as the epigraph for the introduction, was a recurring theme in the political literature of the romantic period. The binary "God and people" provided supernatural confirmation for the "people" as founders of the nation. The Declaration of Independence sanctioned the political myth and made it the basis of the new state.

Lacking a common heritage of traditions and territory, the word "people," written into the Preamble of the Constitution, had from the beginning signified a tie with those democratic institutions that were the result of the Revolution and that defined the idea of American citizenship. The violent and disorderly "mob" that had made "the separation from the mother country" possible was transformed by "the legal and impersonal rationality of writing into the republican *people*."[12] Tocqueville considered the idea of the people's sovereignty a primary element of American democracy, visible in all its institutions: "If there is one country in the world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it can be studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where its dangers and its advantages may be judged, that country is assuredly America."[13]

The notion of the "people" in the nineteenth century was closely connected to the exercise of political citizenship as a process that unified

different social groups by origin, culture, and type of occupation, spread over a vast territory. According to the historian Robert Wiebe, "leveling authority and dispersing power politicized the routines of the white men's everyday lives."[14] The prophets of democracy, such as George Bancroft and Walt Whitman, celebrated "democratic policies of this diffuse sort—sorting friends from enemies, defining how contests would be settled and making connections between immediate and distant issues."[15]

The official nineteenth-century poet of the "people" as founder of the democratic order was Walt Whitman. In *Democratic Vistas*, written six years after the Civil War, in the years of national reunification under the auspices of the Reconstruction, the poet described the people by resorting to images from the natural world; one recurring metaphor was the ocean: "The people! . . . The rare cosmical artist mind, lit with the Infinite, alone confronts his manifold and oceanic qualities. . . . Their measureless wealth of latent power and capacity, their vast artistic contrasts of light and shades."[16] This romantic view of the people was the result of the inseparable link between the development of society and democracy. Democracy "can no more be stopped than the tides or the earth in its orbit. Doubtless, also, it resides, crude and latent, well down in the hearts of the fair average of the American-born people, mainly in the agricultural regions."[17]

It was precisely this spiritual relationship with nature that the poet recognized as the characteristic peculiar to the New World in contrast to European tradition: "America . . . must, for her purposes, cease to recognize a theory of character grown of feudal aristocracies . . . and must sternly promulgate her own new standard . . . accepting the old, the perennial elements and combining them into groups, unities appropriate to the modern, the democratic, the west."[18] The theme of nature, counter to the artificial, and the theme of the vital spirit that from the great classical writers could "breathe [the] breath of life into our New World's nostrils," was a recurring motif of Whitman's vision: "Ever the fresh breeze of field, or hill, or lake is more than the palpitation of fans, though of ivory, and redolent with perfume; and the air is more than the costliest perfumes."[19] It is interesting to note, along with the healthy virility that distinguished the new democratic society and that was most frequently emphasized by Whitman, how female figures were cited alongside the male, with the same natural creative force "greater than man, we may admit, through their divine maternity." They "put aside toys and fictions and launch forth, as men do, amid real independent stormy life."[20]

In this ideal construct of U.S. society, which in the "exceptionalism" paradigm coupled democracy with a vision of a wide open, fertile land, the states would be populated by "a copious race of superb American men and women, cheerful, religious, ahead of any yet known."[21]

However, it must be stressed that American national identity was defined according to the well-known paradigm of exclusion-inclusion. The historian Eric Foner stresses this point: "From the time of independence American political culture unlike that of other nations has been predicated on abstract verities that ostensibly apply to all mankind. . . . The inalienable rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the universal rationality and propensity for self-improvement taken for granted by classical economists. . . . Yet the process of defining nationality is inherently exclusionary."[22] After referring to Benedict Anderson's famous definition of the nation as "an imagined political community," Foner observes how "who constructs the community, who has the power to enforce a certain definition of the nation will determine where the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion lie."[23]

The notion of citizenship had in fact always been a matter of controversy, from the inclusion of African Americans in the body of the "people" after the Civil War to their subsequent exclusion beginning in the 1880s to the demand for suffrage at the end of the century by women and immigrants. In the climate of social instability at the turn of the century, popular protest movements throughout the United States found a home in the People's Party, which claimed the rights of the "people" as American citizens within the radical design for a greater democratization of political power.

At the turn of the century the notion of "we the people," according to the national civic tradition, was subject to different interpretations. In the wake of a threat of racial contamination called miscegenation, which involved both African Americans and the great migratory waves from southern Europe, the idea of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race would be strongly questioned from many points of view.[24] In fact, this ran contrary to less restrictive approaches such as the assimilationist or "cultural pluralism," according to the famous definition of the philosopher Horace Kallen.[25]

While "the people" was the object of fierce controversy, the word "crowd" was used in a variety of contradictory ways. In literature the crowd was often depicted as mainly urban, long before sociological stud-

ies.[26] Literary works varied in tone from some of Edgar Allen Poe's short stories, such as "The Man of the Crowd," or Herman Melville's novel *Pierre*, where the city is filled with a crowd of "frantic diseased-looking men and women of all colors . . . leaping, yelling and cursing," to the clear and positive qualities of Walt Whitman, who celebrated the democratic crowd of the large cities: "When million-footed Manhattan unpent descends to her pavements. . . . I too arising answering descend to the pavement . . . merge with the crowd and gaze with them."[27]

The crowd theme, with its threat of overwhelming individuals but also forcing them to conform with the majority, can be found in works by outstanding nineteenth-century American writers such as Melville, Hawthorne, and Twain. In Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* the emotional, changing moods of the crowd that made up the Puritan communities of Boston and that usually gathered in the market square on important public occasions stand as a counterpoint to the vicissitudes of the protagonists: Hester Prynne, the woman banished from the community, and the Reverend Dimmesdale, the famous preacher who secretly guarded the sin of his former passion for Hester. The most desperate moments of their lives are played out in relation to that crowd: in a dramatic conflict in the novel's first scene with Hester, in a more ambiguous rapport of seduction through oratorical skill, and finally in the Reverend Dimmesdale's revelation of guilt.[28]

The crowd serves as background, but it is also the protagonist in Hawthorne's novel. Described in its different moods and, above all, in its ambiguity, the crowd takes shape and follows the emotional waves that the orator wants to arouse, even as it incorporates the principle of popular sovereignty. The writer skillfully captures the fascination that the crowd exercised on its participants and at the same time demonstrates the implicit risk of its power, the possibility of becoming what Tocqueville defines as the "tyranny of the majority." Banning Hester from the community sanctions the dual inclusion/exclusion mechanism that regulates it, so that the two aspects are shown to be complementary.

From his opening description Hawthorne portrays the "solemnity of demeanor" of the crowd of Puritans gathered in the market square as the characteristic that "befitted a people amongst whom religion and law were almost identical." In the opening scene and the scene of the procession the author emphasizes the different psychological and social components of the crowd. Moving closer and providing a sharper picture, as

though putting the crowd under a magnifying glass, Hawthorne describes the elements that unify the crowd—the common emotional tension that made Hester bear the weight of "a thousand unrelenting eyes," which are mechanisms of both contagion and hypnotic fascination:

> There were many people present, from the country roundabout. . . . These . . . now thronged about Hester with rude and boorish intrusiveness. . . . It could not bring them nearer than a circuit of several yards . . . fixed there by the centrifugal force of the repugnance which the mystic symbol inspired. The whole gang of sailors . . . came and thrust their sun burnt and desperado-looking faces into the ring. Even the Indians were affected by a sort of cold shadow of the white man's curiosity and, gliding through the crowd, fastened their snake-like black eyes on Hester's bosom.[29]

Hawthorne's novel encompasses the main features of the crowd as perceived by mid-nineteenth-century U.S. society: The basic principle of popular sovereignty ("the one vast heart of the many") was understood as the natural repository for rules sanctioned by the democratic community. At the same time the author stresses the substantially emotional nature of the crowd, uncontrolled by the rationality commonly considered a primary characteristic of the democratic citizen, rife as the crowd was with the different states of mind that are transmitted by a kind of psychic contagion. The latter functioned as a means of aggregation through a psychological mechanism of inclusion/exclusion, while a tie of an almost hypnotic nature was developed within this same crowd and its leader. These would become some of the salient points of the crowd theory elaborated by Italian and French scholars in the late nineteenth century.

When the crowd is identified by its role of rigid compliance with the law, as told in *The Scarlet Letter*, it clashes dramatically with individual rights. The theme of the crowd's ambiguous power appears in Hawthorne's other works too. In *The House of the Seven Gables* the crowd exercises a force of attraction that compels the individual to lose himself, as happens to the recluse Clifford Pyncheon when "the rush and roar of the human tide" passes under his balcony. The crowd's power in Hawthorne's description is that "it melts all the petty personalities of which it is made up into one broad mass of existence."[30] In another story, on the life of Wakefield, the protagonist vanishes from his normal existence by disappearing into the crowd of London, after he overcomes the fear that "among those millions

of mortal atoms its eyes might recognize him. . . . He lived in the hubbub of the city as before, but the crowd passed without seeing him."[31]

The unrestrainable power of the crowd had traditionally been compared with natural phenomena, and the analogy most often used in great literature, as I have already shown, was water.[32] From literature these images then became stereotypes in the popular press. The crowd, in contrast to the individual, was described as a liquid phenomenon: elusive, uncontrollable, and able to rise up and become a flooding torrent or a stormy sea or, at the extreme opposite, to evaporate, disappear. When the reference was to the crowd in revolt, the tone became darker and more menacing. Charles Dickens's comment about the Gordon Riots is an example: "Where it comes from and withers it goes few men can tell. Assembling and dispersing with equal suddenness it is as difficult to follow to its various sources as the sea itself; nor does the parallel stop here, for the ocean is not more fickle and uncertain, the more terrible when roused, more unreasonable, or more cruel."[33]

A newspaper account in the *Chicago Times* of the railroad workers' strike that paralyzed the United States in 1877 differed little from Dickens's.[34] From this perspective public discourse at the end of the 1880s and beginning of the 1890s proposed a revision of the insurrectional acts of the American and French revolutions that discredited or at least minimized the revolutions' importance.

Thomas Carlyle's history of the French Revolution furnished a rather negative image of the revolt to U.S. readers. Theodore Roosevelt's biography of Governor Robert Morris, the American minister in France during the French Revolution, was peppered with examples and descriptions of popular rebellions designed to discredit such unrestrained collective behavior lacking any sort of national solidarity.[35]

When "the crowd" referred to metropolitan ghettos where the "other half" of the population lived, according to the writer Jacob Riis's definition, the crowds were proletarians who massed in large city slums and participated in protests in the cities and workplaces. After a series of jobs as carpenter, salesman, and farmer, Riis, who was of Danish origin, had become a police reporter for the *New York Tribune* in 1877. In the 1890 study of the tenements of New York, *How the Other Half Lives*, he describes for his leisure-class readers a man who has emerged from the slums and is standing at the corner of Fifth Avenue and Fourteenth Street in New York,[36]

> looking gloomily at the carriages that rolled by, carrying the wealth and fashion of the avenues to and fro the big stores. . . . He was poor and hungry and ragged. This thought was in his mind: They have no thought for the tomorrow, they ride down to spend in an hour's shopping what could keep me and my little one from want a whole year. . . . Then rose up before him the picture of those little ones crying for bread. . . . Then he sprang into the throng and slashed about a knife, blindly seeking to kill, to revenge.[37]

The man is surrounded by the dark and threatening aura of the swarming crowd familiar to him, and his shadow extends, also dark and threatening, over that other rich and elegant crowd that is filling the city's affluent streets.

The term "crowd" had another meaning when it referred to industrial, consumer, and metropolitan crowds: in this sense it was a synonym for "the masses." The word "masses" in itself, as the social scientist John Hardman explains in the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, is "an elastic epithet, devoid of any scientific content, more likely to reveal the point of view of the person using it than to clarify the phenomena in question."[38] Even John Stuart Mill, in his essay "On Liberty" (1859), described the risks of a mass society in which "individuals are lost."[39]

In the social sciences "multitude" was replaced by "masses," which, as the historian Raymond Williams has pointed out, came into use during the Industrial Revolution. Stressing the ambivalence, Williams observed how "the masses" had retained a pejorative meaning in the conservative tradition and a positive meaning in the socialist and progressive tradition.[40] For the historian Asa Briggs, "the language of the masses" inevitably makes distinctions between "them and us, above and below, brains and numbers, individuals and crowds."[41]

In the American cultural tradition both the positive and negative connotations were reflected in a much wider arena than the merely political. Throughout the nineteenth century, mass American society was of primary interest to political scientists and scholars of various disciplines. Moreover, scholars interested in stressing the values of the individual against the threat of annihilation by the crowd traditionally referred to Ralph Waldo Emerson: "Men are become of no account. Men in history, men in the world of today are bugs, are spawn and are called the mass and the herd."[42]

Scientists who were interested in the European theories of crowd psychology but questioned the premise of the negation of individuality also

turned to the "infusible identity" of the Emersonian individual. They reflected on the antinomy of the individual-crowd-mass relationship as one of the most apparent and disconcerting aspects of "modernity," in all its ambiguous and contradictory facets, and, therefore, on the implicit contradiction between absolute faith in the power of democracy on the one hand and criticism of mass society on the other.[43] Interest in this question moved from the academic milieu of highbrow culture into middlebrow culture, represented by preachers, journalists, and writers of popular novels.[44]

While "the rush of the mass" had many advocates in the business world, as well as in the advertising and newspaper worlds, the notion of "public," defined the principal social aggregate of a modern democratic society. A public or, rather, different publics, were made active and aware by means of the new tools of mass communication. Thus a distinction was created between democratic rationality and the irrational behavior of crowds: the *public* on the one hand, the *crowd* on the other, according to the definition of the sociologist Robert E. Park. Alongside the term "crowd," which retained its broader sense, rebellious crowds, understood as "mobs" by their irrational behavior, represented the most extreme aspect of something to be excluded from a prescriptive idea of society.

Rebellious Crowds: The Mob

The word "mob," derived from "mobile," was used to indicate the instability and mobility of unruly groups, consisting "of the lowest class in the community, according to an editorial writer in 1805.[45] The word lumped together the most extreme movements of social protest, from workers' strikes to the lynch mobs that were becoming more frequent in the southern states.

Until the great railroad workers' strike in 1877, when for the first time the working class proved its power on the national scene, the tradition of relative tolerance in the face of popular mass protests, established at the beginning of the century, had coexisted alongside fears of the bestial fury of the crowd. The common perception of the riotous mob was that of a semilegitimate and ritualized expression of indignation against possible threats to the integrity of the community itself.[46] By the second half of the 1870s, most important newspapers were beginning to belittle working-class protests with metaphors that depicted popular uprisings

as a mob: natural phenomena beyond human control, such as volcanoes, storms, and wild animals such as the tiger.

In July 1877 a peaceful demonstration of the unemployed was taking place in Tompkins Square in New York City, while railroad workers were striking in Pittsburgh and other cities. The crowd filling the square had been greeted by large and threatening signs brought by the police: "Don't unchain the tiger." Police intimidation notwithstanding, the crowd was calm and gave the impression, according to the *New York Herald*, of people "standing around at a popular fair rather than a dangerous revolt."[47]

The commonly accepted definition of the behavior of crowds as a "mob" excluded them from the consensus of a civilized democratic society founded on the concept of "the people."

At the peak of the railroad workers' strike important newspapers like the *New York Times* warned of the risk of exporting scourges from the Old World to the New, such as the "socialist revolt" connected with industrialization. Such warnings were reinforced over the years by the successive intensification of social protests in the countryside as well as in industrial areas.[48] Those agitators who represented a foreign element in U.S. society were blamed in public discourse for the spread of violent behavior, because they were new immigrants and because they promoted the communist doctrines that were considered to be behind the bloody events of the Paris Commune.

In early descriptions of the "dangerous classes" inhabiting urban slums like those of New York, the use of the word "proletaries" went back "to the recent experience of the Paris Commune." The fear of a revolution by mob rule evoked in contemporary writers the image of an "irresistible wave," ready to "swell" with "human power unable to restrain it."[49]

The national press continually evoked the specter of the Paris Commune and the possibility that such episodes could also take place on American soil, given the great workers' strikes. As American society up to that time had considered itself immune to the social ills afflicting Europe, the notion of American exceptionalism lost its certainty. An article in the *New York Times*, in regard to the strikes of 1877, made this comment: "We are gradually acquiring those elements of vice and lawlessness which we had fondly hoped were confined to the older and less liberal countries of Europe . . . one great city after another falls without a blow under the control of the mob of reckless and law-defying men."[50] The newspapers and other periodicals emphasized the ethnicity rather than

the political motivation of those who participated in the protests. Stressing ethnicity instead of class allowed the accusation of "un-American" to tar the organizers of workers' protests, beginning with the Haymarket Square tragedy in Chicago. The "un-Americanized element" consisted, the *Chicago Tribune* declared, of the "worst elements of the socialistic, atheistic, alcoholic European classes."[51]

The concept of "alien" included both racial and ideological connotations that changed over time. Because nineteenth-century America was made up of "island communities," the word "alien" had a meaning basically protective of one's own community. As Wiebe explains, the word "did not necessarily mean foreigner. . . . Every distant, threatening power seemed alien to the besieged community and it was defined as such . . . the insurance companies, the big industrialists, the railroads, the federal government."[52] Wiebe observed how such an attitude, a kind of protection for the community, was present in many movements of social protest of the 1880s and 1890s. Later, the word "alien" acquired a more open ideological and anthropological meaning as a result of the great end-of-century migration and increase of workers' protests.

What the historian Eugene Leach defined as the "mob stigma" applied to the working-class strikes, in the opinion of the middle class. This delegitimized the strikes with a strong exclusion process that focused, as I have shown, on the ethnic character of the strikers and on the socialist and communist doctrines as "un-American" elements, at the same time arousing the bugbear of "contagion" that might result from a dangerous coalition of protesting workers.

According to the journalist Raymond S. Baker, who had closely followed various protest movements in the 1890s, beginning with the march to Washington, D.C., organized by Colonel Coxey, the workers' strikes were largely attributable to the dangerous agitators who could be included in the category of "alien proletarians," advocates of theories of social subversion that were incompatible with U.S. society. "It's not a pleasant job," he remarked, "to track around after a mob of half-drunken, blood-thirsty Huns and Slavs who can't speak a word of English!"[53] In the Pullman strike of 1894 he witnessed "huge mobs running wild, defying the officers of the law, putting the torch to millions of dollars" and asked with dismay, "Could such anarchy be permitted in a civilized society?"[54]

This was not the only interpretation of the events, as many studies,

beginning with Herbert Gutman's, show; he called attention to the role of the communities and the local press in supporting the workers' strikes. Yet the urban middle class's stereotypical view of the social conflict certainly exerted a notable influence. Important unions, such as the Knights of Labor, shared that perspective and disassociated themselves from the acts of vandalism committed by "murderers, cut-throats, and thieves known as anarchists."[55]

The mob stigma attached to the strikers gradually became more pronounced. Big entrepreneurs like Andrew Carnegie called for a sharp line of demarcation between the orderly protests by those who behaved lawfully and those strikers who, along with their union organizations, leaned toward typical mob behavior. The distinction separated the serious workers, the "good workmen," who weren't involved in union activities, and the "bad workmen," defined as an "imported class of agitators."[56] The nomenclature was borrowed from both the field of pathological medicine, with words like "contagion," and the field of anthropology: crowds were characterized by the kind of regressive behavior belonging to "savages, women, children," that is to say, those deprived of the inhibitory restraints dependent upon rationality.

The political scientist Francis Lieber, who taught at Columbia University, distinguished between the law of the people, that is, the institutional organizations of the country, and the "mob," that is, "an inorganic multitude, with a general impulse of action."[57] The stereotype of the "mob mind," with its primitive, female, infantile, credulous mental operations, was the opposite of the positive ideals of a male society confident in the tool of rationality as a guide toward progress. The word "mob," therefore, had the radical connotation of a movement outside the boundaries of a democratic society.

Many scholars, among them, William Graham Sumner, were interested in examining the distinctive characteristics of the mob. Sumner's interest in this subject was motivated by the events taking place around him. As the historian Dorothy Ross observed, the violent railroad strikes of 1877 served as a catalyst, orienting Sumner's research toward those institutions that could be considered the social glue for a more stable society. For Sumner, an advocate of social Darwinism, the ideology of survival of the fittest was also tempered with the moral laws of solidarity.[58] Sumner believed the defense against the evils coming from Europe and threatening American society would come from the consolidation of

the middle-class social strata as symbolized by the "common man," the ideal type extracted from the "mass."[59]

The conflict between the tradition of Anglo-Saxon individuality and the new entity of the masses was crucial to the theoretical investigations of social scientists, just as were the great public demonstrations, the striking factory workers, and the protests of farmworkers.

The presidential election of 1896, which saw the defeat of the Democrat William Jennings Bryan, threw the populist movement into disarray. The victory of the Republican candidate, William McKinley, represented an important stage in what the political scientist Walter Dean Burnham defined as the "critical realignment" of the parties, which handed the leadership of the North to the Republicans and left the South to the uncontested power of the white, segregationist Democrats.[60] According to Dorothy Ross, "The election was widely perceived by the middle and upper classes as well as by the reformers themselves to be a decisive defeat for the native radical tradition . . . gathered around the ideal of a cooperative commonwealth."[61] The project of a "cooperative commonwealth" as a democracy of independent producers, a result of the autochthonous radical tradition, was destined for extinction along with the populist movement, while the tensions it expressed were partially reabsorbed into the Democratic Party. The *New York Tribune* greeted the election results with a "Thank God," while the climax reached in 1896 had a cathartic effect, in regard to the widely feared menace of the radical protest.[62] In the same year the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, with the famous phrase "separate but equal," sanctioned a segregation that in the South was consolidated by the notorious Jim Crow laws after the end of the Reconstruction period. The supremacy of the Democratic Party in the South had brought on a ferocious wave of racism and the exclusion of African Americans from the right to vote in many states.[63] At the same time industrial conflict was destined to remain one of the crucial questions of the new century, one that the political powers, as well as the social scientists, were called upon to answer.

Social Scientists in the Gilded Age: The Making of a Profession

Social scientists had gradually acquired legitimacy and scientific authority during the Gilded Age, while scientific progress in the fields of biology, physics, and chemistry expanded the knowledge of natural phenomena,

and technological developments allowed the worlds of production and communication to press forward. The spread of positivism and the influence of Darwin's scientific naturalism contributed to the deterioration of the previously harmonious relationship between science and religion; what social scientists proposed was not to abandon the religious approach as much as to reformulate that relationship based on new models. The great universities were established as secular centers of modern research. Unfettered by studies of a philosophical and moral nature, and by now in control of their own curricula, the social scientists were charged with explaining the great changes taking place in society.

Following the general trend of professionalism and bureaucratization, new professional organizations were formed that produced experts with specialized competence. After the American Social Science Association was instituted in 1865, based on the English model, with a coalition of academic scholars and social workers exchanging experiences, the American Economic Association was formed in 1885. The economists often attacked laissez-faire theories, considered left over from a tradition whose relationship to public institutions and private power needed critical reevaluation. Richard T. Ely and Charles K. Adams, both educated in Germany, criticized the capitalism of laissez-faire and the parasitism of proprietors. Anticipating the theories of Thorstein Veblen, they theorized a productive democracy based on agreement between the manager-engineers and the workers.[64]

The social scientists were united in their acceptance of the theory of evolution. According to Spencer, the Darwinian laws of the natural world were reflected in human society, following a preestablished perspective of social progress. Such a concept was in accord with Adam Smith's classic theory in respect to the harmony of interests. On this basis the development of society depended on free market competition, with minimum interference from the state. The uniqueness of the American experience confirmed this conceptual picture.

The Protestant work ethic, along with a well-established concept of liberal individualism, had traditionally blended with the regulations of the self-governing community. Such a value system was profoundly affected by the great changes brought about by industrialization. The growing complexity and interdependence of different productive sectors, put in contact by new means of production and regulated by remote and impersonal market powers, had shattered the protected nineteenth-century

"island communities," as historian Wiebe defined them. In view of the enormous changes taking place, the values of the traditional social systems now seemed more and more out of kilter.

The problem of reconciling analyses of the social transformations with the laws of Spencer's evolutionism, and with the utopian tradition of U.S. history, gave rise to catastrophic views of industrial development that were expressed in the literature of the 1880s. It's enough to remember Henry George's "single-tax" program in *Progress and Poverty* or Edward Bellamy's famous *Looking Backward* or Josiah Strong's *Our Country*, which was widely read in its time. According to Dorothy Ross, "fears of the decline of the Republic and apocalyptic images of impending doom and reborn millennial hope still shaped the historical imagination of these social scientists and bespoke the strength of the republican-millennial vision in the face of change."[65] Rev. Josiah Strong, secretary of the Evangelical Society of the United States, which "joined the theories of Darwin and Spencer with the prejudices of a rural and Protestant America," warned his readers of the risks of corruption in a system that produces social inequalities.[66] Strong warned of the dangers lurking in the widening of social extremes, in socialist doctrines, in the migratory waves of aliens; most of all, he condemned the development of big cities where all the vices proliferated.[67] What he, Bellamy, and George foresaw was the end of a value system that was tied to republican freedom, to work independence, to the relative egalitarianism of self-governing communities.

After sounding alarms about the looming catastrophe, these writers concluded their critical analyses of the harm done by the urban-industrial society by contrasting it with an optimistic utopian perspective that saw progress tied to the "manifest destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon race, following the pronouncements of another popular author of the 1880s, John Fiske.[68] Their "apocalyptic" vision that took "a step outside history"—so characteristic of the still-millenarian American mentality while tied to a rapidly changing social reality—represented a reformulation of American exceptionalism as a response to the problems posed by industrialism.[69] The exceptionalist vision had to be reformulated, though, within an historical context, in such a way "as to found in history and society those values guaranteed by God and by nature in the past."[70] What had to be redesigned were the unique lines of American development within the new context of urban industrial society. An example is the plan of

the sociologist Lester Ward in which a kind of intellectual elite, the "social intellect," would make itself the enlightened leader of the collective well-being of the whole society to bring about social harmony, based on traditional republican institutions.[71]

This generation of scholars, such as Albion W. Small, Franklin Giddings, Lester Ward, Charles H. Cooley, and Edward A. Ross, among others, was born around 1860 and came from middle-class Protestant Anglo-Saxon families where the practice of liberal professions was bound to a strong social conscience. For them, the European experience represented a constant point of cultural reference, though in different contexts.[72] In particular the tradition of German studies influenced the social sciences, both through the political theories tied to the preeminence of Teutonic origins of civil and political order and through a direct apprenticeship in the German universities of Berlin, Leipzig, and Heidelberg.

On questions concerning the division of labor and, more generally, questions regarding the new features of the individual in the complex urban-industrial society, U.S. scholars were influenced by Émile Durkheim and Georg Simmel; for race and group theories they followed Ludwig Gumplowitz and Gustav Ratzenhofer. The reworking of such theories was completely original when put in an American cultural context. In this regard it is interesting to note what Arthur F. Bentley, the most original of Small's students at the University of Chicago, wrote about Durkheim, Simmel, and Ratzenhofer.[73] While Bentley recognized the fundamental contribution of the European scholars, he unequivocally emphasized his own pragmatic point of view. In defining the method of analyzing "social facts," he rejected the word "objectivity" as too "one sided" and "positivity" as "too vague" and went on to speak of the "observational coherence in the material observation of the social facts, reaching a unified study of it in its own right."[74] Leaving aside the topic of subjectivity and individuality, as well as every kind of metaphysical explanation, Bentley recommended an analysis of the "social facts"—including the institutions of the state and church—that would stick exclusively to an examination of their social forms as they were manifested in objective reality.

The scientific method for these scholars was the instrument that permitted careful analysis of the complexities of society in order to understand its internal functioning. Striking differences between the American and European cultural environments were apparent. While in the United States faith in science to promote social progress was a cardinal element

in the construction of the social scientists' theories, in Europe a leitmotiv of the so-called end-of-century crisis was questioning the *credit de la science* that had been the basis of positivism.[75] According to this perspective, Ernest Renan thought it possible "to organize humanity scientifically."[76]

Many protagonists of the positivist culture of the end of the century in Europe concentrated on the theme of the *faillite de la science* (the failure of science), the subject of an important essay in the prestigious *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1895, while new cultural currents, such as symbolism, neomysticism, and decadentism, appeared on the scene and made the climate far different from that of the Positive Age.[77] At the same time, in the multiple themes intertwined in the end-of-century crisis, it was possible to recognize in some cases the result of investigations that had had their debut with positivism. One example is the Cesare Lombroso school; it disputed the positivist assumption of the goodness of human nature, developed from the study of degenerate and deviant aspects of the individual to Scipio Sighele's study of the "delinquent crowd." The chief topics taken up in the public debate in major European countries were individualism as a standard for interpreting the complex problems of the new industrial society: liberalism, middle-class values, and the moral and cultural nature of social relations.[78]

The crisis provoked in Germany by Bismarck's resignation in 1890, as well as Boulanger's debacle in France and the rebellions in Italy during the Crispi government, revealed a Europe marked by profound political instability. Faith in the ability of the bourgeoisie to manage the profound changes taking place in society was deteriorating, just as was faith in the political institutions of the bourgeois state.

A recurring theme in public discourse was the decline of nations. To this was joined the theme of race. The linking of the two, nations and races, already present in the work of Hippolyte Taine, led to different conclusions, depending on whether the races were understood as the historical result of evolution in the society. Nations, on the other hand, were linked with the vital cycle of birth and death.[79] The wide interest in Ludwig Gumplowitz's *Der Rassenkampf* and Max Nordau's *Entertung* attest to a growing feeling that contemporary society was in irreversible decline, comparable in intensity to what the Romans felt when they were in decline.[80]

Reference to the classical world was in this sense emblematic of a circular historical movement that was contrasted with the positivistic notion

of progress as characterized by a necessary linearity.[81] The many studies appearing in Europe at the end of the century about the decline of the Roman Empire, such as those by Georges Sorel, Otto Seek, Max Weber, and Guglielmo Ferrero, show that it was not the idea of progress that was dominant but its opposite, the idea of the arrest and catastrophic reversal of progress.[82] This specific notion was not in the air breathed west of the Atlantic. The particular structure of the political and administrative institutions of the United States, federalism; the strong desire of individual states for autonomy; and the relative decentralization of administrative functions in comparison with European governments, had made the reform movements in American society look for a new way for the political-administrative institutions to function within society.

The theme of decline and fall, though present in some American writings, was confined to anxieties about the possible degeneration of the Anglo-Saxon race as a consequence of the migratory wave from southern Europe, but that theme did not touch on the institutions. William Graham Sumner commented on the risks of racial extinction: "The old classical civilization fell under an eruption of barbarians from without. It is possible that our new civilization may perish by an explosion from within."[83] The "new barbarians" in "gathering hordes," according to Henry George's terminology, were the inhabitants of the "squalid quarters of the great cities."[84]

Although a sociological tradition did not exist before the Civil War, two scholars, Sumner at Yale and Lester F. Ward at Brown University, developed sociological theories modeled after Auguste Comte's and Herbert Spencer's. The two American sociologists came from nonacademic backgrounds. Sumner, an Episcopal priest, and Ward, self-taught in the field of mathematics and classical studies, were representative of a not-yet "professionalized" approach to sociology. They actually drew on vast areas of knowledge in the human sciences, from economics to philosophy and history, demonstrating at the same time a civil and moral responsibility, which was a reflection of their Protestant upbringing; it led them away from academia to work on different commissions examining social problems and to participate in forums, newspaper discussions, and other public spheres.

The greater part of this first generation of scholars was formed in rural America, in "small towns," as Jean Quandt and Robert Wiebe, among others, have noted.[85] From this background soaked in Protestant religious

culture, they absorbed those values related to a community ethic that, in a different context, they reproposed as the connecting thread to resolve the problems of the Great Society, according to the expression coined by the English writer Graham Wallas.[86]

Albion W. Small, born in rural western Maine in 1854, was the son of a Baptist preacher. Like many others who took up the study of social sciences, he went to Berlin, in 1879–80, and to Leipzig in 1880–81. His connection with Germany was solidified by his marriage to Valeria von Massow. In the United States he finished his university studies with a doctorate at Johns Hopkins University in 1888. He played an important role in establishing the first department of sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago and in promoting awareness of European sociology.[87] He also founded, in 1895, the *American Journal of Sociology*, the official organ of the new discipline. The Chicago School, begun under his auspices, would soon become one of the most important research centers in the country, giving rise to an innovative series of analyses of the urban condition helped by the pioneering work of social workers. Franklin H. Giddings, a contemporary of Small, also came from a religious environment. The son of a Congregationalist minister, Giddings had a background in engineering and worked for the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics. His fame grew from articles he wrote for newspapers and journals on political and cultural subjects, which led Woodrow Wilson to invite Giddings to teach at the prestigious Bryn Mawr College, where Wilson was a member of the faculty. In 1894 Giddings began teaching sociology at Columbia University and participated on public committees concerned with social problems, as well as on the more restricted academic committees.

These scholars are linked by their critical revision of the traditional evolutionist theory. The "revolt" against formalism, meaning nineteenth-century European thought, primarily German, as "formalized" in the social sciences and philosophy, brought the principal cultural tendencies into question.[88] Morton White named the makers of the "revolt": "Dewey, Holmes and Veblen were the leaders of a campaign to mop up the remnants of formal logic, classical economics and jurisprudence in America, and to emphasize that the life of science, economics, and law was once not logic but experience in some streaming social sense. . . . Antiformalists . . . called upon social scientists in all domains, asked them to unite and urged that they had nothing to loose but their deductive chains."[89]

These scholars pointed out that, in a too-rigid and schematic evolutionary framework, the possibility for individual control over social phenomena was missing, something they considered fundamentally necessary. Social harmony was no longer considered the product of natural development but the result of a rational plan to consciously follow what the historian David Hollinger has defined as a cognitive ideal.[90]

With pragmatism new areas were opened for experimentalism that allowed the possibility for human intervention in the environment, which was not applied as much to a genetic theory of instincts as to what was defined as acquired patterns of behavior. To a vision of the plasticity and adaptability of the individual to a changing external environment was joined an attitude of mental receptiveness, empirically oriented in a world totally unencumbered by every preconceived formulation that could not be verified scientifically.[91] According to the historian Thomas Haskell, it was a revolt against aspects of both the positivistic and the idealistic traditions. On the one hand it reaffirmed the importance of the scientific method as a tool of knowledge and progress, but at the same time it reevaluated the possibility and the responsibility of individuals to control and modify their environment.[92] The old concept of human nature—more appropriate, because of its static character, to a society guided by aristocratic regimes, according to Dewey—was redefined to make it more consonant with a democratic society.[93]

In fact, the better-known social scientists at the turn of the century wanted to reaffirm the importance of a voluntaristic theory of action in which humans did not have to bend to the iron rule of social Darwinism. They did not have to passively follow nature's dictates but rather would be able to follow their own will based on the ethical and moral values of cooperation and community. Thus they could override the utilitarian concept of "rugged individualism" and "laissez-faire" and reevaluate their ability and responsibility to control and modify their environment with the means offered by scientific progress. These scientists proposed an ideal of prosperity and wealth anchored in society's political institutions, no longer as a given deterministically preordained but as a goal to pursue through a conscious design of social engineering, guided by scientific premises.

The new professional experts were required not only to understand but also to direct the processes of transformation that would result in renewed social harmony. Assuming this cultural position meant that any

sympathy for socialist ideology was out of the question. The positions varied from those of the most conservative—Sumner and Giddings—to those of experts who were more open to social reform and to an extension of democracy's rules, such as the midwesterners Lester Ward, Charles Cooley, and Edward Ross.

After the Haymarket Riot in Chicago, Giddings established a newspaper for workers, *Work and Wages*, in collaboration with the economist John B. Clark. They advised workers about the uses and abuses of union organizations, as well as about the role of the unemployed as "defective" workers.[94] At Columbia University, Giddings, like Small at Chicago, began taking his students out of the classroom to analyze the various communities within a metropolis. In search of criteria for evaluating the process of assimilation of the new immigrants into the Anglo-Saxon culture, Giddings designed questionnaires using the rule of racial affinity to measure "the degree of sympathy" present in American society. Without accepting Spencer's natural selection, Giddings thought of a social selection that, after eliminating extreme cases, could strengthen what he defined as "the consciousness of kind." "Racial kinship" therefore represented the glue that could keep together a society that to him seemed perilously fragmented.

The discussion of race revealed the anxieties of a generation facing the international scene as bearers of Anglo-Saxon values. Scientists of the Gilded Age, such as Small, Giddings, and Ward, and those of the next generation, such as Cooley, Ross, and Park, all shared a faith in the ability of the new, white, and Anglo-Saxon middle class to be the engine for the new social order. They rejected socialist doctrine as inadequate for understanding the structural character of U.S. society.

For the most important scholars in this field, such as Ross, Sumner, and Cooley, an analysis that placed the concept of class at its center would not apply to American society. Because such an analysis would emphasize the vision of a static and deterministically preordained society, it would be more suitable to European societies than to a more mobile, open society that was organized and at the same time more free in regard to social status.[95] Although Ross took the concept of class and class conflict into account, he considered it as just one part of a complex picture to analyze along with the other conflicts that are generated within society itself.[96]

One could observe here that even before Werner Sombart formulated the much-discussed question of why socialism had not been able to es-

tablish itself in American society, the chief social scientists gave this idea little credence even on theoretical grounds.[97] In his essay of 1883, "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other," Sumner reconfirmed the social value of moral endowments such as mutual respect and goodwill as characteristic of those middle classes that represented the backbone of American democratic society. The symbolic exponent of the middle class, "the forgotten man," an expression that would become famous in FDR's political rhetoric, was for Sumner "the simple honest laborer, ready to earn his living by productive work. . . . He is independent, self-supporting, and asks no favors."[98]

Sumner harbored no sympathy for the exponents of the industrial and financial high bourgeoisie, who in his opinion were responsible for political corruption and the formation of lobbies. Sumner was also aware of the profound changes taking place in American society, as he supported a kind of Jeffersonian democracy in which the powers of the central government were minimal. He was the first to make a semantic distinction between the terms "masses" and "classes." According to Sumner, the masses, made up largely of the middle class, constituted the core of society and were holders of the cultural traditions common to the entire social body. On the other hand the task of promoting change was up to the classes (in the strict sociological sense) as coalitions of interest groups, with no Marxist meaning. Such distinctions remained in the sociological vocabulary, so much so that Edward Ross later took up the two terms.

The word "proletariat" did not refer to the salaried worker as much as to a social group composed of what Sumner called the "hot-headed, ill-behaved, the ambitious, those who have nothing to lose, the flatterers of rising powers."[99] For Sumner, socialism actually represented an instigation to "mob violence." As for his view of a socialist society of the future, it contained a regression to primitive community cultures. Such a theory, therefore, was antagonistic to the natural evolutionary development of the society and undermined basic institutions like the family and the principle of individualism.

Lester Ward proposed a highly rationalized version of the uniqueness of the American experience—the precursor to future technocratic theorizing of the 1920s. He had spent his childhood in poverty in Illinois and had fought in the Civil War. He was largely self-taught, and to his knowledge of German and French he added the classical languages that he used for coining neologisms, such as "Anthropoteleology" and "Andreclexis" to

indicate the process of male sexual selection. His liking for novelty and change in intellectual domains is reflected in the newspaper the *Iconoclast*, of which he was chief editor.[100]

Ward's most influential work, *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), was the result of his experience in paleontology at the U.S. Geological Survey and as head of the Division of Immigration and Navigation, a position that allowed him to travel widely across the North American continent. Highly critical of the negative consequences wrought by industrialization, among which he listed the excessive concentration of economic power, the intensifying of social inequality, and the extension of unemployment, Ward predicted a society strongly affected by a vision of technology and efficiency. He believed that human societies should turn their collective energies toward gradually gaining control of the process of evolution, and he refused to consider the struggle between classes and the rise of great economic powers as an inevitable consequence of the Industrial Revolution. Because social harmony was the ultimate aim of U.S. democracy, Ward thought that plans to restore the "natural" functioning of American society, based on republican virtues and the reorganization of its institutions, should be left up to the cultured elite, the so-called social intellect, people who by their competence and rational capacity constituted the most advanced and knowledgeable element of society.

Ward's model of "sociocracy" foreshadowed a faith in science that was understood as a cognitive instrument in which the expert played a predominant part. According to the exceptionalist view, the expert should be able to guide the social processes skillfully toward a social harmony founded on traditional republican institutions. Ward believed that a democratically elected technocratic elite was destined to take the governmental reins of the republican democracy, which was composed of self-sufficient, hard-working citizens. A project based on rationality would eliminate from U.S. society those irrational aspects caused by the perverse effect of excessive passion for private property, a passion that would tarnish capitalistic development with irresponsibility and competition.[101]

Cooperation became another aspect of interdependence in Ward's view, just as the leading American social scientists such as Cooley and Giddings maintained. Ward substituted the common metaphors taken from the natural world about competition, conflict, and natural selection with metaphors based on cooperation as the trait characteristic of the

most evolved societies. Cooperation, he believed, was a necessary component of large productive aggregates, such as corporations, governing bureaucracies, and large urban groups.[102]

The "body," understood as an organic whole of independent but related parts, was the most commonly used metaphor, beginning with Spencer. Thus the protests of radical groups or striking workers represented "the pathology of the social organs," while newspapers were compared to arteries.[103] John Dewey himself referred to the "nervous system" of society. Concerning the causes of social conflict, the philosopher rephrased his comments in medical terminology: "Only by making such an accurate diagnosis can we hope to prevent social infection and build a healthier society."[104]

CHAPTER 2 The Language of Race, the Crowd, and the Public in the Progressive Era

The General Context

Faith in modernity drove the great engine of progress. In the words of Richard Ely, founder of the Department of Economics, Political Science, and the History of Science at the University of Wisconsin: "Keep off the track! The train of progress is coming!" The metaphor was most fitting. Railroads had been one of the components driving industrialization; for the generation growing up in the rural Midwest and South, railroads were emblematic of the passage from a society of isolated communities to a modern urban-industrial environment. As William Thomas, one of the founders of the Chicago School of Sociology, recalled, the distance that separated his hometown ("an isolated region of old Virginia twenty miles from the railroad, in a social environment reminiscent of the eighteenth century") from the metropolitan life of the early twentieth century was comparable to the "three centuries" that the railroad crossed, going "from a rural environment to the twentieth-century city."[1]

The abnormal growth of the great metropolises where millions of new immigrants settled was only one of the weighty problems engaging public debate. Other important subjects involved the relationship between corporate economic power and political power, the serious labor conflicts that had broken out all over the country, women's demand for full citizenship, the struggle of African Americans for equal rights, and the movement for Congress to adopt a law outlawing the monstrous practice of lynching that had spread across the South.

Rather than the federal government, the individual states and municipalities had become laboratories for reforms at the turn of the century. At the University of Wisconsin Richard T. Ely established an important center for political research and experimentation in 1892. It attracted economists such as John R. Commons, sociologists such as Edward A. Ross, and historians like Frederick Jackson Turner. Together they constituted a unique group for working on common objectives, notwithstanding the diversity of their specific disciplines.

The influence of the German historical school in the fields of jurisprudence, economics, and social sciences allowed them to rise above their individual disciplines and combine the different juridical, economic, and social dimensions and their interactions in a single process understood in its complexity. Second, by distancing themselves from the rigidity of formal logic and by following a pragmatic orientation, they adopted an analytical method that focused on the data of experience in the formulation of research hypotheses.[2] Empirical analyses of the variations and correlations of social phenomena had to be based on statistical surveys that were scientifically quantitative.

Science, "the basic word that every school of thought claimed and worshipped," was not so much a matter of content as a matter of method.[3] According to the historian Robert Wiebe, "science had become a procedure or an orientation rather than a body of results." As such, faith in science was widespread in public discourse, especially in a cultural environment that held an intermediate position between highbrow culture and the growing mass culture seized on by the muckrakers.[4]

According to the progressive advocates of the new middle class, the criteria of rationality, efficiency, and bureaucracy, inspired by the idea of scientific management, should be extended to the whole society. "If science becomes the language of mature democracy, so too it transforms the structures of the State and the attitudes of those occupying it," writes the political scientist Raymond Seidelman.[5] Therefore, scientists represented the vanguard of rational politics.[6] They were not limited to abstract theories and teaching in universities but often were quite active participants in public debate, through the press or the mushrooming public and private commissions.

Walter Lippmann, who collaborated with Herbert Croly at the *New Republic*, caught this cultural climate in his book *Drift and Mastery*, in which he showed new possibilities opening up for his generation to control and guide social processes. Thus the expert came out of academia and entered fully into civic life: "It was no longer possible to dismiss ideas by calling them 'academic,' for no one any longer saw a clear boundary between the academy and society," notes Richard Hofstadter. The newer type of university professor, according to one observer of the time, was an "expert who knows all about railroads and bridges and subways; about gas commissions and electrical supplies, about currency and banking; Philippine tariffs, Venezuelan boundary lines, the classification of the civil service, the control of trusts."[7]

Another great topic of public debate concerned the nature and power of the great monopolies and the corruption of the system of partisan politics, especially in the big cities. A book widely read by progressives at the beginning of the twentieth century was *The Shame of the Cities*, in which the muckraker Lincoln Steffens examined the most sensational cases of political corruption and bad city government in Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Chicago, St. Louis, and New York. The last was home to the infamous Tammany Hall, a paradoxical example of "democratic corruption," that is to say, government by consensus of the governed. Steffens held up these examples of corrupt governments to his readers, potential voters. He thought the citizens were unaware of "the shame of the cities" and therefore appealed to their civic pride in order to restore a kind of government that would truly represent the people, instead of "an oligarchy tied to particular interests."[8]

Condemnation of public corruption, so profoundly felt in public discourse, strengthened the call for experts to provide regulations and controls on relations between business and the political world, and for a series of plebiscitary reforms to make the democratic institutions more resistant to political corruption. The reform movement was supported by progressive coalitions made up largely of the new middle class and the cultured urban elite. But also, as studies by Herbert Gutman have pointed out, they were composed of workers, farmers, and, to some extent, consumers.[9] At the same time there was a strengthening of executive powers on the local level as well as on state and federal levels, even as procedures for excluding African Americans and groups of immigrants from the vote grew more inflexible in certain parts of the country.[10]

Social scientists supported the whole range of progressive positions, from that of the more conservative John B. Clark and Franklin H. Giddings, who proposed free trade reforms marked by minimal state regulation of the big industrial monopolies, to urban liberals such as John Dewey, Jane Addams, and Lincoln Steffens, who were committed to economic reforms that regulated corporate power. Important intellectual figures like Croly were committed to reformulating a liberal doctrine capable of taking into account the values of the individual within the changing scene of mass democracy; they advocated governmental regulation of big economic interests and welfare for the lower socioeconomic classes.[11]

Faith was placed in public discourse on the social progress promised by technical and scientific rationality to restore the smooth and ratio-

nal functioning of the social machine. Therefore all the disturbing and conflictive elements of society were generally considered obstacles to be removed. This distinction between the aspects of rationality and irrationality in human behavior represented, according to the historian Gary Gerstle, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Progressive Era.[12] Thus the instrument of rationality provided a framework for redefining a democratic society, as it concerned political and administrative management and its constituency. As Eric Foner observed in regard to the inclusion/exclusion process that had in various ways characterized the United States from the beginning, "The electorate was simultaneously expanded and contracted, empowered and removed from direct influence on many functions of government. . . . To most Progressives, the 'fitness' of voters, not their absolute numbers, defined a functioning democracy."[13] The strong emphasis on rational human behavior, on the other hand, implied a process of exclusion of those aspects of the social environment considered irrational and that did not lead to a process of technocratic modernization. Political and administrative, as well as economic, reforms were strictly tied to a "reinvigoration of democracy" that depended on "moral regeneration."[14] A process of scientific legitimization was proceeding along with a break with the philosophical-religious tradition.

The American Sociological Society, founded in 1905, signaled the official acceptance of the new discipline, under the direction of Lester Ward, with William Graham Sumner as vice president and with the active participation of Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia University and Albion W. Small of the University of Chicago. Both Giddings and Small had faith in the ability of the new science to explicate the laws that were the basis of social relationships. Such knowledge was not an end in itself but would become a fundamental tool to promote those social reforms that everyone considered necessary.

Despite the Europeans' disdain for sociology, which they called "the American science," the work of social scientists in the United States focused pragmatically on the problem of clarifying the objective role of this new science within the changing social environment.[15] Sociologists maintained close ties with economists. The marginalist paradigm was the primary point of reference among economists, with some exceptions, such as Thorstein Veblen. While the latter based his theory on the positive sciences, others, like Simon Patten, Edwin R. A. Seligman, and Richard Ely, according to Dorothy Ross "had seen in history a counterweight to

the capitalist market, a realm of political, social and ethical action that might modify and constrain capitalist development."[16]

The majority of sociologists accepted the existing economic framework, and their task became that of correcting the social inequalities and conflicts caused by a capitalist society.[17] Within this framework the sociologist Edward Ross singled out the theme of social control as one of the crucial matters to be faced.[18]

The social scientists (Small was among the first) rejected the class-conflict paradigm and were inclined to consider the interest-group theories of the Austrian Gustav Ratzenhofer as more consonant with a mobile society like that in the United States. Such theories addressed the economic conflicts created by industrial capitalism, considering them as a phase in the evolution of societies.

In a society in which causal relationships had become more complex, marked by interdependence and at the same time based on impersonality, knowledge both was conceived "as the continual testing of hypotheses against life's facts" and "seemed to offer just the fluidity required by the new orientation."[19] Dewey used the metaphor of liquid movement: "Knowledge is no longer an immobile solid. It has become liquefied and flows energetically in all currents of society."[20] In examining the chief accomplishments of sociology in the United States, Small pointed out that one fundamental difference between U.S. sociology and the European point of view lies in the notion of the state in regard to civil society. Surveying the principal philosophical and sociological stages of European culture, he remarked that "as the state was thought of in a mystical fashion as a power independent of persons, superior to persons, and transcendent over persons, so the initial attempt to comprehend society did not untrammel themselves [the European scholars] from a parallel mysticism."[21] Small redefined sociology as "the study of the process of association in groups, a pluralistic process of conflict and accommodation that issued in wider harmony."[22] His sense of public commitment had led to his being a sponsor of the Chicago Civil Federation, which was composed of the most influential businessmen of the city. As a member of the federation, Small had been an arbiter in the famous Pullman strike of 1894. Thus he had been able to apply his theories to real events.

The paradigm of "social process" represented an analytical tool that was both theoretical and practical. Small, after Ross's reflections on the same subject, remarked that, "described with respect to form rather than

content, the social process is a tide of separating and blending social processes, consisting of incessant decomposition and recomposition of relations within persons and between persons in a continuous evolution of types of persons and associations."[23]

In this context progressive reformers sought to form an autonomous, nonpartisan, administrative apparatus essentially made up of experts. Woodrow Wilson, who had studied the European administrative systems, was among the first, along with Frank Goodnow, the first president of the American Political Science Association, to confront the problem of creating a modern administrative system that met the needs of the new industrial society but at the same time respected the constitutional frame of the United States, distinguishing the political function from the purely administrative one. The independent commissions, formed by a "gentry" of civil servants outside the patronage system, responded to the need for a process of modernization based on criteria of rationality and efficiency—and, most of all, on the need to find an administrative solution to the problems posed by social conflict.[24]

One of the many paradoxes present in this highly conflictive society was the variety of analytical tools that the social scientists were constructing. Although they were particularly interested in interpretative paradigms that could explain the complexities and mobility of the new urban-industrial society, they also had to face a very static and rigid viewpoint, the one provided by the theory of races, in order to analyze or interpret the relationships between different social groups.

Racial Hierarchies and Boundaries of Citizenship

In the annual speech that the eminent sociologist Edward A. Ross delivered as president of the American Social Science Association in 1901, he emphasized the issue of "race suicide." The subject had a great impact on the U.S. public as it turned the statistical data of the last years of the century, especially the falling birthrate of Anglo-Saxon stock, into a highly dramatic image. As was common at the time, Ross made reference to ancient Rome. One cause of the fall of the Roman Empire was the substitution of the Latin fathers, the heads of the family, "with an interminable flow of slaves brought by their triumphant generals."[25] Ross used the phrase "race suicide" to stress that there was "no bloodshed, no

violence, no assault of the race that waxes upon the race that wanes. The higher race quietly and murmuringly eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective action."[26]

Ross had become convinced of racial hierarchies during a trip to Paris, when he was already one of the most important sociologists in the United States. Orphaned at the age of eight, Ross had grown up reading Emerson and Carlyle on a farm in Iowa. Ross had a solid faith in humans' creativity and ability to fight social conventions. After receiving a degree from Johns Hopkins University, where the political economy professor Richard Ely was his adviser, Ross maintained an interest in the ethical side of social problems, as was appropriate to his Presbyterian background. Ross closely followed the labor movement and the Populist Party and wrote *Sin and Society*, which criticized the excessive power of great corporations at a time when muckraking was popular.[27] His positions, close to those of his Wisconsin colleague John Commons, were representative of a cultural climate in which advanced proposals for reform and workers' rights were joined with a highly elitist, racially based concept of society.

With the same rhetorical emphasis that Ross used in speaking about "race suicide," William Ripley, an economics professor at Harvard, questioned the survival of the Anglo-Saxons: "Is it any wonder that serious students contemplate the social future of the Anglo-Saxons in the United States with some concern? They have witnessed the passing of the American Indian and the buffalo, and now they query as to how long the Anglo-Saxons will be able to survive."[28] What was behind such a bombastic assertion? The first person to formulate the hypothesis of "race suicide" was General Francis A. Walker, a professor of history and political economy at Yale and former director of the Bureau of Statistics and superintendent of the U.S. Census. Using census data, Walker compared the drop in Anglo-Saxon birthrates with the growing birthrate of new immigrants and found that the disconcerting drop in Anglo-Saxon births resulted from the failure of early European immigrants to produce enough children to one day compete with the children of foreigners.[29]

According to the literary critic Sidney Fischer the impact of this population shift also affected literature. He maintained, in fact, that because half the population in New England was now foreign born, "the high and deep tones" of literary production had vanished: developing the "literature of genius" that had flowered in New England between 1830 and

1860 required a common feeling of cohesion, something possible only among people of the same race.[30] The subject was taken up by influential exponents of the movement against immigration, such as Prescott F. Hall, John Commons, and Henry P. Fairchild, an active member of the Anti-Immigration Restriction League.[31]

The phenomenon of the declining birthrate was not peculiar to the United States and was evidenced in many European countries, such as France and Ireland, and even extended to Australian colonies, such as New Zealand, according to Ripley. For countries with homogeneous populations the danger was not as dramatic as for the United States, where "the hordes of European immigrants [coming from the Mediterranean regions, regarded as at the bottom of the hierarchic scale of races] have continued to reproduce at very high birth rate."[32] The deterioration of race, or rather its suicide, was blamed on massive immigration from southern Europe, illiterate peasants for the most part.

The concept of race intersected with all the relevant questions of the time: the restriction of the migratory flow, Americanization of the new immigrants, women's demand for suffrage, and African Americans' demand for civil rights. In the case of immigration the language of race was the basis of the harsh debate about exclusion/inclusion in the circle of those who could enjoy the rights of U.S. citizenship. Endorsed by anthropology and biology, race formed a sharp line of demarcation between the new arrivals and the earlier groups of immigrants. The few dissenting voices included John B. Clark's among the economists and Albion Small's among the sociologists. Among the anthropologists Franz Boas's point of view was increasingly influential. In addition, a group of black and white intellectuals founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1910 and W. E. B. Du Bois became the director of *The Crisis* journal.[33]

The notion of race entered the United States as well as Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, not only in the language of the social sciences but in popular language as a vague concept that could be semantically extended to a nation or an even larger area but could also include skin color or anthropological character, culture, national origin, and religion. In such an ephemeral frame different theories could coexist or overlap.

In mid-nineteenth-century propaganda during the war with Mexico, the idea of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race as the pivot of na-

tional identity was tied to western expansion and the mission of manifest destiny.[34] The idea that Americans got not only their anthropologically distinctive traits but also aspects of their character—the striking individualism, love for freedom, self-control, and self-government—from the common Teutonic origins of northern European peoples was popular in the nineteenth century among historians, jurists, and political scientists educated in German universities.[35] It is enough to mention that among these were Herbert B. Adams and John W. Burgess. With the new perspective offered by Frederick Jackson Turner's noted "frontier thesis," specific American institutions were traceable to American soil, finding in the interaction with their environment the roots of their own historical evolution and their own "exceptionalism." In this way American institutions could be disengaged, at least in part, from the allegations of rigid determinism, as well as from direct European lineage.

Frontier and race were not, however, such neat opposites, considering that the supporters of Anglo-Saxon superiority also traced their position to the frontier experience. From the turn of the century until World War I, expansionist ideology was widespread, and U.S. society widely saw itself as both biracial and rigorously opposed to the waves of arriving immigrants. In 1894 the Immigration Restriction League was founded in Boston, and the eugenics theories of Sir Francis Galton were gaining currency. Edward A. Ross, as we have seen, subscribed to the theory of Anglo-Saxon race superiority as a solid bulwark against the social harm caused by industrialization and the resulting immigration problem. Charles H. Cooley too was interested in protecting American society from the risks of contagion by popular movements, declaring them a typically European phenomenon.

Within this rhetorical frame writers such as Jack London, Frank Norris, the Reverend John Fiske, and Madison Grant; sociologists such as Ross and Cooley; and philosophers such as Josiah Strong, exponent of the Social Gospel, defined the features of the Anglo-Saxon character capable of joining "finesse with force," according to Ross's expression.[36] At the same time Anglo-Saxonism was in a hierarchy of European races that also captured the interest of scientists. Research in anthropology by the French author Georges Vacher de Lapouge and the German Otto Georg Ammon, conducted on a meticulous statistical base and over a wide spectrum of all Europe, endorsed a theory of races that distinguished a hierarchical order between *Homo europaeus*, coincident with the "Arian"

stock; the *Homo alpinus*, coincident with the "Celtic" stock; and the inferior "Mediterranean." Such distinctions were analyzed according to anthropological-biological parameters that included somatic traits, the size and shape of the cranium, psychological and cultural traits, and the social levels of the three races.[37]

In the United States this approach was disseminated primarily by William Ripley with his book *The Races of Europe*.[38] His text and racial categorization were taken up by the most important scholars of the time. Ripley defined *Homo europaeus* as "Teutonic," which Madison Grant, the great spreader of racist theories, subsequently identified as "Nordic," evidenced by character, culture, and social status. *Homo europaeus* inhabited the geographical area of Scandinavia, Germany, England, and the United States. In Grant's words the Nordic race is "a race of soldiers, sailors, adventurers and explorers but above all of rulers, organizers and aristocrats in sharp contrast to the essential peasant and democratic character of the Alpines. . . . The Nordics are domineering, individualistic, self-reliant and jealous of their personal freedom both in political and religious systems and as a result they are usually protestant."[39]

Although Grant used a different set of terms, the main characteristics that he enunciated coincided with those commonly applied to the Anglo-Saxon race. Taking into consideration the mass of immigrants coming from the Mediterranean area and, therefore, according to the current theories, belonging to the lowest order of European races, Ripley sounded an alarm in the most stereotypical terms: "The horde now descending upon our shores is densely ignorant yet dull and superstitious, lawless with a disposition to criminality, servile for generations, without conception of political rights."[40]

In a lecture that he gave to the Royal Anthropological Institute of London in 1890, he reaffirmed, following Anglo-Saxon canons, the superiority of the early American colonizers: "Most of the pioneers in early days were untutored but intelligent, rude but virile, lawless perhaps but independent free men."[41] In the late 1890s, coinciding with the Anglo-American rapprochement, the debate moved from the academy and cultured elites to a wider public sphere by way of such popular magazines as *Harper's*, *Scribner's*, *Century*, and *McClure's*. They unanimously supported Anglo-American collaboration in the name of racial solidarity between the two countries.

Although avoiding the term "Anglo-Saxon" in expressing the ideal of

the "strenuous life," in order not to offend the other ethnic groups, President Theodore Roosevelt defined the American race as "stern men with empires in their brain" who combined the traits of virility and bravery with the ethos of a strong masculinity.[42] Such a notion, reinvigorated by contact with the "wilderness" of the frontier, was also constructed around the theme of race.[43] Spontaneity and courage, joined with strong will and self-determination, were the traits that unified that "imagined community" around the idea of a nation with an imperial destiny to fulfill. Important figures of the political world, such as senators Albert Beveridge and Henry Cabot Lodge, and John Hay, secretary of state in Theodore Roosevelt's administration, declared their faith in the destiny of those people who were responsible for the organization of the world and who were able to establish rules in the place of chaos.[44] The notion of a civilizing people implied not only technological superiority but also moral superiority in comparison with races lower on the evolutionary scale. However, Thorstein Veblen pointed out contradictions between the idea of Anglo-Saxon moral superiority and the bellicose and aggressive traits characteristic of Anglo-Saxons' "civilizing" imperialistic ambition in respect to the primitive peoples generally considered peaceful.[45] Nevertheless, it was commonly held that the hardness and tenacity of the male Anglo-Saxon character was what served as an antidote to an "excess of civilization" and what propelled Anglo-Saxons to complete their mission in society where "chaos and anarchy" ruled.[46]

Ross remarked that the superiority of a race cannot be kept without "blood pride" and "uncompromising attitudes towards inferior races."[47] Thus the racial element became the nucleus of an elitist concept that expressed itself both on an international level in conflicts for supremacy among nations and on an internal level in the superiority of the original stock to the new immigrants. John W. Burgess, professor of political science at Columbia University, used the term "Arian" to refer to the inhabitants who had come to the United States from northern Europe. Those of the inferior races could enjoy full rights of citizenship only after a long process of assimilation of the values of the superior race. "What folly on the part of the ignorant, what wickedness on the part of the intelligent are involved in the attempts to pollute [the United States] with non-Aryan elements!" Burgess expostulated.[48]

Among the expansionists, Brooks Adams glorified war in the Darwinian struggle of races, while Franklin Giddings in *Democracy and Empire*

spoke of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons to the decadent Latin races. For Josiah Strong the Anglo-Saxon expansion was "God's great alphabet with which he spells for man his providential purposes." As Anglo-Saxons went forward on their mission, they carried their "divine" responsibility with them "like a ring of Saturn—a girdle of light—around the globe."[49] Both the expansionists and the anti-imperialists used race in their discourse, though the latter had a variety of positions and were strictly opposed to war. The argument commonly used by the anti-imperialists, in magazines such as *Dial*, *Arena*, and the *Coming Nation*, was no more than an extension on an international level of the same rhetorical devices used in regard to the most recent immigrants: an appeal to the values of Americanism and to the institutions of American society, and the belief that other races, once conquered, encountered extreme difficulty in assimilating the customs of the Anglo-Saxon race.[50]

It is worthwhile to ask how two apparently irreconcilable positions could coexist. In other words, how could the ideal of an aggressive masculinity, tied to a powerful imperialistic destiny, be linked to the idea of an inevitable decline of the race and ultimately its extinction, or, in most extreme terms, "the suicide of the race"? The contradiction was neatly divided by gender roles and functions. The true repositories of race anxiety were in reality the women upon whom rested the duty of reproducing the species and its racial stability.[51] It was the sociologist Lester Ward who affirmed the female role in the propagation of race, because it was mothers who transmitted the hereditary racial characteristics.[52] Other sociologists took up his "gynecentric" theory.

Even Theodore Roosevelt, in expressing his anxieties about the declining birthrate of the Anglo-Saxon population, showed his disapproval of married women who didn't produce children.[53] Criticism of this position came from two important figures in the feminist movement at the beginning of the century, Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Mary Roberts (Smith) Coolidge. Given her family's limited finances, Gilman hadn't been able to follow a plan of regular studies. She had, however, cultivated friendships with important scholars who advised her about books to read and discussed ideas with her. Before the publication of her *Women and Economics*, which would make her famous, Gilman maintained close friendships with Ward, Veblen, and Ross. Though staying within the racial discourse, and therefore convinced of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race over others, particularly over the African Americans, she did not share Ross's

faith in the positive outcome of imperialistic wars. Gilman used this very argument to counter the idea of race suicide and of woman's responsibility for the declining birthrate. According to Gilman, the fault lay with men and the imperial politics of war. That propensity for military life and war killed young men, took men away from their families, and left women alone to care for the old people and young children.[54]

It wasn't so much Gilman's reasoning that made Ross back off his positions as much as the confirmation of more general considerations related to industrial development and what Frederick Jackson Turner, and John Billings, the greatest demographic expert in the United States, had to say in that regard. They attributed the decline of births to the high standard of life and the level of affluence of the oldest residents, in addition to the process of female emancipation, rather than the arrival of new immigrants. These phenomena, according to the opinion of E. A. Goldenweiser, of the Bureau of the Census, could be reasonably attributed to the process of industrialization and urbanization taking place during the nineteenth century.[55] Mary Coolidge had similar criticisms of the race suicide theory. After studying at Cornell University, Coolidge worked with the feminist sociologist Marion Talbot by collecting data that demonstrated that Edward Clarke's theories that higher education harmed women's health and capacity to reproduce were totally unfounded. In the book that made her famous, *Why Women Are So*, Coolidge took the problem of the birthrate decline into consideration but, contrary to Gilman's view, ascribed the cause to female liberation from the family unit.[56] In reviewing his positions, Ross also finally spoke of the gradual substitution of rational will for "blind instinct."[57]

Once the fear of race suicide had subsided, the concern aroused about immigration remained. Just what should the strategy be for dealing with the new immigrants? Social scientists such as Commons and Ross, while stressing a close bond between U.S. institutions and their universal values, were convinced at the same time of their strong racial and ethnic character, as Commons and Ross fought for laws restricting the migratory flow. Their theories were a mixture of openly reformist positions, open support for the claims of organized labor, and opposition to new immigration, using for the latter the language of race. After studying with the economist Richard Ely at Johns Hopkins University, Commons had followed his professor to Wisconsin. In his research as well as in his public life, Commons's task was to legitimize the labor movement, as

organized by the American Federation of Labor, within the political and constitutional order. Commons was director of the American Bureau of Industrial Research in Madison, Wisconsin, and as an influential member of public commissions on labor problems, he drew up proposals for laws related to labor and immigration for the governor of the state, Robert La Follette; Commons also took part in important federal commissions such as the U.S. Industrial Commission and the National Civic Federation. In 1918 he published the first two volumes of a history of the labor movement that was destined to become a classic.[58]

As a defender of the interests represented by the American Federation of Labor, Commons was opposed to the new immigration of unskilled workers. The definition of race could also be applied to them, he said: "The peasants of Catholic Europe who constitute the bulk of our immigrants of the past thirty years have become almost a distinct race, drained of those superior qualities which are the foundations of democratic institutions."[59] The American people had a duty to protect themselves from the risks of degeneration entailed in admitting inferior races. Based on literacy and physical fitness tests, the proposal of the restrictionists' movement was to raise "the level of those who were accepted, excluding those who are below any standard," relative to both physical and mental ability, apart from beggars, prostitutes, and those who professed subversive ideologies, such as anarchists. Every race, including the peoples from southern Europe, showed distinctive somatic as well as behavioral characteristics. Ross observed in this regard: "There is an imposing stock of facts which seem to prove that the Negro has a fiercer sex appetite than other men, the South Italian has a bent for murder . . . the Jew for money making." On the emotional instability of the Italians from the south, he added: "Before the immigration board of inquiry, they gesticulate too much and usually have tears stand in their eyes. When two witnesses are being examined, both talk at once. Their glances flit quickly from one questioner to the other and their eyes are the restless uncomprehending eyes of the desert Bedouin between walls."[60] The most plausible explanation for such restlessness, the difficulty of understanding what the commissioners said, was ironically provided by Ross himself but as the mark of an additional handicap: "Yet for all this eager attention they are slow to catch the meaning of a single question."[61]

Ross and Commons became spokesmen for the protection of the rights of workers belonging to the oldest immigration stock, the skilled work-

ers, and were opposed to the practice of hiring the new arrivals, whose exploitation by entrepreneurs had weakened labor's claims and protests. Moreover, not only the entrepreneurs but also scholars such as William Ripley opposed the protection of workers' rights. Although Ripley was anxious about the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race, he stressed the need for economic development by importing low-cost laborers. In fact, Ripley observed, "We need the manual labor of these people. They are fellow passengers in our ship of state."[62] In line with this perspective he devised a program of social reforms in the belief that "the health of the nation depends on the preservation of the vitality of the lower classes."[63] This was no altruistic program, for it corresponded to the interests of the nation and its elites insofar as the "very existence of the republic as a political and social unit is threatened by any deterioration of the mental and moral character of the lower classes. If we permit these people to come in order to hew our wood and draw our water, we must in our own selfish interest assume the added responsibility of caring for their minds and souls."[64] Ripley eventually stressed the universal values for which the United States was the standard-bearer by referencing the Athens of Pericles, which, in the words of Thucydides, "wishes all to be equal before the law; gives liberty; keeps open to everybody the path of distinction; maintains public order and judicial authority; protects the weak, and gives to all her citizens entertainments which educate the soul."[65]

In the fierce debate about immigration the Republican Party, which got votes from the new immigrants, was more disposed toward an open immigration policy, while the restrictionist movement found backing in the unions and from the intellectual patrician elite of the Northeast. Competition from immigrant laborers was feared in the South as well as the West, especially in California, where in 1905 a great migratory flux from Japan had found strong opposition stirring up fear of the "yellow danger."

It is important to stress that during the national debate about expansionism, and about immigration with its strong racial overtones, some of the most illustrious figures, including William James, John Dewey, Jane Addams, W. E. B. Du Bois, Randolph Bourne, Eugene V. Debs, and Horace Kallen, according to Jonathan Hansen, "in independent and overlapping criticism . . . attempted to reconcile American nationalism with the liberal principles undergirding the American republic." Hansen has observed that this group "maintained a critical tension between local, national, and international affiliation . . . [rejecting] the notion ascendant

in their day that patriotism entails uncritical loyalty to the government and the military in wartime."[66]

However, on the eve of World War I, in the general war climate of mobilization for "100% Americanism," the more widespread position in public discourse was that of "assimilation," wherein the different races of immigrants already living on American soil would adopt the culture and language of the Anglo-Saxon stock, English. The objective, according to Commons, was not so much the slow and dubious process of amalgamation of blood as it was a more rapid process of mental assimilation, in the belief that "to be great a nation need not to be of one blood, it must be of one mind." In addition, the instrument for arriving at one common thought and common action was the language, a "prism" through which "all the other instruments can focus their power of assimilation upon the new generations."[67]

Crowd Psychology from Europe to America

The language of race deeply marked the boundaries of U.S. citizenship and intertwined with the new theories of crowd psychology developed in Europe. The most famous work by Gustave Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, was published in 1895 in Paris.[68] The English version was warmly received in the United States but also with notable skepticism by the progressives. After emphasizing Anglo-Saxon individualism, Le Bon compared it with the French cultural network, where "the mind of the crowd" in its most irrational forms could easily get the upper hand. The philosopher William James spoke of a form of "Anglomania" that had infected French scholars. How could such an assertion be justified?

The search for analytical categories capable of explaining and interpreting a field as vague as collective behavior, in its dual aspect of urban masses and threats of revolt and social disorder, had contributed to making crowd psychology an important subject in American public discourse at the end of the century. General attention was moving away from the psychology of the ego to concentrate on that sphere that escapes conscious control, where the mind-body relationship was more unpredictable and irrational. In addition, Henri Bergson's "flow of consciousness" and William James's research on the "fragmentation of the ego" joined with this changing cultural perspective to bring unexplored dimensions of subjectivity to light.

According to James, "The psychology of public opinion, the sources of its strength and weakness, its pathology and hygiene and the causes of its stability and alteration ought to be studied with ever increasing care by those interested in the welfare of mankind."[69] Theories about the crowd and the public passed from one side of the Atlantic to the other, finding on U.S. soil a critical welcome from those involved in making a clear distinction between the two spheres. Those involved in the growing business of advertising and public relations, who were less interested in the prescriptive aspects, followed the development of the new theories closely.

Crowd psychology developed in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century from the research of the French alienist school and that of Italian criminal anthropology. The latter grew out of research on deviance begun by Cesare Lombroso, who explored geniuses and revolutionaries on the one hand and delinquents on the other. Problems connected with crime first engaged the attention of alienists and jurists but soon caught the notice of the social sciences, from psychology to sociology, even philosophy.

The new discipline of crowd psychology was the first to try to use instruments and concepts taken from the fields of criminal anthropology and psychiatric pathology in order to analyze collective behavior. In France, which saw a renewed interest in irrationalism and the paranormal phenomena of suggestion, the studies conducted by psychiatrists, such as Jean-Martin Charcot at the hospital of Salpêtrière in Paris on hysteria, gave scientific legitimacy to suggestion and hypnosis. The use of hypnosis was a topic of interest at the scientific conferences of criminal anthropology in the 1890s, just as in the intellectual salons of Paris.[70]

A scientific debate ensued between Charcot of the Paris school and Hippolyte Bernheim of the Nancy school on the nature of hysteria; Bernheim believed it was a consequence of suggestion and could be treated with hypnosis, whereas Charcot believed hypnosis to be a disorder related to hysteria. Bernheim's position prevailed in the scientific community, and this had important ramifications beyond psychiatry, for it gave scientific legitimacy to the idea that suggestion is not only a symptom of illness and that it lies dormant in every individual.[71] At this point it became possible to extend the analysis of the hypnotic processes and of suggestion to analyses of collective phenomena, such as those theorized by Scipio Sighele, an exponent of the Lombroso school, in *La folla delinquente*.[72] Medical

terminology passed from the individual to the social group; pathological terms were used to define the whole complex of crowd behavior. The recourse to psychiatric notions, outside the more strictly scientific centers, constituted an important topic of cultural discourse.

The notion of psychic suggestion was separate from an organicist theory, according to the Nancy school, and was considered particularly significant in the relationship between the patient and physician—and, in the case of the crowd, in its relationship with the leader. The patient, as well as the crowd, was subject to the will of the physician or the leader, by simple verbal suggestion.[73] From this theory arose a series of studies by psychiatrists about hypnosis and psychic magnetism in relation to collective phenomena, with a tendency to look at all collectivity as a kind of pathology. In the field of criminal law, for instance, new questions arose about the concept of guilt, as crime was no longer considered the result of heredity, following a vertical, deterministic-biological approach. This view regarded crime as the product of the entire social environment as expressed by the individual.

Crowd psychology, which in these years had acquired the status of a scientific discipline, began with Scipio Sighele's "delinquent crowd" and then passed to Gabriel Tarde's distinction between crowds and sects and finally to Gustave Le Bon's more general theories.[74] Although Le Bon's and Tarde's works were very popular, they were not immediately well received in the European academy. Important academics such as Émile Durkheim did not recognize the scientific status sought by the proponents of crowd psychology because of the field's location midway between psychology and sociology.

As for the individual/collectivity coupling, scholars of crowd theory emphasized collectivity, the crowd aggregate, as a pathological entity engulfing the individual. Individuals, with their rational judgment, tended to disappear into the group by means of suggestion, according to Le Bon and Sighele, and by imitation, according to Tarde.[75]

In contrast to the political aims of the growing labor movement, which viewed the masses as the collective bearers of a new social order, the new perspective of crowd psychology offered to the more conservative groups of French society a theoretic grid through which to read the behavior of the *classes dangereuses*, seen as a potential threat to social stability. The Paris Commune was the most emblematic episode, still alive in the public memory. The labor strikes and demonstrations that had followed

particular political events, such as the celebrated Dreyfus case, continued to shake French society in the 1880s and 1890s.

In the new discipline of crowd psychology the individual will, the fundamental element of liberalism, was eliminated in the "collective mind." The language used in describing the crowd was revealing in this sense: the crowd, female by definition, with its mutability and pathological irrationality, was compared to the behavior of children or savages, and as such lost every legitimate claim as a responsible collective subject.[76]

Within this general framework there were many links between the Italian and French culture that had given birth to the new discipline. The links and reciprocal influences are demonstrated by contributions to *Critica sociale* in 1894 by the criminologists Sighele and Ferri, and the sociologist Tarde, following the publication of the latter's essay on the criminal behavior of crowds in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1893.[77] Sighele's work was influenced by Tarde's theories relative to the processes of suggestion and imitation in crowds; Tarde regarded the crowd and its leader as being at opposite poles within the same magnetic field.

Gustave Le Bon's *Psychologie des foules*, published in 1885, with its clear expository style, became one of the first nonfiction bestsellers.[78] Immediately translated into the principal European languages (the English translation appeared a year after it came out in French), this book had a great influence for nearly fifty years, on the public as well as on leading scientists, beginning with Freud himself, and on both reactionary and progressive politicians.[79]

Though much criticized by academics, *Psychologie des foules*, which proposed to discover general laws underlying the behavior of crowds, aroused great interest in the American public. According to the main thesis of the book, ordinary individuals (not the mentally ill, who were the subject of Charcot's experiments) were transformed once they became part of the crowd, losing their individuality in order "to feel . . . think . . . act" as "a collective mind."[80] Thus a kind of "madness in common" was created that was transmitted by contagious contact, moving from the physical to the mental.[81]

The characteristics of the new collective subject could no longer be attributed to the single individual, who had acquired new group connotations, those of the so-called collective mind. This included the sense of anonymity and individual irresponsibility, invincibility, lack of sense of guilt, and, above all, the explosion of primitive and irrational impulses

that were held in control in normal life. Le Bon wrote: "Whoever the individuals are that make up a crowd . . . the very fact that they have been transformed into a crowd endows them with a sort of collective mind that makes them feel, think, and act in ways that are very different from how each individual would have felt, thought, or acted had he been alone."[82] This came to be defined as the law of mental unity of the crowd, with a two-level interpretation: the interpretation of social phenomena by means of an analysis of sensory, physiological, and hallucinatory processes, and an interpretation of crowd behavior that followed anthropological paradigms. In the descent of the evolutionary scale to the primordial savage state, crowd behavior, as I mentioned earlier, was compared to that of women, children, and savages. It is important to note that Le Bon had a cultural background in ethnology and medicine. After he traveled to India and the Middle East, he published his reflections on the Indian and Arabic civilizations, followed by a more general work, *Les lois psychologiques de l'evolution des peuples*. The historians Robert Nye and, more recently, Alice Gerard have stressed that it is important to consider these books in relation to Le Bon's better-known works on crowd psychology.[83] In his work, in fact, Le Bon proposed his idea of race, which he understood in an anthropological and historical sense as *l'âme du peuple*, coinciding with the notion of "national character." The latter was made up of all the customs, rules, and habits embedded in the deepest strata of social behavior as a basic element of collective identity, whereas crowds, in their unpredictability and instinctive impulses, had proved to be destructive.

Equally influential to the moderate liberal tradition at the end of the century was Hippolyte Taine's *Les origines de la France contemporaine*, written a few years after the traumatic experience of the Paris Commune.[84] Taine stressed the notion of race, understood as *racines*, the historical roots of the nation. However, he regarded *racines* as tinted with "anthropological pessimism," and his book describes the revolutionary crowds in all their ferocious destructiveness, anticipating Le Bon's theme of "mental contagion."

Thus the "confused alchemy" of crowd and race represented the evolutionary line along which Le Bon wove the historical future, influenced by the cultural strand of irrationalism that denied rational free will to the individual. As the sociologist Salvador Giner observed, "his efforts to produce a scientifically viable explanation of crowd and collective

behavior were as intense as his fears of socialism, collectivism and the new industrial masses."[85]

In addition to being the best-known author, Le Bon was also the most prolific. In *Lois psychologiques de l'evolution* and *Psychologie du socialisme* he expounded his theories about different national characteristics in relation to national traditions epitomized by race.[86] Following what was a commonplace in the French moderate liberal tradition, beginning with Taine, Le Bon admired the English model and "the Anglo-Saxon race" because of the gradual development of liberal institutions, tempered by the persistent leadership roles of the traditional elites.[87] Indeed, Le Bon demonized socialist theories, which he envisioned as catastrophic for French society, contrasting them with the ideal of Anglo-Saxon societies. From this point of view, the values of the individual that were typical of Anglo-Saxon countries acted as a barrier to the new collective social theories in vogue in southern European countries, where the individual was "swallowed" by the multitude. In this perspective in the conservative culture of those years, the word "socialism" was synonymous with "anti-individualism."[88]

Contrary to what one would expect in the face of such an open eulogy of Anglo-Saxon virtues, Le Bon's work, though arousing much interest in the United States, was not especially well received by progressives.

The philosopher George Vincent, in reviewing *Lois psychologiques de l'evolution*, referred to the particular end-of-century French cultural milieu, defining it as "anti-patriotic."[89] William James remarked, "Anglomania is a notion shared by the entire school of Frenchmen who follow Taine's lead."[90] Considering Le Bon's line of reasoning, James observed, "in England and in America, whatever minor inferiorities these countries may show, the individual is left more to himself," whereas, by contrast, "France stops short of complete socialism with every one at once a slave and a pensioner of the State."[91] As for this "Anglomania," the philosopher commented ironically that it reflected nothing more than France's own internal problems; in comparison, Anglo-Saxon society, in this case the United States, constituted an ideal countermodel: "It is curious for us Americans who are just beginning to idealize less our national ways, to hear them so much idealized by foreigners."[92] It is interesting to note how clearly James perceived the difference between European and American scholarly perspectives. At a time when U.S. social scientists were beginning to question one of the pillars of the exceptionalist ideal, that is, in-

dividualism tied to laissez-faire, French scholars emphasized this same aspect by strenuously condemning the collective phenomena caused by the urban-industrial process.

The sociologist William G. Sumner, who took a position closer to the Spencerian tradition, observed how the idea of a crowd mind, which at any rate swallows individuals, thus causing them to lose their personal will, endowed the crowd with a "mystical power," a kind of "gigantic disembodied consciousness of some sort which constrains individuals to act."[93] For the social psychologist Floyd Allport, also strongly critical of Le Bon's theory, "it was not the 'collective mind' or the 'crowd impulse' which stormed the Bastille and guillotined scores of aristocrats. . . . It is the individual who is the 'raison d'être' of the crowd." He then remarked that "nothing new or different is added by the crowd situation except an intensification of the feeling already present and the possibility of concerted action. The individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone, *only more so*."[94] All Le Bon's work was considered an outgrowth of French culture, not exportable to the different American context, despite the great praise that he bestowed on the Anglo-Saxon race. The social psychologist Charles Cooley, for example, spoke of the "frantic, dogmatic, psychological defense of laissez-faire," in Le Bon's work.[95]

For Arthur Bentley, who had based his analysis in *The Process of Government* on the concept of interest groups, there were no social and political activities other than those that could be observed in their complex interactions. He was highly skeptical of Le Bon's concept of the "mental unity" of crowds, as he was of any theory that concerned the "soul" because the latter was, in his opinion, "very abstract."[96] Bentley rejected an interpretation of social phenomena based on psychic or unconscious elements, which he deeply mistrusted, as he did all analyses that favored the intrapsychic life of the individual rather than the complex net of social ties within which the individual operated objectively. By following this path, "that mystical respect inspired by the unconscious would immediately disappear."[97]

Critics also questioned the French scholar's methodology. The pessimistic fatalism and catastrophic forecasts that accompanied Le Bon's reasoning could only arouse James's irony and sarcasm, because "to a reader even half-respectful of the socialist ideals of the present generation, it seems rather a reductio ad absurdum of the pretension of science to look down upon all such ways of thinking as essentially crazy."[98] In short, to

James it risked the confounding of an *objective psychology* with a *subjective teleology*.[99]

James's remarks, like those of other authors I have mentioned, are interesting because they highlight, by contrast, some important aspects of their own cultural orientation. We have seen how faith in the scientific method constituted one of the progressives' basic principles. In this particular aspect it is worth mentioning that George Mead, Arthur Bentley, and the philosopher George Vincent took special notice of the assumed scientific nature of Le Bon's work. Vincent compared Le Bon to a passionate photographer "whose books were full of images from real life that were interesting for him, but, alas, having no relation to one another and out of focus."[100] The undiscerning dogmatism and the "cocksureness" for which Vincent rebuked the French author were also at the center of the criticism of George Mead, who declared that Le Bon's fatalism and Manichaeism needed critical reexamination. Although Mead accepted the theory that human conduct comes from the deepest and most primitive recesses of human nature, and that it is different in different national traditions, Mead did not go on to completely renounce the part that reason plays in social action.[101]

To reaffirm the importance of the scientific method as the only basis on which to construct a program of social reforms, Mead used the analogy of the engineer, also a significant figure in the progressive cultural overview, as the symbol of technical and scientific progress: "The engineer does not know the full value and meaning of the bridge he is building. But he knows how to build it."[102] Although the construction of "new utopias" was no longer desirable, at the same time, according to Mead, "we expect science, physical and mental, to tell us how to behave in its presence."[103] Therefore, it was possible to have certainty about only the method, not the final result.

The "Public" in American Democracy

The criticisms of Le Bon's work did not dampen interest in the general themes that he had introduced. Another important French scholar, Gabriel Tarde, added fuel to the discussion about crowds. His book *L'opinion et la foule* (1901) was widely studied and debated in the United States, and it greatly influenced such social scientists as Edward Ross and, especially, Robert E. Park.

Although Tarde shared many of Le Bon's theories about the nature of crowds, in "Foules et sectes au point de vue criminelle" (1893) Tarde had already emphasized the distinctions between "heterogeneous" and "homogeneous" crowds. "L'esprit des foules" (the mind of the crowd) therefore could not be considered the same as "l'esprit des corps," meaning all associations and professional gatherings.[104]

But Tarde made another important distinction between crowds and the public. In *L'opinion et la foule* he focused on one of the most crucial problems of modern society: the communication and transmission of messages by means of mass media. First, it was necessary to understand the psychological mechanisms that moved the technologies of mass media. Tarde underlined the importance of the psychological mechanism of social imitation: extended to a social level, it constituted a fundamental tool for analyzing the characteristics of the so-called public. In fact, the public, unlike the crowd, was unlimited. The modern public therefore represented a new historical phenomenon. "Spiritual collectivity" was formed by the diffusion of newspapers, that is, by suggestion from a distance, or "contagion without contact." From this point of view, according to Tarde, the epoch of the crowds that Le Bon spoke of was now over. The "public" symbolically represented the "social groups of the future."[105] As Tarde saw it, the community established through newspapers was a community of ideas that assumed a different level of acculturation than the crowd. This, in his opinion, only increased the risks of manipulation in the formation of the public because an undiscerning public would internalize the message transmitted by the media.

The novelty of the argument and the innovative slant that Tarde gave to the crowds theme stirred great interest in the United States. Leading American scientists would take up this distinction between the public and the crowd, and the theme of imitation would be hotly debated. Edward Ross, following Gabriel Tarde's basic distinction, separated the physical "crowd" from the purely mental "public," although ideally they were united by the diffusion of information provided by newspapers, in as far as consuming the information did not require readers to have physical contact with one another. Taking up the theories of Le Bon and Tarde, Ross was interested in the analysis of the psychological mechanisms that determined the crowd. Even though in some passages of his work the author used the words "crowd" and "mob" interchangeably, nevertheless, in his analysis of the crowd as a physical body of individuals, he distin-

guished "crowd" from "mob," a word that etymologically signifies mobility, especially in the phrase "mob mind."[106] This second category included the psychological characteristics of a rioting crowd, one in revolt, reduced to an unstable psychological and physical condition. Even if the crowd could perform a positive function in destroying crumbling institutions, it had no constructive or purposeful capability. As it was "essentially archaic and sterile," the crowd could be considered "as the lowest form of human associations."[107] The factors that determined it—suggestion, first of all, and the ways in which it was formed, "by contagion"—were strictly irrational in nature and as such were deemed female. Following European writers in this aspect as well, Ross analyzed the leader that must subjugate the crowd by his "prestige."[108] He compared the ecstatic audiences of the famous pianist Paderewski to a "feminine mob," one that declares to its leader, "He is my master."[109] In its state of absolute credulity, instability, and lack of morality, the crowd, in addition to assuming feminine characteristics, was close to society's more primitive groups—children and savages.[110]

When a crowd formed and expanded, it grew in excitement and paralysis of reason, with a predisposition for specific objectives brought about by a catalyzing event or a leader. Through "contagion" an orderly crowd was transformed into a "riotous mob." According to this view, any distinction completely disappeared between this type of crowd and those in which positive factors could prevail, such as in celebrations, "crowds of love" (Tarde's definition), or crowds that defended a "moral order" or were harbingers of social change.[111]

In contrast to irrational and destructive crowds, Ross offered "the public" as a paradigm of the democratic society—the ideal social group that, formed by the written word, was based on the rational capacity of individuals united around a particular theme. Thus, while the crowd was physically one, the public could be many and not necessarily in physical contact. As such, these various publics represented the tendency toward which modern democratic society was developing, through large masses' access to culture: "Ours is not the era of crowds."[112]

Ross and others considered "the era of crowds" that Le Bon emphasized as the most archaic, unrelated to the new urban-industrial society: "Where are the crowds that once gathered around Abelard or Saint Thomas?"[113] The contemporary age was "the era of the public. . . . Univer-

sal contact by means of print ushers in the 'rule of public opinion' which is a totally different thing from 'the government by the mob.'"[114] Again, the distinction between "crowd" and "public" that Tarde had made and that Ross would interpret in a way that found wide currency would continue until the confrontation in the 1930s between the democracies and fascist dictatorships.

More than a real and proper antithesis between "crowd" and "public," Ross thought of the differences on a social scale: from the more amorphous groups to different forms of association to the various levels of representative assemblies and up to complex and organized structures, symbolized by the corporation. While all the rigidly closed associations, such as sects, castes, and parties, were becoming "liquified" under the impulse of "universal discussion," the various types of public were marked by the characteristics of mobility and interdependence, which all the scholars of the Progressive Era emphasized.

According to this perspective, Charles H. Cooley, the founder of group theory, distinguished between the excesses of Parisian crowds, which were justifiable within the history of France, and U.S. society, where democratic institutions were so tightly consolidated that an event such as the Paris Commune would not be possible:

> Is it not evident to attentive observers that our society with its strong fiber and more elastic relations supports agitation in a more steadfast way than the more rigid structures of Europe? This is true not only at the political level, because it is the entire basis of a free system that educates men to stand firmly on their own feet and resist the crowd. In a fixed system with little opening towards initiative and differentiated development, individuals have difficulties in perceiving themselves as distinct and self-regulating. From them, the characteristics of the crowds of Le Bon can be expected, while this is unlikely to be true for the discerning farmers and mechanics of the American democratic society.[115]

Cooley thus reaffirmed the exceptionalist course of American history by including a new concept of social individualism with Anglo-Saxon racial connotations. According to Cooley, crowd incitement would always occur in backward rural areas rather than in the "joyous and animated crowds that fill the open spaces of New York and Chicago." Progressive social scientists considered the extension of white middle-class values to the entire

"public" an important factor of moral and social stability in a democracy. Thus they went beyond the barriers of class and emphasized those values of solidarity and cooperation common to the whole society.[116]

Reflections on such a relevant theme as the "public" reached America not only through the works of Tarde and Le Bon but in a more direct way, through the American sociologist Robert E. Park, who wrote an important book on this subject. Park grew up in Red Wing, Minnesota, on the Mississippi River, and after completing his studies in literature and philology at the University of Minnesota he turned to journalism, working as a reporter on newspapers in Chicago and New York. In order to explore the more theoretical aspects of communication, he went to Harvard to study philosophy with William James and Josiah Royce, and psychology with Dr. Hugo Münsterberg. Like many other American scholars, Park went to Europe to broaden his knowledge. He attended Georg Simmel's classes in Berlin and wrote his doctoral dissertation under the direction of the philosopher Wilhelm Windelband. Park's thesis, *Masse und Publikum*, was published in 1904 but was not translated into English until 1972.[117] Despite this delay, his work became well known by social scientists, as he published excerpts of it in the famous *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, which he coauthored with Ernest W. Burgess. Park also made frequent use of his dissertation in the courses he taught for the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. He started teaching there in 1913, after a long partnership with Booker T. Washington at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. The experience of living in the South left a formative impression: in his subsequent research Park concentrated on the relational problems between different races and ethnicities in the cities.

On the subject of crowd and public he drew on the theories of the French school of Le Bon and Tarde, but Park also showed a full understanding of the Italian school, especially Lombroso, Sighele, and Pasquale Rossi, concerning the dynamics of the crowd and its characteristics of impressionability, unanimity, intolerance, and emotionality.[118] Referring explicitly to the work of Rossi, Park reached a more open and dynamic concept of social processes, which he regarded as a constant thread, from amorphous crowds to more organized and evolved forms of social institutions.

He believed the distinction between "crowd" and "public" had to follow the same logic that distinguished the irrationality of the amorphous crowd and the rational architecture of the democratic society.

> The fundamental distinction between crowd and public must not be measured either by numbers or by means of communication, but by the form and the effects of the interaction. An interactional public takes the form of discussion. The individuals tend to interact in a critical way. . . . The crowd does not discuss and thus does not reflect, but simply groups itself together. The crowd, according to Le Bon, "is a slave to its impulses." The real impulses that a crowd obeys may be . . . generous or cruel, heroic or cowardly, but they will always be so imprecise that the interest of the individual, even of self-preservation, will not be able to dominate it. The public represents the people organized around natural centers of influence and thus mainly guided by time and wisdom. Its control is therefore less emotional and more adapted to protecting the common rather than individual interests.[119]

In *The Crowd and the Public* Park analyses the similarities and differences of social groups, then adds a further important element: "the General Will," the fixed institutional norms and traditions as separate and distinct from the "public" and the "crowd." From these three polarities he eventually constructed his complex analysis of "collective behavior," which he saw as a process of continual interaction between various social aggregations. According to this view, the "social unrest" of the crowd, considered the most primitive and amorphous state of social forms, would give way in its "milling process" to a new social and institutional order that would go through various stages, from competition to conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. The author defined this process as "circular reaction," from the most elementary to the most institutionally formalized aspects of social aggregation. Park conceived this process as similar to an "ecological" cycle of a natural and biological sort, thus allowing for a scientific interpretation of social processes on the one hand but risking the suggestion of a predetermined and mechanistic cycle on the other.

Nevertheless, Park deserves special attention for having been the only social scientist to include the crowd, whose irrationality was at any rate confirmed, in a more complex and dynamic vision of social processes. After that, the "crowd" was no longer seen in a negative light as an element to be expelled from democratic society but was credited with a propulsive function toward a more stable social order. Park's experience at the Tuskegee Institute must have influenced him to take a more receptive and dynamic approach, in contrast to the rigid distinctions of his earlier work, *Masse und Publikum*.

Criticism of Universal Suffrage and Mass Parties

Using the language of modernization, colored by "whiteness," the progressive reformers questioned the fundamental requisite of the democratic citizen: the right to vote. Their reflections on mass participation in the political process and on the institution of universal suffrage had many points in common with Europeans' at the end of the century.[120]

The reformers used France as a basic point of reference. The French political writer Charles Benoist had warned of the risks that suffrage posed to modern societies as a *souveraineté moleculaire* (molecular sovereignty) in a series of articles in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1895, although he expressed the widespread public opinion that abolishing universal suffrage would be very risky.[121]

In *La reforme intellectuelle et morale de la France*, Ernest Renan describes universal suffrage as a sovereignty of the people fragmented into millions of individuals, a view that is conditioned by the events that had seriously marked republican France—the military defeat in the war against Prussia, the Commune, and the more recent "Boulangiste" crisis. He compared universal suffrage to an expanse of sand "sans cohesion ni rapport fixe entre les atomes [without fixed ties between atoms]."[122] The sand metaphor, referring to millions of grains, both mobile and without a uniting agent, was a familiar refrain during this period. Le Bon, Sighele, and Tarde used it to describe the idea of the crowd as an amorphous mass.

The analogies of children and the inorganic world that the progressive reformers used to express the inherent risks of suffrage reflected the ways crowds were perceived. Guglielmo Ferrero, one of the most brilliant exponents of the Lombrosian school, who had lived in the United States for a long time, saw universal suffrage as comparable to "a boy king, capricious and irresponsible, kindly and cruel, an easy prey, because of his short-sightedness and impulsiveness, to cunning and fraud."[123]

With this perspective, men such as Taine and Renan were drawn to the study of institutions that could serve as a counterbalance to the crowd, seen as *poussière d'individus* (individual specks of dust) to which suffrage had given voice. The suffrage *universel inorganique* (universal inorganic suffrage) according to Charles Benoist, represented an incumbent threat for the state. To this Gabriel Tarde countered with the esprit des corps, and Durkheim pointed out the possibility of finding in professional

groups some associative ties more responsive than the crowd to the articulations of modern urban-industrial society.

Although the progressive reformers held different perspectives, their common perception was that community ties and long-held values were collapsing. The insecurities and fears about individualism that were perceived as an atomized singularity were blended with fears of this amorphous mass. However, it is important to remember that this vision of the masses, seen through the lens of an emerging discipline, crowd psychology, was actually the outcome of a precise cultural milieu and that this milieu was conditioned by fears and considerations laced with pessimism about the impact of the working masses looming on the political scene. Recognizing the relevance of this viewpoint, Max Weber overturned the argument of those who warned of the risks and dangers coming from the masses. He identified the danger as not so much in the masses themselves as in the weakness of the bourgeoisie, in the inability of the ruling class to face the profound social changes that were taking place.[124]

Compared with the crisis that threatened the institutional framework of the European nations, the American situation was profoundly different. During the peak years of immigration, the theme of suffrage entered the wider debate about the character of the Americanization process and therefore the acquisition of citizenship, a topic that involved all the disciplines, including anthropology and the emergent eugenics.

John R. Commons criticized suffrage on a more procedural level. In his *Representative Democracy and Proportional Representation* he branded universal suffrage as a practice that promoted regimentation of the vote, thus making it unresponsive to organized interests.[125] Taking into account the different races and social classes, he observed how "in the United States today not only is the original Anglo-Saxon allowed to vote but also millions of others of antagonistic races."[126] In the metropolitan areas "from 50% to 80% of the electors were foreign born or children of foreigners," a development that should be closely scrutinized, according to Commons. About the City of New York he observed: "New York exalts Babel. A newspaper writer finds in that city sixty-six languages spoken, forty-nine newspapers published in foreign languages, and one school at Mulberry Bend with children of twenty-nine nationalities."[127] Also, Ross denounced the risks of universal suffrage from the perspective of race. In fact, he stressed the influence of the expert on public opinion,

as it would be "slander to declare that universal suffrage puts Socrates on the same level as Sambo."[128]

Commons, like Ross, favored a restriction of immigration and focused his attention on the fundamental question of political rights: "Our democratic theories and forms of government were fashioned by but one of the many races. . . . The so-called Anglo-Saxons developed them [the democratic theories] out of its own insular experience. . . . Other races and peoples accustomed to despotism and even savagery and wholly unused to self-government have been thrust into the delicate fabric."[129] Thus an aspect of the universal rights of the Republic, citizenship and the right to vote, had racial boundaries and therefore could not be universally extended. In fact, he observed: "The true foundations of democracy are in the character of the people themselves, that is, of individuals who constitute the democracy. These are first, intelligence . . . second, manliness, that which the Romans call virility, and which at bottom is dignified self . . . respect, self-control . . . third, and this is equally important, the capacity for cooperation . . . that willingness . . . to trust their leaders, to work together for a common interest."[130] Commons concluded this argument by observing that if these requirements were lacking, "democracy is futile."[131] The right to vote, in essence, was not only something one earned but something that had to be granted from above.

In Commons's words, "The great political questions of today are those which grow out of the citizenship of the manual laborers, the former serfs."[132] The expression that Commons used to refer to the organized workers of the American Federation of Labor and to their values—citizenship—acquires special meaning in an ideal circle that defines an inner area from an "outer," that of the "former serfs." For both Commons and Ross civic nationalism was colored by a strong racial and ethnic identity. Given the low cultural level of these masses, the argument went, they could easily fall prey to the electoral system of the bosses and of the political parties' machines. Commons added: "It is in the wide extension of suffrage that we find the underlying cause of the 'machine' and the 'boss.'"[133] Other social scientists, such as Lawrence Lowell, also considered utopian the idea of direct electoral control expressed by the multiple groups in a highly complex and diversified society as in the United States.[134] Therefore, these scholars held, direct democracy was not the solution to social problems; better would be the efficient control exercised by commissions made up of experts, representing private interests

and public power and capable of regulating the growing conflicts in this increasingly complex society.

The solution proposed by Commons was to modify the electoral mechanism in favor of a proportional system. While an electorate indiscriminately divided by districts ended up electing "a colorless candidate that represented no one," a proportional system would guarantee representation of all the different groups, such as labor organizations, in relation to the significance of their social weight.[135] "The significance of proportional representation consists in the fact that it prohibits the exaggerated influence of small factions holding the balance of power between two parties."[136] No longer was the proportional representation system called upon to protect the right of the rich and cultured minority against the "irresponsible and ignorant" electoral majority, as it was in John Stuart Mills's view; now proportional representation was seen as a representative of "the interests of the masses organized according to groups of interest, against the power of monopolies."[137]

Although this proposal went unheeded, it is nevertheless indicative of the criticism of the two-party system that was at the center of public debate in those years and of the need many saw for a reorganization of the parties themselves. Linked to the values of preindustrial society, the political parties were considered incapable of implementing the different demands and needs of a complex society in which organized interests had acquired national power and magnitude. It is important to emphasize how this "modernizing" vision of industrial society, built on the language of race, the crowd, and the democratic public, worked to the disadvantage of an integral part of that modernity: the mass of immigrants coming from southern Europe, which from the 1890s onward flowed over the coasts of the United States, filling the great urban slums and forming an essential component of the urban-industrial process.

Voting restrictions had been set in motion to disfranchise African Americans in the South and new immigrants in the northern states. At the same time the reorganization of the political parties alienated the lowest social groups from the electoral process.[138]

CHAPTER 3 The Mob Stereotype

Savages, Women, and Children

Savages, women, and children represented the three groups most easily swayed by the mob, according to the vocabulary used by social scientists. Beginning with the theories of Darwin and Spencer, people in these categories were traditionally considered as having the characteristics of irrational thinking and emotionalism. "The more advanced mental functions, imagination and reason, were presumed to be characteristic of the more highly evolved brains of civilized man," the historian Louise Newman writes.[1] The crowd, like the mob, women, and savages, had no legitimacy as a responsible collective subject because of its mutability and irrationality.[2] Degenerating to the female, the crowd acquiesced to its leader: "He is my master."[3]

"Suggestion" and "mental contagion," words continually used to define the feminine nature of the mob, came from Le Bon's analyses of crowd behavior and would be used again by social psychologists and anthropologists in the 1930s to define the rapport that European dictators established with crowds. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such theories about the suggestibility of women represented an obstacle not only to women's demand for suffrage but also to their obtaining an education equal to men's.[4] According to two noted educators, Edward H. Clarke and Stanley Hall (the organizer of Freud's visit to Clark University in 1909), allowing women access to higher education was inadvisable, not only because of their lack of aptitude but because of the harm it caused them by draining them of the energy necessary for reproduction. "Why should we ruin a good mother by making her a simple student like so many others?" asked Clarke.[5] The risk of female sterility, on the other hand, evoked the end-of-century phantom of the feared "race suicide."

Many years before writing *Psychologie des foules*, Le Bon expressed himself on this subject unequivocally: "All the psychologists who study

women's intelligence, as well as novelists and poets, assume women to be at the lowest level of human evolution, more similar to children and savages than to the civilized adult male."[6] Resemblances between mobs and women became a popular cliché. Edward A. Ross proposed the hysteria phenomenon—a well-known Freudian concept—as proof that women were far more suggestible than men.

In his description of an all-female crowd on a temperance crusade, Ross combined his admiration for the women's determination with a negative opinion of their persistence: "The ladies, led by the wife of a distinguished general, sallied forth to the drug stores, hotels and saloons. The movement spread into the adjacent towns, the women visiting saloons, singing, praying. . . . The ladies suffered severe privations, were oftentimes kept standing in the cold and rain, and were sometimes the subjects of severe remarks and direct persecution. The churches were crowded day and night." Contrary to expectations, the crusade ended as abruptly as it had begun. The reason for this unexpected departure from the scene could be attributed, according to the social scientist, to the movement's being "too much at variance with feminine nature to last, its sudden wide vogue can be explained by mental contagion."[7]

This same notion of women's mob susceptibility was the basis for male resistance to women's demands for suffrage and more power in society. Because women were constitutionally deprived of the rational capacity necessary to comply with the rights of citizenship, as their opponents maintained, a rational (male) person could not argue with women guided by their instincts. Not only women but also children had a specific place in the evolutionary theories. According to the phylogenetic theory proposed by the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, women and children became implicated in the various phases of species development in a significant way.[8] If during his lifetime a man went through all the phases of human evolution, his childhood represented the most archaic, ancestral phase. In the age of imperialism anthropologists classified the general order of all races; those so-called inferior ones were placed on a scale that passed from the primitive age to the stage of barbarism to finally arrive at the most evolved Western civilizations. White male children were the measure of comparison. In other words, the adults of inferior groups were compared to the children of superior groups. The best-known U.S. psychologist of the period, G. Stanley Hall, author of the famous *Adolescence*, summarized the issue, declaring that "savages are like children in

many aspects, or more appropriately, because of sexual maturity, they are adolescents in a man's body."[9]

Following this reasoning, primitive art could be compared to children's drawings, as the celebrated American paleontologist E. D. Cope wrote: "We find that the efforts of the earliest races of which we have any knowledge were quite similar to those the untaught hand of infancy traces on his slate or the savage depicts on the rocky faces of cliffs."[10] Such theories emphasized the racial discrimination evident on the hierarchical scale. Children, the intermediate link between inferior and superior races, were supposed to have the same racial traits as adults. Ross provided as an example the behavior of four hundred Sicilian children on a playground. They showed, according to the author, a more emotional and vindictive character than other children. Despite their quick-wittedness, their slowness in the school curriculum was evident. Ross concluded his reflections on this group of people by saying that because of their highly civilized past, they could not be considered primitive: "Yet if such people had populated American colonies, is it likely that they would ever have given the Declaration of Independence to the world?"[11]

The phylogenetic theory was used to order and interpret the behavior of social groups and offered an explanation of crowds understood as mobs. Le Bon had this to say: "Our savage and destructive instincts are the heredity of the primitive age that lies half asleep within us. In the isolated life of an individual, it would be dangerous to gratify these instincts, but when absorbed into an irresponsible crowd that guarantees impunity from the consequences, he is completely free to follow them."[12] These cultural assumptions allowed the juxtaposition of the behavior of the crowd and that of the savage. The U.S. sociologist Franklin Giddings remarked on this subject: "The crowd is curiously similar to the not yet developed mind of the child and the savage. . . . Like the savage and the child, the crowd does not tolerate anything that comes between its desires and their realization."[13] Upon closer analysis, however, even these stereotypes began to unravel. While Franz Boas was involved with his groundbreaking work on primitive societies and underlining the scientific foundations of racial theories, the heated public debate about the nation's imperial role once more used the primitive theme as crucial but with a different perspective than in the past.

The primitive occupied a place in what John Higham defined as a "reorientation of American culture in the 1890s," bringing into public

discourse, along with the so-called "primitive" and "savage" crowds of strikers, the crowds of immigrants that collected in the cities, and the changeable and moody female crowds.[14] At the same time interest in the western wilderness sprang up, where the frontier emblematically separated "the wild" and "civilization," according to Frederick Jackson Turner's theory.

In the field of literature, just as in the arts in general, geographical explorations and adventures in the South Seas in the period of colonial conquests led to an interest in newly discovered expressions of exotic and primitive art and to a reappraisal of the primitive, instinctual part of human nature.[15]

"Victorian norms which had previously stressed self-restraint, civilized cultivation and privacy, were overthrown by a new call to unrestrained nature, athletic virility, and public life," notes the historian Christopher Wilson.[16] Research into public life required both a social and anthropological immersion in order to understand social ills such as crime, deviance, and the harsher aspects of the great metropolitan "jungles" like Chicago.[17] Out of this came the first news reports of the muckrakers and the first sociological surveys. Thus "the savage" lost its exotic nature and became part of the urban environment.[18] The writer Waldo Frank, criticizing the myth of the "luxuriant external nature" of the jungle, blamed Americans for living like "savages" in the "jungle" of mass culture.[19]

In the United States the victory of 1898 in the Spanish-American War galvanized the country in a wave of nationalism and reaffirmation of the American Anglo-Saxon character. Theodore Roosevelt, who made distinctions between the new American race and the Anglo-Saxon, emphasized virility over the decadence of a too-refined civilization: "The timid man, the lazy man, the man who distrusts his country, the over-civilized man, who has lost the great, fighting masterful virtues, the ignorant man, and the man of dull mind whose soul is incapable of feeling the mighty life that thrills 'stern men with empires in their brains'—all these, of course, shrink from seeing the nation undertake its new duties."[20] An appeal to the courage and the primitive and uncivilized aspects of the American character were part of the dominant racism of those years. Franklin Giddings, one of the most fervent supporters of expansionism, justified the superiority of the American character with its "Saxon-Norman" antecedents, in whose veins ran "the blood of the old untamable pirates."[21]

An inner dimension was also attracting new interest. The archaic and

ancestral aspect of primitivism evoked by the phylogenetic theories was no longer limited to the outer recesses of history but was embedded in the life of every individual. One of the first social psychologists, Boris Sidis, a student of William James, defined this inner aspect of human nature as "the sub-waking self." James himself adopted a position quite similar to Le Bon's on the savage and destructive instincts that in each of us represent our heritage from the primitive ages, poised to reawaken in the anonymity of the crowd.[22] Referring to lynch mobs, the philosopher evoked "the carnivorous within us": "The average church-going citizen has no awareness of the deepest currents of human nature or the native capacity of murderous excitation that lies sleeping within him."[23]

As the philosopher Jean Starobinski has observed, the concept of primitivism, like that of civilization, "belongs to the family of concepts . . . formulated as opposites."[24] Therefore, if "the wild" corresponds to primitive and uncivilized nature, it is one of two polarities, the other being "the tame," the faith in civil progress, in an unresolved tension between the two extremes. The polarity of civilization-savagery can be understood as one of the "paradoxes" of progressive thought, according to David Noble's definition. For the "paradox" to be resolved, the meaning of one of the two terms had to be modified. Only after the anthropologist Franz Boas brought new understanding to "the wild and the primitive," interpreted within its own parameters, would the primitive no longer be perceived as the lowest rung on the evolutionary ladder leading to progress and the triumph of industrial civilization. Based on the paradox of the two extremes, the savage Cubans or Filipinos that U.S. soldiers had to confront needed the "civilizing" intervention of the more developed peoples, according to their white colonizers. Contact with the primitive had now become unavoidable.

At the same time the old stereotypes of children and women were beginning to lose some of their derogatory connotations in the early years of the century. The renewed attention given to the stages of childhood and adolescence, upon which Stanley Hall focused his attention, gave rise to such progressive undertakings as playgrounds and private and public institutions for child care. Dewey's innovative educational theories also focused on the child's point of view.[25]

The great social processes underway also encouraged greater openness and flexibility in the social sciences toward the evolutionary theories of the species. The possibility of a more dynamic vision of the evolutionary

process also forecast progress for the so-called inferior races in regard to future assimilation.

During this same period white women were acquiring public visibility as educators of new immigrants, as ethnographers and anthropologists, as well as social workers. The General Federation of Women's Clubs had a million members in 1912; women participated in a wide range of public service in their work as clerks and as teachers of women, children, and prisoners. The demand for female suffrage was included in the platform of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party. Women were also becoming more visible in the scientific sphere.

Women fighting for their emancipation mounted an offensive against the prejudices of male patriarchy, and they started with the Bible. The two volumes of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's *The Woman's Bible*, published in 1895 and 1898, analyzed in detail the misogyny in the Old Testament. Women were made the standard-bearers of moral values in a racial discourse in which the difference between the two sexes was seen as the result of a society more evolved and civil than those of primitive peoples. As Newman observed, the debate about suffrage was contemporaneous with restrictive immigration laws and the popularity of eugenics, which meant that it occurred in a context strongly conditioned by the discourse on race. African American women, for instance, believed it was important to establish the moral values of a domestic and patriarchal environment alongside their own men as protection against the oppressions of white society as a whole, and appealing to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. White women suffragists demanded equal rights on the basis of their participation in the public sphere.[26] Despite the level of progress reached by American civilization itself, white women still had to overcome the obstacle of unequal opportunity. They criticized the separation of public and private spheres and the cult of domesticity as the ancient legacy of a primitive phase, and they aimed instead to share the rights of citizenship. With the moral authority that they had acquired as social workers with immigrants, they demanded a specific place in the public arena, distancing themselves from women of color.

Though remaining within the sphere of "whiteness," feminists like Charlotte Perkins Gilman longed for emancipation from patriarchy and the economic dependence on men, from father to husband. This emancipation would be the basis for enabling women to make autonomous choices, including sexual ones.[27]

To achieve this emancipation education was a first crucial step. Women's attendance at universities made it possible to invalidate Spencer's theories. Research initiated by Marion Talbot disproved various certainties on the basis of accumulated data. Mental development depended in a large measure on the environment in which the women found themselves: their environment had caused their difficulties, but different circumstances could favor their development. Ross, who held to the most common stereotypes yet shared friendship and esteem with feminists such as Gilman, observed in 1912 that "if women are mobbish it is largely for the same reason that monks, soldiers, peasants, and other rigidly regulated types are mobbish. Much of woman's exaggerated impressionability disappears once she enjoys equal access with men to such individualizing influences as higher education."[28] The Chicago sociologist William I. Thomas, who had studied women's psychology and behavior extensively, observed that women seeking higher education "are not really admitted to the intellectual world of men; and there is not only a reluctance on the part of men to admit them, but a reluctance—or rather a real inability—on their part to enter."[29] The conclusions that William Thomas reached in "The Mind of Women and Lower Races" were clear and without illusions: "The world of modern intellectual life is in reality a white man's world. Few women and perhaps no blacks have ever entered this world in the fullest sense. . . . When something like this happens, we shall be in a position to judge of the mental efficiency of woman and lower races."[30] Nevertheless, the author stressed the importance of women's civilizing influence on society: "In all of our relations there is too much of primitive man's fighting instinct and technique; and it is not impossible that the participation of woman and the lower races will contribute new elements. . . . Certain it is that no civilization can remain the highest if another civilization adds to the intelligence of its men the intelligence of its women."[31]

The Lynch Mob

Social scientists' distinctions between a democracy of white citizens and an irrational crowd—by definition similar to women, children, and savages—were fully disproved by the prevalence of lynch mobs made up of white American citizens, men and women, in the southern United States.

After 1877 the withdrawal of the federal government from the south-

ern states left African Americans without protection against extralegal violence. The worsening conditions in the South, the sharpening of tensions and social conflicts, along with the growth of the populist movement, clearly exacerbated the relationship of whites and blacks in the whole country, particularly as the latter gradually lost their right to vote. After the Civil War and Reconstruction the practice of lynching blacks for crimes committed, or only assumed to have been committed, spread throughout the South. These crimes could be theft, homicide, rape, or simply a remark considered an affront to whites. The trend of lynchings by crowds of white men and women, and, in some cases, children, increased from the 1880s until the years before the First World War. Only after the 1920s and 1930s did this practice lose popularity, until it almost completely disappeared in the 1940s.

Lynching was the most extreme form of terrorism perpetrated by whites against African Americans after 1877.[32] Other measures included the introduction of state laws that restricted political and civil liberties, violent intimidation, collective violence by a crowd whose size could vary from half a dozen people to thousands. In addition to the African Americans who were the chief victims of the crowds' violent fury, immigrants, union organizers, and radical political leaders were targeted after 1890. According to data collected by the Tuskegee Institute of Alabama, organized and directed by the black leader Booker T. Washington, the number of victims from 1882 to 1968 was 4,743; of these, 3,446 were African American—72.7 percent.[33]

Lynching reached its peak between 1884 and 1902, with totals that varied from 130 in 1882 to 211 in 1884 to 170 in 1889, up to a peak of 230 in 1892 before decreasing to 130 in 1902. Until 1885 whites were 33 percent more likely to be lynching victims than blacks, but from 1886 on hundreds of African Americans were lynched, especially between 1891 and 1902.[34]

Far from being an irrational outburst of uncontrollable homicidal fury, the lynchings followed precise rituals that revealed, according to W. Fitzhugh Brundage, "the aims, motivations, and own self-perception" of the crowd.[35] These rituals included a procession displaying the victim, the stake, torture, mutilation of limbs and often castration, and, finally, the disposition of the victim's body parts as souvenirs.[36]

It was precisely the shock provoked by this kind of spectacle—the body parts of a lynching victim exhibited in a drugstore window in At-

lanta in April 1899—that transformed W. E. B. Du Bois's scholarly pursuit of equality for blacks into public activism. After finishing his studies at Harvard with William James and completing his education in Berlin in 1897, Du Bois was hired to set up the sociology department at Atlanta University. His knowledge and interests ranged from philosophy to history and sociology. A fervent believer in science as a means for defeating racial prejudice, he conducted a study of the black community in Philadelphia in 1897 that was exemplary for its rigorous method.[37] According to Alessandra Lorini, "from then [the Atlanta episode] on, Du Bois's double consciousness, his struggle between his American and Negro identity, became further complicated by his awareness that 'one could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered and starved.'"[38]

Social scientists studying the characteristics and motivations behind lynchings have emphasized different aspects of the same phenomenon in different historical periods.[39] In the years after World War II scholars influenced by the Frankfurt school emphasized the mechanisms of social prejudice and stereotypes in a largely assimilative and consensual perspective. As a result they paid less attention to the more antagonistic and violent aspects of racial relationships that would become the center of public discourse during the 1960s.[40] Later, many sociologists, influenced by anthropological studies, were interested in a different perspective. They began analyzing the symbolic and ritualistic aspects of lynching as a tool for comprehending the many-layered problems of race.[41] Only recently has historical and iconographic research shed light on the social phenomenon of lynchings, which historians had all but ignored and about which the public suffered near-total amnesia. At a show of lynching photographs, exhibited for many months in New York several years ago, the public demonstrated great interest but also the contradictory reactions aroused by such violent images.[42]

"White supremacy," which was reaffirmed by lynchings, had a wide range of meanings, from discouraging black political involvement or economic competition to the use of savage intimidation techniques against African Americans to quell their desire for the same economic, social, and sexual freedoms enjoyed by the former slave masters.

The acts that provoked violent crowd reaction varied from region to region and were based on written and unwritten codes of racial behavior. Such codes included the smallest details of daily life and established

every kind of black behavior toward the white in all possible situations, including public expressions of different states of mind, such as anger or humor. Whites perceived any variation of this racial etiquette as an offense and punished it according to local racial codes.

Offenses to codes of white honor were punished with lynching in the Deep South more than in border states like Virginia. The concept of rape was very elastic and in some cases included the simple act of approach or contact of any kind between a black man and a white woman. Even the kinds of crowds varied, from those made up of small groups to an official group that local authorities might call upon to private organizations with terrorist aims, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Night Riders, to crowds composed of the dozens or even thousands who participated in lynchings. All over the South, "homicides and attacks on whites by blacks whether unprovoked or in self-defense were the most common causes of mob violence."[43] The white community perceived these crimes as a direct threat to the social hierarchy and to the stability of moral and social order. Thus the lynching, following a precise ritual, corresponded to a symbolic law that reconfirmed the sharp line separating the two races.

As Brundage has observed: "The culture that sustained the practice of mob violence in the South in the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries also moved the region out of the mainstream of Western practices of criminal punishment. . . . At a time when punishment elsewhere was increasingly hidden from the glare of public observation, lynching in the South seemed to be a throwback to the brutal rituals of executions at Tyburn in eighteenth-century London."[44] Even though representatives of the South condemned it as lawless in theory, in the end they justified the practice of lynching as appropriate retaliation for an unthinkable attack on the color line. Leon Litwack's research documented how outstanding citizens of the community, including judges and police, took an active part in lynchings or at least turned a blind eye.[45] A prominent attorney, Alexander C. King of Atlanta, who attended with jurists, psychologists, and politicians a conference on race relations in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1900, maintained that sexual crimes committed by blacks against white women could not be condemned simply as criminal acts, but as an attack on the integrity of the race itself.[46]

Racist attitudes found scientific endorsement in every field, from biology to anthropology and the social sciences in general. The only exceptions came from the group of scientists and progressive intellectuals, male

and female, black and white, who participated in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), of which Du Bois was a founding member; he also served as editor of the organization's journal, the *Crisis*.

Much of the racist rhetoric had its roots in theories of ethnological origins. The Darwinian view of the evolution of the species, which presupposed a single common ancestor at the beginning of the process of evolution, was in contrast to the polygenic approach of the American school of ethnology. The two positions were for the most part compatible insofar as both attributed profound evolutionary differences to the distinctions between species. However, some ethnologists paradoxically regarded African Americans as an "incipient species."[47]

As different as scholars' opinions were about African Americans' status in the family of humans—and these viewpoints ranged from enlightened paternalism to the extreme of seeking to deport black Americans—all agreed that questioning the racial barriers was impossible. Intermarriage would wreak irreparable damage on the superior race, the white Anglo-Saxons.

Such a concept, which was ultimately used to justify violence against southern African Americans at the end of the century, had roots going back to before the Civil War. During the period of slavery the African American was described according to a double canon: docile and friendly if kept in chains, ferocious and savage once freed.[48] This, in turn, affected interpretations of what would happen to the race after the war. One of the more moderate views, ascribed to one of Darwin's chief disciples, T. H. Huxley, held that once slavery ended, a natural competition would develop within the African American population, as well as between it and other ethnic groups. As a result, Huxley asserted, the general level of the group would rise, although African Americans would remain inferior to whites.[49]

Not surprisingly, more extreme positions were expressed immediately following the Civil War. Hinton Rowan Helper, a resident of North Carolina who was strongly opposed to slavery, nourished a deep racist hatred of African Americans. In his book *Nojoque*, published in 1867, he compared the color white, "an aspect of life, health, and beauty," to black, "the symbol of ugliness, sickness and death." He opposed the extension of the rights of citizenship to African Americans and foresaw a providential design of total extermination of the black race.[50] With less rhetori-

cal flourish Dr. John Van Evrie, one of the chief anti-abolitionists before the Civil War, maintained that it would be impossible to educate African Americans because, according to current anthropological studies, the cranium would not develop in proportion to the rest of the body.[51]

Another kind of thinking that contributed to racist discourse was based on demographic analyses. A Baltimore physician and novelist, Dr. Edward Gilliam, for example, predicted in 1874 that a catastrophic situation was developing in the South because an increase in the black population was putting pressure on the white population. "This dark, swelling, muttering mass along the social horizon, gathering strength with their education . . . will grow increasingly restless and sullen under repression, until . . . conscious through numbers of superior power, it will assert their power destructively, and bursting forth like an angry furious crowd, avenge in tumult and disorder, the social law broken against them."[52] Gilliam's speculation was based on the 1880 census, which showed that the black population was increasing in the South at the rate of 30 percent every decade. The author saw a program of deportation as the only remedy. Embodied in his vision was the most alarming fantasy that the white population could project on the black: a "dark mass" ready to revolt. Such fantasies, commonplace in the slavery period, continued after slavery was abolished. Even Albion W. Tourgée, a judge during radical Reconstruction in North Carolina who had been sympathetic to emancipation, painted a pessimistic picture of racial conflict stirred up by whites once the barriers of the prewar period were abolished. He spoke of racial prejudice not as a cultural given but as a natural given and therefore impossible to eliminate.[53]

The results of the 1890 census led the economist Francis A. Walker, who had served as superintendent of the Ninth Census (1870–72) and the Tenth Census (1879–81), to a completely different conclusion. According to census data, the African American population of the Deep South had increased less than the white population in the same area.[54] So small was the increase that Walker foresaw the extinction of the African American race, partly by natural means, partly as a consequence of the race's return to a barbaric state once no longer under white oversight after its emancipation from slavery.

This extinction would come about naturally, through illness and hardships or through the spread of the race's "inherent" criminality, vice, and sexual violence. The latter hypothesis was put forward by scientists like

Fredrick L. Hoffmann, again based on statistical data, this time from Walter Wilcox, chief statistician for the census.[55] According to this hypothesis, blacks, like Native Americans, were destined to become a "vanishing race."[56]

The possibility of the extinction of an entire race was a widespread notion at the end of the nineteenth century, as we have seen in regard to Ross's prediction for Anglo-Saxons. In the case of African Americans, the idea was reproposed at the previously mentioned Montgomery conference as a radical solution to the "race problem"—encouraging racial diminuendo by advancing the idea that any paternalistic kind of initiative would be both useless and inappropriate.

The historian Joseph Tillinghast took up the argument common at this time, that African Americans, as descendants of Ham—who is portrayed in the Old Testament as a sodomite—were endowed with unbridled sexual aggression in body and soul.[57] In the estimation of thinkers like Tillinghast, the African American race was primitive, uncontrolled, sensually aggressive, and cannibalistic due to its African origin, and incapable of being reformed in the new American environment. The "Negro as beast" stereotype—both in the private sense of African Americans' governing their instincts and the public sense of their making political decisions—was so widespread at the end of the century that it could serve as justification for segregating public places, as well as for abolishing the African Americans' right to vote. And indeed, following the lead of other racist intellectuals, early twentieth-century scientists such as James Ford Rhodes, John Burgess, and William Dunning reexamined Reconstruction and questioned the legitimacy of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. If African Americans were not capable of fulfilling the rights and duties of citizenship, how, they asked, could such amendments apply?[58]

The Reconstruction period was also the subject of novels with fervent racist implications, like *The Leopard's Spots* and *The Clansman* by Thomas Dixon. Written in the early years of the twentieth century, these best-selling novels aspired to replace the familiar docile image of the African American suggested by *Uncle Tom's Cabin* with that of the "black brute." According to Dixon, when black people were enslaved, they were bought and sold like tamed cattle, but with the end of slavery they became ferocious beasts to be kept under tight control. In addition to such novels, nationally distributed magazines like *Harper's*, *Scribner's*, and

Atlantic Monthly published articles in the 1890s and the early part of the twentieth century in which African Americans were marked by similar "black brute" traits or by racial inferiority.

In the end, physicians, statisticians, and economic "experts" such as Edward Gilliam, Francis A. Walker, Fredrick L. Hoffmann, and Walter Wilcox drew an unequivocal line between white civilization and African Americans. The two were incompatible. Such men concurred that the African American race was headed for extinction or, at the least, bound to return to a barbaric state.

From such views came the comments of people like Charles R. Henderson, a University of Chicago sociologist who was resolutely opposed to the practice of lynching. Although he proclaimed it a national shame for a group of men to take the law into their own hands, he hoped police would use force, not to stop the lynching by whites in the South as much as to crush "the insolence, the fierce passion and the dangerous brutality of certain types of blacks in the South," whose freedom from punishment allowed their "sexual passion to be transformed into assault."[59] Henderson M. Somerville, a retired Alabama judge, explicitly laid responsibility for the lynchings on the federal government for having given African Americans the right to vote. The judge reasoned that blacks then sought to increase their social status, which led them to rape white women. To Somerville, the way to end lynchings was simple: revoke African Americans' right to vote.[60]

A congressional representative from Massachusetts made such a proposal at the Montgomery Conference. In fact, most southern states had already enacted legislation to prevent African Americans from voting, but there had been no such significant reduction in the number of lynchings.[61]

A further proposal suggested at the Montgomery Conference carried to the extreme the racial segregation sanctioned by the Supreme Court itself with the *Plessy v. Ferguson* ruling: draw up a separate penal code for crimes committed by African Americans. Leaders from the southern states took positions that ranged from a radical one like this to a more moderate and paternalistic position, as espoused by Atticus G. Haygood. Haygood formally condemned lynchings but at the same time justified them according to the seriousness of the crime.[62]

Most members of Congress—Democrats and Republicans, as well as the progressives and socialists—maintained a cautious and moderate

position that regarded blacks as children under the care of adults: African Americans could "evolve" if properly educated by whites. As for lynching, it was considered a problem of the individual southern states.[63]

While the image of the black male as brutal and hypersexual had always been an obsession of the white community's imagination, originating with the idea of Africa as a primitive land where sexual customs were unregulated and marked by extreme licentiousness, by the late nineteenth century the greatest fear of whites was that white women would fall victim to black aggression. According to data collected by the NAACP, between 1889 and 1919 rape accusations served as the named cause of 19 percent of lynchings (homicide, by contrast, was named the cause in 35.8 percent of the cases). Beyond whatever reality the data represent, sexual aggression toward white women was more pointedly a symbolic attack on racial integrity.

While the white man's abuse of black women was a long-accepted practice, such coupling was eclipsed by the symbolic significance of a white woman's falling victim to the black rapist's bestial ferocity. And the violence unleashed by white men found its "justification" in this image. As the first NAACP surveys showed, and the African American political activist and journalist Ida B. Wells wrote, the white man's racial violence arose from his desire to keep the rights of democratic citizenship a privilege of the white community. In considering rape as a crime that justified lynching, the most authoritative and even the most modern exponents of the southern states—writers, judges, senators—expressed their common indignation at any attack on the integrity of the race. Lynching thus could not be judged according to the normal penal code, because it released humanity's instinctive passions, "the elemental forces that control human nature throughout all time and the world over."[64] According to the writer Philip Bruce, rape by a black man was not considered by nineteenth-century southern contemporaries simply an act of male aggression but the brutal attack of a man freed of his shackles who "takes that fiendish delight in the depredation of his victim which he always shows when he can reek his vengeance upon one whom he has hitherto compelled to fear; and here the white woman is for the time being the representative of that race which has always overawed him."[65]

Female voices also lent their approval to the justification of lynching. Rebecca Latimer Felton, a Georgia woman who would become the first female U.S. senator upon her appointment in 1922, took an extreme posi-

tion, publicly defending lynching, even "a thousand times a week if necessary."[66] And Frances Willard, head of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU)—who lectured widely on moral and social issues—tacitly accepted the practice, in the view of Wells.[67] Indeed, most white women did not take a strong public stand against lynching until 1930, with the founding of the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, presided over by Jesse Daniel Ames, a Texas suffragist who learned of the horrors of lynching while heading a state commission on race relations.

Lynching was a crime that thrived in no small measure because the participants seldom were punished. When a commission of inquiry was established, its members often had participated in the very crime they had been appointed to investigate.[68] Local churches, fearful of losing congregants, also remained silent.[69] The commission would go through the motions and nearly always reached the same conclusion: the victim was killed by parties unknown or by citizens who, seeking revenge for a crime supposedly committed by an African American, "rose in mass and indignation" to kill him.[70]

As Jesse Daniel Ames pointed out, the press played an important role in legitimizing lynchings.[71] Some editorial writers invoked "natural" instinctual passions to justify behavior that overstepped all bounds of legality. Others, like the writer Thomas N. Page, who condemned the practice of lynching, observed that "the stern underlying principle of the people who commit these barbarities is one that has deep roots in the basic passions of humanity: the determination to put an end to the ravishing of their women by an inferior race."[72] After a lynching in Tarboro, North Carolina, in 1887 the crowd left a macabre admonition in the form of a note on its victim's body: "We hang this man, not in passion, but calmly and deliberately, with a due sense of the responsibility we assume. We take executive power in this case and hang this man in accordance with the unwritten law of the land, because the written law provides no penalty adequate to the crime."[73] As Leon Litwack remarks, "By the turn of the century the white South could articulate and implement its racial feelings without much fear of northern or federal intervention."[74]

In 1907 Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina, once more using the alleged rape of white women by blacks to justify lynching, synthesized the problem to Congress in this way: "Shall such a creature appeal to the law? Shall men cold bloodedly stand up and demand for him the right to have

a fair trial and be punished in the regular course of justice?—he has put himself outside the pale of law, human and divine. Civilization peels off us . . . who are men and we revert to the original savage type whose impulses . . . has always been to kill, kill, kill."[75] In 1913 the senator claimed that "from forty to a hundred thousand southern maidens were annually offered as a sacrifice to the African Minotaur and no Theseus had arisen to rid the land of this terror."[76] Writers, judges, and social scientists, in discussing the lynch mob, made reference to the "savage that is in each of us," ready to reemerge from the deepest recesses of each individual in the excitement of the crowd. The progressive sociologist Lester Ward, though condemning lynching on a formal level, explained it as an unconscious impulse of racial conservation.[77]

To understand this perspective, it is important to stress that even those who condemned the crime shared the idea that race was "ahistorical," in that it was considered an integral part of the natural world. As such, it was unchangeable, in contrast to the cultural anthropological theories of the hierarchical evolution of civilization.

But once the barriers fell that had rigidly separated the races, savage and primitive instincts were reawakened also in Anglo-Saxons, the race touted as highly civilized and rational and the one that stood at the top of the hierarchical scale. If the black male was depicted as an animal in the thrall of the savage instincts of lust and murder, the same primordial energies were reawakened in the white male when the integrity of the race was threatened. Indeed, commentators used remarkably similar words to describe the victims of lynching and the perpetrators: wild, bloodthirsty beasts.[78] In Theodore Dreiser's "Nigger Jeff," for example, the lynchers were "as eager in their search as blood-hounds."[79]

Race, as perceived in an ahistorical sense, not only was exempt from the laws of biological evolution, but it incited behavior governed not by the laws of the penal code but by the unwritten laws of tradition. As such, tradition took precedence over the laws sanctioned by civilized society and expressed itself in a rituality that tended to confirm an ahistoric dimension. Lynchings thus were marked by heavily ritualized choreography (though with local variations). Notes Dreiser: "Custom seemed to require death in this way. . . . It was like some axiomatic, mathematic law—hard, but custom."[80] The place chosen for the execution had to have the symbolic value of being close to where the alleged crime was committed, and in a similar setting. If this was not possible, a place was chosen

with some connection to an earlier lynching. The message had to resound loudly and clearly as a cruel admonition, taken up and amplified in some cases by the local newspapers, in order to "let the many Negroes in that neighborhood see that it is time that they quieted down and stopped their efforts to ride over the farmers in that section."[81]

Symbolic also was the confession extracted from the victim by means of the torture that preceded and legalized the execution. The slowness of the process provided a way for the whole community to participate actively. The crowd, composed of men, women, and children from different social levels, had its own inner cohesion, from which came the strength and self-justification for its actions. Its unanimity rose above distinctions of social status and kind. As Dreiser described it, "there was not so much daring as a desire to gain daring from others, an unconscious wish or impulse to organize the total strength or will of those present into one strength or will."[82]

Southern Horrors

The most determined voice raised against the crime of lynching was that of Ida Barnett Wells.[83] Born in 1862 in Holly Springs, Mississippi, she taught school in Memphis before devoting herself to publishing, an interest that was sparked by a desire to share her story after she was forcibly removed from a train car in which she was traveling, sued, and won (a victory later overturned on appeal). After three of her friends, owners of a successful grocery that was attracting business away from a white-owned store, were lynched, she responded with an editorial in her paper, the *Free Speech and Headlight*, that urged blacks to leave Memphis. Many did. Those who remained, including Wells, organized boycotts of white-owned businesses, and she began a series of scathing editorials against lynching, denounced it in speeches, and began an investigation of the charges used by whites to justify lynchings of black men.

Her pamphlet describing her findings, *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases*, detailed the trumped-up nature of many charges, how men were hung for infractions as trivial as being drunk in public, and revealed that many so-called rapes involved consensual sex.[84] Whites, predictably, were outraged, attacked her office, and made threats against her. She never returned to Memphis from a speaking engagement in Phila-

delphia, deeming it safer to relocate to Chicago, where she resumed her antilynching crusade.

Using newspaper accounts, summaries prepared by the NAACP and the Tuskegee Institute, and her own reporting, Wells outlined the active participation of all community members in detailed descriptions of the often long and ferocious phases of torture and of the executions.[85] One of the most vicious lynchings that she recorded occurred in Paris, Texas, in 1893, where Henry Smith, an African American who was considered mentally deficient, was deemed guilty of the revenge killing of the four-year-old daughter of a police officer who had arrested him for drunkenness. In *Southern Horrors* Wells describes the progressive excitement of the crowd:

> Ever since the perpetration of his awful crime this city and the entire surrounding country has been in a wild frenzy of excitement. When the news came last night that he had been captured . . . the city was wild with joy over the apprehension of the brute. . . . Curious and sympathizing alike, they came on train and wagons, on horse, and on foot. . . . Whisky shops were closed, unruly mobs were dispersed, schools were dismissed by a proclamation from the mayor and everything was done in a business-like manner. . . . Along the road the train gathered strength from the various towns, the people crowded upon the platforms and tops of coaches anxious to see the lynching and the Negro who was soon to be delivered to an infuriated mob.[86]

The customs of the lynching ritual were observed for Henry Smith's, with a parody of a festive procession in order to channel the collective excitement through its various stages, from a carnival atmosphere to savage violence: "The Negro was placed upon a carnival float in mockery of a king upon his throne, and, followed by an immense crowd, was escorted through the city so that all might see the most inhuman monster known in current history."[87] Wells recounts what a priest told the local paper: "I followed the procession and wept aloud as I saw little children of my own race follow the unfortunate man and taunt him with jeers." When the priest told parents to take their children home, they replied: "Let them learn the lesson."[88]

Smith was slowly tortured by repeated branding until he died; then his corpse was set ablaze. "As the hot iron sank deep into poor Henry's flesh a hideous yell rent the air, and, with a sound as terrible as the cry of

lost souls on judgment day, 20,000 maddened people took up the victim's cry of agony and a prolonged howl of maddened glee rent the air."[89] The crowd amplified and repeated the tortured man's cries, transforming them into screams of sadistic excitement. The spectacle came to an end with the fire: "The men of the Vance family having wreaked vengeance, the crowd piled all kinds of combustible stuff around the scaffold, poured oil on it and set it afire."[90] The collective participation reinforced the traditional values of the group, exempting each individual from personal responsibility, just as if sentence had been passed by a legally impaneled court of inquiry.

Once the event was over, the ritual epilogue provided for the collecting of souvenirs—pieces of clothing, strips of flesh, bullet cartridges, if the victim was shot, or pieces of the hanging rope, at times even pieces of bone when the victim was burned—to be kept and exhibited in public places, as W. E. B. Du Bois found out. The memory of the event had to instill terror and thus act as an admonition for the future.

According to Wells, any deconstruction of what had happened had to be based on the facts on hand. What she found was that the stereotype of the black-skinned male who assaulted and raped the white female victim often functioned as a metaphor for latent anxieties in a time of great social turmoil. Whenever a lynching occurred, she found, the causes could be traced to an incitement of a sexual nature or an effort to improve social status, or it was rooted in the fear of the black vote in the South, shaken in those years by strong social and political tensions. In analyzing the ways in which the public image of the Negro had been pumped full of fierce and criminal sexuality, Wells revealed the obscure aspects of white behavior that were excluded from such discourse and that were at the basis of such a monstrous invention.

She showed how the image of the black rapist sometimes served as cover for white consensual females but, most of all, how this pairing of the black rapist with the white woman obscured what was always hidden in the South—the white man and the black woman: "I found that this rape of helpless Negro girls and women, which began in slavery days, still continued without hindrance, check or reproof from church, state, or press until there had been created this race within a race—and all designated by the inclusive term of 'colored.'"[91] Analyzing the reasons that drove whites to this paradoxical behavior, Wells observed, "the more I studied the situation, the more I was convinced that the Southerner

had never gotten over his resentment that the Negro was no longer his plaything, his servant, and his source of income."[92] According to Wells, the battle had to be conducted on two different levels, that of symbolic meaning and that of legal activity.

What she thought needed emphasizing on the symbolic level was the ideological construct in which "the entire race should be branded as a bestial race of moral monsters and despoilers of womanhood and childhood."[93] This all-inclusive and all-absorbing image—where no single individual was guilty, but the entire race bore the guilt—had consequently "robbed us of all the friends we had," according to Wells, and "silenced any protest that they might make for us."[94]

Even if the hypothesis of the degenerate black race and the image of the "black beast" did not gain universal recognition in the South, it nevertheless gained enough credence nationally to impede any attempt to organize African Americans through the first decade of the twentieth century. Wells conducted an uncompromising battle against such a stereotype. She even found herself in opposition to the famous social reformer Jane Addams (a member of the NAACP).[95] In addition, Wells argued against Frances Willard, the aforementioned head of the Women's Christian Temperance Union of the South, after Willard's interview in which she described "a great crowd of black faces shouting for 'more whiskey and a better brand,'" a crowd that, she claimed, endangered the security of women. From such a point of view lynching became "a necessary act for domestic protection."[96] Not until 1893 would the WCTU take a position condemning such crimes.

Not until the 1930s was the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching established to move public opinion against lynching. Racism was so deeply engrained in the United States that the "moral" concept of black masculinity itself had to be reconstructed and redefined in the public discourse; the black man should no longer be merely a passive victim, without a voice, without an identity, but capable of self-defense, in direct opposition to the prevalent stereotype.[97] The urging of blacks to not remain passive victims of white violence came from the black leader Frederick Douglass and from Ida Wells herself. In the face of her findings for *Southern Horrors*, she wished for the presence of a Winchester rifle in every black home to provide the protection that the law refused to give.[98] What should be openly exposed, according to Wells, was white men's long-time practice of violating the bodies of black women.

Wells managed through her work to shine a light on the evils of white supremacy. At the same time, as her work became a point of reference in the national public discourse, Wells made African American women visible, restoring their dignity and authority.

The Struggle for Civil Rights

The institution that worked most effectively in the struggle against all forms of racial discrimination was the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.[99] Founded in 1909, at the end of the second meeting of the National Negro Conference, the association was largely composed of supporters of the progressive movement, men and women of both races—social workers, such as Jane Addams, the writer Mary Ovington, Florence Kelley of the National Consumers League; lawyers, experts such as the economist Edwin Seligman, the philosopher John Dewey, and Rabbi Stephen Wise. The NAACP fought for African Americans' political and civil rights, denouncing the racial segregation that confined them to city ghettos and denied them the right to vote. In addition, the NAACP denounced the Jim Crow laws that limited African Americans' work and educational opportunities. In the campaign to win over public opinion, the NAACP played an important role in forcing the public to recognize racism as a national problem.

In July 1910 W. E. B. Du Bois left his teaching position in Atlanta to become director of the research and publicity section of the new association. Under his direction the official NAACP organ, the *Crisis*, became an important source of information. The journal also published scientific articles. Du Bois gave an account of the first Universal Races Congress held in London (1911) on the problem of race, focusing on the international scale of the problem.

During the years of colonial conquests and growing white supremacy, the attention of public discourse was focused on the debate about imperialism, but Du Bois brought attention back to the U.S. South as a potential laboratory for analyzing relationships between the races. In 1901 the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* published an article by an African American for the first time. In his piece Du Bois predicted that tensions between the races would be one of the most important problems for the developed nations of the world in the coming century.

In a concise and extremely clear analysis that Du Bois wrote for the *American Journal of Sociology* about the "race friction between blacks and whites," he began by staking his position in favor of the abolitionists and those who supported Reconstruction, and he argued against the persistent blame heaped on them by those who took a revisionist point of view.[100] He attacked the romantic notion that slavery had been a time of "harmonious relationship between races," as that supposed harmony was based on the subjugation of the "inferior" race by the "superior" one.[101] He remarked that slavery could not be defended from a historical point of view and he declared that all measures for keeping the races segregated would inevitably fail in the long run: "every dream of separating the races in America or separating them in the world, turns out to be not only impracticable, but contrary to the inner tendency of our epoch."[102]

Du Bois related the problem in the South to the position that the United States had recently assumed internationally. Regarding the "acknowledged superiority and inferiority between the white and the black races," he noted how "if the United States expects to take her place among the new nations beside England and France, the nations which first are going to solve this problem of race contact, then certainly she has got right here, in her own land to find out how to live in peace and prosperity with her own black citizens."[103] Du Bois's objective was to obtain equal rights and opportunities without losing racial identity, writing that the black American "would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face."[104] The author expressed the tension between the two realities, the white and the black, in what he defined as "two-ness": "One ever feels his twoness,—An American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self."[105] As for the actual lynchings and the loss of political and civil rights, Du Bois warned that the United States was likely to incur "the absolute dislike and distrust of the darker two thirds [of the world]."[106] Lynching was considered one of the prerogatives of the Anglo-Saxons, along with "lying and slavery." Although the

federal government was insisting that lynching was a state problem, Du Bois made the case that it had to be framed not only in a national context but also in an international one.

His interest in approaching the problem of race relations on a serious scientific basis inspired Du Bois to denounce white supremacy as "the most ludicrous and harmful conglomeration of myth, falsehood and desire."[107] Franz Boas's studies and research were to demonstrate how scientifically unfounded white supremacy was. In the second issue of the *Crisis*, Du Bois published one of Boas's articles, "The Real Race Problem," in which he contested the theory that the black race was inferior because the black infant's mental development was arrested.[108]

Boas, who had emigrated from Germany at the end of the century to become a professor at Columbia University, was an important innovator, both in his methodology and in the results of his research. Rejecting the idea of universal unilineal progress, he advocated approaching a "primitive" civilization by starting with an analysis of the cultural institutions embedded in that particular society by using scientific parameters that could make the specific structures comprehensible.[109] Such an approach would banish from the theory of race the deterministic conception of individual mental and cultural traits. In "The Mind of Primitive Man," which he read in 1900 at a meeting of the American Folklore Society, Boas observed: "The term race as applied to human types is vague. It can have a biological significance only when a race represents a uniform closely inbred group in which all family lives are alike as in pure breeds of domesticated animals. These conditions are never realized in human types and impossible in large populations."[110] Boas's early works debunked the concept of race as untrustworthy both historically and in regard to anthropological research methods.[111] In the immigration study he conducted for the Dillingham Commission of the U.S. Congress, he had in fact analyzed, with a wide sampling, the anthropological characteristics (cranium measurements, for example) of a group of two generations of Italian immigrants. The obvious changes that could be observed in the second generation led him to conclude that individuals could adapt to their environment.[112] Furthermore, in his opinion intelligence tests had no validity without taking environmental conditions into account.[113]

The idea of human nature's plasticity was the basis of Boas's anthropological research. He emphasized how differences between the races did not rule out, for example, the possibility that African Americans could

successfully perform the rights and duties of citizenship. He believed that any real difference would be evident only at the highest level, "the high geniuses," which he believed were more numerous among whites. In his preface to the study that the social worker Mary Ovington conducted on the condition of African Americans in New York, Boas touched on this question, defining the direction of research to that point: "Many students of anthropology recognize that no proof can be given of any material inferiority of the Negro race; that without doubt the bulk of individuals composing the race are equal in mental aptitude to the bulk of our own people."[114] Moreover, the concept of "primitive" lost the negative connotations that it had carried to that point.[115] The "primitive" could no longer be associated with a savage, barbaric state on the lowest rung of the social ladder, the "African barbarism" of which racist anthropologists such as John W. Powell and Daniel G. Brinton spoke early in the century. Primitive civilizations should no longer be analyzed and understood on the basis of how removed or close they were to Western civilization but according to parameters fundamental to human mental functions: aptitudes for abstraction, symbolization, inhibitions, and choice, keeping in mind historical and environmental conditioning.

In the essay that he read to the American Folklore Society, Boas reached the following conclusions: "In different races the organization of the mind is on the whole alike, and the varieties of mind found in different races do not exceed, perhaps [do] not even reach, the amount of normal individual variations in each race."[116] He made an important distinction between "culture" and "mind" that removed the theoretical support for a racist theory: "The development of culture must not be confounded with the development of mind. Culture is an expression of the achievement of the mind, and shows the cumulative effects of the activities of many minds."[117] Boas reformulated the terms of white men's mission to civilize the world. He did this on the basis of the ideal premises that supported such a theory:

> When we analyze the strong feeling of nationality which is so potent at the present time, we recognize that it consists largely in the idea of the preeminence of that community whose member we happen to be. . . . The feeling of nationality as here expressed, and the feeling of solidarity of the horde, are of the same order . . . but the ethical point of view which makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the well-being of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value one's own civilization as higher

> than that of the whole race of mankind, are the same as those which prompt the actions of primitive man, who considers every stranger as an enemy, and who is not satisfied until the enemy is killed.[118]

Accepting a point of view of greater tolerance was not easy—the argument went—because "it is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that we participate in this civilization." But there may be other civilizations, "based perhaps on different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up under their influence."[119] As is well known, in 1900 Boas's ideas were not shared by his colleagues. Only many years later, in the second half of the twentieth century, would he gain scientific authority.

More widely accepted at the time by public opinion was the African American Booker T. Washington's point of view. He did not attack racial prejudice and substantially accepted the principle of a biracial society. His moderate position was universally recognized and appreciated. He had contributed indirectly to the friction in the NAACP between the more radical wing represented by Du Bois and a more moderate group around the editor Oswald S. Villard. Washington, who had once been a slave himself, devoted a large part of his energy to teaching. In 1899 he wrote *The Future of the American Negro*, in which he advocated the type of vocational education provided by the Tuskegee Institute and called on black Americans to improve their lot through thrift, hard work, and self-help. Such an approach would help African Americans to find their rightful place in a society that abided by the racial codes and hierarchies demanded by white supremacy. In *Up from Slavery*, which sold thirty thousand copies between 1901 and 1903, Washington started from the widely accepted premise that blacks are by nature primitive and had been civilized by contact with whites. In a discussion held at the Cotton Exposition in Atlanta in 1895, Washington defined the question of race in a metaphor that became famous, comparing the races to the fingers of a hand, separate but at the same time united in common strength.[120]

Booker T. Washington's moderate position was reinforced by his work with Robert Park. The two met at the Congo Reform Association, an organization formed to denounce crimes committed by Belgian colonizers in the Congo, and their collaboration continued at the Tuskegee Institute.

According to Park, whose research was based on biology, the difficulty of overcoming racial prejudice stemmed from its basis in somatic diversity, thus projecting all anxieties onto the "other," extraneous to the narrow social community, and therefore perceived as an enemy. Yet Park could not foresee any change in the line that sharply divided the two races. But he didn't harbor any personal prejudice in regard to the inferiority of African Americans. "The primitive races are not necessarily inferior," he noted during his journey from Tuskegee to Chicago.[121]

Park seemed to have no better solution for the problem of race relations than vocational education for African Americans. He believed that if whites observed the black man's capacity to work, they could deduce reasons for modifying their attitude.[122]

The NAACP appealed directly to two presidents for federal laws to protect the rights of African Americans. Ida Wells approached William McKinley on the occasion of the Wilmington Riots in 1898, to no avail. Nor could the organization budge Theodore Roosevelt, who had shown himself to favor a cautious paternalism or the gradual improvement of the lot of African Americans (similar to Booker T. Washington's position). The racist positions of the political parties of the South could not be overcome. Even with the subsequent formation of the Progressive Party, Roosevelt distinguished between a politics of greater commitment for solving the racial question in the North and a much more cautious policy in the South.

To gain representation for their position, blacks turned to the Republican Party, although Roosevelt's position agreed with the imperialistic view that humanity's more backward races could not reach the same level of self-government that the races considered more advanced were capable of developing.

As for the question of lynching, U.S. Attorney General Albert E. Pillsbury, a member of the NAACP, requested federal intervention in 1912. He indignantly declared that the practice of lynching put the United States outside the consensus of civilized nations: "It is not agreeable to reflect that lynching . . . is peculiarly an American custom. It does not, and could not, exist under any other government in the world having any pretensions to be called civilized. Not in Spain, Russia, or even Turkey, are men and women burned at the stake by mobs, with or without charges of crime."[123] According to Pillsbury's proposal, federal intervention could be invoked on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed the rights

of citizenship as a privilege received directly from the federal government. The federal government therefore had the right and duty to defend its citizens against encroachments on their liberties by the states. The St. Louis riots in 1917, in which a crowd killed between a hundred and two hundred blacks, again showed in the crudest terms the problem of violent white crowds with no legal deterrent of any kind. Accounts by local newspapers and interviews of participants collected by Martha Gruening and Du Bois for the NAACP demonstrated the crowd's uncontrolled spiral of homicidal fury, with no police intervention to protect the blacks.[124]

In 1919 a national conference organized by the NAACP on the theme of lynching had the dual objective of mobilizing public opinion on a national level and of proposing a federal law. By punishing the criminals the law would finally recognize black victims as citizens. The conference, held at Carnegie Hall in New York in May, took a middle position and concluded with an "Address to the Nation on Lynchings," signed by the governors of seven states, former President William Howard Taft, and by the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes. The statement sidestepped a direct call for federal legislation but called for an inquiry into the practice of lynching. A month later the NAACP published *Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States 1889–1918*, a pamphlet that brought to public awareness detailed documentation of the causes and circumstances of lynching, including the precise accusations against the victims and their names and ages. It confirmed what had first caught Wells's attention: the small number of rape accusations compared with the magnitude of the problem in the popular imagination. She found that of twenty-five hundred African Americans who had been lynched, only 19 percent had been accused of rape.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the NAACP to bring national attention to the problem of lynching, the racist positions of the political parties in the South conditioned the policies of Taft and Woodrow Wilson. They were, in fact, both careful as presidents to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the southern states on the question of race. The Supreme Court took the same line in favor of the states' rights.

The practice of lynching decreased the moment that, "with blacks largely disfranchised, segregated and economically victimized[,] supremacists could dispense with lynchings as an everyday means of manipulation and control. Blacks, however, could never be certain that violence might not recur."[125] Once the South was more in step with the socio-

cultural development of the rest of the country, it also found a means of accommodation that did not sacrifice white supremacy. Industries that moved from the North to the South after World War I, for example, offered whites job opportunities that were rarely available to blacks. Jim Crow laws remained in force. During the Great Depression federal work projects were managed at the local level, which meant that segregationists decided who got the jobs. On the federal level, despite repeated attempts to outlaw lynching, Congress did not enact the measures advanced in 1922, 1937, and 1940. Only with the Civil Rights Act of 1965 would there be federal intervention on behalf of individuals deprived of their civil rights.

CHAPTER 4 The Paradox of a Conformist Democracy

The Making of the Social Self

The analysis of crowds-public-mob paralleled in public discourse at the end of the century the debate about the real characteristics of individuality. The French school of Le Bon and Tarde emphasized the crowd as something that "swallowed up" the individual, in accordance with the European state-centered traditions, while American scholars were intent on redefining a basic assumption of their own cultural tradition: liberal individualism.

A desire to safeguard both single and collective values was evident in the Americans' search for a harmonious relationship between the two. Rather than following the dictates of evolutionism, the task of the social sciences became that of leading the way to establish a society regulated by a "harmony of interests" within a framework that could be defined as "the paradox of a conformist democracy."[1] The paradox was expressed in the many questions this vision attempted to answer. In addition to risks of social fractures along the lines of class, race, and ethnicity were disturbing signs, in the great metropolises, of conformism, which could make the masses easy prey for irrational enthusiasms. Between the two antinomic terms, the irrational crowd and the democratic public, were areas of reciprocal influence that made it very difficult to draw a sharp distinction between them. The distinction was also based on racial characteristics contrasting the rational, white, democratic public to irrational mobs, which were compared to savages, women, and children.

It is important to emphasize that if the lynchings denounced by the NAACP had been fully discussed on a national level, doing so would have blurred this distinction, as the "primitive" lynching crowds were composed of white men and women, the supposed members of the democratic public. However, the subject of lynchings remained on the fringes of public discourse, and even those scholars who were discussing them came, for the most part, from the same Anglo-Saxon and Protestant cultural background that had clearly defined the color line in the first place.

Although all scholars clung to a distinct separation between the irrationality of the "crowd" and the rationality of the "public," some of them reexamined the possibility that irrational elements could erupt within the democratic public. On the eve of the war against Cuba, Ross commented on the strong emotional climate: "in waves of national feelings, in war fevers, in passionate 'sympathetic' strikes . . . in public frights . . . in religious crazes, in 'booms' and panics, in agitations, insurrections . . . we witness contagion on a gigantic scale, favored in some cases by popular hysteria."[2] It is interesting to note how the same use of words, such as "contagion," was significant of the influence of the French school on American scholars.

Moreover, to the characteristics of crowds that Ross described, a new one had to be added: consumerism. In fact, the increasing development of consumerism fueled the advertising industry interested in the psychological mechanism of suggestion and persuasion. While in the most enlightened liberal tradition crowds needed to be "educated" about the values of American society—"education" meant the intention to shape a critical will from the bottom up—consumer crowds had to be "persuaded" from above by the psychology of suggestion and social imitation.[3] It is important to keep these two apparently irreconcilable objectives in mind, because they will be part of every discussion and every subsequent analysis of these themes up to the 1920s and 1930s.[4]

New definitions of the "public" also implied new conceptions of subjectivity. The idea of the "social self" that the progressives developed was radically different from traditional nineteenth-century individualism. The concept of the individual, passively conditioned by the new consumer industry or actively participating in the decisional processes of society, as was John Dewey's wish, was in critical need of revision. The new Anglo-Saxon expansionist discourse now emphasized traditional "rugged individualism," as we saw in the case of Theodore Roosevelt's appeal to the "vigor for life" in the nation's struggle to fulfill its "manifest destiny" through imperial conquest.

Social scientists, however, were more interested in investigating the connection between the individual and society. In the search for social aggregations that would break up the uniformity of large masses and at the same time help define democratic citizenship, progressive reformers focused on the concept of the group and the community as an intermediate link between the individual and the larger society. The progressives

looked for a definition of a social individuality, the so-called social self. This could allow a kind of social participation in the most complex modern democratic society, which the historian Casey N. Blake has defined as "cultural citizenship."[5]

What stands out in all the social scientists' thinking at the beginning of the century is the coexistence of both positions, the participative and the passively conditioned social self.[6] These social scientists were keenly aware of the contrast between "education" and "persuasion." In their view the self might become the passive victim of the market and fashion and therefore should be helped through education to combat this danger.

At the same time social scientists were interested in the psychological aspects of habits, suggestion, and imitation, which could become important social bonds for a stable society. These could be used in a different way for educational purposes by distinguishing between "blind imitation" and "rational imitation" or between "habits" and what Dewey called "acquired habits." The "conformist democracy" grew out of this paradoxical perspective.

In order to better understand these mechanisms, it is necessary to examine what has been defined as "the strange career of the social self" in greater detail.[7] According to progressive reformers, the theories of laissez-faire economics and nineteenth-century liberal individualism were inadequate for understanding the new and profound social changes. They thought of society as a web of interconnected and interdependent parts, and they no longer focused on the isolated individual. According to Dewey, the very notion of an isolated individual was an abstract idea.[8] Instead, progressives concentrated on social aggregations that interacted with an external environment and on the issues that united individuals into larger interest groups. To underscore the disquieting aspect of modern interdependent society, Dewey referred to the division of labor in the factory as a paradigm for society as a whole.[9]

U.S. social scientists studied the works of European sociologists such as Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim, and Georg Simmel, who dealt with the individual in modern industrial society.[10] The Americans shared with European sociologists the assumption that human experience must be understood from a relational perspective. The promotion of traditional individual values therefore no longer corresponded to the prevailing outlook of the social disciplines in America.

As Dewey observed, "associated or joint activity is a condition of the

notion of a community." Focusing on the idea of the social individual, he added: "Human beings combine in behavior as directly and unconsciously, as do atoms, stellar masses and cells; as directly and unknowingly as they divide and repel. They do so in virtue of their own structure . . . as atoms combine or separate in [the] presence of an electric charge or as sheep huddle together from the cold. Associated activity needs no explanation: things are made that way."[11] Therefore, with a profound change of perspective, social scientists argued against the Spencerian tradition of social Darwinism that requires individuals to develop the aggressiveness and competitiveness necessary to achieve success in a modern society. Using the analogy of the animal world but with characteristics that were the opposite of those stressed by the Darwinists, social scientists now described an individual that had acquired new traits of cooperation and solidarity through continual interaction with others. The psychologist Mark Baldwin remarked on this point: "We have quite given up the old abstraction of an anti-social self, an individualist and egoistic person. . . . On the contrary, social psychology shows that the self of the individual's self consciousness is, in its materials and processes of formation, thoroughly social in its origin."[12]

The sociologist Albion W. Small summed up this important concept by observing that "the myth of the individual had given its seat to the 'socius.'"[13] This shift in emphasis, from the individual as social agent to the group within which individuals were subordinate agents, represented one of the most significant aspects of this new way of thinking.[14]

In a profoundly changed environment marked by an ever more complex social organization these observers noted mainly two aspects—that of the dynamic changes of a society in continual evolution and that of self, perceived as social. This shift in perspective led to the explanation of social phenomena as resulting from many causes, rather than a single cause, in order to give a more integrated view of social processes.[15]

The development of the individual conscience could be analyzed from many points of view, as could the nature of the relationships between the individual and society. George Mead rejected an a priori approach in the definition of the basic characteristics of the individual and of the racial characteristics of different societies. His goal was to analyze scientifically the aspects of individuality that pertained to the social sphere.

Contrary to what was taking place in Europe with the Freudian school, in the United States the interest was not in analyzing the intrapsychic ele-

ments of the individual but in dissecting those social aspects that could be observed in relation to others. According to George Mead, the path to follow did not "pass through an affirmation of what the individual or the society would become but rather through searches for a point of identity between these two entities: individual and society and a control of the reform process without sacrificing any worthwhile aspect of either of the two parts."[16] Moreover, Small observed on this subject that "the self that is in me cannot be aware of itself and display itself except by means of contacts with other people, consciousness in itself is not an individual but a social phenomenon."[17]

Tarde in France and the psychologist Mark Baldwin in the United States sought to investigate these themes by analyzing the mechanisms that socialize the individual, though they used different means in their research. Baldwin, who was influenced by the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, is credited with introducing German laboratory research into the United States.[18]

Within the social environment the social scientists focused on the notion of social groups. This notion was broad enough to include Charles H. Cooley's theories in the field of social psychology and Arthur F. Bentley's in the field of political science. Cooley took the most innovative approach by focusing on the relationship between the individual and the social group. Like Edward A. Ross, Cooley had grown up during the great labor conflicts of the Gilded Age. As the son of an eminent jurist, Cooley was influenced by both the egalitarian ideals of Christian social reformers and traditional competitive, market-driven individualism. Cooley worked, as had his father, in the railroad sector of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and his doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan dealt with railroads. The emphasis of his early interest in economics shifted from problems pertaining to production to those related to exchange and distribution. The next step would be an analysis no longer focused on the exchange of goods but on the exchange of ideas and information.

Social psychology became the lens for observing collective phenomena.[19] In Cooley's view individual conscience was closely tied to the social environment. The images that people had of others were the "solid facts" of society.[20] The role of the media in this imaginative universe was to let "people until then invisible to live in our imaginations."[21]

Cooley, therefore, rejected the classic individual/society antithesis in

his effort to understand how the subjective conscience developed: "I believe that the antithesis [of] individual-society is false and misleading when it is used as a general or philosophical principle for human relations. . . . Many people not only think of individuals and society as more or less separate and antithetical, but they consider the latter as antecedent to the first."[22] The relational nature of the individual was no longer an assumption that could not be proved but a fact coming from real experience.

Cooley's theoretical innovation was to "place both phases of this social process within the same consciousness," using the metaphor of the "looking glass self" to express this concept.[23] He used this suggestive image to point out how the idea of "self" was, from the very beginning, intimately made up of the "other." As in a mirror, the latter was reflected in the individual subjective conscience.

In this complicated process of interaction with the outside world, with the "other," the role of communication became fundamental. "By communication, we mean the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop through all mental symbols, together with the means to convey them into space and maintain them over time. . . . Without communication, the mind would not develop a real human nature, but would remain in an abnormal and confused state, neither human nor brutish," Cooley wrote.[24] The development of subjective consciousness was, for Cooley, a blend of private and public experiences, blurring any kind of distinction between the two spheres.[25]

Within this framework Cooley formulated his idea of the "primary group," which was widely accepted in the fields of sociology and social psychology. He defined such a group as "characterized by an intimate, face to face association, and by cooperation" and asserted that primary groups "are fundamental in the formation of the social nature and of the ideals of the individual." In this way Cooley described the place where individual consciousness could develop within the social fabric. The result, he said, was "a certain fusion of individuality in a common whole, so that the real true self . . . consists in the common life and in the group's objectives."[26]

The primary group represented an intermediate link between the individual and the anonymity of mass society. "The simplest way to describe this whole," he wrote, "is by saying that it deals with a 'we' and that represents a kind of sympathy and mutual identification for which 'we' is the

natural expression."[27] With this perspective he modified the neat distinction of Victorian origin that separated the private domestic sphere from the public. Cooley defined a private sphere as one that included public elements from the very beginning and that performed the important function of filter between the two spheres.[28]

The characteristics of the primary group, made up "of the family, the childhood playmates, the neighbors, the group of elders . . . are universal in as far as they belong to all stages of development," he said.[29] With keen foresight Cooley saw that the primary group would not disappear with the advent of urban-industrial mass society but would coexist as a filter or barrier between society and the private lives of individuals.

In conclusion the author reaffirmed the exceptionalist course of American history by including a new concept of social individualism, although it had racial, Anglo-Saxon connotations. The stereotype of this new social individual in fact exhibited traits then deemed peculiar to the Anglo-Saxons: loyalty, cooperation, obedience to laws, and tolerance for competing ideas. These characteristics could be extended to define the whole democratic U.S. society.

The progressives worked on the notion of group from many different angles. The political scientist Arthur Bentley worked on the "interest group" theory, and he is now considered one of the founders of this field.[30] In his review of Bentley's *The Process of Government* the historian Charles Beard observed how the interest group theory could offer a convincing alternative to history conceived as the history of ideas, or to a Marxist class analysis.[31] The driving force of history should be sought, in other words, not in ideas or in class conflict but in conflict between interest groups. Considered iconoclastic at the time, the fruit of a detached analysis of the political processes, the book did not achieve the success it attained in later decades.[32]

As a student of Professor Small at the University of Chicago, Bentley published his book with the University of Chicago Press, although avoiding the supervision of his teacher. Feeling an outsider in the Chicago academic world, after the publication of his book he left the city to live the rest of his life on a farm in Indiana. Despite his subsequent scientific and political work, his fame remained connected with *The Process of Government*.[33]

Bentley studied the formation of groups scientifically, using statistics concerning the size, strength, and techniques of interaction. Groups were

the mobile units "that freely join and dissolve and regroup following lines of interest."[34] He considered the state itself to be an interest group whose powers were limited to specific areas, just as the church had jurisdiction over important aspects of the individual's life that were inaccessible to the state. Consequently, group analysis concentrated on the objective, scientific observation of its functioning processes.

The political scientist Harold Laski and John Dewey himself sided with Bentley in the pluralistic movement, opposing the concept of a state conceived according to the Hegelian tradition. Laski, the best-known exponent of the English pluralistic movement in the United States, demonstrated how religious groups' struggles for independence from state intervention in the nineteenth century had undermined the concept of absolute state sovereignty.[35] Dewey, who was involved also in the interest group theory, included class conflicts among the various social conflicts that could occur among different kinds of groups.

If such a view furnished a theoretical framework for understanding the growing importance of interest groups in the political life of society, it also implied that the state was "a rather clumsy [concept] for arranging terms of interplay among the indefinite diversity of groups in which men associate," Dewey said.[36] The function of the state, which was no longer understood as a power greater than special interests and able to absorb different social pressures, became simply an instrument for negotiations among unequal interest groups.[37]

In the second half of the 1920s and in the 1930s, with the advent of authoritarian regimes on the international scene, political scientists such as Walter Shepard and William Y. Elliott raised strong doubts about the weakness of the assumptions inherent in the pluralist theory of groups.[38] According to this theory, in fact, the state was the subject of continual negotiation between groups and therefore was deprived of its universal power. Although Laski and Dewey reconfirmed the notion of the group as an interpretative paradigm of society, they too would later abandon such a theory of the state. Laski, however, stressed the importance of national institutions that were representative of various interests organized by entrepreneurs, workers, consumers, and public functionaries, whereas Dewey focused less on the institutional aspects and more on the specifically social ones. He was principally interested in a participative democracy oriented toward social radicalism. Political control should be exercised from the bottom up in order to provide an equal distribution of wealth and a strengthening of civil liberties—it should not be a "planned

society," according to the expression used by the philosopher, but a "planning society," with this semantic distinction signifying the importance of participation in a democracy.[39]

Herbert Croly's New Nationalism

Herbert Croly, one of the most brilliant figures of the intellectual liberal environment in the early years of the century and founding editor of the *New Republic*, gave a national perspective to the new concept of individualism and to the relationship between the individual and the community. After completing his studies at Harvard with the philosophers William James, George Santayana, and Josiah Royce, Croly became a prominent journalist and author of acclaimed essays. After the success of his *Promise of American Life* he was regarded as the progressive movement's most important theoretician.[40]

He warned of growing threats to American democracy, as economic development had undermined the basic principles of the society that had been based on democratic and republican institutions and laws. In fact, these principles—in which the characteristics of hard work and self-sufficiency were joined to pride and dignity of work—had guaranteed relative equality for the average citizen. However, the growing social and economic inequalities and an increasing diversification and interdependency of work processes undermined the concept of egalitarian individualism of the Jeffersonian tradition. Progressive social scientists critically reexamined the traditional notion of "the invisible hand of the market" and its harmonizing of private and public interests. In order to reinvigorate the faith in progress that was an important component of the American dream, the entire national community needed to be provided with common moral codes.

Within the new concept of the social self, Croly particularly emphasized the notion of sharing a common national purpose as a public good to which citizens should be committed. He was not as interested in a "new nationalism," which was understood as an increase of public power in the Hamiltonian tradition of controlling the private power of industry and finance, as much as he was in reasserting a common ideal of a modern nation able to harness through its institutions the sovereign will of the people. Such loyalty to the nation would in turn foster political maturity, because "a people which becomes more of a nation has a tendency to

become for that very reason more of a democracy."[41] According to this perspective, the notion of an individualism committed to the common good retained its positive value, in contrast to the notion of a "particularity," or only pursuing its private interests.

According to Walter Lippmann, Croly's *The Promise of American Life* marked the end of the "age of innocence," which had been characterized by unconditional faith in the American destiny. Croly's vision of the "uniqueness of the American promise" focused on the common national identity based on liberal individualism. Theodore Roosevelt himself would adopt the "new nationalism" as a prominent part of the Progressive Party's platform.

Within this context the metaphor most commonly used to define the whole social group, as well as the individual, was taken from the military vocabulary.[42] In the novel *Caesar's Column*, published in 1890, Ignatius Donnelly expressed the dual nature of a large group that was made up of individual components. He depicted a multitude obedient to the leaders of the populist movement, observing that "a multitude is like soldiers in an army. They obey when called upon."[43]

The leader obviously then had an important role with the group. In *Hero Tales of American History* (1895) Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge took examples from the military world in order to praise the leaders' role.[44] Likewise, in *The Red Badge of Courage*, the famous novel published the same year, Stephen Crane described the strong emotions of a "common man," an infantryman, at being part of an army: "He suddenly lost concern for himself. . . . He became not a man but a member. He felt that something of which he was a part—a regiment, an army, a cause or a country—was in crisis."[45]

In the euphoric climate of the Spanish-American War the definition of "identity within an army" was extrapolated and used as an example that could be applied to modern enterprise.[46] In fact, Elbert Hubbard's short story, "A Message to Garcia," was a great success in the business community.[47] But what was the message to Garcia? The author compared an employee's praiseworthy loyalty to his corporation to that of the unknown Captain Rowan of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment, who during the "splendid little war" in Cuba was charged with delivering an important message to Garcia, the Cuban leader of the insurgents, in order to secure his cooperation. In this brief parable Hubbard praised the humble work of the employee who, "given a letter for Garcia, without asking any

idiotic questions . . . quietly takes the missive."[48] The employee, like the unknown Captain Rowan, felt he was part of the large and coordinated group, the corporation or the army. According to this perspective, Croly observed: "The whole community includes the individual as well as the mass, the many as well as the few. The individual is merged in the mass unless he is enabled to exercise efficiently and independently his own private and special purposes."[49]

Thus state institutions should help the individual enjoy economic independence within the social structure of the community. Enhancing the power of the state in order to support the most disadvantaged classes would not create economic dependence (one of the aspects most opposite to the principle of freedom embodied in the "American promise"). Quite the contrary. State assistance was required, according to Croly, to increase the individual's economic independence in order to guarantee the basic rights of political freedom.

In his renewed concept of the nineteenth-century principles of liberal individualism, Croly did not consider individual liberty to be at odds with public power but looked at the ways those principles mutually supported each other. As a matter of fact, progressive intellectuals used interdependence as a theoretical paradigm. Such a profound change of perspective, once it referred to the problem of social disparity, implied, according to historian Thomas Haskell, "a sense that the individual reformer himself was causally implicated in poverty since the social arrangements that 'made' him affluent 'made' others poor." Consequently, "the technique of aiding the poor shifted away from the effort to inculcate thrift, prudence and the other elements of self-mastery so essential to nineteenth-century humanitarianism. The new emphasis fell on redistribution of wealth or the design of institutional shelters where the poor might be shielded from life's worst hazards."[50]

Although in *The Promise of American Life* Croly mixed political analysis with incongruities, such as touches of mysticism in the final passages, in his *Progressive Democracy* (1914) he stated more coherently his faith in a pragmatist's vision of democracy, understood as "pragmatic faith" in fragile human wills. As James Kloppenberg has observed: "Science no longer yielded definite knowledge but only an experimental method, and social guidance came from democratic participation rather than from a priesthood of sociologists."[51] Moreover, Croly reconfirmed the uniqueness of the American experience. Of U.S. society, he observed: "In no

respect does it resemble the omnipotent and arbitrary mob which the constitutional conservatives profess to fear."[52] The fate of progressive democracy could not be compared to that cycle of "anarchy and despotism" that characterized the French experience.[53]

The Mob Mind in a Democratic Urban Society

Although social scientists acknowledged the sharp divide between a crowd's irrationality and the rationality of a democratic society, in the early years of the century they had already begun to question the strength of this approach and to examine whether there was an intersection of the two. Growing increasingly more concerned about this perspective on the eve of World War I, they feared that homologation could lead to forms of collective hysteria, even through the popular media, which at least theoretically should motivate public debate.

Although progressives emphasized the rational side of human nature, in these same years new French and U.S. studies on hypnosis and the mechanisms underlying human rationality were starting to shake one of the theoretical pillars upholding the concept of a democratic society. In 1894 Boris Sidis, a Russian immigrant and student of William James at Harvard, was among the first in America to publish a work about the mob.[54] Then, in 1898, he published *The Psychology of Suggestion*, which was acclaimed by the group of Boston psychiatrists around Morton Prince and the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* as on a par with the work of the famous European psychiatrists Jean-Martin Charcot, Alfred Binet, Josef Breuer, and Sigmund Freud.

Sidis basically labeled all the nonrational characteristics of human behavior as "suggestion." With this term he defined those aspects deep within the human psyche that he called "the sub-waking self." William James, who wrote an introduction to Sidis's book, stressed the dramatic change of perspective in recent years, once the problem of consciousness was no longer studied in a metaphysical light but by means of laboratory experiments.

In his research about the formation of self-consciousness, Sidis, following James, spoke of the inner self's two parallel and coexisting "streams of consciousness"; however, Sidis held a pessimistic and catastrophic view of the destructive nature of the deeper, sub-waking self, similar to the view of European crowd psychologists. The comparison referred once

again to the primitive world: "Like a cannibal the crowd is nourished by human beings."[55] And again attention was paid to the emergence of these primitive aspects in more advanced societies: "If now something striking fixes the attention of the public—a brilliant campaign, a glittering holy image or a bright 'silver dollar'—the sub-waking self, the demon of demos, emerges . . . to the surface of social life and throws the body politic into convulsions of democratic fury."[56] The allusion to the recent populist campaign was clear. Sidis emphasized even more dramatically and fatalistically than Le Bon the pathological and "demonic" aspect of crowds in revolt. Perhaps this was because of the still-fresh memories of the pogrom that the scholar brought with him from tsarist Russia. In fact, before coming to America he had been held in prison for rebelling against both his family's Jewish culture and against the Romanov dynasty.

Though less popular and successful than Le Bon's book, Sidis's *Psychology of Suggestion* was distinguished, as William James noted, "by its originality and width of its scope."[57] It is worth noting that Sidis was interested in how the mechanisms of suggestion could be extended to include the tendency toward conformity and standardization, as found in the behavior of metropolitan masses:

> With the growth and civilization of society, individuality is more and more crushed out and the poor barren sub-waking self is exposed in all its nakedness to the vicissitudes of the external world. . . . Man's relations in life are determined and fixed for him, he is told how he must put on his tie, and the way he must wear his hat . . . and display a smile full of delight. Personality is suppressed by the rigidity of social organization. . . . The cultivated civilized individual is an automaton, a mere puppet.[58]

Sidis's book greatly influenced even Edward A. Ross in his *Social Psychology*.[59] Ross cited the same examples of collective suggestion proposed by Sidis: the financial panic of 1857–58, the religious revival in Kentucky, and the women's 1873 crusade for temperance.

In an attempt to redefine the lines of exclusion/inclusion in a democratic society, Ross was among the first to warn of the inherent risks that a mob mind would develop within a democratic public. In a work published shortly after the 1896 elections, in the heated climate of the Spanish-American War, Ross focused on the theme of the mob mind. Elaborating on Tarde's well-known distinction between crowd and public, Ross captured the full meaning of the changes that mass communication had

introduced to public consciousness: it could not only stimulate a higher level of critical awareness but also arouse strong emotional tensions. "A vast public shares the same rage, alarm, enthusiasm or horror," he wrote.[60] This could not be defined as an archaic phenomenon, according to Ross, because it was inscribed at the core of modern life.

In defining mob characteristics, Ross distinguished between a "mob" and a "lynching party." The great mental instability typical of a mob could be absent in a lynching party, such as the one in New Orleans where the crowd lynched thirteen Italians. According to Ross, this lynching could not be considered a real mob where "fickleness and instability" led to "unanimity" due to "mental contagion," because the participants acted in full awareness.[61]

According to Ross, an urban setting, traditionally regarded as the social environment of a democratic public, was most liable to produce those characteristics of the mob mind: "emotionality, impulsiveness, exasperated feelings, excessive credulity, fickleness and inability to reason," which should be countered with the "triumph of intelligence, conscience and wisdom in public affairs."[62] Moreover, he observed that "it has long been recognized that the behavior of city populations under excitement shows the familiar characteristics of the mob quite apart from any thronging."[63] The same instruments of communication that the press had invoked as the most suitable for forming a "public" of rationally conscious citizens could instead amplify its excitability.

While rationality was at the basis of public behavior, Ross acknowledged that those processes of imitation and sympathetic attraction espoused by Gabriel Tarde and Franklin Giddings were also important in the formation of "the universe of discourse" (according to Park's definition). The "mental touch" did not require physical proximity. "With the telegraph to collect and transmit the expressions and signs of the ruling mood and the fast mail to hurry to the eager clutch of waiting thousands the still damp sheets of the morning daily, remote people are brought as it were into one another's presence."[64] Ross identified a series of gradations in the formation of various types of "mob minds," from collective manias to popular trends transmitted by mental contagion.

Like Alexis de Tocqueville, Ross emphasized the contradiction between individual and mass: "The public swallows up the individuality of the ordinary man, as the crowd swallows the will of its members. . . . The individual is left with nothing to do but follow the drift. . . . Ideas succeed

one another in his mind, not by trial and rejection but in the order of how they arrive on the scene."[65]

The greatest obstacles to the spread of mental contagion, according to Ross, who agreed with Giddings, were the inevitable fragmentations produced by differences between various ethnic groups and within them by differences of wealth and social status. But even with these limits he observed: "These faults are due in part to the nervous strain of great cities. The bombardment of the senses by innumerable impressions tends to produce neurasthenia, the peculiar affliction of the city dweller. . . . In the main, however, the behavior of city dwellers under excitement can best be understood as the result of mental contacts made possible by easy communication."[66] Ross notably chose the most significant examples of mass urban contagion from those at the core of industrial development. He looked back in time for an example of "mass contagion" involving New York's financial center:

> It was in October . . . (1857) that Mr. Lamphier, a missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church, thought, in his own heart, that an hour of daily prayer would bring consolation to afflicted business men. In a few weeks those holding the meetings were astonished to find the crowds growing too large for the buildings. The Methodist Church on John Street and the Dutch Reformed Church on Fulton Street were opened daily. Next, Burton's Theater was hired, and throughout the winter noonday prayer-meetings were held at numerous places in the city. Even the firemen and policemen held their prayer-meetings.[67]

This exemplary case of the "ethics of capitalism" shows there was no break between the irrational crowds of the past and the rational development of industrial society but that examples of irrational crowd behavior could be seen in the development of modern urban society and not just in a rural or a preindustrial past.

The progressives' ambivalence toward such irrational mass contagion can be clarified by observing their fear of its potentially dangerous effects in a democratic society and in their interest in the new instruments for conditioning the masses. At this time the rising consumer industry was also showing an interest in ways of influencing mass markets.[68]

The center of these contradictions of modern industrial society was the metropolis, a place that attracted the great masses as well as repelled them—a common theme in the literature of the time. In *A Certain Rich*

Man William Allen White described the two contradictory worlds: the city dominated by rapacious financiers and the small-town America of another day. And in his novel *A Far Country* Winston Churchill, inspired by the banker J. P. Morgan, denounced the emptiness of the drive for profit.

The best-known novel on the big-city theme was Upton Sinclair's *The Metropolis*, which was turned into a popular movie by Fritz Lang. Sinclair's visionary fantasy blends the rationality of giant slave-labor organizations with the ambiguous and irrational appeal of corruption and vice to the masses. From the scintillating metropolis, where the dissipated wealthy lived at the expense of a slave population, the seeds of corruption and lasciviousness were spread over the entire nation through the crowds that continually flocked into big-city hotels from every state. "It was said that the hotels of New York, placed end to end, would reach all the way to London; and they took care of a couple of hundred thousand people a day—a horde which had come from all over the world in search of pleasure and excitement. . . . In this seething caldron of graft there were many strange ways of making money, and many strange and incredible types of human beings to be met."[69] The only possible solution for the indignant protagonist, Montague, a personification of the uncorrupted common man, was flight and return to his origins, to "some simple and decent place to live in."[70]

The philosopher Josiah Royce also emphasized the importance of small towns as a political and cultural counterbalance to standardization and the spread of the mob spirit. In fact, he stated, "freedom dwells now in the small social group and has its securest home in provincial life."[71] The task of the community or small town was "to save the individual," Royce said. The specter to be exorcised, according to Royce, was that of "the big cities inhabited by wanderers without a community, sojourners with a dwelling place but no home, citizens of the world, who have no local attachment."[72]

The alternative to the risk of spreading the mob mind was to return to the values of rational individualism represented by the old Anglo-Saxon stock, a belief held by a large number of progressives: "A society of men with neither the 'back' look on the past nor yet the 'out' look on their fellows but the 'in' look upon reason and conscience," Ross wrote.[73] The problem of social control, then, had to be seen within the frame of U.S. exceptionalism from a racial point of view as scholars were looking for social bonds able to cope with the great problems of integration of

the new immigrating races with the old Celtic stock. According to Ross: "With them [Anglo-Saxons] honor and self-respect are the mainsprings of right action. Of an inward-looking, self-analyzing bent, in contrast to the more outward-looking, sensuous peoples of the South, they can be reached by such illusions as 'moral law,' 'conscience,' and 'duty,' which install the reflecting self in the judgment seat of the soul."[74] In the end Ross reconfirmed his faith in the Anglo-Saxon heritage as guardian of the highest values achieved by the human race, able to overcome the profound changes taking place in society.

Social Control and the Laws of Imitation

In his autobiography Ross tells how in December 1894 he began to reflect upon the relations and conflicts between the individual and society in terms of social control. In the previous summer his professor of economics at the University of Wisconsin, Richard Ely, had undergone a public trial. The university trustees had fired Ely and accused him of aiding and abetting the workers' movement, of harboring sympathy for socialism and giving advice to the labor union organizers. As Dorothy Ross observed, under these circumstances "it would be surprising if unconsciously at least, [Edward] Ross's sense of the pressure of society upon himself and his fellows did not inform his discovery of social control."[75]

It is important to remember that Ross was influenced not only by his personal experience but also by the profound changes taking place in society, with labor conflicts arising in factories all over the nation, and the massive influx of immigration from different countries. Social scientists felt it important to redefine the basic tenets of democracy in public discourse. If on the one hand conflicts should be avoided because they were detrimental and unproductive, and on the other hand excessive conformism left no room for individuality, what was the answer? Ross faced the problem by using a typically modern example: the crossing of a busy big-city street. "Order cannot be said to prevail among people going in the same direction at the same pace, because there is no interference." Nor could one speak of order, obviously, if men and machines were free to move as they pleased. One could speak of order only "when all who meet or overtake one another in crowded ways take the time and pains needed to avoid collision, then the crowd is orderly."[76] From a state of disorder and conflict, according to the theories of Darwin and Spencer,

human societies had evolved toward more complex forms that required new kinds of social cooperation. Ross observed: "The truth just coming into focus, that all groups and organs constantly exercise manifold cohesive pressures and attractions upon their units, is a discovery of the first order and cannot fail to influence the future of social science."[77] While according to the liberal theory, beginning with John Stuart Mill's classic, "On Liberty," social "control" of the individual should be reduced to a minimum, the progressives reversed this assumption, convinced that the profound changes taking place in a highly complex democratic society like America's required new forms of social control.

The importance of this new position came about at a time when anthropology exerted a strong influence on sociology. In fact, the most interesting suggestions for analyzing modern society came from anthropology. Although rituals and ceremonies had always been foremost in the study of primitive societies, what was emerging at the turn of the century was the importance of analyzing these same traditions and customs in advanced industrial societies as influential forms of indirect social control.

Just as Sumner spoke of "mores" and Giddings of "sympathy of the species," Ross took into account such instincts as sympathy, sociability, and the sense of justice. He distinguished some interests basic to human associations, such as health, religion, government, and knowledge, by focusing his analysis on collective behavior linked to "suggestion, education and publicity," which were fundamental to the formation and conditioning of public consciousness. According to Ross, it was a matter of forming a "folk craft" in place of a European-type "state craft."

He posed the problem as a matter of "social consensus" and focused on the more properly cultural and political aspects of society. External coercion was unnecessary, according to Ross's idea of social control, once the social nature of human behavior was established: "The control of the individual on society was identified with the same nature of the individual."[78] The "moral method" of democracy consisted of obtaining social control through control of the individual consciousness that went far beyond mere compliance with the law, and of binding the community together through its beliefs, habits, ceremonies, and social values. Ross had been the first to write a treatise of social psychology that analyzed such methods for the purpose of defining this new field of inquiry.[79]

The theme of social control would become one of the crucial issues in public discourse of the Progressive Era, with a wide spectrum of implica-

tions—from the need to counter the theories of laissez-faire economics, in order to impose some form of control on the growing concentration of economic power, to the commonly shared faith in science as the basic instrument for reading, interpreting, and guiding social processes.

Within this broad framework an important topic of research and debate in academic circles, as well as among the wider public, was the controversial question of "imitation." Tarde in France and Baldwin in the United States analyzed imitative behavior through hypnotic experiments.[80] The mechanisms of suggestion and repetition offered a unique key, Tarde maintained, for interpreting the "social enigma" of human society and the seeming chaos of social life.[81] He claimed in fact that "society is imitation and imitation is a sort of somnambulism."[82] Thus imitation, suggestion, and contagion represented the psychological mechanisms that drove the social self through the complex social reality. Tarde also emphasized the media's responsibility for amplifying such psychological processes. As Tarde stated, the laws of imitation provided data of universal import: "They are to sociology what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy."[83] Baldwin, the American psychologist, took a very different approach. He did laboratory experiments analyzing the role of imitation in child development and then extended the scientific results of his work to a general interpretation of social processes.[84]

The theories of Tarde and Baldwin were the subject of intense debate at this time. While Small gave Tarde credit for focusing attention on the mechanism of imitation, he also observed that Tarde's "service to social science ends when he wants to make us believe that imitation is the social 'factotum.'"[85] The strongest objections to imitation theory were rooted in the belief that imitation was an instinct and therefore not subject to environmental influences, and that it provided the key to understanding the entire social universe.

The social psychologist William McDougall added gregariousness, the so-called herd instinct, to human instincts such as hunger and aggressiveness, which lent material support to Le Bon's and Tarde's theories about the assembling of crowds and the processes of imitation. Moreover, McDougall accused Tarde of not taking Darwin's laws of evolution more into account: the imitation process, that is, staying with the herd, should be seen as an evolutionary response to a stimulus (fear in the face of danger). McDougall argued that by ignoring this process Tarde erroneously considered only one side of the coin.[86]

According to the sociologist Franklin Giddings, the process of imitation assumed another, more universal meaning. The so-called consciousness of kind that Giddings took from the concept of sympathy (which is discussed by Adam Smith in his theory of moral sentiments) became diluted in an indistinct "like-mindedness," according to the critical observations of Albion Small. Giddings foresaw the spread of a generalized, common mentality through "national kinship." The sense of national, racial similarity would come about through possession of common mental and moral traits. However, the nature of the processes of exclusion/inclusion in what he himself defined as the "in-group" remained unclear.

Small called for the rigor of the scientific method, a common appeal of all the social scientists of the time, as the fundamental investigative tool, along with the rejection of every dogmatic apriority. Moreover, Small observed of the methodology, "sociology has nothing to gain, but everything to lose, by ignoring the conclusions of the centuries about the limitations and restraints which must be enforced upon speculation, if it is to be kept serviceable. Speculation does not alter its character when we entitle it 'subjective interpretation.' Science is not made by subjectivity. Science is the output of subjectivity applying itself to the objective and correcting itself by progressive apprehension of the objective."[87]

As we have seen, U.S. social scientists focused most of all on the theory's method, as had been the case with Le Bon's crowd psychology. From a pragmatic perspective they criticized the abstractions and generalizations that were not supported by empirical research. In the case of imitation the method used was "a rather obscure assumption, almost a mystical 'a priori,' antiquated and invisible."[88]

These scientists were in almost unanimous agreement that imitation should not be restricted to fixed and inherited instincts. Rather, it could be extended to the area of "acquired perceptions" that could be modified, conditioned, and oriented according to the guidelines of a pragmatist culture in which mobility and change played a fundamental role: not a single type of imitation but imitation of sound, motor skills, and behavior. As William James had stressed, there was no such thing as a single memory but only many different memories; in the same way there was not one imitation but only "imitative actions."[89]

Regarding the homogenization processes, Ross proposed another important distinction between what he defined as "rational imitation" and "blind imitation." He considered imitative actions as something that could

not be eliminated in a democratic society, since originality and critical awareness could be the prerogative of only the few. In a society characterized by increasing complexity and specialization, the guiding instrument for the masses had to be that of the "rational imitation" of expert authority. In the field of the "practical arts" (fashion, entertainment, the arts) and in the applied sciences, rational imitation could be most effective. The imitative mechanism, based on instinctual drives such as suggestion, should be corrected with the rational verification of results actually obtained, thus emancipating the masses from the "blind imitation" that made individuals easy prey to whatever fashionable wind was blowing.

The New Role of Community

Some of the most important scientists of the Progressive Era—John Dewey, Josiah Royce, Jane Addams, and Charles Cooley—introduced the concept of community as a new basic element in the individual/mass antithesis. The notion of community, which was already present in U.S. culture, now assumed a new significance. It had a wider range of meaning than the notion of "group," as community was rooted in the tradition of the self-governing communities of New England. Just when it was about to be destroyed by the development of a new industrial society, the community was reaffirmed as a valid paradigmatic model not only for the past but also for modern industrial society.

As the historians Jean B. Quandt, Robert Wiebe, and Tom Bender emphasized in their studies, many social scientists at the beginning of the century brought back concepts learned in Europe and translated them into their own cultural framework.[90] Their concept of community came from their youthful experiences, in addition to a whole number of theories based on the Scottish Enlightenment and the Protestant town council meetings in New England. And they reintroduced different versions of the concept of community: Cooley's primary group, the idealization of small towns by the philosopher Josiah Royce, John Dewey's "Great Community." Each sought to erect a bulwark against the advancing "Great Society" that brought with it increasing complexities of language and vast, impersonal networks of reciprocally interdependent relationships. John Dewey defined the "lost individual" as deprived of the cultural framework necessary for coping with the problems of a radically changed environment.

Royce related his concept of community to the small town, understood geographically and culturally as the social guardian of positive values in contrast to the alienating effects produced by the great metropolitan society. Dewey's idea of the Great Community turned out to be more original and innovative, as it included not only conservative elements from the past but also important contemporary elements. His attention was focused less on economic distribution, which remained implicitly in the background, and more on the modifications of the social, psychological, and cognitive sphere of collective behavior.[91]

Dewey, who went beyond a nineteenth-century theory of a society composed of atomic units, shared the concept expressed by the majority of progressives about the "self" as a social product. Like Cooley, he spoke of the formation of consciousness as a process that included interaction with community members.[92] The role of sympathy, which Dewey adopted from the Scottish Enlightenment, was to act as a link between ideas and feelings.

From this perspective communication acquired a decisive role in the formation of a participatory public capable of controlling social and political activities, thus avoiding processes of exclusion of part of the population for economic, social, or ethnic-racial reasons. Dewey referred to the ear as symbolic of the importance of communication in contemporary society, whereas the eye made one a spectator: "The connection of the ear with vital and outgoing thought and emotion are immensely closer than that of the eye. Vision is a spectator, hearing is a participator."[93] The constituency of a "democratic public" depended on "the improvement of methods and conditions of debate, discussion, persuasion."[94] On the other hand, in regard to the increased complexity of social relations, he noted how the "public" or "various publics" that had come into existence found themselves in a condition of "bewilderment" or "eclipse" inasmuch as they were incapable of understanding the meaning of the rapid social changes in effect.

These changes had produced alienation in social relationships, a matter of concern to Dewey, as such relationships were subjugated to the iron laws of the market and profit: "The new era of human relationships in which we live is one worked by mass production for remote workers, by cable and telephone, by cheap printing, by railway and steam navigation. Only geographically did Columbus discover a new world. The actual new

world has been generated in the last hundred years. Steam and electricity have done more to alter the conditions under which men associate together than all the agencies which affected human relationships before our time."[95] Dewey noted the gap that was growing between this kind of society and the "absence of ideas in connection with which technological factors operate. . . . Mental and moral beliefs and ideals change more slowly than outward conditions."[96]

Inasmuch as symbols were vehicles of meaning, the philosopher recognized the important function of controlling "sentiment and thought. . . . And the new age has no symbols consonant with its activities. The ties which hold men together in action are numerous, tough and subtle. But they are invisible and intangible." While the means for the transmission of information and therefore of communication had never been so available, "the thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not communicated and hence are not common." The conclusion reached by Dewey was that of a public "shadowy and formless, seeking spasmodically for itself, but seizing and holding its shadow rather than its substance."[97] In the utopian "Great Community," according to Dewey, the ideals of the American community had to be reaffirmed, allowing those aspects to emerge that could be joined to the ideals of the French Revolution: liberté, égalité, fraternité.

Dewey was also critical of the Freudian theory of subconscious drives, while he stressed the importance of the social character of humans, for whom "habits" constituted the means of access to social life. On the relevance of habits in human conduct, he clearly borrowed from William James: "Habit is the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious protective arm. It is what maintains us within the boundaries of order. . . . It sees that even the most difficult and repelling work is not abandoned. . . . It keeps the fisherman and the boatman in the sea during the winter . . . the miner in his darkness, it ties the farmer to his cabin and to his lonely farm during the snowy winter . . . [and] keeps different social classes from mixing."[98] Differing from James's more conservative viewpoint and from the unconsciously predetermined "mores" of Graham Sumner, Dewey believed that habits did not at all correspond to "routinized behavior" but instead represented a "predisposition acquired through ways and means of response, not with respect to particular acts. . . . Habit means a special sensitivity towards certain classes of stimuli, preferences or aversions

rather than specific facts. Habit means will."[99] Dewey based his theories of education on the notion of human conduct as a flexible and pliable predisposition toward the social environment.

Eliminating the distinction between the elite and the masses that we found in Ross—who would in fact be among the elitist democrats of the 1920s—Dewey envisioned not the reproduction of standardized behavior in the masses, like a mechanical chain of stimulus-response sought by the new consumer industry and the school of behaviorism, but a democracy in which citizens would be educated to use intelligence and critical analysis as a democratic habit. From this perspective Dewey thought of Le Bon's crowds as a "negative force, especially when they disintegrate habits that liberate impulses, thus subjecting people to immediate stimuli."[100]

Habits therefore represented the barrier against unruly gatherings. Though recognizing the importance of habits in democracy, Dewey observed that "assimilating the psychology of democracy with that of the masses, dissolving thus individual judgment, as in the case of Le Bon, denotes a lack of psychological intuition."[101] According to Dewey, American democracy was facing in two opposite directions with respect to the "construction of habits." On one hand was the tendency to "multiply the occasions for imitations" or routine behavior, and on the other was the tendency to "stimulate the impulses and habits that, as experience has proved, render us more sensitive and generous . . . the habit of intelligence."[102]

The anthropological aspect of habits as social functions, not only in the passive, hereditary sense but also in an active and plastic sense—in the sense of democratic values—would then be the distinctive feature for redefining American democratic citizenship. As we shall see, this discourse was to be taken up again at the end of the 1930s, in the great national mobilization on the brink of World War II.

CHAPTER 5 Criticism of Mass Democracy after World War I

"Jazz in the World of Science": The Theory of Cultural Relativism

The solar eclipse of 1919 after the end of World War I had aroused worldwide expectation: on that occasion it would be possible to test Einstein's revolutionary general theory of relativity. This expectation was matched by enthusiasm about the result: "Jazz in the world of science" was the definition the *New York Times* gave the new theory that questioned the foundations of current scientific thinking.[1] As such, according to the *Times* article, the general theory of relativity (1916) had the same impact as the social upheavals going on at the same time: "It is bolshevism in the world of science," commented the journalist. Despite divergent points of view about the legitimacy of extending the new epistemology beyond physics, such an approach, that of applying the axioms of physical science to other fields of human knowledge in a purely symbolic way, was commonly practiced, transferring Einstein's theory of relativity from the physical world to that of a subjective relativity.

The impulse for experimental research in all the social sciences occurred in a cultural climate generally defined as cultural relativism.[2] Exercising a notable influence on the development of this approach was Franz Boas's school of anthropology and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, which was bent on reformulating criteria of knowledge to take account of the revolutionary discoveries coming from physics and geometry. The discovery that a system of values like Euclidean geometry, indisputably universal up to that time, could have a relative value along with other systems, seemed to confirm the impossibility of guaranteeing certainties in a fixed and static universe.

Scholars from a variety of fields, from economics to jurisprudence, oriented their studies in this direction. The historian Charles Beard criticized the system of checks and balances of American government as "an Euclidean form of government," no longer adequate for the needs and present-day problems posed by the growing power of the corporations.[3]

Following the general lines of cultural relativism, anthropology pointed out the possibility for studying primitive societies, defined as "non-Euclidean," with scientific parameters that would shed more light on their systems. The anthropologists who were formed in Franz Boas's school analyzed non-Western societies without using a scale of predetermined values that placed modern Western society at the apex of human rationality.[4] *The Meaning of Meaning*, a widely discussed book by the linguists Charles Ogden and Ian A. Richards, echoed this same approach. They developed a critical analysis of language, breaking down the meaning of words not only to the reality of the things they signified but also according to the network of symbols present in a specific cultural context.

According to the same perspective of cultural relativism, historians such as Charles Beard and Carl Becker rejected the idea of "objectivity" in their own research, as they believed it was inevitably tied to the values and interests of the present. For Becker the myth of objectivity was based on the "usual concept of pure reason, without ties to will and emotions, purposes, passions and desire."[5] In a 1931 article for the *American Historical Review*, "Every Man His Own Historian," he observed that in the study of history "the past is a kind of screen upon which we project our vision of the future and it is indeed a moving picture borrowing much of its form and color from our fears and aspirations."[6] Similarly, Charles Beard, for whom the idea of scientific objectivity was essentially nothing more than a "noble dream," observed how much the cultural climate, interests, and social situation affected the historian's work and was inevitably reflected in it.

People from all points of view agreed that the war had profoundly changed the features of American society.[7] The role that the United States was about to take on was that of the leading economic power to which all European nations would become debtors. The world financial center therefore became Wall Street, in the heart of the great metropolis of New York, making "the first American city" a "World City."[8]

After the war the great financial and industrial interests, powerful from the strong economic growth, had unconditional faith in the "American way of life" to provide for the economic well-being of the consumer masses. In the political and cultural environment, however, there was a deep fracture that had not existed in the prewar years. The wide-ranging points of view that had been a part of public discourse during the Progressive Era were sharply curtailed in the postwar climate with the

end of liberal appeals for reform. Emphasis was more on the role and importance of the "experts" who had been the pivot of the "independent commissions." Moreover, there was "a collective sense that Progressives' political science had not helped to achieve progressive goals."[9]

Immediately after the war, in a climate of sharp social conflicts and a fierce xenophobic campaign against the "Reds," a campaign of recriminations sprang up against the Versailles treaties and excessive war profits. The stark contradictions of a war fought in the name of Wilsonian ideals, "to make the world safe for democracy," had deeply affected American public opinion. Witnesses reported the devastation and enormous burden of suffering and death that the war in Europe had brought to the continent. Meanwhile, an exasperated nationalism spread throughout the United States. The phenomenon of collective hysteria seemed in some cases to confirm the theory about the crowd and collective psychology that had been at the center of public discourse at the beginning of the century. One of the most discussed aspects of that hysteria was war propaganda.

At the outbreak of war the biggest U.S. government apparatus ever assembled for the diffusion of information, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), recruited psychologists and social scientists, such as Charles Merriam, who went on to head the CPI in Italy, as well as journalists, novelists, and advertising writers.[10] All the new techniques of advertising and publicity were put to its service.

George Creel, director of the CPI, marshaled the principal newspapers of the country to provide free space for war propaganda. He prepared material for publication in the smaller newspapers, sent propaganda abroad through radio and telegraph services controlled by the government, and directly supervised the information released to U.S. newspapers. The Information Division broadcast controlled news all day long. The mobilization of the country by all possible means of communication, from newspapers to movies to "talking newspapers" (news hawkers), gave those who participated in this extraordinary undertaking firsthand experience with the great inherent power of the new media and also the opportunity to use mass manipulation techniques.

Many of these propaganda methods would be adopted in the large commercial and financial enterprises of the publicity world. Creel himself considered the entire operation a gigantic publicity campaign. His accounting of it after the war was significantly titled *How We Advertised*

America.[11] The war had triggered an increase of government power over information as well as economics. Both the War Industries Board and the CPI would be dismantled at the end of the war, but they remained in the public memory as examples of potential solutions in emergency situations, in both the positive and negative sense, regarding the intervention of the state in different sectors of society.

At the end of the war a bitter debate developed not only about this powerful propaganda apparatus but also about the enemies' use of propaganda. While newspapers denounced the horrors of war, sociological and political research documented the massive propaganda operations set in motion by enemy countries to mold public opinion.[12] The debate was not limited to the scientific world but spilled into popular periodicals, such as *Harper's* and the *Nation*, as well as government publications like the official manual for the armed forces.[13]

The word "propaganda" thus came to have a substantially negative meaning that included the diffusion of false and misleading news, similar to the appeals put out by the enemy powers. As the social psychologist Leonard Doob remarked: "In America the word 'propaganda' has a bad odor."[14] "Propaganda" meant a devious and subversive action performed by some external and extraneous power to damage the American nation; thus the enemy powers, Germany in particular, used propaganda, whereas the Committee on Public Information, as its very name stated, provided not propaganda but news, information verifiable by objective data.

Propaganda was considered extraneous to the framework of a democratic society. Studies of war propaganda wholly debunked the liberal idea of a government that, without pressure from interest groups, represented the free expression of its citizens' will. Moreover, the social scientists who had worked in the CPI were unsettled by their experience because it had made dramatically evident the possibility of manipulating public opinion toward preestablished objectives, even in a democratic society like America.[15] According to the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, the experience of war had given to those who lived through it an "unaccustomed richness of realism . . . [in] their way of thinking."[16]

The distinction between America's organization and the enemy's continued, even after the war, to be based on ideological arguments. The government information apparatus promoted the "diffusion of news," information based on truth, while the enemy promoted a "propaganda" of lies. According to Creel, one reason for Germany's defeat was its moral

collapse, influenced by the campaign of "information" promoted by the United States.

Paradoxically, statements about the importance of truthful and objective information were tied, in Creel's mind, to all the most sophisticated techniques of American "marketing." News had to be sold to the public like other consumer goods. According to Creel, selling the U.S. worldview was nothing more than a great selling initiative, the greatest adventure anyone could have in the advertising field.[17] The work of the CPI was nothing more than "a gigantic effort to guide public opinion," Doob noted.[18] Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the notion of propaganda itself came to mean the hidden manipulation of the masses by illicit means, appealing to the irrational aspects of the human mind. It is important to remember, though, that these irrational aspects were at the core of research studies in all the social science fields.

The current of thought known as "irrationalism"—which held that the human mind was governed by unconscious forces—influenced all sectors of cultural life in America in the postwar years. New and different perspectives changed the traditional concepts of time and space. The arts, from literature to figurative art, also experimented with new canons of representation.[19] During the 1920s, once the hot waves of xenophobia of the immediate postwar period cooled off, a cosmopolitan culture arose, enriched "by a permanent diversity" of cultural influences—especially in large metropolitan areas like New York, where the flowering of the Harlem Renaissance contributed to the cultural development of that "mongrel Manhattan" detailed by the historian Anne Douglas.[20] At the same time, however, in the literary world, as Tom Bender has observed, there was less interest in the public sphere, with authors more focused on their own artistic needs.[21] Influenced by Dadaism, authors such as Harold Loeb, Matthew Josephson, and Malcolm Cowley celebrated the United States as the true "Dada" country. Dadaism was not limited to art museums but was made a part of everyday American life in the thousand sounds that arose from the metropolis. As Edmund Wilson said to Josephson, "the honking taxis, the screaming sirens, the joyous yell of mechanical life . . . is the rhythm to which we dance, to which the power-drunken city exults."[22]

In the field of pragmatic philosophy, Dewey, James, and Pillsbury considered memory and imagination an integral part of the thought processes. The arguments at the center of philosophical debate took up

Bergson's theory of the nature of memory, the relativity of space-time concepts, and an aesthetic of the disintegration of subjective reality.[23]

In political science, as in European societies, there was a critical revision of modern mass democracy. Europeans critically reexamined the idea of democratic citizenship, which traditionally was based on the rational capacity of participation and decision on the part of the citizen. In the United States, as James Bryce had observed, the opinion of the majority, far from being a rational process, was largely built on prejudice.[24]

Meanwhile, anthropology, sociology, and psychology were investigating the irrational aspects of human behavior, in both the individual and collective life. A person was more than a rational being but rather the product of emotions, impulses, instincts, sentiments, prejudices, and social customs. According to Doob, "man is no longer considered the rational individual upon whom too many economists and jurists assume their system to rest; man is heralded as a creature guided by his impulses, instincts, drives, desires, needs, libido. . . . [This is] a more or less accurate portrayal of man as a dynamic complex and frequently unconscious motivated being."[25] The broader theories, each proposing very different concepts of the human psyche, offered new means for analyzing the mental processes.

Freud's revolutionary theories about the unconscious, and especially its role in the psychological mechanism of repression, were of particular interest to social scientists, while John B. Watson's behaviorism influenced the analysis of the neurological and physiological aspects of human behavior.[26] The psychologist William McDougall, for his part, concluded that because the human personality was the result of a collection of instincts underlying different behaviors, institutions and educators could manipulate people to move in preestablished directions. Thus a whole new field of research was opened, analyzing techniques for conditioning social behavior, especially in the advertising field.

The most important social scientists, including such analysts as John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, and Charles Merriam (the principal coordinator of the School of Political Science of the University of Chicago), assessed the possibility of submitting democratic ideals to the scrutiny of an objective scientific method.[27] In doing so they were interested in revealing the irrational behavior of democratic crowds. A call for the rigor of the scientific method implied, according to the pragmatist point of view, the rejection on the one hand of every a priori concept and on the other

of an empiricism tout court. Edward S. Corwin, one of the best-known political scientists, reconfirmed the necessity of scientifically analyzing the real behavior of the masses in order to better shape an ideal educational plan. As he observed, "So far as it contributes to this end, the more scientific method, the better."[28]

Questions concerning what research methods to use resulted in an answer suited "to the historical anxieties and disillusion with politics that professionalism channeled into science."[29] The leading experts proposed in this way to analyze reality as though in a laboratory in order to develop a more solid knowledge of the social processes.

Eugenics: The Restrictionist Movement

Within this cultural context, one of the crucial arguments of public discourse, which had been a topic of debate also in the prewar years, concerned the problem of immigration. In addition to the racial theme underlying the movement to restrict immigration, another argument had received notable attention early in the century: eugenics.

According to Edward A. Ross, in order to maintain and consolidate the living standards of the masses within American democracy, it was necessary socially, politically, and economically to limit immigration as well as to adopt a proeugenics policy. Initially called "Stirpiculture" by the eugenicist Sir Francis Galton, Charles Darwin's cousin, this new science proposed to apply Darwinian ideas of evolution to the human race itself. To counter a deterministic viewpoint of the evolution of the races, eugenics proposed a conscious and enlightened intervention with the aim of elevating and planning the psychosomatic traits of the population. In presenting these arguments to the American Sociological Society, Galton observed that natural evolution "in continual flux and constant change," even while apparently keeping its forms unaltered, can be likened to "a stream of wind-swept clouds that sometimes clings to a mountain, whose parts change unceasingly, even if its overall aspect rarely changes."[30] The comparison taken from the natural world was meant to make rational awareness stand out in sharp relief: "Evolution is in any case a great phantasmagoria, but it assumes an infinitely more interesting aspect once it is realized that the intelligent action of human will can somehow shape its course," he said.[31]

Galton believed that eugenics was therefore a matter of a "manly creed

full of hope and one that appeals to many of the most noble aspects of our nature." The increase in "health, energy, manliness, skill, [and] disposition to courtesy" to be gained from the application of this new science would, in the author's estimation, lead to the formation of an individual "more suited to our vast imperial opportunities."[32] The eugenics movement had two facets, "positive eugenics" and "negative eugenics." Those from the positive wing regarded this new science as one that aimed to improve the white race through a wise marriage policy, not imposed from above but, according to Galton, elaborated "in the national conscience like a new religion."[33] In contrast, the aim of negative eugenics was to discourage marriages between people with physical and/or mental defects, in order to prevent a possible increase in the appearance of an anomaly within the population. Negative eugenics was based on investigations into the laws of heredity, along with statistics that described the psychophysical conditions of the population.

Interest in this research on the hereditary transmission of somatic traits went along with the wide American interest in the criminal anthropological studies coming from the Italian school of Ferri and Lombroso and the French school of Manouvrier and Lacassagne.[34] Lombroso's ideas inspired Frank Norris's 1928 short story, "A Case for Lombroso," which deals with the ill-fated consequences caused by the inherited traits recognizable in a woman of Mediterranean descent in her encounter with an Anglo-Saxon. Her character, who has Spanish blood, is incapable of exercising self-control and has a wholly negative influence on her fiancé. The reference to Lombroso in the story's title was not only a formal bow to the celebrated Italian criminologist but also a means of asserting the popular view that miscegenation was a form of pollution and deterioration to the detriment of the superior race. To illustrate this issue, Norris used the example from Aesop's Fables of two jars floating in a cistern that bump and break when they collide.

Paul Popenoe claimed, with the authority of his scientific background as editor of the *Journal of Heredity*, that miscegenation was an advantage for the inferior race but a disadvantage for the superior one from the point of view of mental capability: the danger for the superior race, according to those who supported these theories, lay in the general decline in intelligence and personal rectitude that would result from a mingling of the genes of the races.[35] These positions were spread among the wider public by magazines such as *Collier's* and the *Saturday Evening Post*.

American reformist and progressive circles warmly received two aspects of the new discipline of eugenics: the notion of selecting hereditary factors to improve the race (if not to create geniuses) and the policy of discouraging reproduction, even to the point of sterilizing the weak and unfit.

In 1910 a center called the Eugenics Records Office was set up at Cold Spring Harbor, on Long Island, New York, for the collection and study of data relating to the transmission of various inherited traits. Its director, Charles B. Davenport, organized the first research project that studied a small rural community and involved the analysis of clinical data over five generations. The findings revealed the hereditary transmission of mental feebleness, offering to the organizers of the research the opportunity to promote a policy of prevention of reproduction as an important component of social policy.[36]

Indiana had passed a law in 1907 that allowed sterilization of the mentally handicapped. The first Eugenics Congress was held in London in 1912, while in the United States in 1913 the American Breeders' Association established a new division, the American Genetic Association. The eugenics movement was gaining momentum, and it was fairly widespread, as the historian Richard Hofstadter remarked, "the National Conference on the Improvement of the Race held in 1914 demonstrated the extent of the inroads made by eugenics theories in medical schools, among those involved in providing social assistance, and in charitable organizations."[37] By 1915 twelve more states had adopted measures similar to Indiana's.

Eugenics had long aroused great interest among social scientists. Twenty years before it became a scientific pillar in the debate about restricting immigration in the 1920s, it had been the subject of heated theoretical discussion. According to the new science, evolutionist theories could not be applied in any practical way to the human race, insofar as racial traits, genetically transmitted, were immutable; nor was there any possibility that the environment might influence them in a meaningful way. This was only one side of the question, however, because the new science proposed a progressive improvement of the somatic and psychic traits of the human species by countering the blind workings of nature with a conscious and carefully aimed intervention.

The sociologist Lester Ward thought it appropriate to make some distinctions on the subject of eugenics. Though he maintained an inflexible racial prejudice toward African Americans, he stressed the possibility

for modifying the environment and even coined a new vocabulary for his idea. In Ward's opinion the efforts of the legislators and of all those who devoted their energies to bettering social conditions had to turn to "euthenics," the science for the control of environment. Because, Ward argued, power over hereditary aspects was beyond human control, social research ought to focus on environmental conditions. Ward discounted the unjustifiable fears of the elite in relation to the lowest classes of society and, like Ripley, considered the well-being of the masses crucial for the development of the nation. He coined a new word for the study of the general welfare: "eudemics." The people, in fact, represented the reservoir of society's workforce. They, Ward emphasized, rather than the elites, should be the focus of social scientists' study, as they represented "the corner-stone" on which rested "the gilded pinnacles of the social temple."[38] The betterment of the population should be reached not with eugenics practices but by analyzing their real needs.

Within the context of positive eugenics, mentioned above, biologists, physicians, and social scientists had many misgivings about the prospect of selecting the best character and intelligence traits of individuals in order to produce the so-called gifted because the data of real experience seemed to contradict or at least complicate this possible goal. What appeared much more feasible than positive eugenics, which H. G. Wells believed should not be encouraged as it went against the principle of individuality, was the option of putting negative eugenics into practice, that is to say, the policy of discouraging unions among the weak and unfit, even to the point of campaigning for their sterilization.[39]

Proponents of putting eugenics into practice regarded as fundamental the separation of innate data of character—inborn traits—from acquired traits, those acquired by modifications introduced into the environment. An analysis of the transmission of acquired traits over many generations could demonstrate to what extent environmental influences could modify either somatic or psychic traits. The best-known example, which I have already mentioned, was the research of the anthropologist Franz Boas in 1911 on the anthropometric variations present in Italian immigrants.[40]

The different points of view came to the fore in the great debate about immigration and the feasibility of assimilating races so different from the Anglo-Saxon. The racist premise underlying eugenics resulted in its being defended by those who fought for restrictions on immigration, sometimes maintaining racist views, and at the same time embraced the most ad-

vanced progressive positions along with the tradition of civic nationalism, as was the case with John R. Commons and Edward A. Ross. To these must be added Henry P. Fairchild. A professor of sociology at New York University and president of the American Eugenics Society, Fairchild was involved in progressive causes and believed in the principles of socialism while maintaining his deep racial convictions. Instead of the word "racism," he used the phrase "the consciousness of kind," which had been introduced by Franklin Giddings to indicate the members of the so-called in-group, defining its boundaries and those living outside it: the "out group."[41] Given the effects of immigration on salary levels, pauperism, criminality, and the mental health of the population, Fairchild believed that it was impossible to assume a laissez-faire attitude.

The most popular author of racist theories had been Madison Grant during and immediately following World War I. His best-known book, *The Passing of the Great Race*, published in 1916, was very successful, with sales of twenty to thirty thousand copies.[42] Contrary to every idea of assimilation, he renewed the alarm about the disappearance of the Anglo-Saxon stock in the event that "the melting pot" was allowed to boil out of control.[43]

The most respected scientist to support eugenics was Harry Laughlin, director of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and counsel to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.[44] As counsel he played an important part in providing a scientific basis for the Quota Acts of 1924. In one of his reports to Congress in 1922 he developed the thesis that the new stock of immigrants had "inborn socially inadequate qualities."[45]

Political analysts translated the problem of racial inequality into criticism of democratic citizenship and equal political rights. The president of the American Museum of Natural History, Henry Osborn, a noted biologist and paleontologist, observed on this point: "The true spirit of American democracy, that *all men are born with equal rights and duties*, has been confused with the political sophistry that *all men are born with equal character and ability to govern themselves and others*, and with the educational sophistry that education and environment will off set the handicap of heredity."[46] Osborn concluded that the rights and duties within democratic society ought to be distributed according to the responsibilities imposed on each individual by that person's social and ethnic background.[47]

After World War I, Kenneth Roberts, a journalist who had been a captain in the U.S. Army during the war, did a survey for the *Saturday Evening Post* of European populations that wanted to emigrate to North America. He observed that they were unsuitable for U.S. citizenship, maintaining that no one could believe that "the mixing of all the races of Europe in a great human melting pot" would continue to produce "the same race of men who had founded America, and who had subscribed to its way of government."[48]

The social psychologist William McDougall, who had prepared the psychological tests given to soldiers in the U.S. Army to determine the intelligence quotient of the average man, did not consider it possible that the American environment would have an influence on ethnic groups that had emigrated recently. Nor did he believe that a process of racial crossbreeding would work to the benefit of the preexisting Nordic race. The type of American formed in the frontier environment, adventurous and at the same time public spirited, remained, according to McDougall, the backbone of the nation. In fact, he observed: "Such men, their virtues disguised under their business suits, and their rifles and axes exchanged for portable typewriters, still abound in America. They owe their qualities to thousands of years of the severest tempering process to which any part of the human race has been subjected."[49] The work of both McDougall and the psychologist Charles Brigham confirmed the results of the army tests pertaining to American intelligence, as we shall see further on in greater detail. Congressional debates about the passage of restrictive immigration laws referred to these results.[50] It is well known that while the results of the Senate Committee on Immigration emphasized economic conditions as the primary obstacle for the inclusion of new immigrants, the restrictive laws of 1921 and 1924 used ethnic-racial criteria, "to which genetic theory gave a scientific sanction," to determine the quota of immigrants to be admitted, based on the U.S. censuses of 1910 and 1890.[51]

In the second half of the 1920s, after the passage of the new immigration laws, eugenics theories lost their scientific credibility, mainly because of the work of the anthropologist Franz Boas and his school, who demolished the very concept of race along with the hierarchic scale that many scientists promoted. In fighting every kind of racist determinism, Boas always stressed the interaction between any given society and the environment in which it had developed.

The possibility for the most disadvantaged classes to "assimilate" to a democratic society depended on the environmental conditions. In 1935 one of Boas's most famous students, Ruth Benedict, published *Patterns of Culture*, a widely read book whose central theme was human nature's great ability to adapt in the most disparate social-historical circumstances and, consequently, the need for an analysis of the cultural layers of different societies. "Cultural patterns" were the interpretive key for understanding heterogeneous societies. Known as cultural relativism, her approach allowed her to draw important conclusions about ethics in the societies that she studied. Analyzing societies directly from value systems so different from each other discredited the idea of a hierarchy of races and of universal moral values. In the "Morals" entry in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Horace M. Kallen had this to say, for example: "So great is the diversity of patterns and principles of conduct that actually comes under the scope of morals . . . that it is impossible to analyze the subject matter scientifically on the basis of a single rule or formula."[52]

In the second half of the 1920s cultural relativism eventually defeated the eugenics theory of racial purity. In the 1930s, though, with the rise of the Nazi regime, the leading actors in the confrontation that took place were again Franz Boas and Harry Laughlin.

The Herd Instinct and Mass Conformist Democracy

In 1919 Everett D. Martin, editor of the *Forum* of the Cooper Union's People's Institute in New York City, the college's adult education division, organized a public adult education course on the philosophy of knowledge. Its significant and provocative title was "How Free Men Think." At that time the People's Institute had a twenty-year tradition of public lectures and debates that were attended by scholars, progressive intellectuals, and U.S. and foreign workers. The institute had seen no unrest or demonstration during the war that could have been interpreted as un-American. Martin had stressed this, as he was involved in a review of all the new theories of crowd psychology that the war seemed to have spawned. It was totally unexpected, then, when the posters announcing the course were forbidden to be printed by an order from some anonymous high-ranking official.

The reason for this unexpected turn of events was to be found in the surname of the man scheduled to teach the course. F. C. S. Schiller, who

had taught in the prestigious Corpus Christi College at Oxford, had been mistaken for a German national.[53] As Martin remarked sarcastically, "This is intellectual freedom that we have achieved in a world 'made safe for democracy.'" This was but one of many episodes of intolerance, some of which were violent, in the postwar years. The war years had seen many incidents in which racial or ethnic intolerance was fueled by war hysteria in reaction to whomever might be labeled as un-American. Now political intolerance skyrocketed with the well-known raids against the "Reds" during the wave of widespread fears raised by the Bolshevik Revolution.

Within this cultural framework, in the heated climate of extreme nationalism fueled by war propaganda, social scientists debated two important topics that had been elaborated by European scholars at the beginning of the century: the suggestibility of the individual and Gabriel Tarde's theory of imitation.

The theory of suggestibility, tried out with war propaganda, could now be tested in the new field of advertising. To the enthusiastic pioneers this opened perspectives that seemed unlimited. As for the theory of imitation, sociologists would develop research designed to condemn mass conformity and uphold the values of individualism, but they also investigated whether imitation had any positive aspects.

Both themes, suggestibility and imitation, inscribed in the instinctual inheritance of the individual, formed a particular mélange in the works of William McDougall and William Trotter. Both Englishmen were well known in the United States, where McDougall went to live immediately after the war. Instead of the "crowd mind," he spoke with great success in America of the "group mind," the title of his book published in 1920. The social psychologist was mainly interested in establishing imitation as an instinctual heritage of the individual and dealt with the theme of the crowd within a smaller unit that was easier to analyze empirically: the group. The herd instinct, according to McDougall, propelled the individual naturally toward the group, no matter what kind. Trotter, a sociologist, also stressed gregariousness. Using the animal world as an analogy, he spoke of a herd instinct capable of sheltering the individual from the anxieties provoked by the search for autonomy, in opposition to the notion of mass conformity.

Basically what was involved was a redefinition, using different terms, of the debate that had developed at the beginning of the century. While the earlier discourse took into account the instinct of imitation, innate or not,

in the individual inheritance, now the definition of herd instinct presumed a social aggregation in terms of conformity. This was to become the major theme around which the research in the 1930s would develop, in its positive and negative aspect: more positively, advertising experts researched the significant characteristics of the crowd, and, much more negatively, the social scientists focused on the problem of social aggregation and on the perception of the individual as a passive victim of an external power. Erich Fromm would develop his works along this same perspective: as expressed in his *Escape from Freedom*, Nazi Germany represented the realization of a society aggregated according to a modern concept of "crowd," devoid of room for personal freedom, similar to a herd.

Martin himself published *The Behavior of Crowds* (1920), in which he emphasized those aspects of crowd theory that underlined the danger of crowds moved by totally irrational drives that had been stirred by the media in mass democracies. The book reflected the heated postwar polemics. Following the classic interpretation of crowds by Le Bon, Martin applied it, with all the effects of a crowd's irrational behavior, to the U.S. democratic society. His analysis was full of examples taken from recent history. The innumerable episodes of lynchings in the South represented the paradigmatic example of a crowd in which the latent homicidal impulse became the mainspring, provided that it was disguised with a "moral" motivation, such as the defense of white womanhood.

The "moral" crowds, according to Martin, have always needed a victim, someone from outside the group, on whom to project their own homicidal instinct: just as it was in the pogroms in Russia and Poland, so it was in the Turks' massacre of the Armenians during World War I. War is the classic situation that breeds a "moral" crowd.

A nation is ready for war when not only the army but also the entire population acquires a "homicidal crowd" mentality. "The entire processes of an entire people are transformed. Every interest—profit seeking excepted—is subordinated to the one passion to crush the enemy. . . . The homicidal wish-fancy, which in peacetime and in less sovereign crowds exists only as a hypothesis, can now become a reality," Martin wrote.[54] However, he was careful not to emphasize too strongly a cause-and-effect relationship between what he defined as "crowd mentality" and the development of democratic regimes: "I should say that democracy has *indirectly permitted*, rather than directly caused, an extension in the range of thought and behavior over which the crowd assumes dictatorship."[55]

The antidote to this behavior consisted of bringing the individual back to the concept of personal responsibility, and the authoritative source for that was Ralph Waldo Emerson. Martin called attention to the need for critically analyzing those aspects of crowd thinking that are deeply rooted in every individual:

> The democratic crowd today, with its sweet optimism, its warm "brotherly love," is a sticky, gooey mass which one can hardly touch and come back to himself clean. By dissolving everything in "one great union" people who cannot climb alone expect to ooze into the cooperative commonwealth or kingdom of heaven. I am sick of this oozing democracy. There must be something crystalline and insoluble left in democratic America. Somewhere there must be people with sharp edges that cut when they are pressed too hard, people who are still solid, who have impenetrable depths in them and hard facets which reflect the sunlight. They are the hope of democracy, these infusible ones.[56]

The counterposition was therefore between the crowd and crowd psychology on the one hand and the individual as a rational entity, "infusible"—mentally autonomous—on the other. If the reference on the ethical-cultural level was to Emerson and his "self reliance," on the education-pedagogical level it was to Dewey and the development of rational scientific thought, capable of driving out any tendency toward mental conformity.

The process of democratic education as the way to counter propaganda was in fact widely discussed in the 1920s and 1930s. Martin strongly condemned "propaganda," together with all those tools of communication that could condition the masses in some way. His remarks in a debate with Edward L. Bernays, the publicist, became a familiar quotation on this subject:

> It is a mistake to confuse propaganda with public information, or with the professed "education of the public." Most propagandists persuade themselves that they are merely informing the public. But the public educator has no other aim than the dissemination of the truth. He strives to create open-mindedness. The propagandist strives for conviction, the closed mind, and action which will be to the advantage of his client. He is not necessarily seeking the truth, but only such truth, or appearance of it, as will aid him in presenting his case. And when the people acquire the habit of thinking as the propagandist wishes them to, on every important matter in

> life, they almost cease to know what the pursuit of truth really is. . . . This habit of mind makes for illiberalism and intolerance.[57]

A pioneer in the field of public relations and advertising, Bernays held a more flexible and open position on this entire question. Bernays was Freud's nephew and took care of his uncle's interests in America. But, according to Bernays' biography, although Freud showed little interest in America, his new theories gained enormous interest there.[58]

It is well known that during the period of strong economic growth in the early 1920s, known as "the new era," the field of advertising acquired public acceptance. Advertising was becoming part of a wider sector, that of public relations, which was taken up by all important corporations with the aim of planning and managing how they were regarded by the public. What was involved was not only promoting the increasingly more sophisticated corporate products but also gaining credibility with the public as promoters of the well-being and advancement of the democratic society. Their efforts were legitimized by the increasingly more articulate network of potential consumers and public authorities at the local, state, and federal levels.[59]

As the historian Ferdinando Fasce has observed, because of the growing interaction between the academic world and the political world, it became a common practice at the annual meetings of the professional advertising associations for heads of prestigious universities and national leaders, such as the then-secretary of commerce and future president Herbert Hoover, to enthusiastically hail advertising as "an agent of civilization," and "the producer of desires which ends in creating demands."[60]

The United States was on its way to becoming a country that dispersed more "propaganda" than European countries.[61] The psychologist Horace B. English noted that social consensus could easily be obtained by using the current psychological techniques of mass persuasion "if the right catch-words are used, a group of emotions with a corresponding complex of ideas is so effectively aroused that reflection becomes impossible."[62]

The new method of advertising that Bernays pioneered was not based on a mechanistic reaction of stimulus-reply but on a more complex procedure that worked on the desires of the masses by creating a series of indirect suggestions aimed at preparing them to receive the desired message.[63] Therefore, the new kind of advertising was designed "to create the circumstances," as Bernays put it, "that will make emotional desires

merge with appeals to buy."[64] According to this perspective, it was not the products that were being sold but the benefits connected to them: prestige, not cars; sex appeal, not soap or perfume; the idea of illumination, not lamps and lightbulbs.[65] To make their message effective, advertisers had to know how suggestion worked. The subject was also of great interest to public speakers.

In a handbook for public speakers published in 1906, Walter D. Scott observed, following in the footsteps of Sidis, that the suggestibility of the crowd represented an opportunity for the speaker.[66] In the 1920s various books came out on the subject, including *The Psychology of Persuasion* by William McPherson, *Our Unconscious Mind and How to Use It* by Frederick Pierce, and *Man the Puppet: The Art of Controlling Minds* by Adam Lipsky. These books touted the message that only through awareness of the irrational aspects of the personality was it possible to condition human behavior to predetermined ends. Lipsky applied this persuasion to the political sphere in order to obtain the consensus of the masses, not so much by coercive means as by the more sophisticated techniques of psychology. Thus, by extension, anyone who wanted to become an opinion leader should win over the crowd by appealing more to irrational factors than to logical-rational arguments. If the crowd were well disposed, the speaker's arguments would seem valid. Bernays said of the impact of propaganda on modern U.S. society: "Propaganda exists on all sides of us and it does change our mental pictures of the world. . . . In fact its use is growing as its efficiency in gaining public support is recognized."[67]

Indeed, Bernays was convinced of the importance of "a conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses" in a democratic society, where "invisible rulers control the destinies of millions" but where in the end the battle for truth was winning. Following McDougall's theories, Bernays considered the human being as part of a group whose behavior resembled that of a herd: "In place of thoughts it has impulses, habits and emotion. In making up its mind its first impulse is usually to follow the example of a trusted leader, but when the leader is not at hand, and the herd must think for itself, it does so by means of clichés, passwords or images which stand for a whole group of ideas or experiences."[68] In his autobiography Bernays recalled the most outstanding event of his public relations career: the Light's Golden Jubilee. He used it as an example of how private interests could be harmonized with public interests, to the benefit of the entire community.

Commissioned by the General Electric Corporation and Henry Ford, he planned and organized an event in honor of Thomas A. Edison, in which not only Edison himself participated but also the president of the United States, Herbert Hoover, as well as the most important financiers and cultural leaders. The Light's Golden Jubilee was widely celebrated by museums, universities, and libraries with every sort of political and cultural event. Edison's name was brought up at press conferences, mentioned in newspapers, talked about on the radio and at the movies, and his face appeared on a commemorative postage stamp; his name even appeared on menus in the dining cars of trains and in a popular song, "Edison-Miracle Man," which played at a variety of public events. Finally, on the day of the ceremony, in the presence of President Hoover and other dignitaries, Edison symbolically lit a perpetual light on Henry Ford's skyscraper in Dearborn, Michigan. On that occasion he reenacted, for the benefit of the spectators, his famous original experiment. At the same time a large number of carbon-filament lightbulbs were lit in the nation's large cities. As Doob observed, it was "one of the most astonishing pieces of propaganda ever engineered in this country during peacetime."[69]

Extrapolating the new techniques of advertising from the business sector for use in politics, Bernays noted that "good government can be sold to a community just as any other commodity. True, it is an intangible product . . . but not more intangible than the creation of a desire for breakfast foods or a new style in hats or a new philosophic thought or theory. And it is not sold in the market place everyday; often only on election day."[70] In 1928, when he again expressed his theories in a book with the provocative title of *Propaganda*, public reaction was not favorable.[71] His observations—such as, "the politicians of the future will endeavor to train politicians who are at the same time propagandists"—too openly espoused the opposite of the common understanding of the democratic creed.[72]

According to the inventor of public relations, propaganda should not be demonized, as it so often was, but rather its enormous impact on American society should be fully understood, extending as it did from everyday life to big corporations to political parties to the government itself. The enormous potential that could come from the use of these new techniques should be closely examined.

Removed from the myopic perspective of an exclusively empirical approach, propaganda should be considered a science, in the manner of

social psychology, Bernays believed. In such a way "the new propaganda . . . takes account not merely of the individual, nor even of the mass minds alone, but also and especially of the anatomy of society with its interlocking group formations and loyalties. It sees the individual not only as a cell in the social organism but as a cell organized in the social unit."[73] Therefore it was necessary to know the structural makeup of the society in order to produce the desired effect, just as, to use Bernays's example, touching a nerve at its most sensitive point gets the expected reaction. Bernays observed how Freud's discoveries added to this knowledge of the complex mechanism of the social body the skills for understanding the unconscious emotions and desires that represent the driving forces of society: "An engineer may know all about the cylinders and pistons of a locomotive, but unless he knows how steam behaves under pressure he cannot make his engine run. Human desires are the steam which makes the social machine work. Only by understanding them can the propagandist control that vast, loose-jointed mechanism which is modern society."[74] The notion of "group" constituted the unit through which it would be possible to scientifically investigate the different sections of society.

The Expert and the "Common Man" in Mass Democracy

During World War I, U.S. Army recruits were given a questionnaire prepared by a team of social psychologists under the direction of Robert Yerkes, a Harvard University professor.[75] Yerkes had seized the opportunity offered by the formation of a large army to measure the intelligence quotients of masses of people. The test results became known during the heated arguments about immigration laws, and a debate revolved around the real meaning of these results. The average IQ in fact was shown to be approximately equal to a mental age of thirteen years. Important public figures such as Walter Lippmann attacked the validity of the results, while authoritative social psychologists, such as Edward Thorndike and Carl Brigham, defended it (indeed, Brigham analyzed the results in a book dedicated to the study of "American intelligence"[76]). McDougall, one of the authors of the questionnaire, saw in the test results a confirmation of the low mental level of the masses, whereas John Dewey attacked the questionnaire itself as methodologically unreliable. The low "intelligence quota" found among recent immigrant groups constituted one of the pivotal arguments for repudiating the ideal of the "average man " as capable of exercising the rights and duties of citizenship.

Critics of mass democracy often referred rhetorically to the "incompetence" of the common man.[77] According to the political scientist Edward S. Corwin, "the doctrine of government by the people" was based on the assumption that "man is *in primis* a rational being."[78] The possibility for understanding social reality and therefore for verifying even this kind of argument in a more direct and "objective" way now seemed close at hand, thanks to the wide-scale use of investigative methods such as the tests collected in the first sociological surveys. At any rate, the results obtained in those early years seemed to substantiate the views of those who considered the new urban masses, composed mainly of immigrants, incapable of performing the duties of citizenship.

In the aftermath of the IQ test experiment, empirical research was developed in the fields of social psychology and political science. Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell of the Political Science Department of the University of Chicago analyzed the electoral behavior in the Chicago metropolitan area. Their studies confirmed the lack of participation and political ignorance on the part of the urban masses and even the possibility that political machines and special interest groups could manipulate the average citizen.[79] The idea of the "mental inferiority of the masses," to use the definition of the sociologist Harry E. Barnes, therefore required a reexamination of the political creed of "government by the people."[80]

Propaganda in its many forms—whether by government, advertisers, or lobbyists—seemed to be corrupting the proper functioning of democratic rules by manipulating the political consciousness of the citizens. Many believed that the influence of propaganda could no longer be removed from modern industrial society, making necessary a search for adequate solutions for the reestablishment of the good functioning of democratic society.[81]

One of the central arguments revolved around the importance and the role of the expert and technical elite. The elitist-technocratic view, often seen as providing the means for producing "citizens who were active, skeptical, guided by rational choices," was always linked to the notion of a public guided by rationality.[82] Ethnic social components and class fractures were interfering with the technocratic approach according to which society should be organized in a "harmony of interests." The aim was to form a public of democratic citizens sparked by the spirit of cooperation and common integration in the complex social framework. The same kind of problem stimulated Gosnell and Merriam's research on the "nonvoting citizen."

Merriam in particular set his sights on a civic education that would maintain a balance of authority, indirect coercion, independence, and personal freedom. Merriam was interested in the study of "civic cohesion," and he stressed the importance of social traditions, rituals, and symbols, in addition to education, religion, political parties, and national organizations. In his book *Civic Education in the United States*, the last in a series of studies promoted by the Commission on Social Studies of the American Historical Association, Merriam asserted what would become in the late 1930s one of the fundamental tenets of democratic theory: "There is no fundamental inconsistency in the long run between democracy and the scientific rule. . . . The new scientific orientation, the new drive to remake the world in creative fashion, may rest upon the assumption of faith in the possibilities of common humanity. . . . Nor are great human values so precious to the spirit of man destroyed under scientific direction but on the contrary they are recognized and placed in a more realistic setting than ever before."[83] In three national Political Science Conferences sponsored by the American Political Science Association held between 1923 and 1925, leading scholars appealed for greater professionalism and specific skills. The repeated exhortations to produce scientific results were based on the ideal of a government sustained by rational-scientific paradigms.[84] With the help of a new discipline, psychology, and the tools of quantitative and statistical methods of investigation, political scientists could probe and analyze everything that went under the label of "irrationality" and that the experience of war had emphasized dramatically (the tendency for "manipulation" that made the masses prey to uncontrolled emotions and intolerance, tied to ethnic and racial prejudices). Once America was established as a great power, the social sciences had the important task of giving a firm scientific basis to a society strongly oriented toward the future. An impressive increase in the development of the social sciences in those years came from a series of foundations: the Social Science Research Council, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Such a strong emphasis on the problems of science and technology resulted in elevation of the role of expert. Experts were asked for explanations of complex social phenomena in an urban-industrial environment marked by impersonality and interdependent relationships.

The processes that regulated modern society should no longer be considered a "natural" given: once those irrational aspects that could be

found in the behavior of the masses were studied and clarified, it would be possible to bring the "real" behavior of the citizen closer to the democratic "ideal." The cultural debate in the 1920s and 1930s would in fact swing between these two extremes, the real and the ideal, emphasizing first one and then the other at different times, in a continual intermingling with the events occurring on the national and international scene.

One of Merriam's most prominent collaborators, Harold D. Lasswell, would focus his research on these themes. He was interested in connecting the political sphere with the most recent contributions of psychology, psychoanalysis, and anthropology. On the one hand he shed light on the elements underlying political choices that could be caused by irrational drives, in some cases pathological. On the other hand he deciphered the characteristics of the symbolic language of politics that could unite large masses around specific goals. The discovery of and consequent emphasis on all the irrational elements conditioning human actions in the political sphere gave credence to the idea of the popular masses as incapable of judging their own interests rationally.

The democratic "average man," described by conservatives as well as progressive authors in the twenties and early thirties, was an individual incapable of rational choices and at the mercy of public opinion experts. How the process of critical analysis of the average citizen took advantage of a growing faith in the expert's role is interesting. Though they held tightly to the framework of democracy, some of the most illustrious social scientists (for example, Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, and Harry Barnes) envisioned a society governed by enlightened technocratic criteria. The experts' crucial role would be to guide the average citizen through an ever more complex social network that deprived individuals of their autonomy.

As a result the emphasis was on rules, procedures, and modalities of democratic participation that the average citizen completely lacked. Average citizens were described in a negative, deprecatory manner that varied from Irving Babbitt's or H. L. Mencken's sarcastic remarks about "the boasting vulgarity" or "the cheapness of mind" prevailing in a "boobocracy."[85] The average person was a mixture of obtuseness, chauvinism, bad taste, and credulity, combined with false optimism and profound hostility toward the "other." In Sinclair Lewis's novel *Babbitt* the protagonist had all the traits deemed typical of the American "common man."[86] His creed, as one of the most respectable citizens of the little town of Zenith,

brought him to the conclusion that "the working classes must be kept in their place. . . . American democracy did not imply any equality of wealth, but did demand a wholesome sameness of thought, dress, paintings, morale and vocabulary."[87]

Criticizing democracy from a conservative point of view, the philosopher Irving Babbitt arrived at the same bitter conclusion: "Democracy risked producing one of the most trifling brands of the human species that the world has yet seen, a huge mass of standardized mediocrity."[88] For the sociologist Harry E. Barnes "the average man is not only deficient in cerebral power, but also the victim of his emotions in public affairs and political deliberations." The average person was at times a "puppet" whose strings, in Adam Lipsky's words, were pulled by the hands of invisible rulers or else the victim of "goose stuffing," and would, like a "stampeding herd," go "red-eyed and panting after a lie or two."[89]

At the same time the empirical research relative to the actual functioning of American politics and the behavior of the "nonvoting citizen" consistently disproved the idea of popular democratic government.[90] According to the view of some of the most authoritative political scientists, such as Pendleton Herring, the will of the people was "a pleasant fancy but not a present fact," while the political scientist Walter J. Shepard defined the word "democracy" as a perfect example of a stereotype that did not correspond to the real functioning of a democratic society.[91] Gosnell himself advanced the idea of restricting universal suffrage by means of a test to distinguish the good citizen from the incapable one, as the first step toward a proposal for restricting political freedoms.[92]

Madison Grant also expressed himself in a way that was radically opposed to universal suffrage: "In the democratic forms of government the operation of universal suffrage tends toward the selection of the average man for public office rather than the man qualified by birth, education and integrity. From a racial point of view it will inevitably increase the preponderance of the lower types and cause a corresponding loss of efficiency in the community as a whole."[93] In *Public Opinion* Walter Lippmann analyzed what he called the "mystical will of the people" as one of the basic assumptions of democratic theory, with the underlying implication that "the innate good will and the instinctive sense of the statesmanship of every man could be translated into action."[94] A critical analysis of how "the common man" reached political decisions emphasized his irrationality, with a prevalence of prejudices and stereotypes.

In the average person's mind there was "no more natural order than in a dusty old attic," Lippmann opined. "There is often the same incongruity between fact, idea and emotions as there might be in an opera house if all the wardrobes were dumped in a heap and all the scores mixed up, so that Madame Butterfly in a Valkyr's dress waited lyrically for the return of Faust."[95]

The picture that Lippmann offered of the basic irrationality of the "common man" was hardly encouraging. In another book he concluded that "it was pure fiction to say that the [elected] are carrying out the will of the people. They may govern the people wisely. But they are not governing with the active consultation of the people."[96] Focusing on the common use of language and calling attention to the confusion of terms used for expressing the concept of democracy, he underlined the need for a clear definition of the concepts in relation to words. The common man needed "a Socrates who will separate the words, cross-examine him until he has defined them and made words the name of ideas. Made them mean a particular object and nothing else."[97] By using the scientific method, the social sciences supposedly would be able to bridge the gap that Lippmann stressed between theory and practice—once democratic theory abandoned the notion of "individual omni-competence" and self-centered opinions as the source of good government. Social scientists such as Harold Lasswell, Edward Bernays, and Walter J. Shepard, on the other hand, shared an enlightened faith that society would progress by using a scientific methodology to overcome the weakest aspects of the democratic process. A redefinition of democratic theory should be conceived as "government for the people by enlightened and responsible elites."[98]

In books that he wrote after *Public Opinion* (in *The Phantom Public*, for example), Lippmann revealed a growing skepticism toward the possibility of a modern democracy's functioning with the participation of the people. The agreements that different interest groups privately contracted rarely reached the attention of a public that was completely unaware and incapable of evaluating the real nature of the problems on the table.[99] Unlike such men as Babbitt and Mencken, who were both politically conservative and elitist, Lippmann, though recognizing the impracticality of democratic theory, held an Enlightenment type of conviction about the reforming ability of society itself in a technocratic-progressive environment. Lippmann believed that groups of experts organized to

examine complex problems relative to the public sphere would make the democratic process more functional and efficient by providing channels for the diffusion of information as a way to keep the different parts of the society in contact.

Lasswell's criticism, based on the same premises, was more radical yet. The discovery after the war of the government's use of mass propaganda techniques deeply challenged what he defined as "the traditional species of democratic romanticism."[100] If the public was moved only by irrational drives, and was in addition substantially superficial and ignorant, it would be "stupid and even dangerous to exhort this scum to exercise the extremely difficult virtue of self-control."[101]

To have a well-functioning society it was necessary to find the instruments that would make a wise and efficient government possible. Collective well-being was reached, in fact, "not in the mighty rushing wind of public sentiment. It is not organic secretion of the horde but the tedious achievement of the few," Lasswell declared.[102] The main problem, in his opinion, was to keep the reins of government in the hands of a technocratic elite: "Inform, cajole, bamboozle and seduce in the name of the public, but dictate to the majority."[103] By following this dictum the gap between the ideal principles and the actual practice of democracy would thus be considerably reduced.

In a society strongly conditioned from above, Lasswell considered that the propagandist had to perform an important propelling function by his ability to gather together and politically orient the masses with the use of political symbols.

Dewey's position diverged most dramatically from those of Lasswell and the other scholars who nourished an optimistic faith in the role of an enlightened technological elite.[104] In his book review of Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, Dewey called it "the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned."[105] Lippmann had criticized the dogma of the omnicompetent individual, with a specific focus on "the world outside and the picture in our heads."[106] Dewey observed that such an approach represented "a more significant statement of the genuine problem of knowledge than epistemological philosophers have managed to give." Lippmann's critical attitude toward the "common man's" omnicompetence led to the consideration that "this particular Humpty Dumpty can never be put together again."[107]

For Dewey a critical analysis of democracy also should focus on the

preconceived theoretical axioms: "There is no sanctity in universal suffrage, majority rule. Belief in this political aspect is not a mystic faith."[108] Dewey described the "public" as "amorphous, inarticulate"; most of all it was "bewildered" by the complexities of the new machine age, which was in the end responsible for all the chief ills of modern society, he said.

Even if Dewey fully agreed with Lippmann in the "deconstruction" of democratic theory, he followed a different path in the constructive part of his theory. Dewey emphasized the need for active public participation in a democracy, through the renewal and revivification of the concept of community.[109] Comparing society to a living organism, he put the accent on mobility and circulation, since "knowledge is not a function which originated in individuals by means of isolated contact with objects but . . . by means of association and communication. Ideas which are not communicated, shared and reborn in expression are but soliloquy and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought."[110]

Thus Dewey underlined the importance of communication in a modern democratic society. The constituency of a "democratic public" depended, for Dewey as for Lippmann, on the "improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, persuasion."[111]

CHAPTER 6 From the Factory to the Nation: Leadership or Domination

Studies in Human Engineering

The director of the American Management Association, Sam Lewisohn, in reference to the "harmony of interests" advocated by entrepreneurs, insisted they should ask themselves to what extent it respected the workers' interests. He observed that "the modern employer realizes that in order to secure results there are certain desires of the workman that he must satisfy. But what does the worker want?"[1] Lewisohn was reminded of George Bernard Shaw's sarcastic but apt admonition that "one must beware of doing unto others as you would that they do unto you, because tastes differ!"[2]

The human element of factory work had become increasingly important in the training of engineers and technicians. Thomas Edison himself affirmed that "problems in human engineering will receive during the coming years the same genius and attention which the nineteenth century gave to the more material forms of engineering."[3]

Social psychology was considered a useful scientific tool in human engineering. Experimental research of group dynamics, developed over the 1920s and 1930s, was based on studies of scientific management. Interest focused on problems connected with harmonizing the different social groups after the violent social conflicts early in the century. Social psychologist Floyd Allport coordinated an important center for this kind of research at Harvard University. With the institution of an experimental psychology laboratory at Harvard University early in the twentieth century, Doctor Hugo Münsterberg prepared tests for selecting industrial workers. In the 1920s a famous scholar at the Harvard Business School, Elton Mayo, investigated the adjustment/maladjustment of manufacturing workers. He felt that these aspects had been neglected for scientific and technological ones. And yet, according to Mayo: "At no time since the industrial revolution has there been . . . anything of the nature of effective and wholehearted collaboration between the administrative and the working groups in industry."[4] Their attention turned to the consequences

of the profound changes introduced by urban-industrial life (inside and outside the factory) and on customs, mentality, behavior, and loss of cohesive ties that had regulated preindustrial community life.

According to Elton Mayo, anthropologists had proved that preindustrial communities featured profound social integration. In contrast, "the characteristically modern industrial community has lost its capacity for peace and stability; the authority of the social code is ignored; the ties of kinship are no longer binding"[5] Thus, after material needs had been satisfied, the "maintenance of organized cooperation in social routines" was lost.[6] This important aspect of past societies was completely absent in the present age, which, however, was marked by the "most amazing scientific and material progress." As Mayo observed, "Our methods are all pointed at efficiency; none at the maintenance of cooperation."[7] He argued that this should be the focus, since "collaboration in a society cannot be left to chance."[8] Without such collaboration, a gap developed between the level of technological efficiency and what was defined as "morale."

Another frequently debated issue was the competitive or cooperative nature of the individual. Thomas Whitehead, also of the Harvard Business School, saw two aspects—far from being opposites—that should be seen as linked to each other. He noted: "The problem of satisfactory living for the individual is very largely the problem of providing a satisfactory society and fitting him to live in it. Individual liberty and collective action are no[t] alternatives: each is bound up in the other."[9]

On the other hand, according to these scientists the rapport between the human factor and the organization of work in the factory was the chief problem to resolve in industrially advanced societies, whether capitalist or socialist. On this issue Elton Mayo noted: "Better methods for the discovery of an administrative elite, better methods for maintaining working morale: the country that first solves these problems will infallibly outstrip the others in the race for stability, security, development. . . . Dispassionate understanding, for Russia, is the greatest need."[10]

The business world was no longer oriented toward individualism but toward cooperation. Around the concept of cooperation, in fact, revolved the ideology of the "American Plan," which gained much consensus in the entrepreneurial world.[11] With the most difficult period of the workers' struggle ending after World War I, the strong economic development of the 1920s was marked by a drastic decrease in the number of unions in the factories, as well as a notable drop in strikes.[12]

The "harmony of interests" theory first elaborated by John D. Rockefeller Jr. and then circulated among entrepreneurs was based on the premise, according to the historian David Brody, that employers and employees "must join hands and recognize that their interest is a common interest."[13] Entrepreneurs considered this approach more helpful than the traditional, conflictive work relationship in the factories, as well as more economically profitable, because it avoided the slowdowns caused by strikes. The day was not far off, according to one noted industrial manager, head of Industrial Relations Counselors Inc., when a strike would be considered a "public shame."[14]

Workers' delegations had to be organized in company unions, which replaced workers' unions. And as for the "continuing state of war and the constant preaching of enmity and antagonism" promoted by the American Federation of Labor, entrepreneurs believed that company unions should help workers operate under a "citizenship theory of labor relations."[15]

Even though Lewisohn attempted to analyze the workers' aims fairly, the interests considered in this harmony of interests doctrine were mostly those of the entrepreneurs. Therefore, although it was widely accepted ideologically, insofar as it seemed to solve "social unrest" problems, it was effectively adopted by only a few industrial relations departments in large industries.[16]

In analyzing the characteristics of social relations in the industrial society, as had Elton Mayo, T. N. Whitehead observed: "The need of the moment is social integration, at least in the industrial civilizations. Our society shows no tendency to stagnate, that is to remain unchanged, generation after generation; but it is in grave danger of falling to pieces like an overdriven engine. . . . This tendency to lose cohesion can be seen as likely to accompany a vigorous quest for technological advance."[17] The American Management Association (AMA) reached the same conclusions: responses by the nation's principal engineering schools to the AMA's 1924 questionnaire revealed a lack of "scientific" preparation, beyond the technical, that covered human relations within the factory.[18]

In the general climate of faith in scientific progress to solve the main problems of American society, social psychology provided a scientifically valid instrument of interpretation. Mayo conducted an experiment in the 1920s at Western Electric's Hawthorne plant in Chicago that attempted to confirm that the psychological mechanisms of affection for and disaffection from work were the key to social consensus and the stability of the system.

The question of individual "morale" in regard to work conditions was considered fundamental in order to avoid tensions and, if they did appear, to sidestep possible social conflicts. Therefore it was necessary to train professionals not only in new technologies but also to attend to the human factor in the work process. In an effort to find solutions to this set of problems, Mayo pointed out how the male and—in the case of Western Electric's Hawthorne plant—female workers were organized into small groups with strong affective ties.

In technologically advanced workplaces, small groups persisted, formed by subjective emotional links, those that Cooley had singled out as characteristic of what he called the "primary group." According to Mayo, this led to important considerations for social control within the factory. One was that the rapport between management and workers should not depend on a single medium or channel and it should not deal with the workers as a whole. Rather, it should deal with workers in small groups "with appropriate customs, duties, routines, even rituals."[19] There was another important point for management to take into account: worker resistance to the innovations intended for increasing productivity. He found that productivity increased when the Hawthorne workers felt integrated into the group.

Through the lens of his analytical tools, Mayo deconstructed a collective group like the great anonymous mass of workers into small groups, largely distinguishable and reachable through an analysis of their internal ties. This process was analogous to Edward Bernays's observations about the impact of the advertising message or to what Harold Lasswell remarked about political propaganda. In fact Bernays and Lasswell observed that it was necessary to keep in mind an intermediate stage in the reception of the message, that of groups composed of different communities, before it reached a broader audience.

Studies of Leadership in the Industrial World

After World War I many factories posted signs bearing the slogan "Teach, don't boss." It was indicative of what the relationship between management and workers should be.[20] In the so-called American Plan, leadership assumed an essential role. Studies of the nature of leadership began with the work of two psychiatrists, John Moreno and Helene Jennings, who advanced the study of group dynamics.

Beginning with the idea of society as an organic whole, Moreno an-

alyzed groups and their functioning not so much from the objective, institutional point of view as from the subjective view of the attraction/repulsion of emotional currents running between individuals.[21] Thus a kinetic force field was created that could be measured by a "sociometric" test.[22]

Through such a survey it was possible to create a diagram of the group in the workplace or in the community that did not necessarily correspond with the institutionally established social group. In this way the authors emphasized internal dynamics, with processes of attraction toward some members or the exclusion of others considered "alien" to the group. The center of attraction in this context, the leader, was analyzed not so much as a separate figure, but in the way he interacted with other members. His leadership ability was evaluated in relation to a specific necessity of the group. The leader was situated in a "continuum," therefore, rather than in a particular situation: "leadership itself appears to be a process of choosing as well as being chosen."[23]

Research by Moreno and Jennings revealed the complex psychological dynamics in the interpersonal relationships of established groups. At the same time they combined the analytical aspect with a pragmatic interest, showing how the leader could adapt better to his environment once he understood the conditions under which his "attraction" of the individual members could be better developed. Therefore, leadership should be considered not as an innate gift but as an "attitude" to form and develop through adequate training.

Leadership was a particularly deep-felt need in industry, and indeed the Taylor Society promoted a convention on leadership in 1927. The Personnel Research Federation was responsible for organizing the meeting. The purpose was to stimulate research on the subject.[24] The basic result was an analysis of the leader's functions in relationship to the group he represented.

The objective was to train good leaders in the workplace. Chester Barnard, head of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Corporation and a noted industrial executive, maintained that the job of the executive, the one who passed on management's directives, was crucial to keep the social machine running smoothly and to implement strategies of social control in the factory.

In the more advanced system of separating production and labor processes—as social scientists observed—in an increasingly more complex

and hierarchically organized structure, the individual became more and more alienated. This made it imperative to have good leaders who could provide the necessary drive and guarantee efficient work in the many sectors of the associate life.[25] Confronting the question of leadership, Ordway Tead, a social psychologist at Columbia University, started from the assumption that "individual efforts are expected to fall into place as a related part of a whole large plan of pooled collaboration."[26] Conversely, according to Tead, the individual worker needed to be fully aware of the overall organizational process of which he was a part: "However eager a 'joiner' a person may be, he only comes to a sense of genuine oneness with his several groups, as he experiences some deliberate unifying summons and personal quickening."[27]

Within this process the leader was responsible for making different sectors aware of the entire productive method. In the multifaceted corporation, in the increasing division of work, "administration, supervision, purchasing, engineering, research, production, publicity, planning, finance,"[28] the leader's job became vital since he was expected "to keep the group committed to that unity of aim which alone produces the best results."[29] In so doing the leader was in a position not only to give comprehensive meaning to the fragmented operations of the single workers but to listen to and arbitrate different points of view. In short, he created an active consensus among workers. Tead used the analogy of an electric motor set in motion by an electric current to describe the functions of the leader: "What he does is to combine human energies in a way that creates a new and satisfying harmony of effort. . . . Passive consent among the member workers gives place to active assent. . . . It is like the turning on of the inexplicable current which brings into action the great complex of an electric engine. Individuals in a group are stirred by the prompting of deep self-propelling motives which add to the relationship a power, a tone, and a tonic which have a literally electrifying effect."[30] Invigorated and "electrified" by the leader, the group functioned because it had developed, according to Tead, "a sound sense of a concert of interests among all that can keep a unified producing group whatever happens."[31]

On the other hand, the leader made the mechanism function to the best of its ability, using the art of persuasion with the employees, instead of giving commands; as the already stated slogan stated, "teach, don't boss." By forming leaders who were, as Lewisohn put it, "organizational[ly] conscious" rather than "class conscious," disruptions such as national strikes

could be avoided.[32] Lewisohn cited the great steelworkers strike of 1919 as an example of a drastic negative approach that nevertheless gained wide press and public support when the president of the U.S. Steel Corporation refused to deal with union representatives.[33]

Government commissions on labor problems, such as the President's Mediation Commission, instituted in 1918, and the U.S. Coal Commission, reached similar conclusions. After a 1925 investigation the latter established that by carefully evaluating the local situation and mediating between the opposing needs of management and labor it was possible to maintain a high level of productive efficiency and avoid costly strikes—all to industry's advantage: "The relation between employer and employee—or between operator and union—is in its very nature a continuing relation. For its efficiency and success it is dependent on cooperation between the two parties just as is the domestic relation between husband and wife."[34]

The concept of industrial democracy thus expressed assumed, according to Lewisohn, the paradigmatic value of a microexperiment of what should work on a national scale: "From one point of view the factory is the melting pot of the nation. The adoption of the right methods of conducting industry and the tactful and effective supervision of employees will make the workers appreciate the importance of brains and leadership in our industrial structure. This will mean more for rational stability than any artificial propaganda. There is as much opportunity for statesmanship in the industrial field as there is in the political field."[35] In this passage from the factory to the nation, where the former served as a laboratory for the society at large, the melting pot assumed the significance of a mechanism that integrated and standardized the separate parts. Conflicts and diverging interests were eradicated in contrast to a notion of society marked by class and race divisions. The concept of an organizational leader was related to the view of society as a whole whose different parts should be integrated. He should not be class conscious, as his job was to integrate different social components into a completely harmonious structure.

The problem of leadership was transferred from a precise research field, of factory work, to a broader political question. In the 1930s the features of democratic leadership would be analyzed in contrast to current Fascist or Nazi authoritarian dictatorships, or to some of the groups led by various leaders that sprang up in the United States during the Great Depression.

The Democratic and the Authoritarian Leader

In the 1920s research in the field of public opinion emphasized a network of communities or groups connected and conditioned by the presence of leaders coming from within the various groups. Social scientists defined the making of public opinion as a long series of passages from one group to another through the key figure of the leader. In this regard Edward Bernays observed: "But just as the physician has developed a clinical eye, so the expert in dealing with public opinion can roughly gauge the dominant though inarticulate thought in his community by a survey of what are ordinarily termed 'group leaders.' . . . The basic reason underlying such an analysis is the fact that men's opinions are most often changed by their acceptance of the opinions of those whom they regard as leaders."[36] Other researchers also took up the topic: political scientist Robert C. Brooks remarked that instead of only one leader there were many small leaders in many disparate fields, and Ordway Tead studied problems related to personnel administration, developing his work on the art of leadership.[37] The social psychologist William Biddle put among the principal rules in *A Psychological Definition of Propaganda* the rule of "two steps," which he would further articulate: "First the ends of propaganda must be interpreted in terms of the purposes and prejudices of the group. Second the endorsement of key-men within the group must be obtained."[38]

The image of the group leader then played a fundamental role, according to Biddle: "Propaganda has leaned to condition the desired responses to group purposes, prejudices, emotional drives, using the group leaders to express and personify these emotions."[39] William F. Whyte illustrated an intermediate link between the basis of the group and the leader in *Street Corner Society*, his study about gangs: "The leader does not deal with his followers as an undifferentiated group. The leader mobilizes his group by dealing first with his lieutenants."[40] The image of the leader was inserted therefore in an intense social network. As Tead put it, "on every hand today the cry is for more and better leaders."[41]

During the Depression there was a proliferation of different groups that sprang up all over the country led by various leaders. Father Charles Coughlin fought for a populist kind of program, Dr. Francis Townsend wanted to restore the country's economics by a national system of pensions, and Father Divine of Harlem promised eternal salvation and earthly happiness to members of his congregation. A well-known social scientist,

Hadley Cantril, used these examples as case studies in his analysis of social groups, comparing them with European fascist movements, as we shall see.[42]

The sociologist Paul Pigors begins his book *Leadership or Domination* with an assertion: "We need leaders in the professions, in education, in business, in the church."[43] The problem was the relationship between the two poles: the exercise of democratic government and leadership that was traditionally perceived as an authoritarian management of power. Tead and Pigors both found that the demand for efficient leadership was felt not only in the labor sector but also in public life. According to Tead, "faced as we are by a new kind of world in which organized action is the typical channel and area of personal effort—organizations require more than to be administered."[44]

Leadership therefore came to be analyzed primarily as a social process. During a tense period of social conflicts in 1935, another social psychologist, Mapheus Smith, assessing the different viewpoints in the field of leadership studies, defined leadership as the "management of social differentials." Smith considered the group and its leader as on a magnetic field: "The process is essentially the same whether the field consists of a few individuals who are in direct or face-to-face contact with the leader . . . or whether the field consists of a constellation of interrelated groups each of which exhibits managements of differentials by some directly influential leader who in turn is but a satellite subject to a greater leader who from time to time influences his satellites directly."[45] Rather than undergo analysis only of his individual characteristics, the leader had to be studied in relation to his group and environment. Thus, for example, according to social psychologist Leonard Doob, the leader was closely tied to his supporters since he was connected to the related attitudes of the group.[46] The question of leadership did not concern as much the leader's charisma in respect to the masses, as it had been traditionally analyzed, especially in European culture, as it did the need for a popular, broad-based leadership, competent to guide the various sectors of associate life.

If the leadership role had expanded enormously, it was also limited by a particular context. Outside of this context the leader could even lose his capacity for this role, becoming instead the follower of another leader in a different situation: "The leader should no longer be looked upon as a unique individual set apart from humanity by unusual personal qualities. The leader in one organization is often the follower in another."[47]

Various researchers of the period investigated this further. In 1927 social psychologist Mildred Parten conducted an experiment with children in order to identify the principal psychological traits of leadership. She demonstrated that leadership was based on the needs of the group and that each child had different degrees of leadership ability.[48] The sociologist William Cowley of the University of Chicago made some important distinctions concerning a subject he considered important for the good of society: "If one could produce an authentic list of such leadership traits, immediate and important theoretical and practical advances might be made in our understanding and control of human behavior. . . . With such a simplification of knowledge of human behavior control of our institutions and advance of our civilization would run along smoothly and with considerable speed."[49] Therefore if leadership was considered a fundamental part of the social process, it was also important to know its specifics in order to teach them in the most important sectors—industry, the military, and education.

William Cowley was first to distinguish a leader from a headman. According to Cowley the leader, exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt, had a plan, a program to develop; whereas the headman, epitomized by President Coolidge, though having an executive function, lacked a clear program. Second, Cooley put personal traits in touch with the demands of a definite situation and therefore demonstrated potential leadership in respect to a clear-cut social context. Once again President Theodore Roosevelt was proposed as an example, the one who paradoxically had demonstrated no clear leadership characteristics as a young man:

> he was not a leader at Harvard. He did a bit of boxing and he played around with a semi-intellectual group, but except in a small way he was not a leader. . . . His leadership began when he went out to his western ranch and acquired self-confidence by being successful with his ranchers . . . because of acquiring the qualities that the ranch group considered important. He learned to ride well, to shoot straight, to hunt expertly and even to swagger a bit. With the self-confidence he thus gained, he came back to the political situation in the east, worked hard at his politics, obtained prestige because of his success, got into the habit of thinking of himself as a leader, and ended up with everyone considering him to be a born leader.[50]

From his youthful experiences on the ranch, Theodore Roosevelt had acquired leadership characteristics as demanded by the situation. He

successfully transferred those characteristics to the political sphere in an exchange of reciprocal expectations with his voters.

At the root of these studies is an understanding of leadership as tied to a particular context. By focusing on its contextual aspect, researchers could analyze and better understand the essentials of leadership. The sociologist Emory Bogardus remarked: "The development of leadership depends on studying situations and acquiring skill in controlling them. In order to 'learn' leadership, a person analyzes situations and develops appropriate techniques for controlling them."[51]

As leadership was mainly perceived in its interaction with the group, it acquired a mutable character, changing in different situations; a change of context could cause a leader to fail who might eventually succeed in another situation. As Bogardus observed: "Social situations are never static. They are ever changing; the idea of process is implicit. Social situations call now for one set of leadership qualities, but tomorrow perhaps for another set of traits."[52]

The social psychologist Robert Nafe of the New York State Department of Rural and Social Organization observed that by analyzing a leader's characteristics with the eyes of his follower one realizes that "the leader needs only to have the appearance of possessing the attitude desired by the following. The real problem in this connection is the attitude of the led towards the leader. Similarly it may be observed that the attributes of leadership exist only in the minds of the led. The leader may be this to one, and that to another one, but it is only by virtue of having a following that he is a leader."[53] Exploring leadership from the group's point of view, Nafe concluded that just having a following did not make one a leader and that, furthermore, the psychological traits defining him as a leader existed only in his followers' minds. This was also the tack taken by the School of Sociology at the University of Chicago in studies about Chicago gangs and in Whyte's *Street Corner Society*.[54]

Looking at the process from the top down, the leader performed an important function in the pursuit of social integration. Thus the sociologist Bogardus distinguished the characteristics of the "prophet" leader from those of the politician or the industrial manager.[55] Moreover, these characteristics were classified according to criteria that distinguished between a scientific or political leadership and a leadership that provided new stimulus to the group that reacted in its turn.[56] In other words, the difference was between "static" and "dynamic infusive leadership," as

Nafe called it.[57] That contemporary society needed dynamic leadership was a tenet of those who studied leadership in industry. In such a context, dominated by scientific and technical progress, the chief function of the executive was to introduce and make acceptable the technological changes within the industrial process.

In the more specifically political field, Paul Pigors made a distinction in *Leadership or Domination* between a managerial and a political boss. In industrial relations the word "boss" referred to the typical authoritarian factory manager. Pigors identified the popular Plumkitt of Tammany Hall as the emblematic figure of the boss: "The easiest way to make political capital is to satisfy the little wants of many people."[58] In this "barter philosophy," the political vision of the leader was anchored to the narrow horizon of the electors' material aspirations, while a statesman with a broader vision was capable of guiding his electorate and not simply satisfying more immediate needs.

Although in the 1920s political scientists, philosophers, jurists, and sociologists were intent on debating the characteristics of a democratic system, in the second half of the 1930s their attention turned to weighing the differences between democracies and dictatorships in response to the threats of the new international order.[59] Pigors distinguished between a "leadership" in a democratic regime and the "domination" of an authoritarian type: "In a critical period such as ours thoughtful observers cannot help but marvel at the ease with which certain people acquire ascendancy over their fellow men. . . . How can we differentiate between the constructive and the destructive use of power?"[60]

Pigors summarized the authoritarian characteristics of leadership in his definition of leadership in these terms: the leader and his followers were "united by the will to lead on one side and by the will to follow on the other."[61] Moreover the followers recognized traits in the leader similar to theirs. They accepted him "not because he is utterly different, but because he is the same, only more so," and also because they shared with him a common situation in view of a goal they have both chosen: "Leadership is a process of mutual stimulation which by the successful interplay of relevant individual differences controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause."[62]

Pigors saw the use of power defined as "domination" as substantially different from leadership because of its coercive connotation: "Domination is a process of control in which by the forcible assumption of author-

ity and the accumulation of prestige, a person through a hierarchy of functionaries, regulates the activities of others, for purposes of his own choosing."[63] He drew a distinction between a power that is exercised *on* the underlings and a power that is exercised *together* with the followers and not from above; it implied the consensus problem as a particular problem of a democratic society. Similarly, Ordway Tead framed the problem in this way: "Leading is the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable."[64]

The goals of the art of leadership would be therefore the "management of social differentials," the art of conditioning or, according to those involved in public relations, the art of persuasion, that is, of arousing active consent from the people.

In this regard, Charles Lundholm considered Mark Antony's speech to the people after the assassination of Caesar in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* to be "a marvelous piece of persuasion or propaganda." Mark Antony was able to persuade the people without subjugating them, the reverse of what Brutus did in his oration.[65] Edward A. Ross had previously referred to Mark Antony's speech as an example of a leader's "indirect suggestion."[66] In his comparison of the two orators, Lundholm wished to emphasize Mark Antony's "democratic" characteristics: "Mark Antony lets his audience make its own rational conclusions . . . he thus appeals indirectly to the assertion of his audience. . . . He can vanish from the psychological picture of his audience, his creation remains."[67] Brutus proceeded in another way, according to Lundholm: "The acceptance on the part of his audience of his proposition is chiefly contingent upon his hearers submission to himself. Accordingly the preservation of his message in the minds of the Romans is conditioned by the continual presence in the psychological picture of himself as the dominating dignified leader."[68] Mark Antony's speech, therefore, corresponded to a model of noncoercive authority that found its best expression in an industrially advanced democratic society.

It was also necessary to discuss the concept of authority in light of modern scientific progress, according to businessman Edward Filene. In a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he referred to the change of mentality produced by the spread of scientific culture: "All America, including our theological students, participated in this drift from the unquestioning acceptance of authority, to scientific fact finding research."[69]

Filene extrapolated from the scientific field a method to apply to political science based on a critical analysis of phenomena, which by its nature questioned the principle of authority. This same way of thinking about scientific progress in a democratic society typified the pragmatic philosophy of the progressives, as we have seen. John Dewey would develop the same line of thought in his *Freedom and Culture*. According to the philosopher, such a position would become the most convincing point of reference in the thorny debate about the relationship between science and ethics, which would develop around the democratic/dictatorship controversy, as we examine in detail.

The problem of achieving group consensus was commonly expressed in terms of "morale," as we have already mentioned. Fritz Roethlisberger of the Harvard Business School wrote about the "morale" of workers in relation to the "management" of industry. According to his definition, "morale is not a quality attaching to an individual or to a group, it is a dynamic relation of equilibrium between individuals and the organization they serve."[70] The relationship between the individual and the group was a matter of using an "intelligent exercise of control."[71] Beginning by analyzing the situation in the factory, Roethlisberger extended his considerations to a more general process of social integration.

Another social psychologist, Floyd Allport, expressed strong reservations about crowd theories. He was interested in the "innate or acquired predispositions of the individual," the set of attitudes composed of emotional or cultural leanings that filter impulses and external stimulus. Thus a wide field of inquiry opened for both advertisers and politicians to determine how best to target the message. The study of "attitudes"—with its tradition-laden baggage of stereotypes, prejudices, mores, and customs—could yield accounts of the behavior of individuals beyond the rational level and of their receptiveness of labor's role.

Experiments conducted by Ronald Lippitt (future director of the section of research and analysis of the U.S. Information Agency) on communism and by Ralph K. White on the behavior and morale of groups organized with authoritarian, democratic, and a sort of laissez-faire leadership demonstrated how the democratically led group had a higher rate of success than the groups following the other two models.[72] In fact, the democratic leader was able to combine efficiency with freedom, overcoming the authoritarian exercise of power and unregulated freedom, both detrimental and unproductive.

According to Lippitt and White, the functioning of the democratic group was different from the authoritarian group because of the leader's "low control" and the "strong stimulation of group procedures," since it was based on the inspiring stimulus of a dynamic leader. In contrast the group left to itself in an absolute freedom of expression, according to the laissez-faire formula, was not as successful and showed little aptitude for cohesion. This experiment was taken up again by social scientists in the great debate about democracy versus European dictatorships.[73]

After the war, in their *Autocracy and Democracy*, the authors responded to the question "how satisfying is democracy?"[74] The problems with inefficiency, slowness, and conformity typical of a democratic system must be resolved differently from what Erich Fromm proposed in *Escape from Freedom*. According to the latter, in fact, the individual was conceived of as an atomic part of the mass. David Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* and Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* would take up this same concept. Lippitt and White proposed a different interpretative key that placed the individual as part of a group situation where active participation was possible. At the same time, the democratic leader's function as a guide was fundamental in order to avoid the dangers of confusion, inefficiency, and chaos, characteristic of the group organized according to laissez-faire principles.

The Leader and Political Symbols

Experts in the fields of advertising and politics were especially interested in public-opinion studies, since polls could measure the tastes and interests of citizens as consumers and as voters.

Bernays proposed a management of politics scientifically conducted by the leader, since "politics has failed to learn very much from business methods of mass distribution of ideas and products."[75] Only campaigns capable of turning not indiscriminately to Republican or Democratic voters but of attracting many specific interest groups had any possibility for success. On this point he remarked: "The public is not made up merely of democrats and republicans. . . . The public is made up of interlocking groups . . . economic, social, religious, educational, cultural, and hundreds of others."[76] Bernays used examples coming from recent incidents in national politics.

Consensus could be reached by a symbolic gesture, like that of the

spectacular luncheon hosted by President Coolidge with the glamour of Hollywood actors, or by parades, mass meetings, or direct contact with group leaders. A political campaign had to be organized around not only the public's rationality but especially its emotional disposition. As Bernays noted: "Big business has realized that it must use as many of the basic emotions as possible. The politician however has used the emotions aroused by words almost exclusively."[77]

Politicians would use publicity campaigns—which were the most effective medium to reach listeners—to observe carefully the public's tastes and attitudes. The work of the able politician would fall on an already well-disposed audience, and he had no more to do but gather the fruits of the labor:

> In whatever ways he dramatized the issue, the attention of the public would be attracted to the question before he addressed them personally. Then, when he spoke to the millions of listeners on the radio, he would not be seeking to force an argument down the throats of a public thinking of other things, and annoyed by another demand on its attention; on the contrary he would be answering the spontaneous questions and expressing the emotional demands of a public already keyed to a certain pitch of interest in the subject.[78]

Bernays did little more than report techniques already widely applied in electoral campaigns. According to Ralph Casey, director of *Journalism Quarterly*, political propaganda employed all the means of mass advertising: "timely news stories, editorials," interviews and photographs of the candidates, animated cartoons, films, campaign buttons, "meetings, tours and radio talks."[79] Presidential campaigns included highly efficient advertising specialists, and journalists and cameramen from the major Hollywood studios followed the candidate across the country. Radio influenced the political campaign more than any other means in the 1920s. In 1924 the Democratic Party expenses in the presidential campaign were forty thousand dollars for radio; four years later that figure had jumped to six hundred thousand dollars. Along with radio, movies would have an extraordinary influence in the 1930s. As Casey remarked:

> The honest debate of really significant issues is subordinated to specious appeals that will capture votes. . . . It is a truism that many voters make no pretense of studying the qualifications of the aspirants for public office . . .

> but support a candidate because they "like his radiating smile. . . ." Knowing that personalities are often more important than principles, propagandists busy themselves in and out of season to "build up" their candidates, create myths about them. . . . Myth making accentuates a few individual characteristics of a political candidate to the exclusion of everything else, for the purpose of presenting a picture that is not too complex for the average voter. Because of this oversimplification, the stereotype is actually a symbol and not a reality.[80]

Commenting on the 1928 election, Charles Michelson, correspondent of the *New York World*, expressed himself using similar language: "The American people will elect as President of the United States in November a nonexistent person—and defeat likewise a mythical identity. . . . They will vote for and against a picture that has been painted for them by protagonists and antagonists in a myriad of publications, a picture that must be either a caricature or an idealization."[81] New advertising techniques had already filtered into politics and would become even more prevalent in the 1930s. In the sphere of political science, interest also turned to quantitative analyses and psychology in all its ramifications. Under the direction of Charles Merriam and with the collaboration of Harold D. Lasswell, the School of Political Science at the University of Chicago analyzed the management of power in politics and the mechanisms capable of conditioning mass behavior.

One product of this investigation would then be the 1934 book by Charles Merriam, *Political Power*. However, Merriam had already stated in a previous work that "political science must be founded upon a study of the political process out of which institutions are made, as well as a description of their external features or their operation."[82]

Lasswell's successful book about the political world, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, deals with the use, for direct political ends, of theories and research pertaining to the formation of public opinion and its possible conditioning in a democratic consumer society—a practice stimulated by developments in the fields of advertising and public relations.

As we have seen, the impact irrational drives have on human behavior had been closely analyzed after World War I. In "The Irrational Factor in Human Behavior" Elton Mayo used the metaphor of the "night mind" to illustrate the importance of the irrational component in industrial civilization. He observed that

> man's pride in the achievement of the last few centuries tends to cancel from him the fact that the human mind and the social organism are still very largely uncivilized. . . . Certain thoughts and activities are controlled by the day mind, the product of concentrated thinking and disciplined reverie. Certain other ideas and actions are controlled by the night mind, the product of unacknowledged reverie and the minimum of concentration . . . even people of education in the ordinary sense are still more dominated by magic and the night mind than by clear thinking.[83]

Whereas Mayo concentrated on factory-related problems, Lasswell focused on political ones. Neither wanted to study the rational processes of "government by discussion and voting" as much as the emotional impulses underlying them. And until they could define what characterized political action, Lasswell added: "People emotionally bound together are not yet involved in a political process. . . . Politics begins when they acquire a symbolic definition of themselves in relation to the world-wide questions they think about."[84] Propaganda understood as a tool for conditioning the masses, of major interest to Lasswell, continued to be strongly debated in the light of insightful comparisons with authoritarian European regimes.

The first comprehensive review of the nature of propaganda was conducted under Lasswell's direction for the Social Research Council and published in 1935 as *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*. After classifying the various political, cultural, or economic groups involved, the author turned to the symbolic aspect of propaganda. Finally, he took into consideration propaganda outlets—institutions in charge of education, radio, film, theater, newspapers, and advertising. Within this grouping, there were manifestations that Lasswell called "ceremonies," whose function was to maintain established order. "In many times and places the symbols that sustain the existing distribution of values are transmitted with a minimum of premeditation, since they are deeply implanted in the culture. Under such conditions the ceremony is one of the most potent means of preserving the traditional order. . . . The ceremonial is a reminder of continuity and permanence, offering the individual another opportunity to identify his own destiny with the imperishable."[85] Public ceremonies in a spectacle-loving society were of particular interest to those involved with the study of public opinion and the means necessary for conditioning it.

Therefore it was the symbolic level that allowed the emotional mobili-

zation necessary to form a political movement. To this important observation Lasswell added another interesting point. In a study conducted of a group of Communist political leaders in Chicago during the Great Depression, the author reconstructed their common psychological traits, concluding that "the mature political personality knows how to transfer private motives on public goals in the name of common shared values."[86] Historian Paula Rabinowitz has noted that Lasswell's way of "documenting" the subject of his works through accurate description—according to the guidelines of the Chicago School of Sociology—has many points in common with literary novelists of the time.[87]

Lasswell described the 1934 Lenin Memorial demonstration at the Chicago Theater as a highly symbolic ceremony. On stage large posters depicting Lenin leading the masses of workers and farmers galvanized the six thousand spectators, half of whom were African Americans. They were made participants in a great collective ritual by the large and small red flags filling the theater, by the lines of children in uniform, each with a flag in hand, and by the orchestra of Hungarian workers.[88] Showing the mass demonstrations was especially important, since such images usually resulted in a flood of new members and reinforced the identity of the group now gathered. The leader was the fundamental point of reference for the masses. In some cases a leader would spontaneously spring out of the crowd. Lasswell described an August 3, 1927, demonstration a few weeks before the execution of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti:

> The meeting proceeded peacefully, but the audience was tense, over responsive, restless. As the meeting closed a young Italian woman Aurora D'Angelo sprang to the stage and began to address . . . the audience. The police rushed to the stage and forcefully escorted her from the hall. The overwrought crowd followed into the street and gathered around her. Climbing on to a parked automobile, she continued to address them.[89]

Police were unsuccessful in dispersing the crowd, which formed "a parade with a young Italian woman in their midst" and "marched down Van Buren Street."[90] Another interesting element of Lasswell's analysis regarded the split the political parties would make between the positive aspects of their own activities and the negative ones of opposing parties. Lasswell recognized in this an analogy with war propaganda, an attempt to channel all emotional energies toward promoting their own collective identity in contrast to the complete devaluation of the enemy: "the illu-

sion of victory" against "the illusion of Satanism."[91] In the 1933 May Day demonstration, the inner cohesion of the group, resulting from a common "illusion of victory," guaranteed its success:

> May day dawned grey and clouded in Chicago. By five o'clock when the parade began to move the marchers numbered about six thousand. In the face of a terrific rainstorm which had broken over the city the thousands of marchers held their ranks, singing revolutionary songs and shouting the slogans of the day: "Free Tom Money." The parade marched on, headed by an automobile bearing Mrs. Spies and Mrs. Parsons, widows of the anarchists executed after the Haymarket Riot. Slushing along in the pouring rain, singing, shouting, carrying their sloganed banners, the paraders first appeared not to be disturbed by the rain . . . the dwindling ranks finally poured into the Chicago stadium.[92]

Lasswell's research emphasized the cohesion of the group strengthened by the leader, the ability to transfer private emotions to public objectives, the split between positive and negative aspects, and the importance of symbols. The political context in which Lasswell worked out his analysis offered him many opportunities to test his theories in the political arena. Beyond individual cases, these theories furnished the tools for an interpretation of the many groups of social protest on the public scene in the mid-1930s, when he was writing.

CHAPTER 7 The International Challenge

Democracy between Ideals and Reality

The Great Depression had swept away not only economic certainty but also public confidence in the values underpinning American society. In the aftermath many quarters strongly questioned the very concept of democracy, presenting controversial arguments far beyond the political sphere.[1] In the winter of 1932–33, before the installation of Roosevelt's new Democratic administration, the crisis had reached a critical stage. The gross national product had shrunk by a third since 1929, and the number of unemployed exceeded fifteen million, or nearly 25 percent of the workforce. Among the unemployed were something between one and two million hoboes who drifted across the country in search of means of survival, living in huts of cardboard and corrugated sheet metal—the famous Hoovervilles that sprang up in city parks and elsewhere. In states more affected by the economic crisis, public order was seriously threatened by violent social protests sparked by the slightest provocation.

In larger cities the Communist Party organized thousands of the unemployed to demonstrate in the streets, interrupting public life. The impact of the economic crisis on American society, with the long-term economic stagnation, widespread unemployment, and growing social unrest, drew attention to the failure of the U.S. government to perform even the most elementary tasks that a democratic system of government sets for itself, such as economic and social guarantees, as well as equality for all its citizens. According to Harold Laski, "there is in America a wider disillusionment with democracy, a greater skepticism about popular institutions, than in any period in its history."[2]

The eminent jurist Edward S. Corwin maintained that "the modern attack on democratic dogma has proceeded from a two-fold basis." On the one hand, Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell had investigated "the growing indifference of the voter." On the other hand, the specific features of the average man had been redefined starting from Graham

Wallas's "challenge of the notion that the voter . . . will act on rational considerations."[3] And for his part John Dewey believed democracy was challenged from the left by demands for economic guarantees and from the right for moral certitudes.[4]

The "gap" between ideals and reality became one of the most frequent rhetorical figures in public discourse of the time. French journalist Raoul Roussy de Sales, in a brilliant *Atlantic Monthly* article titled "Love in America," compared the notion of democracy to that of love, referring to the discrepancy between ideals and reality: "The prevailing conception of love in America is similar to the idea of democracy. It is fine in theory—it is the grandest system ever developed by man . . . Love is perfect, in fact . . . and there is nothing better, but like democracy, it does not work."[5] The distance separating ideal values from reality grew wider during the Great Depression, as Robert and Helen Lynd noted in their return to Middletown.[6] Even Franklin D. Roosevelt in his second inaugural address referred to his administration's accomplishments as "beginning to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal."[7]

The idea that the basic values of American democracy were "challenged on all sides, from within and from without," was widely held by public opinion, even beyond highbrow culture and academic circles.[8] According to Stuart Chase, well known to the general public for his articles in the *Nation* and the *New Republic*, and for *The Tyranny of Words*, the very term "democracy" encompassed a wide range of meanings that generated contradictory opinions: "If we are to talk sensibly about democracy we should begin by asking: What kind of democracy? Where? When? Shall the kind be political as in a nation, industrial as in a labor union, or social as in a club? Shall the place and times be Athens . . . the Roman Republic . . . the American democracy of 1787 or the American Democracy of 1938?" Chase observed that the phrase "democracy-in-general" was just as treacherous as the expression "production-in-general."[9] The principal obstacle to a critical analysis of the concept of democracy was found, in his view, when the focus was on "the weakness of democracy as currently practiced," because then "we tend to burst into rhetoric about freedom, liberty, the Constitution, hallowed rights and imperishable traditions." The possibility of "making studies, performing experiments to the end of changing the machinery of democracy" was barred if democracy was considered as an "entity, fixed, eternal and inviolate."[10] This antithetical view—an experimental, pragmatic approach as opposed to an ideological

one—varied in the years between the two world wars in relation to the great economic depression on the one hand and to the spread of authoritarian regimes in Europe on the other. Chase's observations became part of the debate involving important philosophers, scientists, politicians, and economists who questioned some of the fundamental principles that supported the American liberal tradition.[11]

Far from being either abstract or fixed, the concept of democracy had always carried with it many opposing values and aspirations, undergoing profound changes in different historical contexts. In respect to a liberal tradition "as large and complex as America's very political culture," the experts were engaged in redefining America's essential values in order to cope with the problems caused by the Great Depression and the changed international framework.[12] While questioning democratic values they also considered European dictatorships and the communist system to be alternative models. Supporters of the democratic way of life felt challenged to respond to these broad questions. They critically compared one system to the other until, in the mid-1930s, they reconfirmed the basic principles of American democracy. However, some aspects of the mass-persuasion techniques exploited by dictatorships were the object of great interest and close investigation.

The noted jurist at Yale University, Thurman Arnold, observed during the presidential campaign of 1936: "Every practical scheme for social betterment had to be tested for tendencies leading to one of the other of these systems. If it led to Communism or Fascism it was thought better to humiliate the unemployed or to waste natural resources rather than take steps which would change the 'capitalist system.'"[13] In a debate that included such wide-ranging problems, the core of the argument and the point of departure of every critical comparison between the different regimes turned on criticism of the functioning of the democratic society.[14]

The *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* devoted an entire issue in 1933 to the "crisis of democracy."[15] The journal carried essays of the most diverse positions, from writers who commented positively on the success of communism in the Soviet Union to others favorable to fascist and Nazi regimes. The common denominator of the diverse positions was the way in which European regimes had faced economic crisis and unemployment. The authors measured the consequences of the profound social, economic, and political changes in relation to the principles of democracy. The controversial word "plan-

ning" had entered the public debate, with its questionable compatibility with the democratic capitalist system.

Some believed that the current democratic representative system needed a change of direction. The historian Charles Beard proposed a revision of the basic criteria that sustained representative government, such as the very concept of "checks and balances." He found such a criterion inadequate for the needs of a democratic society and in particular for greater government control of corporations.[16] In the opposite direction, conservative exponents defended the traditional freedoms against an interventionist government. The jurist Ira I. Williams, who frequently wrote for the *Annals*, asserted: "We believe that American constitutional representative government is a working ideal. It attempts to avoid the very evil advocated by fascism and socialism—an excess of government."[17] While denouncing an "excess of government," Walter Shepard, president of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1934, defined it "the intervening state."[18] This not only contradicted the traditional system of separation of powers, the checks and balances, but also went against the democratic dogma of economic freedom, the traditional doctrine of laissez-faire, and the freedom of political rights.[19]

Political scientists focused their attention on new economic initiatives undertaken by the government, on the increasing power of the executive branch of government compared to Congress, and on the concomitant bureaucratic growth. The debate from different and sometimes contradictory viewpoints focused on economic and political questions. Roosevelt "confronted budget balances and inflators, regulators and trust-busters, traditionally southerners and restless urban liberals."[20] As is well known, in the first period of FDR's administration legislative measures had swung from industrial recovery based on governmental regulation of the industrial sectors, to provisions for direct aid to the unemployed, public works, and guaranteed freedom for unions.

In December 1934 at the end of Roosevelt's second year in office, with economic recovery still very uncertain, the APSA met in Chicago to celebrate its thirtieth year. The talk President Shepard gave on this occasion was significantly titled "Democracy in Transition." Democracy, that is, not as a series of static values, but as subject to continual change. Shepard remarked that "the term democracy is a perfect example of a verbal stereotype. . . . It is surrounded with an aura of sanctity . . . It calls forth visions of heroes such as Jefferson and Lincoln. It evokes as its antithesis

concepts of despotism, of dictatorship, of absolute monarchy. To be a democrat is to be on the side of the angels."[21] He underlined not only the institutional importance but also the values, the system of ideas that citizens made more or less consciously their own, as a reflection of the institutional system. On the other hand, the threats of the new international order had given rise to profound doubts about the basic principles of democratic dogma.[22]

According to Shepard, the crucial question was "who are the People?" In the alternative between the whole mass of the population with its amorphous nature, subject to powerful group pressure or to the will of demagogues and "the legally constituted electorate," the latter seemed to respond better to the requirements of a modern democratic society, once the notion of people conceived as an abstract and absolute entity was removed.[23] Therefore the idea that "the Voice of the People" was "the Voice of God" was no longer sustainable. Thinking of the electorate as just one among many bodies that "shared the responsibility of the State" made it necessary, the argument went, to revise suffrage and thus avoid the political influence of masses of electors subject to political propaganda. The new techniques in fact appealed to irrational tendencies and the "ballyhoo" of interest groups.

Without going as far as the radical solutions proposed by Shepard, the noted expert in political affairs of Harvard University, Pendleton Herring, maintained that democracy understood as popular government was reduced to a "counting of noses" with the sole aim of obtaining social consensus. "The Voice of the People," according to him, constituted "a pleasant fancy and not a present fact," whereas political initiative had to be organized and imposed from above.[24] The experts envisioned a revival of the democratic system of government as a strengthening of the executive power rather than a strengthening of congressional powers too tied to interest groups. The U.S. president, according to Herring, had in fact the power of fulfilling a symbolically unifying function on a national level. By his personal magnetism he would be able to stimulate the popular interest necessary to overcome sectionalisms and hostilities of the legislative and judiciary bodies, and follow a political line of general interest.

The solutions Herring proposed closely reflected the real changes undertaken by FDR's administration. Once the social and economic inequalities of a democratic society were acknowledged, the task of the social sciences, according to Herring, should aim at "a redefinition of the demo-

cratic culture." On various occasions he stressed that "democratic government is not a set of principles which must be consistently followed. . . . The significant thing is that the ideology of democracy permits the peaceful solution of interest conflicts through accepted institutions."[25]

In distinguishing between alternative forms of democratic government, the notion of freedom was a topic of uppermost importance. In 1935 the *Annals* devoted one issue to a comparative analysis of fascist, communist, and democratic regimes. The number opened with an article by the illustrious historian exiled in America, Gaetano Salvemini, appropriately titled "What Is Freedom?" He made some important distinctions relating to the concept of freedom, particularly political and economic freedoms. Tied to the doctrine of laissez-faire, the latter had been more or less abused by various governments, whether oligarchies or democracies, to the extent that these could intervene in regulating the processes of distribution and accumulation of wealth. Therefore, according to Salvemini, the accusations of the conservatives tied to big private interests that Roosevelt's administration was becoming a dictatorship had no real basis once political freedoms and the functioning of representative institutions were guaranteed.

The distinction the Italian historian made between economic and political spheres was particularly appropriate in view of a cultural climate where the principle of individual economic freedom had been traditionally tied to political freedom.[26] Salvemini then developed other considerations in regard to the concept of freedom. Refusing to analyze the notion of freedom on an abstract level, he analyzed the freedom/coercion polarity in relation to the democracy/dictatorship opposites, considering both extremes to be part of each regime, the difference between the two being "in the proportion of liberty to compulsion. Freedom and democracy begin when there is more liberty than compulsion for the opposition. Dictatorship begins where there is more compulsion than liberty. Neither pure dictatorship nor pure freedom is to be found anywhere."[27] Therefore it was not the question of majority consensus that defined a democratic system as opposed to a dictatorship, as much as it was the political rights of the minorities.

Another significant contribution came from Thomas V. Smith, professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, who considered the concept of democracy as a "continuum" ranging from the greatest democratic experience, a direct democracy obtained in a "government by the people,"

to its opposite, a "government for the people." Between these two poles Smith specified the "government of the people" as the best expression of the democratic government, since it implied the concept of representative government, understood as "the flexible middle ground over which democracy fluctuates back and forth from near success to near failure."[28]

Alongside this kind of critical examination of the democratic system, social scientists began using a different approach especially in the second half of the 1930s. They favored a reevaluation of democracy, taking into account also its symbolic level in an open comparison with that of European dictatorships.

Thurman Arnold held an intermediate position, still striving for a critical comparison between the ideal and reality in the functioning of a democratic system, but at the same time reconfirming the abstract value of ideals. His *Symbols of Government* shed light on the political contradictions of government policies and its incongruities, analyzing the relationship between the actual workings of the public institutions and "that complex of theories and ceremonies," which constitute the "fundamental principles of the different sciences of law, economics, political theory, ethics and theology."[29] About the gap between a symbolic and a practical level, he stated: "The chasm existing between the two levels is more evident in a period of crisis when practical and organized institutions fail to control practical situations and we attempt to find our way out of the wilderness by the guiding light of great principles."[30] But these same principles had to be examined in the light of practical results; otherwise, according to Arnold, "when men observe human conduct in the light of principles which they consider sacred or fundamental they develop priests but not scientists."[31]

Political symbols, "the great principles," acquired a complex significance in Arnold's way of thinking from the moment they were a necessary requirement for social cohesion, but at the same time they constituted a theoretical hindrance for pragmatic action: "Social institutions require faith and dreams to give them morale, they need to escape from their faiths in order to progress"[32]

In agreement with members of the University of Chicago School of Political Science, he believed that this ideal aspect was inevitable, since it was a part of human nature. "Man can never escape from his moral self and a cynical position brings the futility of disillusionment. Man is under the constant necessity of putting on ceremonial robes and watching himself go by."[33] This need to wear "ceremonial robes," which linked

ideal principles with real politics, was the motive for parades, slogans, and symbols of the New Deal. In his study about public opinion Walter Lippmann also emphasized the importance of symbols as an instrument of social cohesion, especially in the lowest strata of the population, as well as their possible influence on mass behavior: "The leader knows that only when symbols have done their work is there a handle he can use to move a crowd."[34] According to Lasswell and Bernays a symbolic level of ideals fulfilled the important function of social cohesion.

Arnold pointed out as evidence for his argument the Administration Relief Program for the unemployed, where government spending was at odds with classic laissez-faire theory. Therefore political strategies had to "conform to the ideals of a time when there was no government spending." From this ideological premise, according to Arnold, sprang "frantic efforts to make relief look like productive employment" and "eternal conflicts about the moral clothing in which relief for unemployment should be dressed." The consequence was that "the symbolic effect of public works became more important than their practical needs," from the moment that "the idea that such activities could be an obligation of business for government rather than a sentimental interlude was considered dangerous to those great principles which kept Americans from growing beards and drinking vodka like the Russians!"[35]

Arnold, in fact, believed, as did the New Dealers in 1937–38, that the federal government was responsible for regulating economic problems. As historian Alan Brinkley has observed, the New Dealers abandoned the vision of "a harmonious capitalist world" and being aware of "the inevitability of the conflict and instability of economic activity," they had "to rely on the state to regulate that conflict and instability."[36]

The liberal ideology, which deemed intervention by the federal government detrimental to traditional individual freedoms, gave way to a redefinition of liberalism that focused on the economic aspects involved with the concept of liberty. Despite the diversity of ideas about the nature and importance of governmental intervention, the latter was expected to guarantee and protect its citizens in the vicissitudes of economic cycles. The argument acquired special significance by comparing different regimes and institutional procedures, not only their abstract significance, but also how the different economic policies coped with the economic crisis and unemployment.

In 1936 W. E. B. Du Bois visited Germany on a study grant from the Oberländer Trust of Philadelphia. Particularly sensitive to racial politics

and the material well-being of workers, he observed how "nine Germans out of ten supported Hitler because more than nine out of ten had a job." It far surpassed the economic recovery of Roosevelt's administration, Du Bois commented in the *Pittsburgh Courier*.[37]

Roosevelt himself found a connection between an authoritarian government capable of resolving the economic crisis and the freedom of a democratic system. In one Fireside Chat broadcast he said: "Democracy has disappeared in several other great nations—not because the people of those nations disliked democracy, but because they have grown tired of unemployment and insecurity. . . . Finally in desperation they chose to sacrifice liberty in the hope of getting something to eat." The solution proposed by the president was that of "a government strong enough to protect the interests of the people, and a people strong enough and well informed enough to maintain its sovereign control over its government."[38]

In the second half of the 1930s the whole frame of reference shifted from a debate on the dynamics of politics and the roles of the elites to a new emphasis on the notion of economic equality within the concept of democracy. In the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* Harold Laski's entry for "democracy" reads: "It is because political equality, however profound, does not permit the full affirmation of the common man's essence that the idea of democracy has spread to other spheres . . . since the war . . . emphasis is upon . . . equality of opportunity."[39] The limits of such freedom were defined by the Social Security Act of 1935, through the influence of a wide coalition of workers supported by big labor unions, which were at the basis of the welfare state; excluded were those without steady work under contract, domestic workers, agricultural employees (mostly African American), and women. As Eric Foner noted: "Designed to alleviate poverty and economic insecurity, the Social Security law of 1935 established the key elements of federal social policy for the next half century. From the system's inception boundaries of gender and race circumscribed the new definition of economic freedom."[40]

Huey Long and Father Coughlin

A 1934 Paramount film with the captivating title *The President Vanishes* aimed to sensitize public opinion by means of a fictitious Nazi takeover in America.[41] During the Great Depression social scientists became keenly

interested in the protest movements springing up in the United States, which were basically religious or social—or more accurately political—while during these same years they analyzed the fascist and Nazi regimes led by charismatic leaders in Europe.[42]

By their astute use of the media religious leaders like Father Coughlin and political leaders like Governor Huey Long of Louisiana gathered enough followers to form a potential third party in the presidential election of 1936. The growth of this phenomenon throughout the nation caused Washington increasing anxiety. Other popular figures included Doctor Townsend and his movement attracting the elderly, the writer Upton Sinclair and his End Poverty program in California, and Governor Olson with his Farmer Labor Party in Minnesota. There were local leaders too; Father Divine's popularity developed in New York's Harlem ghetto. President Roosevelt made the following comment to Judge Henry Stimson about Long and Coughlin: "In normal times the radio and other appeals by them would not be effective. However, these are not normal times, the people are jumpy and very ready to run after strange gods. This is so in every country as well as our own."[43] On this subject he also wrote to Breckinridge Long, the U.S. Ambassador to Italy, "We too are going through a bad case of Huey Long and Father Coughlin *influenza*—the whole country is aching in every bone."[44]

According to FDR, these U.S. movements were analogous to those spreading to European countries, though with indigenous characteristics. The Nazi and fascist organizations on American soil did nothing to lessen his preoccupation. Liberal and progressive politicians and those close to Roosevelt's administration felt threatened by such movements.

As for the fascist-type organizations, the outlawing of the Fascist League of North America in 1929 dismantled one of the principal strongholds of fascist propaganda in the United States.[45] However, less direct channels remained open through which the Mussolini regime exerted pressure on Wall Street and on U.S. public opinion. Moreover, para-Nazi organizations like the Silver Legion and the Friends of the New Germany sprang up in 1932–33. The American press followed with some alarm the spread of such organizations.[46] The result was the formation first of the McCormack-Dickstein Committee and then of the U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee to investigate subversive movements, whether fascist, Nazi, or communist.

Public opinion was made aware of the risk of another "red scare" follow-

ing the mounting protests of those most affected by the economic crisis. Moreover, the national press coverage of the general strike in San Francisco in 1934 refueled the already aroused fears.

According to H. Arthur Steiner a campaign aimed at a "revival of the spirit and techniques of the battle with the reds of 1918–20" was fomented by the Hearst papers.[47] In 1934 the Hearst organization mounted a defamatory campaign against the National Civic Federation and some of the most prestigious universities, accusing them of being hotbeds of communism.[48]

Between 1934 and 1935 forty-four states debated laws against seditious activities as an anticommunist measure, and the American Civil Liberties Union denounced the progressive increase in civil liberty violations throughout America. But the Hearst campaign and the strain on civil liberties ended in 1935, once the McCormack-Dickstein Committee rescaled the dimensions of these groups. Laws restricting freedom of opinion were rejected as a double-edged sword in the effort to guarantee social stability.

According to U.S. Congressman Maury Maverick, "freedom of speech and of the press is a safety valve for the protection of our social order. It acts as an escape for steam for such ideas as are hair brained. . . . If we stop them with force, if we give them more attention than they deserve, then the boiler may burst." Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes maintained, "Communism is merely a convenient bugaboo with which to frighten those who are in their political childhood."[49]

On the other hand, stirring up a communist threat was part of the ideological arsenal used by the fascist movement, according to the analysis of various commentators and journalists. "Fascism always comes through a vast pretense of socialism backed by Wall Street money," William Allen White remarked.[50] The popularity of right-wing movements was followed with as much interest as the communist movement in public discourse. They were joined in the common definition of "un-American." Investigations conducted by the Committee revealed that, besides the direct political ties with the mother country of groups such as the Veterans of War, the Steel Helmets, or the Friends of New Germany, the industrial groups operating in America, such as I. G. Dye Works, had undertaken a publicity campaign in favor of Germany. One of the most famous men in the advertising field, Ivy Lee, directed this campaign. In fact he won acclaim

for redefining a more positive image for John D. Rockefeller after the Ludlow strike massacre.[51] Lee suggested that the American correspondents in Germany could give a favorable image of Nazism in America, while at the same time he advised against any kind of direct propaganda from Berlin, as it could be accused of being un-American.

Actually, both the progressive Democrats and the American Civil Liberties Union, and on the left the American League for Democratic Socialism, and politicians like Norman Thomas strongly debated the possibility that a kind of fascist movement more closely tied to the American fascist tradition might spring up.[52] The main distinction between the U.S. and the European fascist tradition was in their respective perceptions of the state. In fact, in the tradition of American political liberalism, the state should be curtailed as much as possible in order to preserve individual freedom from government interference.

European totalitarianism was thus exactly opposite to U.S. political tradition. In fact, the conservative American Liberty League denounced the New Deal's legislative innovations, since it risked damaging the classic principles of liberalism.[53] They accused the American government of falling into a fascist-type regime; paradoxically, the same accusation was held by the left, but for different reasons.

Industrialists hostile to FDR, such as Henry Ford, and illustrious Republican Party members, such as the former President Herbert Hoover, in addition to the conservative press, warned of the danger to the democratic system, and the possible risk of a dictatorship.[54] The enormous growth of executive power came under attack, as did the proliferation of civil servants charged with regulating the new departments.

The left also unsparingly accused Roosevelt's government of fascist politics. Contrary to the right wing, the left criticized the class nature of the capitalist economic system that legislative interventions of the New Deal attempted to reform, as we shall analyze in the next chapter in greater detail. Here it is enough to state that the accusations of fascism leveled at Roosevelt's administration were part of the heated political climate of those years, but they also expressed the difficulties faced by all the political parties after the economic crisis of 1929.

Public opinion experts such as Hadley Cantril and Daniel Katz, and social psychologists like Ross Stagner, made an empirical survey of these problems. Their attention centered on the concept of "attitude" that had

been elaborated by Floyd Allport and was, as we have seen, widely popular in the social research field.[55]

A similar inquiry was conducted by the social psychologist Ross Stagner in 1935. Avoiding an investigation of the fascist stereotype that provoked a ready emotional response, Stagner focused his attention on those elements of the American mentality in which a homegrown fascist movement could develop, especially in middle-class America.[56] His study revealed an inadequate understanding of the nature of the fascist regime as well as a purely emotional rejection of the word.[57]

An American fascism—which by the way was forecast by scholars such as Lawrence Dennis as the best solution to democracy's problems—could have fertile ground in which to grow in the widespread racist positions that were particularly rampant in the U.S. South, as well as in the anticommunist positions of many antilabor entrepreneurs.[58] Although anti-Semitism was especially prevalent in the Midwest, Ivy Lee pointed out to his German associates that it had little possibility of spreading throughout U.S. society.[59] The traditional racism on which a movement from the right could win a consensus was that against the color of African Americans. Harry Ward, chairman of the American League against War and Fascism, made this observation: "A wave of emotionalism, thrown up by a much wider break in economic security, could of course easily develop anti-Semitic hysteria. But when a national psychopathic condition expresses itself in racial ego mania and race hate in the country, it will be the Negro, as it has been and is, that will bear the brunt of the attack."[60] The danger came not so much from the expansion of foreign organizations as from the escalation of openly racist groups or movements already a part of U.S. society, and from followers of the various leaders who made themselves spokesmen for the discontent of those hard times. Among these, Huey Long was the most politically prominent nationally. With its radical proposals of taxes for the wealthy and well-being assured for all, the Share Our Wealth Society he founded had almost eight million members by the spring of 1935, with 27,000 clubs around the country.[61]

The "Kingfish's" rhetorical skill and his use of radio contributed to the success of his political group. The refrain of the song "Every Man a King" (also the title of Long's autobiography) evoked the Promised Land: "with castles, clothes, food for all, all this belongs to you."[62] According to Long biographer Thomas H. Williams, the Reverend Gerald Smith, a member of Long's team, proclaimed on his tours of the country what was coming

for everyone: "real spending money, beefsteak and gravy, Chevrolet, Ford in the garage, new suit, Thomas Jefferson, Jesus Christ, red, white, and blue job for every man."[63] With a profound understanding of the psychology of the people, Long knew how to talk to the rednecks of his state, using the salesman's skills he had learned as a young man.

It is worthwhile to remember the story of a meeting held in Louisiana during the most difficult time of the Great Depression. Before a crowd of the poor, whose conditions had worsened during the crisis, "Huey rose and looked out over the crowd. 'How many of you wear silk socks?' he shot out. Not a man raised his hand. 'How many of you wear cotton socks?' Huey next asked. A great show of hands went up. . . . Then he gave them the clincher: 'How many of you have holes in your socks?' Again there was a forest of hands. Huey took off one of his shoes—and sticking out of the sock was his big toe. The crowd exploded in applause. This man was theirs!"[64] This anecdote is representative of the leader's skill in making his followers feel he understood their needs because he was one of them.

Famous in his state as well as in the nation's capital for his brazen remarks, he was also known for his ability to reduce the caustic hostility of his political enemies in exhilarating word play. Facing two adversaries who were only superficially different he would use the comparison of a famous recipe made from the bark of a tree to straighten hair, very popular with the blacks: "The makers called it 'high popalorun' or 'low popaphirum' depending on how they manufactured it. They made the first by tearing the bark of the tree down and the second by tearing the bark up."[65]

Long took into account the thinking and mood of his listeners, but he knew when and how to keep the distance necessary in order to arouse his followers' admiration. According to one of his collaborators: "They would reach out to touch him as he passed. They would touch his sleeve, lightly almost religiously."[66] One black Louisiana farmer said Long had acquired a religious halo: "He was fair to colored people, good to all poor people. He walked the land like Jesus Christ and left nothing undone."[67]

Most disturbing to the FDR administration was Long's suppression of Democratic rules as state governor, as he "closed his grip over the state's political apparatus," not to mention his political ambitions supported by his growing popularity.[68] A poll conducted by the National Democratic Committee in view of the 1936 elections verified Long's popularity not

only in the South but also from the Great Lakes region to the East Coast, confirming the Democrats' alarm.[69]

Long drew the attention of conservatives such as Lawrence Dennis, who saw him as a potential fascist leader of national importance.[70] Robert Penn Warren based on Long the protagonist in his novel, *All the King's Men*—an idealist transformed by experience into an unscrupulous man. Long's rise inspired Sinclair Lewis to use him as the model for the protagonist in his novel, *It Can't Happen Here*, where the author forecast the coming of American fascism. Lewis saw phenomena like the Ku Klux Klan, lynchings in the South, and the rise of protest movements led by fanatical and popular leaders such as Long, Coughlin, and Townsend as fertile ground for fascism to grow. He exposed the fallacy of the saying "it can't happen here": "We are a country of free men. . . . That couldn't happen here in America . . . but there is no other country in the world that can get more hysterical—yet or more obsequious—than America."[71] Lewis further elaborated: "The worst Fascists were they who disavowed the word Fascism and preached enslavement to capitalism under the style of constitutional and traditional Native American Liberty. . . . To their purpose they could quote not only Scripture but Jefferson."[72]

However, there were striking differences between U.S. and European leaders, according to the narrator's reflections on Doremus, the protagonist of Lewis's novel: "The one thing that most perplexed him was that there could be a dictator seemingly so different from the fervent Hitlers and gesticulating Fascists and the Caesars with laurels round bald domes; a dictator with something of the earthy American sense of humor. Windrip could be ever so funny about solemn jaw-drooping opponents and about the best method of training what he called 'a Siamese flea hound.' Did that, puzzled Doremus, make him less or more dangerous?"[73]

Winston Churchill recognized the openly didactic intention behind the novel. Furthermore he observed: "Such books render a public service to the English speaking world. When we see what happened in Germany, Italy and Russia, we cannot neglect their warnings."[74] With the same educational purpose, the Federal Theater Project, a unit of the Works Progress Administration, staged a play from the novel; the play appeared simultaneously in eighteen cities, with Lewis himself taking to the New York stage as one of the main characters.[75] In light of the presidential elections of 1936, the Democratic Party was alert to the danger of a possible collaboration between Long and Father Coughlin, who also

represented the development of religious sects deeply rooted in American culture.

Father Coughlin, the priest who formed a listener group called the Radio League of the Little Flower, owed his fortune to the skillful use of the radio in getting his religious-political messages over. He went from being an unknown preacher for a Detroit radio station in 1926 to the Radio League funded by listener donations to his own broadcasting station in the 1930s. His radio talks typically brought in 50,000 letters weekly until it reached two million in 1931 after a talk in which he strongly criticized President Hoover's policies.[76] With a mixture of attacks on representatives of the financial world, in biblical language, "the money changers," and on the red "commies," Father Coughlin, during the FDR administration, reached a larger audience—thirty to forty million listeners—than did President Roosevelt with his Fireside Chats. The new mass media provided enormous power to someone who knew how to tap into it. On the other hand, the religious propagandist represented a very familiar figure in the American landscape. According to Lasswell: "The propagandist of religion walked beside or little in advance of the explorer, trader, and occupier of the broad areas of the New World. . . . The natural reluctance of men to pull up stakes and settle overseas was overcome, in part, by the incessant use of propaganda. . . . 'The land of opportunity' is a tribute to the tireless propaganda of the colonizing and shipping interests on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean."[77] The radio priest of the Radio League of the Little Flower was within a solid American tradition, but like Long he was riding on the wave of the great financial disaster that had struck the United States and that Roosevelt's policies were only partially resolving, as there were still ten million unemployed in 1935.

Coughlin's influence and his listeners' need for a messiah to lead them were issues found in President Roosevelt's mailbag also; for instance, one of Father Coughlin's listeners wrote this to the president: "If you listened in today to Father Coughlin's talk over the radio, you will have an idea of what the people who are forgotten are ready to fight for. All we need is a leader. We might better be dead than living as we are, you have failed us so far."[78]

Disappointment in Roosevelt's unfulfilled promises was substituted in this case by expectations in the new radio personality. The editor of the *St. Louis Star Times*, Elzey Roberts, warned the president about the growing danger of these movements and their powerful leaders: "A power

has arisen in this country greater than that of the government itself. . . . The new power, unless checked, will itself become government. I would describe this power as a demagogue with a foundation of discontent to stand on and a radio to talk through. . . . The demagogues are impatient and by use of this new weapon, the radio, they are turning the usual patience of the people into impatience that merely awaits a strong enough leader to break out into direct actions."[79] Roberts's description of Coughlin's followers coincided with Sinclair Lewis's definition of collective hysteria in *It Can't Happen Here*. Roberts wrote: "The tens of thousands of Father Coughlin's followers among our readers are so emotionally worked up that an appeal to reason seems vain."[80]

In another novel Lewis wrote before Coughlin's appearance on the political scene, inspired by the imaginary figure of an unscrupulous preacher, he sharply and sarcastically analyzed all the rhetorical tricks of the protagonist, Elmer Gantry, as he preached to the large crowd: "It did not matter what he said so long as he kept them listening and he enjoyed the buoyancy of power and he bespelled his classes with long involved fruity sentences rhapsodic as perfume advertisement."[81]

The preacher's histrionics, therefore, were matched by the irrational and hysterical response of the masses. In Lewis's *It Can't Happen Here*, Doremus is attending a meeting of the future dictator, Windrip; during the speech Doremus falls into a trance:

> Windrip was passionate yet never grotesquely wild. He did not gesture extravagantly, only, like Gene Delt of old he reached out a bony forefinger which seemed to jab into each of them and hook out each heart. It was his mad eyes, big staring tragic eyes, that startled them and his voice, now thundering, now humbly pleading that soothed them. Doremus marveled "What if, in spite of all the demagogic pap that he has got to feed out to the boobs—he is right in claiming that it is only he . . . that can break the hold of the absentee owners?" But what Mr. Windrip actually had said Doremus could not remember an hour later, when he had come out of the trance.[82]

Doremus's trance state revealed the bond that had been established with the leader.

Starting from theories of hypnosis to describe the relationship between the leader and his followers, experts in public relations such as Lasswell and Bernays analyzed the unconscious mechanisms on which the propaganda of consumer goods as well as politics was based.[83] The

irrationality of the masses under a leader's influence was of particular interest. In order to free them from the state of hypnotism in which "the pipers of Hamelin" reduced them, it was necessary, according to Lasswell and Bernays, to appeal to the rational faculties of the critically educated individual.

Charles Beard, Robert Lynd, and other important scholars in the field of public opinion founded the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937.[84] The purpose of the institute was to organize civic educational programs to review all sources of propaganda polluting the citizen's critical awareness. In other words, the institute would help "the intelligent citizen to detect and analyze propaganda by revealing the agencies, techniques and devices of the propagandist."[85]

One of the publications to advance this understanding was a study of Father Coughlin's talks that exposed the rhetorical tricks he used to get his listeners' attention. One scheme the group analyzed was "name-calling," that is, the association of a name, a concept, an ideal, with another one universally disparaged (the Jew with communism, for example), or the method of authoritative testimony to give weight to the argument. Another rhetorical trick was the "bandwagon," the chain reaction that inspires the most skeptical to embrace the ideas of the majority, and then also the "defense mechanism" argument: Nazism as defense against communism, and communism as defense against the greedy financial world.[86] The intent was to arouse the critical spirit of the democratic citizen as a defense against the emotional persuasion of leaders.

Consensus of the Masses and Propaganda in U.S. Democracy and European Dictatorships

Although social scientists critically debated the democratic system, they also paid close attention to the European authoritarian societies as an alternative solution to the economic, cultural, and social problems brought on by the economic crisis of 1929. Commenting on Thurman Arnold's book, *The Folklore of Capitalism*, sociologist Robert Lynd observed how the attitude of "sophisticated disappointment" by which the author dissected modern industrial society left little room for an optimistic vision of social processes. Lynd emphasized, in agreement with a majority of social scientists, the lack of citizenship bonds in the modern society. The discrepancy between stimulated desires and the possibility for their realiza-

tion, just as between the extended boundaries of individual freedom and its objective limitation, were the basic motives that left the "untutored masses"—as they were defined in social science discourse—confused, ambivalent, and directionless. From this arose the need to reinforce an "American way of life" perceived in the research of different "patterns of culture" present in the society.

In a complex world, the social psychologist George Catlin observed, "the man of the XX century" required a "way of life" inspired by a myth in which he could believe in place of the more "ancient certainties supplied by the Church, the family, the local community."[87] It was perilous, therefore, for democracy not to provide a myth to replace old orthodoxies. According to Leonard Doob the totalitarian ideology took advantage of the emotional and material state of insecurity of the new mass-man who lacked a religion and a community consciousness.[88]

The social scientists' interest in the European authoritarian regimes was the other side of the coin of a critique of the inadequacies of a democracy confronting the problems of modern mass society. European scholars immigrating to the United States between the two world wars increased such interest. The contributions of this "intellectual migration" to the different scientific and artistic areas, from physics and psychoanalysis to architecture and Hollywood movies, have been the subject of innumerable studies.[89] Much was written about the social sciences, mostly by the immigrants themselves, with the transfer of the Frankfurt School to Columbia University in New York, and the formation in 1933 of the New School for Social Research, the University in Exile, composed primarily of German immigrants. The New School and the Frankfurt School are only the most outstanding examples of a phenomenon that involved thousands of scholars, not all of whom were able to find positions equal to their abilities. A notable interest in this subject has recently been renewed, not to reconstruct it as much as to appraise its impact on the social sciences in the United States.

Many aspects of this influence have been cited, beginning with the cultural initiatives shared by social scientists of both worlds, such as the journal *Social Research*, edited by the faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School, and Columbia University's series of translated monographs. One of the more emblematic results of collaboration with German social scientists was the influential *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* which was begun before the intellectual diaspora.

Under the direction of the economist Alvin Johnson, along with Edwin Seligman, many eminent German scientists—such as Emil Lederer, who wrote the "technology" entry, and Franz Lehman and Hans Speier—contributed to the encyclopedia, thus paving the way for more contributions from other illustrious immigrants. The encyclopedia project, and the favorable reception of German social scientists in American cultural life, marked the beginning of many years of research.

The story of the German scientists' fortune in the United States has been variously interpreted. Stuart Hughes wrote positively of this complex phenomenon, and Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn spoke of the "creative strength of an interstitial situation."[90] Martin Jay commented on the "non-reception" of the German social scientists, and more recently Daniel Bell, working during those years at Columbia University, distinguished between a more open and receptive situation of the 1930s to that coming after World War II.[91]

From the beginning German protagonists were faced with the problem of making their experience understood. In fact, in 1937 the journal *Social Research* sponsored a seminar with the participation of Thomas Mann and a group of German and U.S. scholars. On that occasion the philosopher Paul Tillich spoke of migration in a symbolic sense: "Mind and migration belong to each other in an essential way and consequently the act of migration is not strange but natural for the creative mind."[92] He reasoned that "without self-separation there is no self-recognition, no creative self-objectivity and . . . no culture."[93] In this concept migration became a universal condition of human creativity; on the other hand, according to Tillich, every migration did not necessarily result in creative development. The productive encounter between two cultures depends more on chance than necessity, the argument went; it can take place according to the circumstances, just as the encounter with an unforeseen event can provoke our creativity: "It demands a personal touch, a real community, and cross migration of minds and souls, creative reception and therefore cross-fertilization is connected with transformation of what had been received."[94] Franz Boas, also a seminar participant, underlined the importance of the migratory phenomenon, the coming together of different peoples in the birth of new cultures, thus pointing out the cultural limitations of racist politics.

A fertile meeting ground between the two cultures from opposite sides of the Atlantic was found by probing the nature of the regimes

the immigrants had left behind. Applying their intellectual energies to dissecting the societies they had to flee was a response to an inner need in the first place, but it was also strongly encouraged by the American intellectual community. Interest in the authoritarian regimes in Europe was translated by American social scientists into analyses and research of the specific elements of the totalitarian state. They traced the traditions of an "irrational" culture and then analyzed the development of the political control of information in order to understand mass propaganda techniques and the relationship between the leader and the masses.

Sociologists, psychoanalysts, and historians (Franz Neumann, Emil Lederer, Gaetano Salvemini, Erich Fromm) did the most exemplary work.[95] Less known but also worthy of closer examination are anthropologists' and social psychologists' analyses in the field of public opinion.

In effect, the way social scientists in the United States viewed fascism and Nazism is indicative of the problems in American society itself, as seen from their specific political and cultural background. Interest ranged from mass communication to the tools of propaganda that had been at the center of public discourse from the 1920s, as well as political symbolism, and the theme of racism, though different in both societies.

In the debate over the degree of compatibility of a propaganda machine in a democratic society, Leonard Doob held a position of absolute cultural relativism: "Propaganda, education, persuasion, agitation, advertising, the practice of the law . . . from this point of view are neither good nor bad, true nor untrue, holy nor profane; they all represent truths, the relativity of which is a function of the ideologies of the people with whom they come in contact."[96] A clear line had to be drawn again between education and propaganda. The political scientist Carl Friedrich, for instance, reaffirmed the importance of education, understood in its broadest sense as the formation of the entire personality, as opposed to propaganda.[97]

Until the rise of the Nazi regime the debate on this subject reflected the need to reconcile the new techniques of conditioning public opinion with the liberal theories of American democracy and the ideology of American exceptionalism. With the establishment of European dictatorships, the problems involved with propaganda and leadership came under closer scrutiny. Most research in the social sciences came from the need to understand better the similarities of the two opposite regimes, as well as to make the necessary distinctions.

The irrational element in dictatorships and the rationality of demo-

cratic society was considered the most important difference separating the two systems. The irrationality that typified fascism and Nazism was most conspicuous in the propaganda that was crucial in the relationship between the leader and the masses.

The claims of social scientists such as Bernays and Lasswell—that the lack of rational acumen of the masses required an elite capable of assuming public responsibilities and resolving the problems of a complex society—had to be reexamined in light of the great social and political changes taking place in Europe.[98] Harwood Childs, professor of political science at Princeton, edited *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, a collection of essays that examined innovations in the propaganda machine used by European dictatorial regimes. Tied to this was the question of the boundaries, or the powers that conditioned the reception of propaganda. The third question regarded the impact of propaganda on democracies. In the study of propaganda in dictatorships it was essential to understand that the phenomenon of propaganda also pertained to democratic societies, especially the United States. It was necessary to know to what degree propaganda was legitimate in democracies and how deeply the government was involved.

Other social scientists looked at political propaganda methods used in specific countries: Fritz M. Marx studied Germany, Arnold F. Zurcher Italy, and Bertram W. Maxwell the Soviet Union. From these analyses emerged a common denominator: the capillary diffusion throughout the levels of society and the use of all available institutional channels by the party in power, including the creation of new outlets. The word "totalitarianism" had not yet come into common use, but the innovations established by the new regimes in their takeovers of the states, and their relationships with the masses, were very clearly perceived, though their specifics varied according to circumstances.

Fritz M. Marx considered the propaganda in Germany the most advanced and for this reason the most similar to that of the United States, though the context was different. He was particularly interested in the importance of symbolism in relation to the masses. Marx noted that the object to strive for—"one single public opinion" according to Joseph Goebbels's mandate—should represent the synthesis between an authoritarian exercise of power from above and carefully listening to the people's needs from below.[99]

In 1933 Lasswell wrote "The Psychology of Hitlerism" on this topic.

On the reasons for Hitler's consensus, he wrote: "Most of those who were in material want before Hitler, are in material want today, though many of the materially cramped have been emotionally rejuvenated by the crusade to regenerate the German nation. New meaning has come to life, symbols are welcome substitutes for bread. The vast discrepancy between promise and performance in high political emergency economics is worthy of attention, for it reveals the peculiar dependence of Hitlerism on abracadabra."[100] Hitler's "abracadabra" in Lasswell's analysis was the whole frame of symbols and myths that Nazism offered primarily to the lower middle class as "welcome substitutes for bread."[101] The author identified the ideological components that made Nazism appeal to the masses, as well as the psychological makeup of the masses themselves to which the leader responded, thus satisfying the deep irrational needs of the German people. In this sense the German awakening was interpreted as a concession to the cultural fundamentalism that formed the nucleus of Nazi and Hitlerian rhetoric. Though important for isolating one aspect of the Nazi regime, Lasswell's study could not possibly take into account the full-employment politics that later provided an important base for mass support.

The author studied the pattern of Nazi rhetoric in order to understand the social, cultural, and psychological motivations that had won the masses over to the Nazi regime, as well as to determine the political symbolism constructed by the regime. In Lasswell's view the fertile ground for Nazism was the impoverishment of the lower middle class, thus underlining the "emotional insecurities" that made the new ideology appealing.[102]

In subsequent work he emphasized how the emotion that made the individual identify with national or international symbols arose from the decline of traditional religions and insecurities generated by the rapid process of modernization.[103] The sociologist Talcott Parsons based his comparative study on these same basic elements distinguishing the "fundamentalist reaction" of Nazism from the American culture based on the Enlightenment and on a concept of liberal individualism.[104]

In Childs's study of the Nazi propaganda machine, he stressed the all-pervasiveness of propaganda and its attack on liberal individualism in the name of an antirational concept, in view of a community consciousness of race, history, work, and opinion. There was nothing new in Nazi propaganda, in Childs's opinion; the Nazis had borrowed techniques from

the communists, the Roman Catholic Church, U.S. advertising, and the American business world. In fact, it is well known that the United States had a higher concentration and greater technical development of propaganda than any other industrialized country in the world. In comparative studies of democracy and totalitarian regimes, "Democracies believe in propaganda, believe in having lots of it, with plenty of variety. . . . Dictatorships believe in it too, but prefer to have only one kind."[105]

Nazi propagandists were past masters at staging spectacular events, a fact that caught the Americans' attention. They noticed how the Nazis "would arrange their celebration in good taste and on an enormous scale," showing they possessed an uncanny ability in the use of movement, color, and sound.[106] Cantril remarked how "all the science, art and propagandistic skill the Nazis could muster were devoted to celebrations without parallel in history."[107]

U.S. scientists noted the Nazis' efficient use of psychology to heighten the effect of public ceremonies: the time of day (especially twilight or evening, which contributed to a suggestive atmosphere); the use of decorations, flags, lights, and slogans; the choice of venues and buildings to remind of past events and traditions; the choice of music. The aim, according to a passage in *Mein Kampf*, was to construct "the artificially created and yet mysterious dusk of the Catholic church, the burning candles, incense."[108]

Once the necessary tense and expectative atmosphere was created, the Führer would begin speaking. Fritz M. Marx analyzed the way the masses listened to Hitler's speeches: "The Funkwart [radio] service establishes loud speakers in public squares and conveniently located public halls in court rooms, administrative departments, school and factory yards. Sirens bawled and the pulse of professional life stopped through out the nation for the time of community reception."[109] In the 1932 political campaign Goering's innovative idea was to have a fleet of Lufthansa's airplanes placed at the disposition of the National Socialist Party. According to David Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, the experiment involved an "American high speed method grafted on to German hero-worship and semipagan rites . . . probably no other political candidate, before or since . . . lacking the use of radio, has been able to treat a whole nation as his constituency."[110] In the words of the Nazi spokesman responsible for press relations, that political campaign was undertaken with epic overtones: "We drove to the Mannheim aerodrome . . . only with great ef-

fort could the muscular mounters and the S.A. [*Sturmabteilung*, storm troopers] men hold it fast to prevent wind from thrusting the wings upward and shattering them . . . as passing Frankfurt am Rhein the clouds broke and soon we saw the Rhein lying before us in brilliant sunshine and Düsseldorf racing track where great masses packed closely together were awaiting our leader."[111] This flamboyant success with the masses aroused the interest of the financial and industrial world in Hitler and his movement, which garnered "the harvest of 13 years of tireless and unscrupulous agitation."[112]

On the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, Hans Herma researched Goebbels's concept of propaganda. He confirmed the fundamental role of the latter in establishing a direct relationship between the leader and the masses; that relationship was essential to the new regime, in contrast to its role in a parliamentary democracy.[113]

Already by 1933, when the Nazis rose to power, the American scholar Max Lerner reflected on the unscrupulous use of advertising techniques and propaganda by National Socialism: "The democratic state . . . evolved a technique of advertising and of high pressure salesmanship a flamboyant journalism, a radio and a cinema that stamped the same stereotypes on millions of brains . . . the most damning blow the dictatorship have struck at democracy has been the compliment they have paid us in taking over and perfecting our most prized techniques of persuasion and our underlying contempt for the credulity of the masses."[114] The use of propaganda in organizing the masses in dictatorships was of interest to the scientists as they could compare it to its use in U.S. society. Harold Lasswell observed that "the study of propaganda goes to the heart of the most compelling, popular, practical and scholarly issue of our time, which is the connection between what men think and how men live."[115]

"Our most prized techniques of persuasion and our underlying contempt for the credulity of the masses," as Max Lerner put it, were the crucial points of the debate that continued to be of interest to anthropologists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts. Ernst Kris, a psychoanalyst who immigrated to the United States at the end of the 1930s, advised that "the danger of propaganda" consisted of an inherent human propensity toward hypnotic suggestion.[116] The psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi attributed that phenomenon to the infantile part still alive in every adult man and woman that seeks protection and help in a parental figure. Therefore they look for complete dependence on another person, and this state of

mind is reactivated in a situation of crisis or danger. In this perspective, propaganda met the unconscious need for guidance, while the serious economic and political crisis in the last years of the Weimar Republic created the need for a leader—the first step toward the emergence of a charismatic leader.

In this same perspective the main point of Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* was the difficulties met in a modern democratic society in which the individual was supposed to be able to make autonomous, free decisions.[117] One of his recurring themes, variously explicated, was the psychological security provided by the "herd" in the relationship with the leader, on the one hand, against the risks involved in developing an autonomous individuality within the framework of a liberal democracy.

Emil Lederer, one of the most active exiles of the New School, made important contributions in this field with his study of Nazi Germany, sharply distinguishing between a liberal society of interest groups and the Nazi dictatorship characterized by the amorphous masses. In *The State of the Masses*, written in 1940 at the beginning of World War II, Lederer analyzed the character of this modern form of dictatorship in which all preexisting social stratifications had been dissolved into an amorphous mass on which the leader could exercise power. The Nazi regime was seen as the totalitarian state par excellence.

Many questions went unanswered in Lederer's book written in the tense climate of 1940, such as a more precise analysis of economic, social, and political motives of what made the "state of the masses" possible. Thus he left room for critics like Franz Neumann, who in *Behemoth* joined to the theme of consensus of the masses a more complex analysis of the different components of the regime, its governing elites, and the rapport between them and the Nazi Party.[118]

For their part, psychoanalysts sought an all-encompassing explanation in order to understand the Nazi regime. Nazism was considered a form of psychopathology spread throughout the society of which Hitler was the emblematic representative.[119] The most common, often-noted characteristics attributed to the Führer were paranoia and sadism.[120] Psychopathology was the interpretative key of complex social phenomena, such as describing the German reaction to the Peace of Versailles as a neurotic form of a "castration phobia."[121] Psychoanalysts' more interesting contribution can be traced less in this kind of research and interpretation than in a combination of psychoanalytical tools with other disciplines: sociology

for Lasswell; historical and sociological analysis for Fromm; and anthropology and social psychology for Ernest Kris and Erik Erickson. Although Fromm's book was among the most famous, other lesser-known works reveal a network of different interests and interactions between diverse disciplines according to the intense cultural climate of those years.

We have seen how Ernest Kris analyzed social psychologists' and anthropologists' popular theme of "suggestibility." In regard to the processes of suggestion, which (like hypnotism) reached the irrational levels of the mind, Doob compared the propagandist leader to a hypnotist.[122] He referred to what was called "preexisting attitudes."[123] The "hypnotist" leader used a method of "indirect suggestion," addressing those aspects of personality where the deepest mental habits, stereotypes, and prejudices were located. Through the use of repetition as well as variation in slogans, and the ability to condense concepts into simple formulas, advertising and propaganda approached the most ancient and worthy art of rhetoric, according to Kris.[124]

On the subject of charismatic leadership, U.S. scientists emphasized the need for a study of a leader who acquired significance only if connected to the group from which he sprang. An analysis of the leader's characteristics, therefore, should not be separated from the needs and aspiration of the masses.

In his book *Why Hitler Came into Power*, German exile Theodore Abel explained this aspect by the testimony of a large group of Nazi Party followers. These witnesses continually revealed social as well as mental instabilities. Therefore they looked for a leader with whom they could identify, and at the same time on whom they could project their own problems, with the faith that he would solve them: "The call for a second Bismarck resounded through out East Prussia. The desire for a leader was evident in every political manifestation of East Prussians."[125]

Abel's meeting with Hitler assumed a messianic tone: "I first saw Hitler at an S.A. meeting at Gera in September 1931. The experience was a revelation to us and we should have rushed blindly anywhere Hitler commanded us to go. The sun shone all the time Hitler was there, in proverbial 'Hitler weather.'"[126] American social psychologists had always emphasized the mutual bond between the "leader" and the "led," just as they had emphasized the importance of a crisis to unleash the need for a charismatic leadership. About this need Doob remarked: "Leaders both affect and are affected by culture and public opinion. . . . Propaganda

can be effective only when it is shaped to satisfy the attitudes of those whom it is affecting. Hitler and his comrades have had the necessary skill and insights into the German people, but it has been the particular groups of German attitudes which has enabled Nazi propaganda to be successful."[127]

Racism in the United States and in Nazi Germany

In analyses of Nazi Germany the subject of racism struck a particularly vibrant cord among U.S. social scientists. Research focused on three issues: eugenics, a comparative analysis of the two different societies, and an analysis of the primitive and symbolic aspects of Nazi rituals.

Eugenics, a subject closely connected to racism, was supported by a good number of scientists. Cooperation between the United States and Germany in this field began early in the twentieth century. At that time the vice consul of Austria in California, Geza von Hoffmann, regularly informed the German public of the new laws being enacted in the United States. The Second Congress of Eugenics, organized by Charles B. Davenport, director of the American Center of Eugenics at Cold Springs Harbor, was held in New York in 1921, without German participation; but by 1925, with the contribution of Davenport and Harry Laughlin, the German and U.S. movements were fully cooperative. In fact, the Rockefeller Foundation helped found the German Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for anthropology, eugenics, and human heredity problems.

Harry Laughlin's articles translated into German informed readers of the 1927 Supreme Court decision of the constitutionality of enforced sterilization and of the necessity for sterilizing "degenerate" women. In 1934 Paul Popenoe, a member of the California eugenics movement, organized a show about the eugenics program of the Reich at the annual meeting of the American Public Health Association at the Los Angeles County Museum. The *Eugenic News*, the official organ of the Eugenic Research Association of the Galton Society and the American Eugenics Society, often printed articles praising Nazi Germany.

In 1934, the Zurich meeting of the International Federation of Eugenics Organizations approved a resolution to promote eugenics research and to get it accepted in countries that were without it; the resolution was reached despite political differences. In this indirect fashion the law for the prevention of hereditary defects approved by Nazi Germany received

international endorsement. In 1935, the International Congress for Population Science held in Berlin (in which the two vice presidents were the Americans Harry Laughlin and Clarence Campbell) represented the era of the greatest support by the international scientific community for the politics of Nazi Germany. In an article in *Eugenic News* Campbell maintained that the new German racial politics was beginning to bear fruit: "While American families want another car, when they can afford it, the German families want another baby."[128]

Laughlin, as vice director of the Eugenic Record Office, was in charge of the distribution of German propaganda in America. In 1936 he bought an English version of the propaganda film, *Erbkrank*, put out by the Nazi Party's Political Office of Race Problems. The film had two goals: to convince viewers that the prevention of hereditary defects was a moral duty and to instill the notion that Jews were particularly susceptible to mental retardation and moral deviance. Laughlin minimized this second aspect and prepared for the American public a version purged of the most extreme assertions.

The first signs of a change in public opinion came around 1935–36. The Rockefeller Foundation stopped financing Laughlin and the American eugenic movement; nevertheless eugenics retained a prominent position in the scientific community both nationally and internationally. For instance, at the International Conference on Population held in Paris in 1936, the group gathered around the journal *Race et Racisme* included such influential figures as the historian Georges Lefebvre, the director of the École Normale Supérieure Celestin Bouglé, and the anthropologists Lucien Lévy-Brühl, Paul Rivet, and Franz Boas. Even so it was unable to defeat the positions of their German colleagues, who had used the rostrum of the congress to propagate their doctrines. At the closing banquet, held at the restaurant Lapa'ruse, the group was re-formed as the Committee for International Initiatives against Racial Actions, under the leadership of Paul Rivet.[129] Its purpose was to promote scientific studies that would influence the chief institutions of each country. For America the responsibility was handed to Franz Boas, who devoted the last years of his life to delegitimizing racist doctrines that, although lacking scientific legitimation, the international community was slow to condemn.

Aside from the relationship established between Germany and America in the field of eugenics, the theme of racism itself roused possible comparisons of the two countries.

The sociologist Clifford Kirkpatrick, focusing his studies on family life and women in Nazi Germany, emphasized the need to consider racism one of the most serious problems facing U.S. society: "Gasping with horror at Nazi repression helps the average American to forget the 5000 lynchings in his own country. It is more pleasant to protest against the persecution of Jews than to reconcile American race relationships with the principles of democracy."[130] Kirkpatrick argued that the refusal "to apply to our problems the understanding gained by an objective study of Nazi Germany" made fascism more likely to spread in America.[131]

Though ever mindful of his privileged status as an official visitor with a U.S. passport, W. E. B. Du Bois, in a short visit to Germany in 1936, did not fail to notice that the Germans were much more respectful toward people of color than were whites in America, despite racial politics in Germany. He explained to readers of the *Pittsburgh Courier* that anti-Semitism in Germany was closer (though with obvious differences) to American prejudice against blacks. With the Olympic games taking place in Berlin in the summer of 1936, Minister of Propaganda Goebbels ordered all public demonstrations against Jews to be suspended. From what Du Bois was able to discern about the racial politics, the comparison he drew with the conditions of African Americans was plausible. As the historian David L. Lewis observed:

> Given what Du Bois knew of Nazi discrimination against Jews and when he knew it, it was entirely reasonable for him to equate German anti-Semitism with American Jim Crow: with the denial of the franchise to Negro-Americans, the restriction by law and practice upon access to public accommodations and places of entertainment, the rigid application of a one drop rule of racial classification, confinement to ghettos in North, de facto exclusion from universities and professions, the ban on intermarriage and vulnerability to insult and assault.[132]

In an editorial in the *Crisis*, Du Bois ironically suggested that "Hitler ought be invited to lecture at a few southern white universities." He added: "They might not understand his German, but his race nonsense would fit beautifully."[133]

According to psychiatrist Friedrick L. Schumann and social psychologist Hadley Cantril, the methods used in Nazi and U.S. propaganda were similar in three ways. The first analogy could be seen between that "skill of evoking a collective frenzy of emotional exaltation through the devices

of spell-binding," which was typical of southern Baptists, leaders of lynching mobs, and ballyhoo artists in local politics.[134] A second analogy could be found in the symbolism used by the German National Socialist Party and the Ku Klux Klan, with its fiery crosses, and the Knights of the Golden Circle, comparable to the SS and its racist ideology. The third more commonly cited similarity was the use of modern advertising techniques.

Schumann called attention to the most violent forms of racism that still pervaded the U.S. South in 1935, a time when the dramatic conditions of life for the poorest strata of the African American population had reached national public awareness. Criticism leveled at FDR's administration was based on the inability of the early legislative measures to assist the weakest social groups by not enacting direct-aid provisions.

The reports that journalist Lorena Hickock, a friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, sent to the desk of Harry Hopkins, head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, revealed a condition of marginalization and endemic poverty in the rural areas of the South and Southeast, where the primary victims were African American.[135]

One of the most attentive analysts of apparently irrational social phenomena was Hadley Cantril. As director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research, which worked closely with the Roosevelt administration from 1939, Cantril was an expert in opinion polls. Furthermore, he had researched the rise of social protest movements guided by a leader, comparing very different situations, such as Dr. Townsend's movement, a lynching episode in the South, Father Divine's Harlem movement, and the birth of the Nazi Party.[136]

Stimulated by the unique situation of the Great Depression, Cantril focused on that void that appears when a particular cultural and symbolic order no longer corresponds to reality, and there is no alternative order of values to replace it. He dealt with themes not too unlike those of Harold Lasswell and Thurman Arnold. Cantril developed his analysis from what he considered basic to human behavior, following a cognitive approach: the "frames of reference" to which every individual turns to find an explanation for social events that are not immediately understandable. Especially in times of crisis, such a frame had to be understood and analyzed adequately since it represented the compass of human action. He verified that a split between a certain social group and the symbolic and cultural frame of reference in which the group operated and which gave it meaning increased the suggestibility of individuals, making it easy

for them to fall prey to protest groups or other sources of information and propaganda. These "frames of reference" were precisely what were shaken during the Great Depression.

The first important event that allowed Cantril to make use of his scheme of interpreting mass social movements, otherwise defined as irrational, was the mass panic following the broadcast of Orson Welles's radio play of H. G. Wells's science fiction novel, *The War of the Worlds*.[137] On Halloween of 1938, when the radio voice announced that a strange flaming object had fallen on a farm in New Jersey, disgorging hairy monsters with leather faces and snake eyes that had incinerated a group of policemen, the situation quickly spun out of hand. According to Cantril's reconstruction, the ensuing silence, followed by sudden noises, had combined to create the impression of an extraordinary event that required immediate and urgent measures. Fleeing had been the first thought of millions of Americans, or the need to deal with the Martians. "We'd better do something instead of just listen!" a woman exclaimed. According to the testimony of another woman, "I wasn't frightened until they said the gas was within a few miles of us."[138] The ease with which people transposed the radio broadcast to a level of reality was proportional to the degree of the "suggestibility" of the masses, to their state of material and mental insecurity, to their lack of self-esteem, and to their lack of a "frame of mental reference" with which to confront what they heard.

An explanation for the phenomenon that would be limited to pointing out the lack of critical sense, "a lack of active intelligence," according to Cantril, would have left "the crux of the problem very much in the air."[139] He tried to interpret such phenomena within the cultural framework of those years. He connected the success of Townsend's and Father Divine's movements to a condition of suggestibility, understood more in the active sense as "the capacity to dream," referring to the religious and millennialist tradition, with a wealth of utopias that were present in American society from colonial times.

In Cantril's assessment the Townsend movement offered a utopian panacea in a dogmatic way, with the same attraction as other past popular movements, such as the Greenbackers or the populists. The Townsend Plan, with the proposal of a monthly pension of two hundred dollars for every sixty-year-old—to be spent by the end of each month—was expected to get the economy moving as well as solve the problem of unemployment. Cantril concluded that its success was due to the fact that it

proposed solutions for serious problems afflicting the poorest classes—unemployment, poverty, lack of social welfare—by a program that offered a "frame of reference," a grid for reading and interpreting in a simple and accessible way the social reality, keeping within the tradition of American values.

Among the case studies examined in Cantril's book were his analyses of the Nazi Party and the lynch mobs. In denouncing the horrors of lynching and in tracing the rise of the Nazi Party, Cantril's objective was to interpret and understand the reasons for the consensus and social support for these movements; the label of "irrational" did nothing to help people understand their complexity. Instead, Cantril offered the possibility for interpreting the mental makeup of social groups that formed their own reality in times of crisis as an alternative to existing norms. In establishing the comparison between the Nazi Party and southern lynch mobs, the "frame of mental reference" was racism. The importance of the racial myth consisted in its cohesive effect on the entire society, in the case of the German Nazis just as in the southern white society.

To better understand the reason for such a comparison, it is necessary to remember that the book was written in 1940, before Nazi Germany had undergone any military defeats. The author warned against excessive simplification in the analysis of the Nazi Party's strong hold on the masses. The mass attraction to the new regime had to be interpreted—in addition to the level of material satisfaction of needs through policies to combat unemployment—as a renewed moral and political legitimization after the period of crisis following the Treaty of Versailles. In addition to the more traditional methods of obtaining consensus, the party used terrorist tactics, exactly as happened in the U.S. South.

In the South whites' perceived racial superiority had to be preserved—by lynching, if necessary. Reversing the common expression that "the negro must keep his place," Cantril observed how the whites were actively motivated to "keep their place": their dignity and status depended on it, as well as their economic good.[140] Institutionalized racial superiority gave whites unrestricted rights over blacks. Should the racial boundaries be violated, the reestablishment of such boundaries could go as far as a manhunt that generally ended in a murder or lynching.

By means of data and eyewitness accounts, Cantril showed the diverse economic and cultural situations and the different degrees of racial prejudice in the South. The slightest incident disrupted the established

equilibrium and became the mainspring for a lynching. Although this type of investigation was kept on an objective level, Cantril was primarily interested in the subjectivity of "white supremacy." From this point of view, the "inferiority" of the blacks became a necessary part of the mental makeup of the white population and their self-esteem. This was not something that could be treated as marginal, nor could it be abolished without the collapse of the whole order of values underpinning southern society. The lynching mob represented the "normal" recourse to terrorist methods, without incurring penal sanctions, so as to reestablish social equilibrium along traditional channels.[141]

Comparing the final decades of the nineteenth century the NAACP and Ida Wells refer to with the 1930 events Cantril wrote of, there are no substantial differences despite the fifty-year gap between them. Crowds of white citizens of both genders and from all social classes and ages took from jail the incriminated victim awaiting judgment for infractions ranging from theft to homicide, and proceeded with the collective lynching by hanging, shooting, burning, and brutal torture depending on local tradition and the seriousness of the accusation. As Wells had first shown, the accusation of rape, which was considered the most heinous crime, represented only 25 percent of the accusations; among other allegations in the remaining 75 percent were "improper conduct," "wanting to eat in a restaurant," "trying to imitate a white person," "going to vote," being a strike-breaker," "questioning a lynching," "traveling on a train with white passengers," and "being too rich."[142]

In areas of sharply marked distinctions, as in the so-called Black Belt, lynchings tended to be more limited in kind than in areas where the boundaries between the two races were less defined and where the lynchings were more brutal and violent, with greater public participation.

To demonstrate the way in which a lynching might affect everyday life in different counties of the South, Cantril related specific episodes, such as how the masked participants of the lynching of Pig Lockett and Holly White put the bodies in two caskets to give them a "decent burial" on September 10, 1920.[143] On October 1, 1930, an "orderly" crowd took Willie Clark from the Barton County Jail, dragged him outside town, and hung him. A Cartersville resident was quoted as reported to have said that this had been the "cleanest lynching he had ever seen." The masked citizens who participated in the lynching wanted the scene to be impressed in an indelible way in the eyes of a black boy near the victim's

burning body: "Watch out, boy, this is what happens to someone who bothers white folks."[144]

As proof that lynchings had great popular support, Cantril summarized the results of a study conducted by the Department of Sociology of Southern Methodist University in Dallas. He stressed in this case the direct attack against legal institutions, when the crowd reacted by storming the courtroom. After the arrest of a black worker who had attacked his female white employer for not paying him for the work he had done, rumors about him circulated around the town of Leesville, Texas, including those of rape. On the morning of the jury selection, as a menacing crowd milled around the jail, maintaining a precarious balance between a gathering "crowd" and a crowd in revolt, a "mob," "the precipitating event which changed the huge curious crowd into a vicious active mob was the bringing of the woman"—the victim of the rape—from the hospital to the court room with a police escort, along with the news that the police had been ordered not to shoot. "After that the mob went wild."[145] After invading the courtroom where the trial was being held, shouting "let's go get him" and being restrained by the police, "a group of teenage boys led by an excited and vociferous woman dressed in red broke the courthouse windows with rocks, threw gasoline in and fired the building. . . . There was some objection to the rescuing of the judge, county attorney, sheriff and rangers. 'Let the bastards burn up with the nigger' was the cry. . . . As darkness fell the spirit of the mob became uglier."[146] Some of the crowd's leaders managed to make a hole high in the jail building and toss in dynamite. Eventually the victim's corpse was dragged out and exposed to the crowd. The author stressed how once more, just as early in the century, a dramatic and festive air was created in town with the connivance of the local authorities. In Cantril's account: "Everybody was crazy to see the nigger." At the shout "Take him to Niggertown," the body was "fastened behind a Ford roadster" full of young people. "About five thousand howling, yelling people fell into a midnight parade behind the corpse. . . . Someone struck up the strains of 'Happy Days,' and soon hundreds joined in with 'Let us sing a song of cheer again,' 'Happy days are here again.' Motorists tooted their horns. The city police tried to direct the traffic."[147]

In the epilogue written on the eve of U.S. intervention in World War II, Cantril warned against the risk of oversimplifying the Nazi phenomenon and demonizing its leader, as well as that of undervaluing social frustra-

tions and unmet economic needs in America. Only after these problems had been faced would "appeals characteristic of the Nazi programs fall on deaf ears." A nation that wanted to counter the Nazi power in a strong and efficient way "must take care that the needs and frustrations within their own boundaries are satisfied," thereby defining an effective, functioning democracy.[148]

Primitivism and Symbolic Rituals of Nazi Germany

In addition to research on eugenics and comparative analyses of Germany and the United States, another important sector of study regarded primitivism. Anthropologists were especially interested in emphasizing the primitive and symbolic features of Nazi rituals. In fact, Germany represented "an experiment in regression to tribal-group intimacy on a national scale by means of modern agencies of communication."[149] Edgar Mowrer published *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, on Nazism, just as the new regime was taking hold in 1933. And Lewis Lochner, director of the Associated Press in Berlin, defined Hitler as the modern Genghis Khan in his book on Germany, *What about Germany?* Cantril also made reference to the primitive when he reported Goebbels's words: "Our agitation has been called unintelligent and primitive. Certainly National Socialist agitation is primitive. However people think primitively."[150] The psychoanalyst Ernest Kris came to a more thoughtful consideration of the primitive as a group unifier: "This is in fact similar to the condition of tribalism. The part played by the drummer in the tribe may be considered to some extent the ideal fulfillment of totalitarian propaganda in Hitler's sense. At the highest point of development the media of communication are made to serve a social ideal which resembles to some extent that of primitive communities."[151]

A parallel between the primitive tribal drum and the regime's propaganda apparatus, according to Kris, was to be found in its hypnotic effect; as we have seen, this was also one of the main features of the leader. As we've already seen, Doremus, Sinclair Lewis's protagonist in *It Can't Happen Here*, returns from a meeting with the future leader in a trance-like state, unable to remember the substance of what he had just heard.

Before Thomas Mann emigrated to the United States from Germany he also described a "hypnotic" leader in a short story, "Mario and the Magician." The same theme recurred in 1939, when he compared Nazi

meetings to ritual dances in Bali: "Lately on the screen I saw a ritual dance of the Bali islanders. It ended in the complete trance condition with frightful twitchings of the bodies of the exhausted youths. Where is the difference between these practices and the procedure in the European mass meetings? There is none—or rather there is one: the difference between the exotic and the repellent."[152] Mann considered irrationality to be the common denominator of the two different situations. In *Doctor Faustus*, written in his American exile, Mann described the city where Adrian Leverkuhn, the protagonist, was born as a combination of modern life and primitive irrationality. About this mixture of the modern and archaic, he observed: "Our times are inclined, I say, to return to such epochs and repeat symbolic actions that have something sinister about them, that strike in the face of modern understanding: burning books, for instance, and other deeds I would rather not put into words."[153] Writers were not the only ones using this kind of terminology. Freud himself spoke of Germany as falling into a state of "prehistoric barbarism."[154] Characterizing dictatorships as irrational became a common cliché in the press when describing various aspects of the relationship between the masses and their leaders. However, the social scientists' comparisons of irrationalism and primitivism had to confront the theoretical frame constructed by Boas and his school of anthropology, which made "the mind of the primitive man" intelligible and no longer relegated to prehistory. According to the anthropologist, "the differences between the civilized man and primitive man are in many cases more apparent than real."[155] On the specific subject of race, to which he had devoted much effort to demolish its pseudoscientific basis, however, he recognized its strong emotional appeal:

> It is not any rational cause that forms opposing groups but solely the emotional appeal of an idea that holds together the members of each group and exalts their feelings of solidarity and greatness to such an extent that compromises with other groups become impossible. In this mental attitude we may readily recognize the survival of the feeling of specific differences between the hordes transferred in part from the feelings of physical differences to that of mental differences. The modern enthusiasm for race superiority must be understood in this light.[156]

Boas's remarks regarding racism as an idea replacing nationalism were written in the 1920s, before Nazism and in reaction to the discussions

that had flared up in America about the immigration laws, but they retained their significance after the rise of the Nazi regime. In 1936 Boas added a chapter to *The Mind of the Primitive Man*, "The Race Problem in Modern Society," in which he deals with the primitive element in modern society: "It is not difficult to show that a very general primitive attitude of mind is involved in the identification of the characteristics of an individual with the supposed typical characteristics of the group in which he belongs."[157] As he noted elsewhere, the emotional component tied to the idea of race was a more modern, and at the same time a more primitive, offshoot of nationalism: "At present the belief is that race determines mental behavior and culture rests on the strong emotional values. Race is considered a unifying link between individuals . . . and a call for race allegiance. A new group concept is replacing that of nationality, or is being added to it."[158]

Among psychoanalysts it was Carl Gustav Jung who was most interested in these problems. His studies involved the function and structure of myths, as well as the relationship between primitive culture and archetypes. In an interview about the psychology of dictatorships, he compared Hitler to a tribal "medicine man."

> The secret of Hitler's power is that Hitler has an unconscious more plentifully stored than yours and mine. He is like a man who listens intently to a stream of suggestions in a whispered voice from a mysterious source and then acts upon them . . . with Hitler you do not feel that you are with a man. You are with a medicine man. . . . I remember a medicine man in Africa who said to me almost with tears in his eyes: "We have no dreams any more since the British are in the country"; when I asked why he answered "The District Commissioner knows everything." Mussolini, Stalin, Roosevelt rule like that, but in Germany they still have dreams.[159]

Hitler, like "the Sybil" or "the Delphic oracle," was able to get in contact with the "dreams" or the "collective unconscious" of the German people. Jung's analyses came very close to what Peter Viereck developed on a cultural level in his book on the origins of Nazism, *Metapolitics*. Both Jung and Viereck spoke of what Jung defined as "German paganism," consisting of a split between a highly civilized cultural framework and "an excluded lower portion that still awaits deliverance."[160] In respect to its threatening aspect, the psychoanalyst added: "More audibly we can hear the pacing to and fro of the blond beasts in their subterranean dungeons threatening

us with an outburst which is bound to have devastating consequences."[161] Viereck emphasized the barbaric aspect joined to modern elements and advanced technology when in his study of Nazi Germany he spoke of "neanderthalers in bomb-laden airplanes," adding that "barbarism does not mean lack of brain or lack of rational efficiency. . . . Barbarism is psychological, ethical, religious in category."[162]

To Russian sociologist and student of Pavlov Serge Chakotin, who wrote *The Rape of the Masses*, both primitive mentality and modern organization were at the basis of Hitler's gigantic parades as well as of the rituals of the American Ku Klux Klan.[163] Emotionally charged myth gave meaning to a community, understood as primitive group brotherhood, which obliterated the value of the single individual. According to Chakotin: "Hitlerist movements come close to the feasts of savage tribes with the sole distinction that modern organization and robot discipline play a great part, the barbarous mentality remaining unchanged."[164] The tools of anthropology, along with those of Jungian psychoanalysis, were used to highlight how the modern Nazi propaganda machine was able to attract the masses. The bond with the leader as well as racist ideology were ways of stimulating what was defined as a "group thought," by the identification with "the tribal whole," reinforced by rituals and ceremonies of the group itself.[165]

For psychoanalyst Erik Erickson myth was a tool for reconstructing the story of Hitler's childhood, just as he had recounted it in *Mein Kampf*—not as a real story, but an imaginary one, analogous to a myth that "blends fact and fiction . . . causing pious wonderment and burning ambition."[166] Erickson also applied his analysis of myths to the study of "primitive" cultures as a key for understanding the collective mentality or a people's imagination—the German nation in this case. As a matter of fact the author was interested in the audience instead of the leader; his attention was concentrated on the "tune" of the story told rather than on the realistic reconstruction of the events.

Far from explaining it by irrationality, he analyzed National Socialism by considering some crucial points of Hitler's adolescence: paternal authority, the mother figure, but also the concept of Lebensraum and anti-Semitism. He understood these as paradigmatic cultural constructs for the German mentality. Just as Viereck, Erickson analyzed National Socialism as the other side of the coin of a profoundly ambivalent cul-

ture marked by what he defined as "limes disease," in other words, the problem of "boundary," which Viereck called "the Roman wall" dividing civilization from the barbarians.[167]

Erickson drew a compelling comparison between the still-open wounds left by the Civil War in America and the split in German culture: "Just as Mason's and Dixon's line today still runs through the heart of many Americans, so through the center of German hearts runs the great Roman wall. Speaking metaphorically, on one side of the wall are the classical, rational, legalistic and Christian traditions of the Romanized German, on the other side are the paganism of the old Saxons, the barbaric tribal cults of war and blood, and anti-rationalism and anti-legalism of the Romantics."[168] From this point of view Viereck quoted Hitler himself when, in the search for his own identity, from the political and geographical point of view as well as the cultural and psychological, he proposed "not only a military conquest of the invasion centers surrounding the Reich but within the German mind a victory of the social consciousness over the bacterial invasion of foreign aesthetics and ethics."[169] Such a proposal met the needs of a "national mind with a great regional heritage and burning spiritual ambitions, but with a morbid suggestibility and a deep insecurity in its basic values."[170]

Erickson's research, sponsored by the Council on Cultural Relations, was part of a program of research on what was defined as the "national character" of the various nations involved in the world conflict in view of a future international order. Gregory Bateson, in agreement with Erickson's line of reasoning, analyzed the 1933 Nazi film, *Hitlerjunge Quex*, from an anthropological point of view, finding in it a "split" between the "over pure" and the "over dirty" that he attributed to the Nazi character; the representation of the Nazi and communist typologies were seen as two extreme polarities in mutual relation.[171]

Though accepting Bateson's thesis, Fromm restated the terms of the question in order to avoid a deterministic and too generic conclusion: "The Germans, like any other nation, have a character matrix which is the result of a centuries-old interaction of character, ideas, social and political conditions. This basic complex is in itself neither good nor bad. It has its specific virtues and vices which are determined by certain conditions which differ from class to class."[172] Distinguishing between the psychological characteristics of the lower middle class and those of the

working class, in agreement with Cantril and Boas, Fromm emphasized the importance of the social and cultural environment as opposed to a deterministic point of view. It was in fact possible and necessary to intervene in the social environment in order to strengthen the values of "freedom, solidarity, well-being."[173]

CHAPTER 8 The Defense of Democracy

Speak Up for Democracy

At the end of the 1930s with the United States facing the threat of international conflict, social scientists attempted to redefine the democratic principles and values in the name of which the entire country would be asked to mobilize for war.[1]

Sidney Hook expressed the need for sharpening the ideological weapons in defense of democratic principles in these terms: "Today we are not living in ordinary times. Nor fortunately have we in America reached a state of mass despair. But time is short. . . . We are now awake to the fact that more fundamental than armament, as essential as that is, is ideological rearmament, a rearmament of method rather than a doctrine."[2] After World War II, the most widely accepted notion of democracy would be that of a coherent combination of principles and values in contrast to dictatorial and communist regimes. Looking closer, though, to those troubled times in the late 1930s social scientists' analyses of democracy revealed fragmented points of view. In various ways they echoed previous studies about the functioning of the democratic system in contrast to those dictatorial regimes they were at that time preparing to fight. The viewpoints were very different, sometimes contradictory.

Sociologist Piotr Sorokin, political scientist William Elliott, and many Catholic scholars such as jurist Robert Hutchins directed their criticism toward those relativist or pragmatist positions prevalent in the social sciences of those years, as they wished to reaffirm, even if in an aprioristic way, the moral foundation on which democracy was based in contrast to totalitarianism. On the opposite side, important historians, political scientists, and sociologists like Charles Beard, Robert McIver, Charles Merriam, Carl Friedrich, Peter Odegard, and Arthur Bentley, though demonstrating a readiness to defend democracy and its moral ideals, were not inclined to renounce their own scientific formulations imprinted with cultural relativism.

Many symposiums and conferences offered occasions for discussion and debate on science, philosophy, and religion or on totalitarianism organized by the American Philosophical Association and other professional associations. Divisions within the groups over intervention in the war further complicated the picture. However, by the end of the 1920s there were already signs of the general debate that would take place in ten years.

In fact according to Harvard political scientist William Y. Elliott, pragmatism, as applied by U.S. scientists to an analysis of the problems of power and mere factual objectivity, could in the end foreshadow the loss of liberalism, the parliamentary system, and the whole democratic apparatus of representative government.[3] After the rise of Nazism, critical analyses of cultural relativism redoubled.

According to the head of the University of Chicago Law School, Robert H. Hutchins, the four cults accepted by the majority of Americans were skepticism, the cult of the present (insofar as the values of the past had a legitimacy only within a determinate historic-cultural context), the cult of the empirical method, and finally, the cult of anti-intellectualism that prized will over reason. From these premises, he feared that "the journey from the man of good will to Hitler is complete."[4] Roscoe Pound of the Yale Law School, along with other U.S. law scholars (especially in Catholic centers), attacked the concepts of "realism" or positivism as deprived of moral values. As Pound observed, "The political and juristic preaching of today leads logically to political absolutism."[5]

Scientists who had emigrated from Europe, such as Arnold Brecht, along with the majority of the members of the New School for Social Research, held the same opinion. One of the best known, Emil Lederer, in early 1934 warned against a methodology in the field of social science without ethical reference points. In contrast with positions taken by Max Weber and Werner Sombart, he stated: "Weber and Sombart defended the opinion that in the social sciences only facts and certain uniformities can be proved in the sense in which the word is used in the natural sciences, that the valuations and decisions in the social field are strictly personal."[6] Lederer observed that Weber had not reflected on the consequences of this approach. Instead, such consequences should be examined after the rise of Nazism, when the assertion was unacceptable that "since all values are relative, it makes no difference what choice we make between them."[7] Many years later Arnold Brecht observed at

the height of the war, "there can be little doubt that totalitarianism has greatly profited from the value-emptiness which has been the result of positivism and relativism in the social sciences."[8] Many chief social scientists, though confirming the crucial role of democracy and the necessity for rejecting a "naturalist-objective" sort of approach, nevertheless denied that a rational basis could be found for those moral values that they upheld as fundamental to democratic institutions.[9]

The argument that gained greatest currency was that proposed by John Dewey. Consonant with his philosophical approach, he linked the principle of liberty (the foundation of a democratic society) with what he defined as the "supremacy of the scientific method." In *Freedom and Culture* (1939), he wrote, "freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication . . . are involved in the democratic as in the scientific world."[10]

The pragmatic approach that he endorsed led him to reject absolutism, reconfirming the tie between "the pragmatic method, the American exceptionalist idea, and American liberal reality" that had distinguished his philosophical reasoning from the beginning.

Therefore, Dewey stressed, as did a large part of the intellectual community, the necessity for social institutions to make every effort to form a critical, rational mentality in the average citizen, and thus make him less prone to be manipulated by different kinds of propaganda. Lasswell and Bernays, along with George Gallup, the initiator of the new technique of opinion polls, and founder of the American Institute for Public Opinion, rejected the previous elitist technocratic approach in favor of reaffirming the validity of democracy as a system "governed by opinion and disciplined in discussion."[11] Gallup warned against the thesis of "the gullibility of the people" that was so widespread in the 1920s, since such a position differed "by intensity but not by quality from that proposed by Hitler and Mussolini." He observed that "ignorance, stupidity and apathy are the exception," whereas "honesty and common sense of the ordinary people . . . at all levels of the economic scale" were the qualities of those "who have continued to meet their responsibilities as citizens."[12]

Once the "moral capital," "basic myth," and "ruling ideology" had been squandered, the risk for democratic societies would be that "this liquidation of the sentimental basis of democratic government [would leave] the community more exposed than before to anti-democratic movements during crises."[13]

Reconsidering his previous idea about the elites' role, Harold Lasswell stressed the importance of open discussion in forming public opinion for the public good, stating, "democracy depends on talk." Lack of confidence in public debate could lead indirectly to a nondemocratic government: "The person who objects to the futility of public discussion may not think that he is an enemy of democracy: dictators get things done, democrats talk."[14] It was important, therefore, to reestablish the importance of democratic institutions, while the relationship between the leader and the majority in a democratic society needed to be more clearly defined. This should be based, according to the social scientists, on the art of persuasion, "through public discussions carried on not only in legislative halls but in the press, private conversations and public assemblies."[15] The aim was to arouse an active consensus, unlike dictatorships that relied on the passive obedience of the majority toward their leader. The claim Bernays launched with his book *Speak Up for Democracy* was only one of the many appeals of those years.[16] The difference between the individual as a passive object of propaganda from above, and the active participatory citizenship that had been debated so often in the United States since the beginning of the century, was applied to the international picture, in the democracy/dictatorship dichotomy.

The Leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt

The radio, bringing President F. D. Roosevelt's messages into even the most isolated American homes, is one of the most popular icons used in literature and movies about the 1930s. The flood of letters received by the White House for days after one of FDR's radio talks was proof for the president and his staff of the impact the talks had on the general population. The talks beside the fireplace were the special means by which Roosevelt built his popular consensus.

Actually, "the atmosphere in which the 'fireside chats' were delivered bore little relationship to the quiet and secluded atmosphere generally associated with a real fireside," according to Judge Samuel Roseman, a member of Roosevelt's speechwriting team. "There happened to be a real fireplace in the room, but it was empty."

On the table before the president were a reading lamp, a pitcher of water, glasses, and a forest of microphones. All the technical equipment and machines "had to be brought in which would enable sixty or seventy

million people to join in the scene and hear what was being said. . . . Radio announcers for the major broadcasting chains would huddle about, testing their microphones." Radio engineers readied the necessary equipment that "was spread all over the room from wall to wall, making it difficult to move about. There were some thirty uncomfortable folding chairs for those who had been invited to listen." The president was wheeled into the room ten minutes before the broadcast, and he exchanged greetings and pleasantries with the few guests and technicians present. Just before the program went on the air, the atmosphere grew tense. The president would put out his cigarette, glance over the copy of his talk, and "take a drink of water, as nervous as [if he were about to] address a visible audience." At the signal, after a moment of absolute silence, "a nod from the chief radio engineer, the usual announcement . . . that the broadcast was coming from the White House and introducing the president of the United States, and finally the clear, resonant voice, 'My friends.' The president's nervousness had completely disappeared, everyone sat back and listened."[17] Finally, after the president left the room came the ritual question: "How did I do?" And then the wait for mail to pour into his office, confirming or refuting the arguments in question. The president's political enemies were given short shrift; letters considered offensive or racially prejudiced went unanswered. Throughout his presidency, FDR asked his listeners around the country to respond directly to his messages by writing. Thus the letters completed a kind of circular communication that, by skipping the mediation of congressional representatives, ended by strengthening the presidential image.

Studies of leadership, as we have seen, had always stressed the relationship between the leader and the social group he epitomized. In Charles Merriam's opinion: "Without undertaking to settle the position of the great man in history, it is clear that in modern times at least, with the rise of democratic, national, and class enthusiasms, political leaders are in large measure followers and interpreters rather than the inventors of the special formulas . . . they express. . . . In the deepest and truest sense no government can ever safely be considered from the top alone, but must also be regarded from the bottom as well."[18] Therefore it was apparent that "Hitler didn't create German nationalism: nor Mussolini Italian nationalism."[19] According to this view it was possible to establish analogies between a situation of profound economic and social crisis such as afflicted the United States as well as European countries. The most

important example was Germany, with the underlying demand from different levels of society for a guide capable of leading their country out of its serious difficulties. Both Roosevelt and Hitler filled the need for a charismatic leader of their respective countries in a crucial national emergency. Historian Gerald V. Johnson collected analogies between the two countries caused by the crisis into a book written during FDR's third term, with the provocative title *Roosevelt: Dictator or Democrat?*: "Yet in March 1933 the positions of the two men were strangely alike. Both had risen to power on a wave of protest set in motion by similar grievances. Both took over countries in a state of economic collapse, visibly disintegrating socially. Both faced the problem of putting millions of idle men back to work immediately, and the even more urgent problem of putting some spirit into an apathetic and despairing people."[20] Raymond Moley, one of the principal exponents of the "brain trust" close to the president, affirmed that the national bank holiday proclaimed by Roosevelt and the passage of the Emergency Banking Act marked "the turning point of the Depression. When people underwent the shock of seeing the banks close and then reopen with their money protected, there began to be confidence."[21] Reference to an exceptional situation such as that of a war, recurrent in the vocabulary of many politicians in the administration of this first period, was also symbolically present in the inaugural speech of the newly elected president. FDR used it both as a metaphor to galvanize the population into strengthening the national unity in danger of collapse and also as an historical precedent in order to request greater executive powers.

The *New York Herald Tribune* called it a "call to arms" to combat an exceptional situation with exceptional measures. The president, as what Maurizio Vaudagna called the ideal leader of a "people in arms," declared he wanted to face openly the emergency situation with nothing to fear but fear itself, as he famously expressed in his first inaugural speech.[22] As the social psychologists Cantril and Allport observed: "In times of potential social disruption the radio voice of someone in authority, speaking to millions of citizens as 'my friends' tends to decrease their sense of insecurity. . . . Through the use of the radio on March 4 and 5, 1933, President Roosevelt unquestionably diminished the force of the financial panic."[23] His ability to tune into the people's expectations, responding positively to widespread requests, heretofore ignored, to find a way out of the economic crisis, was the basis of FDR's charisma as a leader. However,

his leadership was actually much more controversial at the time than it was later perceived to be in the democratic discourse.

The famous first "one hundred days" were marked by broad popular consensus and by what was defined as the "honeymoon" period between the new administration and Congress. The country's expectations had been high for a recovery that by the end of the hundred days proved to be very limited, so strong opposition grew toward "that Man in the White House" who was considered "a traitor to his class" by the country's big financial interests.[24] After the great elective success of 1936, obtained largely through massive union backing, the president's popularity fell further in 1937 because of the constitutional court crisis, the lack of response to the workers' struggles following the Little Steel massacre, along with the so-called "Roosevelt's recession" provoked by a policy of cutting public expenditures, which increased unemployment.

From the polling results, which started to be collected regularly during the war, it was possible to deduce a direct relationship between a crisis and an increase in the president's popularity, just as occurred at the dramatic beginning of his presidency.[25] Comparing the rise of Hitler in 1933 with FDR's new administration, the writer Robert Sherwood, one of the president's collaborators, referred to the majority of American people as "literally starved for leadership." He added: "Under the existing circumstances it might not have been difficult for him to seize dictatorial powers." But Sherwood hastened to clarify how the concept of a leadership, far from representing "something foreign and distasteful" in the American tradition, was actually a basic part of the democratic system. "We Americans are inveterate hero worshipers, to a far greater extent than are the British or the French. . . . We like to personalize our loyalties, our causes. . . . In our political or business or labor organizations we are comforted by the knowledge that at the top is a Big Boss whom we are free to revere or to hate and upon whom we can depend for quick decisions when the going gets tough."[26] Leadership was needed in times of crisis, Sherwood asserted, though without entailing any risk to democratic institutions, as the opposition feared. The central issue revolved around the danger of overturning American political tradition by an excessive increase in executive powers, the proliferation of bureaucracy, and the president's unscrupulous use of mass media. Political discussion in the second half of the 1930s, in a more heated climate, was articulated in the light of the international scene. Against this background, political

scientists and historians evaluated the more or less long-lasting consequences of Roosevelt's administration.

According to Sherwood, "the dragon's teeth of fascism and communism were being sown throughout the world and in that winter of closing banks, of 'script' currency, and interminable bread lines, it was all too possible to fear that these destructive seeds might take root on the American soil."[27]

Restating once again American exceptionalism, historian Charles Beard considered the experience of European totalitarian regimes at odds with the pragmatic tradition of U.S. history. He was highly critical of legislative measures advanced to confront the economic situation, as these were marked by "confusion beyond every possible description . . . incompetence, uncertainty of objectives." Nevertheless he ironically observed,

> However that may be, the fact remains that the kind of universal intellectual prostration required by Bolshevism and Fascism is decidedly foreign to American "intelligence." It is significant that the United States has produced no Marx, no Pareto, no Spengler, and that all such compass-boxing theories awaken only a mild interest and an amused skepticism in the United States. Europeans have explained it to their satisfaction by reference to our superficiality, our incapacity for profound study and thought. So be it. Whatever the interpretation, our wisdom or ignorance stands in the way of our accepting the totalitarian assumption of Omniscience. And to this extent it contributes to the continuance of the arguing, debating, never-settling-anything-finally methods of political democracy.[28]

At the end of the 1930s, with war looming on the horizon, social scientists underlined the specific traits of American democracy as linked to pragmatic experimental tradition. Accusations against the chaotic and often contradictory administrative policies, then, were viewed in a positive light. Roosevelt's collaborators and some of the political commentators stressed his political pragmatism.

His undogmatic and experimental nature, along with his sensitivity to public opinion and outstanding ability to work with different social interests and sections of society, contributed to the construction of what has been defined "the broker state," a federal government with new social responsibilities toward many different sectors, from the big organized interests to those of labor, unions, agriculture, but with the exclusion of the weaker social strata.[29]

Political scientists Harold Laski, Pendleton Herring, Carl Friedrich, and Charles Merriam went beyond the presidential figure itself to analyze the features and novelties introduced by executive power in the framework of American institutions. Harold Laski took up the theme of "emergency" not in the context of "exceptionality" but as a constant in U.S. history (from Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt to Wilson under the threat of war). Appealing to the "emergency" of the war just as he had to the Great Depression, the president got Congress's full cooperation. In fact, Laski observed in regard to the relationship of the president and Congress:

> The president is at no point the master of the legislature. He can indicate a path of action to Congress. He can argue, bully, persuade, cajole, but he is always outside Congress, and subject to a will he cannot dominate. He is, while in office, the national leader of his party: of set purpose he is not and cannot be its congressional leader. Even if his party has a majority in both houses, he has to win the good will of his party in Congress. He cannot exact it. A president, indeed, who sought to do so would soon discover the limits of his power.[30]

Herring's analysis was similar to Laski's, except that he was critical of the notion of the "people's choice" in regard to presidential elections: "To talk of the president as the 'people's choice' is to use an extremely loose language. The people's choice is usually the man who succeeds in winning through a sectional alliance barely enough votes to win the presidency."[31] President Roosevelt, so went the argument, must therefore be considered the product of a series of political circumstances.

Once the president was elected, power would swing from a "positive government" given to him by Congress in times of "emergency" to one much more reduced, after the return to normality and after Congress had regained its autonomy. Herring believed that the peculiarity of the U.S. system lay less in the division of powers than in the dynamic relationship created between them "as the doctrine of separation of powers finds a realistic justification not in the distinction of functions between legislative and executive powers, but rather in providing that one branch will be open for contesting the control that has previously been established in the other branch"[32] The political battle was not so much between the two national parties as it was between the local policies and special interests of congressional groups and the wider national interests represented by

the president, or, as Herring put it, "not a balance but an alternation of power. In this sense we can point to the centripetal forces converging in the chief executive and the centrifugal influences found in Congress."[33]

Given the dynamic rapport between these different government branches and the consequent swing of power from one to another (though within limits imposed by the constitution), Herring believed there was no basis for the alarm that the presidential system was changing to a personal dictatorship after the constitutional court crisis of 1937. According to political scientist Lindsay Rogers, such fears were entirely "chimerical," considering the real autonomy of Congress, sanctioned by the Constitution. That the president represented a symbolic point of reference for the whole nation in the face of Congress's divided interests was undeniable. It would be more auspicious for a democratic government, Herring believed, to reinforce executive power rather than strengthen the powers of a Congress too tied to interest groups. Through personal charisma FDR aroused the popular enthusiasm necessary to overcome the specific obstacles that the legislative and judiciary branches of government put in the way of the general interest. The solutions that Herring proposed more closely reflected the real changes undertaken by Roosevelt's new administration.

Though there were differences between these authors—some like Herring were more skeptical about the effectiveness of the election process in a democracy—all agreed that leadership should be defined in the light of a democratic framework, in contrast to European dictatorships.[34]

Reviewing studies made of the business sector, Charles Merriam observed, "those who assert that democracy cannot organize effective management forget that scientific management is the very child of modern democratic societies; and the executive leadership is the great contribution of modern democracy to statesmanship, notably in the United States."[35] Again, according to Herring, the characteristics of a democratic leadership such as the U.S. presidency capable of winning the confidence of the nation must be sought in the dynamic relationship with his electoral base: "Leadership is the opposite of followship or of fellowship."[36]

In distinguishing between tyranny and authority, the latter, according to sociologist Robert Lynd, should be analyzed as a process that goes in two directions in a democracy: "horizontally at the local base and vertically up to the apex."[37] Lynd's metaphor was reflected in the complex net of public relations that distributed information locally about new govern-

mental activities, taking advantage of the latest developments in mass media, such as radio, movies, and polls, in addition to the more traditional press. The polls used to canvass the most different sectors of public opinion, from those connected with consumer interests to those relative to political orientation, became very important to the administration during the war years.

With all its pros and cons, the discourse on the subject of freedom of information and on the necessity for citizens to participate politically revolved around the use of the new techniques of the radio and polls, either as instruments of greater democratic participation or of greater social control.[38] These could be seen according to Jürgen Habermas's definition "with the two-faced characteristics of explanation and guide, of information and publicity, of pedagogy and manipulation."[39] Paul Lazarsfeld, an authority on the subject of radio, commented that "the future of democracy depends upon whether we can find new ways for the formation and expression of public will without impairing our democratic form of government."[40]

The attention Roosevelt gave to communications is well documented. Press conferences at the White House became biweekly, and reporters were no longer required to submit their questions in writing beforehand but were free to ask them at the conference. Also, background information was provided and news was given "off the record," not to be printed, taking up an innovation introduced by President Coolidge.[41] These became crucially important for two reasons: "First they served as a forum from which to discuss pending policies and urged their favorable consideration in Congress or build support in the country that in turn would be translated into pressure on the legislature. But the conferences were also means of conveying the presidential image to the country, keeping interest in the White House and the doings of its occupants at a high pitch and thus helping to maintain the public as a receptive audience for more specific appeals."[42] The president considered "objective" information a fundamental duty of the press as well as of politicians. "Education" formed politically astute citizens, enabling them to participate in a democratic society with all its rights and privileges. From the time of FDR's governorship he made education a cornerstone of his democratic ideology, which he continually reiterated in his speeches.

With this rationale, Roosevelt attacked a hostile press that lacked the professionalism to provide facts without interpretation. A news commen-

tator should stick to being a news analyst and not an "opinion pusher," as Eric Barnow later put it.[43] According to Hadley Cantril's observation, though, what was really going on was that official "propaganda is often disguised as explanation. Spokesmen for the administration in power are frequently given free use of broadcasting stations and the recent tendency of such spokesmen has been to gain favor by 'explanation.'"[44]

The press accused the administration of preventing use of any but the government-managed news outlets. The president himself was accused of adroitly avoiding uncomfortable questions at press conferences and of leading the discussions in directions of his own choosing.

Roosevelt's apparent impartiality was questioned by the African American press.[45] Although theoretically all political groups had access to radio time, in reality smaller political groups were hamstrung by lack of funds. For example, when he ran for governor of California in 1934, writer Upton Sinclair created a great stir because of his radical political ideas and his End Poverty in California program. However, big economic interests, with the aid of the major Hollywood studios, were able to thwart his campaign and ensure his defeat because their vast financial resources dwarfed the candidate's.[46]

FDR prepared his talks with great care, as his collaborators attested. He might revise a text seven to ten times, simplifying the language and adjusting the style to the occasion, whether an address to Congress, a public gathering, an election speech, or a radio talk.[47] His language sensitivity, which reflected his university study of rhetoric, came under close scrutiny over the years. The rhetorical methods and expressions he used were influenced by such authors as Walt Whitman and Mark Twain, and his rhythms, images, and phraseology were often biblical.[48] Comparing FDR's rhetorical methods to Mussolini's, the historian Maurizio Vaudagna reconstructed Roosevelt's leadership characteristics against the background of Victorian culture, marked by the ideal of paternal authority able to combine rational argument with private emotions, with the goal of public education for citizenship.[49]

To the prevalently public use of the radio in dictatorships Roosevelt countered with a specifically private use: the Fireside Chats used the radio as a place for the family to gather around the presidential figure.[50] The small group listening to the president symbolized the more extensive unit of the nation that he appealed to, continually harking back to an ideal of national unity and solidarity that did not cancel the individual's role of active democratic participation.

The essential role of radio in creating Roosevelt's charismatic leadership is evident. FDR used specific rhetorical devices that endeared him to his common-man listeners, as borne out by the number of appreciative letters the president received. He frequently used personal pronouns in the Fireside Chats, which made it seem as if he were talking not to the people as a group but to the individual listener. His very deliberate use of plain and simple language also reduced the distance the listener might have felt between himself or herself and the president of the United States. FDR's faith in this kind of appeal to the masses made the Fireside Chats credible and a valuable political tool, which Roosevelt would have wished to use more frequently than his advisors considered wise.[51] Moreover, it is relevant to point out the timing of his radio addresses. Of FDR's twenty-eight Fireside Chats, almost half were broadcast between March 1933 and September 1934 and between December 1941 and June 1943—the times of greatest crisis, in which national "emergencies" called for charismatic leadership.[52]

After his unexpected death in April 1945 FDR was mourned, as author Dwight Macdonald wrote, by the whole nation as "the Father of his country"—quoted from the letter of a midshipman unable to resign himself to the loss. Macdonald had a Freudian interpretation for this term; the people depended on the president as a father figure rather than as a leader of active citizens in a democracy, "in the Fourth of July sense." Putting aside Macdonald's critical remarks, there is no doubt that the full employment policies adopted during the war brought the country out of the crisis and again gave the president a consensus that had been so controversial in previous years.[53]

Defense of an Interracial Democracy

With war imminent, the aim of social cohesion could not be taken for granted. Only half the population was in favor of the Lend-Lease Bill, while opinion polls showed the majority was opposed to U.S. intervention.[54] According to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the debate between interventionists and isolationists became more bitter and desperate in the months preceding the war: "There have been a number of fierce national quarrels in my lifetime—over communism or McCarthyism, Vietnam—but none so tore apart families and friendships as the great debate of 1940–41."[55] In the summer of 1941, Congress and the whole country strongly opposed a law to extend military service in wartime. The country was split

into two opposing fronts that nevertheless sometimes intersected. Conservatives or "old dealers" were not necessarily isolationists, and liberals or "new dealers" were not always interventionists.[56] Schlesinger observed: "Though isolationists were predominantly Republican, conservative and law business minded, the debate cut sharply across party and class lines. The left had its own quota of isolationists: the Stalinists, of course, but the Trotskytes too, and half of the socialists."[57] Only after the attack on Pearl Harbor did 97 percent of the U.S. population support the declaration of war.[58]

Measures undertaken by governmental and private agencies for the building of national morale were extremely diverse and at odds with one another. During those crucial months political and social scientists organized committees, work groups, and associations, in some cases backed by public organizations whose purpose was to support the war effort. The collaboration of social scientists from different disciplinary fields brought anthropologists into dialogue with sociologists, social psychologists, and psychoanalysts at events such as seminars at Columbia University in New York and the New School for Social Research, with participation by European immigrants.[59]

Among the many organizations that sprang up over the country, particularly in metropolitan areas, one of the most active was the Council for Democracy, where the well-known Harvard political scientist Carl J. Friedrich was involved with the publication of leaflets and bulletins. The council worked with other smaller committees, such as the Committee on National Morale, or on the local level, the West Side Defense Council of New York directed by Margaret Mead and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The committee oversaw an area from 59th Street to Central Park West to Riverside Drive, ending at Columbia University. The object, as in the other organizations, was to translate the values of democracy "in comprehensible terms of everyday life."[60] Well-known scholars and New York Public Library personnel collaborated on a *Democracy Reading List* of books and articles explaining the meaning of democracy; the list was distributed to churches, schools, and the community at large.

A series of one hundred conferences was scheduled during the final months of 1941 in an area east of Mississippi and north of the Mason–Dixon Line. Actors and celebrities such as Eva Curie, Thornton Wilder, and Bertrand Russell took part in radio broadcasts on NBC titled *Speak-*

ing of Liberty. On January 1, 1941, actor James Cagney read a text by Walter Millis, "A New Year's Resolution for America," on NBC. On May 18 of the same year, designated by the council as the "I Am an American" day, a prose piece written by the poet Stephen Vincent Benét, "Nightmare at Noon," simulated the arrival of Nazis on the streets of Manhattan along the lines of Orson Welles's famous broadcast of the *War of the Worlds.* In many of the rallies organized by the council "as instruments of public education" there was music as well as speeches. At Madison Square Garden on August 19, 1941, after speeches by various personalities on "democracy in crisis," eighteen thousand people listened to a concert by the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra and a choir of one hundred. Although all these activities were intended to strengthen the democratic tradition of civic nationalism, the problem of race and ethnic divisions sprang up in different sectors of society.

A large number of foreign-born Americans and so-called "aliens" feared possible legal and social discrimination as happened during World War I. The presidential order of December 8, 1941, in which all the immigrants born in enemy countries were defined as "enemy aliens" and were blocked from naturalization procedures aroused strong resentment among ethnic minorities and provoked social and racial tensions in large urban areas like New York City.

A number of political refugees from the Axis countries called attention to their anomalous situation. Thomas Mann asked that "a clear and practical line" be drawn "between the potential enemies of American democracy on the one hand and the victims and sworn foes of totalitarian evil on the other."[61] This contradiction was remarked upon by members of the Council for Democracy who believed the whole problem had to be expressed differently: "The term enemy alien as well as all the administrative and legal machinery built around older concepts of nationality and citizenship do not fit this war. For this war is more than anything else a world civil war."[62]

Threats of social unrest came also from other sources. African Americans bitterly criticized the policy of racial discrimination. The emotional tension that had developed over the promotion of an African American March on Washington was relieved by an executive order of June 23, 1941, in which FDR banned discrimination in defense employment and established a Fair Employment Practices Commission. The council was also engaged in combating practices of racial discrimination in war

employment. *The Negro and Defense* pamphlet was widely distributed to businessmen, various community leaders, and newspaper editors, thus influencing public opinion favorably in regard to the executive order. For a large part of the population these important social changes required a new point of reference.

The African American press remarked how the worsening of the black Americans' social conditions and exclusion from job opportunities could not arouse active support of a war perceived as "the white man's war," along with their strong dislike of England because of its racist tradition. The war had to be transformed for African Americans into a war of the darker races against white imperialist countries. The double-V campaign for "Victory at home and Victory abroad," sponsored by the *Pittsburgh Courier*, would thus indicate their own struggle within the general context of war.[63]

The risk, as many social scientists remarked, was that collective insecurity and strains of war, together with increased friction among different ethnic groups, would reinforce racial prejudices and deepen social and racial divisions. Moreover, social scientists considered race a crucial issue in the war propaganda campaign against the Axis powers. An attempt was made to challenge Nazi racist theories scientifically, as Franz Boas and his student Ruth Benedict had done in establishing in 1939 the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom (ACDIF), which tried to reach mass public opinion outside academic circles.[64] As previously explained, Boas had been the American in charge of the Committee for International Initiatives against Racial Actions since 1936.

The ACDIF was sponsored by historians such as Charles Beard and psychologists such as Gordon Allport, sociologists such as Robert McIver, and important political figures such as Secretary of the Department of Agriculture Henry Wallace. It also enjoyed the support of scientific and academic associations such as the Social Science Research Council, the American Sociological Society, and the American Psychological Society, in addition to important publishing houses such as Harcourt Brace in New York and Houghton Mifflin in Boston. The ACDIF stood for "the protection of intellectual freedom, as science is wholly independent of national boundaries and races and creeds and can flourish only when there is peace and intellectual freedom."[65]

The committee had been formed to awaken and mobilize teachers, editors, and educators. It fought "to get American scientists to take a

plain stand against the race nonsense and the general suppression of free thought." Its purpose was to counteract the groups and organizations that in the years immediately preceding World War II fomented the spread of anti-Semitism within a climate of general intolerance toward minorities, even to the point of proposing laws restricting civil rights in various states.[66] Even some members of Congress and the U.S. Department of State campaigned for laws against accepting Jewish refugees coming from Europe. Although their efforts were unsuccessful it was an alarming sign of widespread anti-Semitism, signaled by public opinion polls, as well as by the popularity enjoyed by Father Coughlin, who continually attacked the Jews in his radio talks, and by Henry Ford's anti-Semitic prejudices.[67]

In his work with the committee, Boas made every effort to express the scientific terminology in the clearest and most accessible language possible and to give his ideas the widest possible exposure. Such language concerns had been important to him from the time he was curator of the Museum of Natural History in New York early in the century. He had insisted that the museum be not only a place for displaying objects but also a place for learning; he fought Nazism with the same civic engagement.[68] His battle against racism actually dated from the rise of Nazism. During the fall of 1933 he stepped up his efforts to "attack the racial craze" then "sweeping the world" by "undermining its alleged scientific basis."[69]

In 1933 Boas organized the Lessing League, a society to combat the Silver Shirts' anti-Semitic propaganda, and he wrote a pamphlet for the American Jewish Congress opposing the racist theories advocated by Nazism.[70] To give his initiative further exposure, he proposed that the Council on Research in the Social Sciences of Columbia University be sponsor.[71] Boas's goal was to compare the behavior of different ethnic groups living in the same environment, and vice versa, of the same group in different environments. By doing so he would prove that "individual heredity and racial heredity are entirely different things. And while we may find that certain characteristics are inherited in a family, the race is altogether too complex to infer that racial characteristics as such are inherited."[72] In 1934 Boas published "Aryans—Non-Aryans" in the *American Mercury* to explain his position. This article was widely circulated and translated into many languages. Anti-Nazi resistance groups in Germany also secretly distributed a German version. However, Boas's ideas were still not well accepted in scientific communities until the years immedi-

ately preceding World War II. In those years the American Association for the Advancement of Science, on the urging of Boas and his collaborators, approved a document endorsing the need for independence in scientific research from racial problems, religious faiths, and nationalisms. The statement dealt with important but still too imprecise positions. After *Kristallnacht* Edward Sapiro, president of the American Anthropological Association, asked Boas to make an official pronouncement as an influential member of different academic and scientific associations.[73] The association came up with this declaration: "Race involves the inheritance of similar physical variations by large groups of mankind, but its psychological and cultural connotations, if they exist, have not been ascertained by science."[74] From his past experience Boas was well aware how difficult it would be to expect the scientific societies to declare anti-Nazi positions, as they remained firmly entrenched behind the idea of keeping scientific research separate from politics.

A turning point in the scientific community came in 1938. A *Manifesto on Freedom of Science* was signed by 1,284 scientists and scholars; publication of pamphlets and other educational material was intended to have wide distribution in communities and educational institutions. Boas thus finally won wide support in the scientific world by tying the controversial question of race—which many scientists were reluctant to face publicly—to that of intellectual freedom. He declared: "We publicly condemn the Fascist position toward science. The racial theories which they advocate have been demolished time and again. . . . We firmly believe that in the present historical epoch democracy alone can preserve intellectual freedom."[75] The signers of the *Manifesto* represented a considerable part of the antiracist intellectual world, in an intermediate position between the small group of scholars, fearful for their position, and the wider American public, whose "general attitudes" on such a question had remained unchanged, according to Boas. He observed that "in the scientific circles in the United States the whole question of an intimate relation between race and behavior is dead. This however does not mean that in the general aptitude of the American people the question is dead."[76]

The educational campaign promoted by the ACDIF requested those in charge of learning institutions to remove every critical mention of race from textbooks. "The man of science must educate the people against the acceptance of all false and unscientific doctrines which appear before them in the guise of science, regardless of their origin."[77] One of the most striking examples of an inappropriate use of the word "race" was by the

U.S. Immigration Commission, in cataloging immigrant arrivals at Ellis Island, but examples of the indiscriminate use of the term could also be found in history, geography, and sociology textbooks.

Furthermore, the ACDIF came out against proposals to limit the civil rights of so-called "aliens," such as those proposed by the Special Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the New York Chamber of Commerce. Boas once again, after nearly twenty years, had to confront Harry Laughlin, the head of the New York State immigration service.[78]

Among the many programs undertaken by the American Committee was the 1939 symposium in New York, the "Genetic Basis for Democracy." Promoters of the symposium were opposed to Nazism as well as to the infiltration of Nazi propaganda in America. The chairman of the symposium, Walter Rautenstranch, aptly paraphrased the speech the dying Henry IV makes to his son in Shakespeare's *Henry IV*: "I was about to engage in a foreign war in the Holy Land. It is always a good idea to keep the giddy minds concerned with the affairs on foreign soil lest they inquire diligently into their own state."[79] Some of the scientists had, in fact, stressed the importance of not diverting attention from U.S. society while denouncing German atrocities.[80]

In his own symposium speech, Hadley Cantril underlined the important part emotion played in racial prejudice, something assimilated unconsciously early in a child's life since racial slurs were learned in association with the emotional reaction of the speaker. According to Cantril, such deeply embedded racial prejudices kept the purported inferior social strata at a distance. More equitable economic conditions were believed fundamental for combating the main cause of racial prejudice.

Therefore, according to Secretary of the Department of Agriculture Wallace, economic improvement was the only viable alternative to a deterministic and hierarchical vision of the genetic characteristics of different ethnic groups. Wallace demanded from the process of Americanization greater respect for national identity ties within a common ideal; the example proposed at the symposium was that of the national gardens cultivated by various ethnic communities in the public park of Cleveland, to start with the Anglo-Saxon Shakespearian Park, the Jewish Park, and so forth.[81]

The general metaphor, according to Harold Hoskins, a State Department officer, was "not the melting pot, with its somewhat mournful implication of uniformity, but rather in terms of an orchestra in which each racial group contributes with its special different tone to the rich ensemble

of the whole."[82] The classification of hyphenated Americans had to be dismissed in favor of the simple definition of "American citizen."[83] The title of the newsreel produced at the council's suggestion for the *March of Times* series was, significantly, "Americans All."

A Ballad for Americans

On January 1, 1940, the singer Paul Robeson broadcast on CBS "Ballad for Americans," which had become a semiofficial hymn for the Popular Front. The broadcast was so successful that Robeson recorded it with the American People Chorus, an amateur workers' choir. With its "everybody who is nobody" refrain and its long recitation of "an Irish, Negro, Jewish, Italian, French and English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Polish, Scotch, Hungarian, Litvack, Swedish, Finnish, Canadian, Greek and Turk and Czech and double Czech American," the ballad became such a success that it was sung at the Popular Front and Committee for Industrial Organizations (CIO) public meetings.[84] "The common man, everybody who is nobody" had the thousand faces of different ethnic groups creating a vast circle joined together in an interethnic and interracial alliance.

The "people," as President Roosevelt usually called them, were an important rhetorical symbol of the 1930s. "The people are the heroes of our most gratifying books," wrote the literary critic Samuel Sillen in an article for the *New Masses* titled "The People: Yes."[85] Contrary to the tendency to interpret the populist rhetoric of those years as the solvent of a harsher mobilization of workers of the early 1930s, Michael Denning has critically analyzed different meanings of the word "people." He showed how, besides the populism of the movements of Huey Long and Father Coughlin, which nevertheless contained radical criticism of corporate power, the official populist rhetoric of the New Deal often intermingled or dealt with the radical culture of the Popular Front. This gave voice to millions of young workers, children of immigrants from different ethnic groups, and to the African Americans' aspirations for civil and political equality.

The mobilization of the Popular Front through the International Labor Defense transformed the case of the black boys of Scottsboro, Alabama, who had received death sentences for the rape of two white women and risked lynching, in a case that aroused international interest. The Popular Front promoted an interethnic and interracial culture that fought against every kind of discrimination and saw the United States as "the nation of

nations" in the international framework of anti-Fascist solidarity.[86] Out of this culture sprang radical films, theatrical performances, radio broadcasts, and murals promoted by the New Deal agencies, along with the growing industry of mass culture. One of the best-known examples is that of the Resettlement Administration, in which the painter Ben Shahn, along with photographers Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, and the film director Nicholas Ray collaborated.

The artistic genre par excellence was the documentary. The "participatory method" used by sociologist Robert E. Park of the Chicago School allowed the interviewee freedom to speak in first person, without intervention from the interviewer. Social scientists used this method to delve into the problem of mass unemployment in a highly industrialized consumer society.

Inquiry into unemployment in the small town of Marienthal, Austria, conducted in the 1930s by Paul Lazarsfeld showed how social research might combine data obtained by direct observation with data deduced from prepared questionnaires.[87] After coming to the United States, Lazarsfeld worked for the Works Progress Administration. He had been one of the first promoters of sociological research about how the Great Depression affected daily life. He dissected the "unemployed worker" by analyzing everything to do with the worker's material life and family structure, including more psychological aspects.[88] The new investigative tools, such as the camera and radio, were used to show crude reality with the rhetorical strategy of objectivity.[89]

The stereotype of the "common" man and woman had been totally revised by the critical dissection of the preceding years. He—or she—was now seen in the context of daily life, anchored to local cultural roots, and considered to have not only political but also economic and civic rights. Artists, journalists, and sociologists traveled the country far and wide producing diaries, documentary reports, collections of photographs, and films in order to record the bewilderment and despair of ordinary people. The famous collections of photographs, *You Have Seen Their Faces* and *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* focused on those men and women of rural America "worthy of fame" in which the "acids of modernity" had not yet produced the damage that comes hand in hand with urban-industrial development.[90]

The photographs of rural poverty taken by the Resettlement Administration and the image of the migrant mother photographed by Dorothea

Lange in *American Exodus* symbolically represented a literary canon of realism, objectivity in order to put common men and women at the center of public discourse. Although victims of the Great Depression, they transmitted the American values of dignity and pride. According to Gary Gerstle, "in cultural terms the New Deal privileged the suffering of these Americans. . . . No photograph of an Eastern European immigrant, black or working woman during the decade came closer to evoking a similar kind of response to that elicited by the migrant mother. She was the universal American; she was a mother; she was also a Nordic."[91] The artistic activities of the American Scene Movement followed this kind of realistic rhetoric: in contrast to the European experience, these artists sought the indigenous values of U.S. reality through the strong bonds of traditions and culture in the single regions.[92] The unique American experience was a fertile field for study by sociologists and ethnologists. Sociologist Howard Odum believed that "the groundwork had been laid for a new science of regions in American thought." In this perspective, for instance, the Federal Theater in the Works Progress Administration, intended to work at "counteracting the past drifts of talent away from home communities to the great cities."[93]

The canon of "authenticity" also encouraged the confessional genre and first-person narratives in literature, thus drawing the two fields, literature and sociological research, "in the same continuum" rather than in "two separate spheres."[94] Writers such as Sherwood Anderson and Edmund Wilson traveled through the rural regions of the country in search of America's failures and its victims, but paradoxically they ended their trip by celebrating the American virtues of the "forgotten man": "dignity and honest straight standing" instead of "laziness or moral dereliction."[95] Sherwood Anderson described in *Puzzled America* what he thought to be the general attitude through the Great Depression: "It is a cry going out of the American people. I think it is about the absolute net of what I have been able to find about America in these last few years. . . . I do not want government to go on just being a meaningless thing. . . . We do not want cynicism. We want belief." The author concluded that "the most pathetic thing of all—in the workman who had been put to one side by his civilization—was his undying . . . American optimism."[96]

In public discourse the "common man" was becoming the "forgotten man," according to the famous expression adopted by FDR. Taking the phrase from an essay by the sociologist William Graham Sumner, written

in 1883, he used it with success in a radio speech in the 1932 presidential campaign. According to Judge Samuel Rosenman, the "forgotten man" was not a rhetorical abstraction to the president but a living person: "The man without money, power or social position, the worker in the sweat shop, the small farmer with the problem of high debt and low income . . . the unemployed, the destitute, the aged."[97] The forgotten man "at the bottom of the economic pyramid" that the president addressed in his radio talk was becoming popular in new literary genre of the 1930s. In radio documentaries, in journalistic reportage, and in paintings he symbolized the disinherited in the American land of opportunity.

In the search for new values during the 1930s, the liberal tradition underwent a profound revision. The "American way of life" that had evolved in the 1920s with the idea of a society in expansion, characterized by continual progress and a growing state of prosperity for large masses of consumers, came to a halt. The rhetoric of "liberalism as rugged individualism, free enterprise, strict reliance on the laws of the market was considered incapable of coping with the problems raised by the economic crisis . . . by those who saw the practical effects of these ideals in the daily lives of the unemployed and the disinherited . . . glorification of individualism had failed to develop a sense of community or social control."[98] New concepts like cooperation, reciprocity, and social responsibility replaced the old individualism for an ideal of civic nationalism.

Scholars such as William James and John Dewey again took up the kind of research begun early in the century for the purpose of defining a new order of society, stressing the values of group interests over individual values and cooperation over competition.[99] Marxist and radical writers such as Calverton and Arvin, in addition to liberal magazines (the *New Republic*, *Modern Quarterly*, and the *New Masses*), were also interested in this perspective. Such a theme inspired the Social Science Research Council to organize a special work group in 1934 to discuss the problem of competition and cooperation, coordinated by scholars such as Leonard Doob in a research project about culture and personality.[100] Margaret Mead coordinated a research team on this subject in 1937 concerning cooperation among primitive people.[101]

The clear perception of the limits of progress, and the end of faith in its infinite development, induced many scholars to look for new models, either through research of ways able to "tame capitalism" or through the perspective of a radically alternative society organized by different values.

In confronting this whole set of problems many scholars were attracted by the Soviet Union in the early 1930s or looked elsewhere for societies in which community values still operated. This interest is illustrated by Stuart Chase's studies of the Mexican culture.[102]

Robert Penn Warren organized a 1930 symposium with the militant title "I Will Take My Stand." The many southern intellectuals and writers in attendance identified the basic problem of modern society as a conflict between "culture" and "civilization." According to Richard Pells, writers such as Herbert Agar and Howard Odum prized the values of an agrarian society where small communities with a heritage of "instinctive democracy" were in harmonious relationship with nature, in contrast to "civilization," with its unremitting process of modernization and destruction of those same values, in antithesis with real cultural progress.[103]

The most important work on this theme would be the study by Robert and Helen Lynd, who focused not on rural societies, but on "Middletown," at the core of U.S. society itself. They analyzed the contradictions produced in daily life by the new processes of mass production, as well as by the development of the means of communication, by emphasizing the destruction of traditional communities, with the resulting isolation of individuals and loss of old securities.[104]

The need for "a new faith in the common man" implied, on the one hand, a reexamination of the previous deconstructive analyses in regard to his rational capacity and, on the other hand, the foundation of a whole new order of values.[105] In *The Folklore of Capitalism* Thurman Arnold ironically summarized the problem: "In the naïve psychology of the past, 'Free Will' was a little man in the top of one's head who caught bad impulses and suppressed them. He did this by asking the advice of another 'little man' called Reason. In order to listen to Reason however it was necessary for Free Will to dismiss from the conference a 'third little man' called Emotion who had the tendency to obscure the clear advice of Reason."[106] An understanding of the "thinking man" was essential because all public debate was supposed to be addressed to him as the person able to choose the best system of government. Paradoxically, according to Arnold, the consequences of Nazism should have been clear to the rational and thinking German, otherwise one should infer that either "there were not enough of them in Germany or else the German thinking man was not particularly bright on government."[107]

The "highly idealized portrait" of the thinking man might have been

flattering, but it was only useful, Arnold believed, "to hang on the wall," while what actually affected the thoughts and behavior of the "common man" were the habits and mores deeply rooted in the culture. This basically anthropological concept of culture so widespread among social scientists during those years was stressed again at the end of the decade by sociologists such as Robert Lynd and philosophers such as Dewey.[108] Broadening the meaning of culture, as Dewey observed, "put a new face upon the old problem of the relation of the individual with the social."[109]

The philosopher replaced the earlier theory of the self-governing individual, whose conduct was directed by reason alone, with a new epistemology of the "common man" whose knowledge was the product of reason in constant interaction with emotions: "Denial that [desires] can be influenced by knowledge points emphatically to the non-rational and anti-rational forces that will form them."[110]

Social scientists were becoming increasingly aware of the interconnections between both the rational and the irrational aspects, in the study of social as well of individual life. The difference from previous years was in the shift of emphasis between the two aspects. Max Lerner observed that "there is an enormous difference between the recognition on our part of the role of the irrational life and the glorification of that role."[111] He summed up his viewpoint observing that "we are beginning to discover that we shall never be able to introduce the truly scientific spirit into social science unless we recognize that men are both irrational and rational, and that we must take man as a whole."[112]

Social psychologists and sociologists attentively scrutinized the irrational aspects of social behavior in a wide spectrum that included, as we have seen, "fascist attitudes" in U.S. society. Although the latter was condemned as tending to increase passivity and leader dependence in the "average citizen," there was a widespread tendency to play up "democratic attitudes" in public discourse. Particular attention had to be paid to a critical analysis of language. "Linguistic rituals," to use Dewey's expression, had to be closely analyzed in order to get at the meaning of the words at the core of democratic theory. Historian Carl Becker suggested paying particular attention to an analysis of "certain unobtrusive words with uncertain meaning that are permitted to slip off the tongue . . . as little keys . . . secret entrance ways . . . little back stair doors . . . to every era."[113]

The very concept of freedom was, for instance, at the core of criti-

cal analysis: "Call it a dream or call it a vision . . . it has been interwoven in a tradition that had an immense effect upon American life."[114] In past American tradition freedom had been linked to strictly individual prerogatives. However, "in the very different urban world of today," as Robert Lynd remarked, since freedom is disconnected from economic equality it could be paradoxically interpreted as the freedom "of workers to be dispossessed from their houses and to sleep on park benches because private business is free to work itself into a depression."[115]

In order to cope with the widening gap between the ideal and the real functioning of a democratic society, new positive contents had to be added to traditionally negative aspects of individual freedom, such as equality of opportunity and ownership. According to Carl Becker, without these new meanings connected with economic equality, democracy risked becoming an "empty form."[116]

The transformation of the "democratic motive" from the connotations of "problematic actuality" to those of "futurity of an endless process" left room for the recruitment of the entire population—even of the underprivileged and minority groups who might question the real worth of democracy—in the total war effort.[117] "The disfranchised such as . . . Negroes of the South can logically be asked to defend democracy as a purpose even when they could not be asked to defend it as an actuality."[118] The ideal aspect of democracy had to be restated without any critical questioning of its real accomplishments.

Political scientist Carl J. Friedrich reconfirmed this in "The Role and the Position of the Common Man."[119] In the celebrated speech Henry Wallace gave on May 8, 1942, he also spoke in prophetic tones of the advent of the "century of the common man" in contrast to Harry Luce's "American Century."[120] The disinherited common man then acquired a new role and new positive values, not so much as Dewey observed, for a renewed faith in the positive aspects of human nature, as for substantially ethnic motives.

Popular democratic behavior and democratic symbols needed to be strongly reaffirmed. A definition of democracy included not only a specific form of government, but "a feeling in the mind and heart."[121] On the verge of U.S. intervention in World War II, sociologist David Riesman observed that "Americans are not a reading nation, they play by ear. Press and printing are not very effective for organizing them either for or against democracy."[122] Following the Nazi example, he suggested the

organization of mass rallies: "The Nazis have found that the solidarity of the crowd at a meeting and the charisma of the speaker can make great lies come true, but on the other hand critical democracy at a meeting can also make great truths come true."[123]

Public relations expert Edward Bernays had a different idea. He appealed for a common effort to make use "of all the socially sound methods to help uphold our democracy."[124] At the opening of the 1939 World's Fair in New York he proposed that this event be used "to teach the millions of Americans, dramatically, graphically, effectively how our democracy works and what its values are, by injecting in the Fair the keynote of the relation of every aspect of American life to America's essential democratic system."[125] In the gigantic organization of all kinds of spectacles the motor parade staged as a preview in 1938, a year before the fair, was recalled as "the greatest spectacle ever witnessed by a city which has grown accustomed to lavish and skillful entertainment."[126] The automobile was a symbolic conduit for the values of democracy: "In terms of greater freedom of motion . . . [the automobile] becomes a conduit for democratic thoughts and ideas. . . . More than a mechanism on wheels it becomes then an instrument of democracy."[127] The fair's architectural plan followed Bernays's suggestion. Composed of a series of buildings in a semicircle, the central area—called Democracity—was reached by elevated walkways displaying consumer goods for the public.[128]

With the photography show, *A Road to Victory*, designed by the great photographer Edward Steichen, also a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy, "the American people" entered the Museum of Modern Art in New York as protagonist. The show that opened in June 1942 took six months to prepare. On the large museum walls crowds of visitors viewed giant photographs scanning the passage from the calm and ordinary life of the city and countryside to "a cavalcade of men in the sky, sea and earth for the defense of our continent." Carl Sandburg's comments accompanied the enlarged photos taken from military and the Farm Security Administration archives. After seeing the daily life of common citizens against the background of the great American landscapes, visitors were offered a view of the great Boulder Dam and Shasta Dam, a combination of the Reims cathedral and Niagara Falls, according to a journalist's report.[129] After the sight of the dramatic bombing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, accompanied by the isolationists' phrase, "It can't happen here," six large photographs

of men and women, fathers and mothers, hung opposite a large mural that showed marching young men, their sons, called by President Roosevelt "to the armed defense of democratic existence."[130]

The "procession of photographs of a nation in war" (as the exhibition was subtitled) corresponded to that notion of the common man on the march, according to Henry Wallace, who would come out of the war bearing commonly shared civil rights and responsibilities. In this interplay of reciprocal perspectives, "the public" of visitors observed "the crowd" of men and women, the common citizens, which in turn watched the procession of their young sons in uniform. By this circular embrace the official rhetoric brought to the fore the notion of the "people" that the war emergency had united in a bond of national solidarity.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Hawthorne, *Scarlet Letter*, 215–16, 217. For a comprehensive study of crowd representations in American literature, see Esteve, *Aesthetics and Politics*; see also Mills, *Crowd in American Literature*. On the *Scarlet Letter* see, among others, Brook, "Citizen Hester."

2. See, among others, Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*. On the end of the nineteenth-century crisis, see Luisa Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*; Salvati, "Vecchio e nuovo ordine," 149–73; see also the introduction by Giacanelli, Frigessi, and Mangoni to Lombroso, *Delitto, genio, follia*, 5–37, 333–69, 685–97; Pombeni, *La trasformazione politica*.

3. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 3.

4. De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*.

5. Testi, "Questi partiti 'selvaggi e voraci.'"

6. On the theme of crowds, masses, and mobs see, among others, Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871–1889*; McPhail, *Myth of the Madding Crowd*; Mucchi Faina, *L'abbraccio della folla*; Giner, *Mass Society*. See also Canetti, *Mass und Macht*; Moscovici, *L'âge des foules*; McClelland, *Crowd and the Mob*; Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*; Rudé, *Crowd in History, 1730–48*; Boyer, *Urban Masses*; and Nye, *Origins of Crowd Psychology*.

7. Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 154.

8. Gerstle, *American Crucible*. See also Gerstle's "Protean Character of American Liberalism." On nationalism and American liberalism see also, among others, Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*; Hollinger, *Post-ethnic America*; Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*; Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*; Holmes, *Passions and Constraint*; Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*; Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism*; Kloppenberg, *Virtues of Liberalism* and *Uncertain Victory*; and Dawley, *Struggles for Justice*.

9. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*; Lorini, *Rituals of Race*; Allen, Als, Lewis, and Litwack, *Without Sanctuary*; Gilje, *Rioting in America*; Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*; and Tolmay, *Festival of Violence*.

10. Livingston, "Strange Career of the 'Social Self'"; in the same issue of *Radical History Review* see also Mary B. King, "Make Love Not War: New Man-

agement Theory and the Social Self," *Radical History Review* 76 (winter 2000): 15–24; Barry Shank, "Subject, Commodity, and the Marketplace: The American Artists Groups and the Mass Production of Distinction," *Radical History Review* 76 (winter 2000): 25–42; and Casey N. Blake, "All Lost in the Supermarket," *Radical History Review* 76 (winter 2000): 80–89. See also Livingston, *Pragmatism*. On the theme of the public sphere see Habermas, *Lifeworld and System* and "Concluding Remarks"; and Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access."

11. Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, xiv, xvi. See also my review of Hansen's book in *Clio: A Journal of Literature* 34, no. 1–2 (2004–5): 206–10; moreover, see, among others, Hollinger, *Post-ethnic America*; Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*; Dharwadker, *Cosmopolitan Geographies*; Bodnar, *Remaking America* and *Bonds of Affection*; O'Leary, *To Die For*; Joshua Cohen, *For Love of Country*; Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*; Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism"; Holmes, *Passions and Constraint*; Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging*; Rogers Smith, *Civic Ideals*; and Kaplan and Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*.

12. For a reconstruction in general terms of the theme of crowd psychology in U.S. culture, see Eugene E. Leach, "Mental Epidemics"; and Bush, *Lord of Attention*. For more specific studies of social psychology and sociology, see Giner, *Mass Society*, 57–68; and McPhail, *Myth of the Madding Crowd*, 2–9. For a comprehensive synthesis of the theories of the crowd from its origins to the present, see Mucchi Faina, *L'abbraccio della folla*, 32–43. Dorothy Ross touches on the theme of the crowd only briefly; see *Origins of American Social Science*, 238–47.

13. For an analysis of the rise of public relations in regard to the business world, see De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*; see also, among others, Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*.

14. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*; Chandler, *America's Greatest Depression*; Bordo et al., *Defining Moment*; Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*; Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*; Vaudagna, *Il New Deal*; Badger, *New Deal*; Fraser and Gerstle, *Rise and Fall*; Brinkley, *Voices of Protest*, *End of Reform*, and *Liberalism and Its Discontents*; McElvaine, *Great Depression* and *Down and Out*; Plotke, *Building a Democratic Political Order*; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, chap. 9; Terkel, *Hard Times*; Sitkoff, *New Deal for Blacks*; Ware, *Partner and I*; Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal*; Lieberman, *Shifting the Color Line*; Sullivan, *Days of Hope*; and Vezzosi, *Madri e stato*.

15. These themes have been treated only marginally in the now-classic works of Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*; Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science*; and Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*. On this same subject see Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, and Novick, *That Noble Dream.* See also the critical review of Novick by J. T. Kloppenberg, "Objectivism and Historicism: A Century of Historical Writing," *American Historical Review* 94 (1989): 1011–30.

16. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*.

17. Fabbrini, *Il principe democratico*; Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*.

18. Among the several biographies of FDR, see Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* and *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*; Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt* and *Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny*. A fundamental source for Roosevelt's presidency is *Public Papers and Addresses*. See also FDR, *Complete Presidential Press Conferences*. For Roosevelt and public opinion see, among others, Rosten, *Washington Correspondents*; Rogers, "President Roosevelt's Press Conferences"; Pollard, "F. D. Roosevelt and the Press"; Graham J. White, *FDR and the Press*; and Steele, "Pulse of the People." See also Steele, *Propaganda in an Open Society*; Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion*; and Barnow, *History of Broadcasting*, vol. 2.

Chapter 1. American Democracy in the Gilded Age: The Individual, the Crowd, and the "People"

1. Gerald S. Lee, "Making the Crowd Beautiful," *Atlantic Monthly* 87 (1901): 248, cited in Bush, *Lord of Attention*, 8.

2. Lee, *Crowds*, 551.

3. See, among others, de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*; Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness* and *P.R.!*; Richard Fox and Lears, *Culture of Consumption*; Stephen Fox, *Mirror Makers*; Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream*; William Leach, *Land of Desire*; Lears, *Fables of Abundance*; Thelen, *Becoming Citizens*; Glickman, *Living Wage*; Ortoleva, "I media"; and Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*.

4. Haskell, *Emergence of Professional Social Science*, 1.

5. Quoted in Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 148.

6. See, among others, Trachtenberg, *Incorporation of America*; Nelson, *Divided We Stand*; Montgomery, *Beyond Equality* and *Fall of the House*; Sklar, *Corporate Reconstruction*; Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*; Jones, *Labor of Love*; Dubofsky, *State and Labor*; Fink, *Workingmen's Democracy*; Wiebe, *Search for Order*; Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society*; Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*; Wilentz, *Chants Democratic*; Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours*; Barrett, *Work and Community* and "Americanization from the Bottom Up"; Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism*; and Noble, *America by Design*.

7. About the populist movement see, among others, Goodwin, *Democratic Promise*; Gennaro Lerda, *Il populismo Americano*. For a discussion of the tradition and meaning of agrarian populism in U.S. political history, see Christopher Lash, *True and Only Heaven*, 460–64; and Kazin, *Populist Persuasion*.

8. Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society*.

9. The distinction is by an editorialist of the *Evening Post* of 1805, quoted by

Eugene E. Leach, "Mental Epidemics," 7–8. The people were composed of "the great body of American farmers, merchants, mechanics."

10. Quoted in Formisano, *Transformation of Political Culture*, 457. See also Grimsted, "Rioting in Its Jacksonian Setting," 361–97.

11. Portelli, *Il testo e la voce*, 66.

12. Ibid.

13. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1:57.

14. Wiebe, *Self-rule*, 67.

15. Ibid.

16. Whitman, *Democratic Vistas*, 326.

17. Ibid., 338.

18. Ibid., 350.

19. Ibid., 354, 350.

20. Ibid., 337. On female iconography as an emblematic utopian image see Hobsbawm, *Worlds of Labour*, 98–111 in the Italian edition.

21. Whitman, *Democratic Vistas*, 343.

22. Foner, "Freedom, Race, Citizenship," 76.

23. Foner, "Freedom, Race, Citizenship," 77. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*. See also Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*.

24. See, among others, Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*, 179–259; Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 44–80; and Martellone, "Ideologia di un'appartenenza."

25. Christopher Lash, *True and Only Heaven*, 353–55; Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 92–93, 109–10. See in the vast scholarship, among others, Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States*; Higham, *Send These to Me*; Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization"; Werner Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity*; Fasce, "Culture, Politics and the Making"; Bender, "Wholes and Parts"; Conzen et al., "Invention of Ethnicity"; Takaki, *A Different Mirror*; Gabaccia, *From the Other Side*; Kazal, "Revisiting Assimilation"; Hollinger, *Post-ethnic America*; Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*; and Desmond King, *Making Americans*.

26. Mills, *Crowd in American Literature*, 51–55.

27. Melville, *Pierre*, 282. Whitman, *Leaves of Grass*, 242.

28. The passages are from Hawthorne, *Scarlet Letter*, 42, 48, 209. For an analysis of Hawthorne's novel see Bercovitch, *Office of "The Scarlet Letter"*; Cheyfitz, "Irresistibleness of Great Literature"; Brook, "Citizen Hester."

29. Hawthorne, *Scarlet Letter*, 213.

30. Hawthorne, *House of the Seven Gables*, 170–71.

31. Hawthorne, *Twice-Told Tales*, 97.

32. Concerning the crowd as a metaphor, see Bush, *Lord of Attention*, and Mills, *Crowd in American Literature*.

33. Dickens, *Barnaby Rudge*, 414.

34. Bush, *Lord of Attention*, 14.

35. Theodore Roosevelt, *Governor Morris*. For the controversy about erect-

ing a statue to the victims of the Boston Massacre of 1770, see Bush, *Lord of Attention*, 16–19.

36. Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*, 233.

37. Ibid., 233.

38. Hardman, "Masses," 197.

39. Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, 73

40. Raymond Williams, *Keywords*, 192–97.

41. Briggs, "Language of Mass," 45.

42. Emerson, *Portable Emerson*, 40.

43. Mason, "Moderno, modernità, modernizzazione."

44. Lawrence Levine, *Highbrow, Lowbrow*. See also I. W. Levine, "The Folklore of Industrial Society," 1379 and passim.

45. Eugene E. Leach, "Mental Epidemics," 7–8.

46. Grimsted, "Rioting in Its Jacksonian Setting," 361–97; Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 60–143.

47. Eugene E. Leach, "Chaining the Tiger," 187.

48. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 98–140.

49. Maffi, *Nel mosaico della città*, 242, 245; see also Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*, 254.

50. Quoted in Eugene E. Leach, "Chaining the Tiger," 189, 193.

51. Ibid., 210.

52. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 54.

53. Eugene E. Leach, "Mental Epidemics," 11.

54. Ibid.

55. Eugene E. Leach, "Chaining the Tiger," 206.

56. Ibid., 189.

57. Quoted in Bush, *Lord of Attention*, 19.

58. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 86–88.

59. In *Folkways* Sumner analyzed the behavior of a social group in light of those habits, customs, cultural and religious traditions deeply rooted in the individual unconscious and connected to the biological substratum of the species in continual interaction with the environment. According to this point of view, cultural and traditional rules regulating the different societies were just the sediment of this long process in which it was useless to counter with the rational capacity of the individual: "It is the greatest folly of which a man can be capable to sit down with slate and pencil to plan a new social order" (Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, 210).

60. Burnham, *Critical Elections* and "System of 1896"; Testi, *Trionfo e declino*, chap. 1; Foner, *Story of the American Freedom*, chap. 5, and *Reconstruction*; Ayers, *Promise of the New South*.

61. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 136.

62. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 104, 110.

63. Lofgren, *Plessy Case*; Nieman, *Promises to Keep*.

64. See Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 61, and "Liberal Tradition," 116–31.

65. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 61.

66. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 178.

67. Dorothy Ross, "Liberal Tradition," 122.

68. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 176–78.

69. Dorothy Ross, "Liberal Tradition," 126 (quote), 125. See also Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 127; Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*.

70. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 127.

71. Lester Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*; Ely, *Socialism*; Clark, *Philosophy of Wealth*. For the German university backgrounds of these authors, see Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 98–122. See also Anna Maria Martellone, "Il modello tedesco nelle università Americane"; Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 21–28.

72. See Baritono, *Oltre la politica*, 59–81.

73. Bentley, "Simmel, Durkheim and Ratzenhofer," 251.

74. Ibid.

75. See, among others, Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*; Donzelli, *Folla e politica*; Salvati, *Vecchio e nuovo ordine*.

76. For a discussion of this aspect see Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 3–17.

77. The French phrase is from Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 4. On the subject of the end-of-century French cultural ambiance and the psychology of the crowd, see also Pozzi, *Gli intellettuali e il potere*. For the Italian environment see the introductions of Ferruccio Giacanelli, Delia Frigessi, and Luisa Mangoni to Lombroso, *Delitto, genio, follia*.

78. Regarding France and Italy, see Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 18, 43, and passim.

79. On Taine and French culture at the end of the century, see Salvati, *Vecchio e nuovo ordine*, 149–76. On the crisis of the institutional aspects, see Pombeni, *La trasformazione politica*.

80. Regarding France and Italy, see Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 18, 43.

81. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*. About the idea of progress in end-of-century culture, see Sasso, *Tramonto di un mito*, 250–57.

82. Canfora, *Ideologie del classicismo*, 236–42; Sasso, *Tramonto di un mito*, 25.

83. William Graham Sumner, "Sociology," *Princeton Review* 57 (November 1881): 321, cited in Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 87.

84. Quoted in Dorothy Ross, "Liberal Tradition," 123.

85. Quandt, *From the Small Town*; Wiebe, *Search for Order*; R. Jackson Wilson, *In Quest of Community*; Bender, *Community and Social Change*.

86. Wallas, *Great Society*.

87. Small, *Introduction*.

88. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*; Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America*.

89. Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America*, 11–12.

90. Hollinger, "Knower and the Artificier."

91. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 384.

92. Haskell, *Emergence of Professional Social Science*, 5–14; Bannister, *Social Darwinism*, 10 and passim.

93. Kloppenberg, *Virtues of Liberalism*.

94. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 128.

95. In addition to the work of Dorothy Ross, for a careful, if dated, exploration of this argument, see Charles H. Page, *Class and American Sociology*; on the theme of social mobility, see Kazal's critical survey, "Revisiting Assimilation."

96. Edward A. Ross, *Social Control*.

97. See, among others, the critical survey on the subject by Foner, "Why Is There No Socialism?" See also Arnaldo Testi, "Once Again: Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?" *Storia Nord-americana* 7 (1990), reprinted in his *Trionfo e declino*, 137–98.

98. In his first presidential campaign in 1932, three years after the Great Depression began, FDR used the well-known expression "the forgotten man" in a very different context. Sumner quoted in Charles H. Page, *Class and American Sociology*, 209.

99. Sumner quoted in ibid., 97.

100. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism*, 67–84.

101. Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 27–40.

102. Haskell, *Emergence of Professional Social Science*, 12 and passim. See also Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 246–56; Quandt, *From the Small Town*, 27–35.

103. Quandt, *From the Small Town*, 33.

104. Dewey, *Lectures in China*, 71.

Chapter 2. The Language of Race, the Crowd, and the Public in the Progressive Era

1. Fred J. Baker, "Life Histories," 246.

2. Baritono, *Oltre la politica*, 88.

3. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 147.

4. Ibid.; Lawrence Levine, *Highbrow, Lowbrow*; Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*.

5. Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 35. On the Progressive Era see, among

others, Eisenach, *Lost Promise of Progressivism*; Diner, *Very Different Age*; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 139–61; Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 66–130; Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 44–65; Kathryn J. Sklar, *Florence Kelley*; Dubofsky, *State and Labor*; Wiebe, *Search for Order*; Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society*; Montgomery, *Fall of the House*; Testi, *L'età progressista negli Stati Uniti* and *La politica dell'esclusione*; Fink, *Progressive Intellectuals*; Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*; Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*; Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory* and *Virtues of Liberalism*; and Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*.

6. Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, 199–213.

7. Ibid., 205–6, and on the subject of the rise of the expert, 197–213. On Lippmann see Ronald Steel, *Walter Lippmann*; Bender, *Intellect and Public Life*; on Herbert Croly see Bender, *New York Intellect*, 222–27; Stettner, *Shaping Modern Liberalism*.

8. Steffens, *Shame of the Cities*, 24.

9. Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society*.

10. Testi, "Questi partiti selvaggi e voraci," 68–79, and *La politica dell'esclusione*; and McCormick, *Party Period and Public Policy*.

11. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*,144–62.

12. Gerstle, "Protean Character of American Liberalism."

13. Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 154.

14. Gerstle, "Protean Character of American Liberalism," 1072, 1050.

15. Small, "General Sociology," 208.

16. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 216.

17. Ibid., 233, 237.

18. Edward A. Ross, *Social Control* (1905). The book is a collection of essays previously published in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

19. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 151.

20. John Dewey, *School and Society*, 40.

21. Small, "General Sociology," 202.

22. Quoted in Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 224.

23. Small, "General Sociology," 210.

24. Baritono, *Oltre la politica*, 79–81. In regard to the expansion of the administrative system in the Progressive Era, see Skowroneck, *Building a New American State*. According to Woodrow Wilson, "if a strong state was to be introduced into America it had to 'breathe free American air'—it had to merge with a cultural predisposition for self-government, not fight this disposition" (quoted in Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 26). Political scientists such as Arthur Bentley, and the group of economists at the University of Wisconsin that included John Commons, understood the state not as an abstract entity separate from civil society but as the entire governmental framework in a concrete working relationship with citizens. This guaranteed a harmonious and coordinated functioning among

the different associations and interest groups, the "collective actions," according to Commons's definition.

25. Edward A. Ross, "Causes of Race Superiority," 88. For a somewhat different version of these themes, see Frezza, "Public Boundaries."

26. Edward A. Ross, "Causes of Race Superiority," 88.

27. The introduction to *Sin and Society* was written by Theodore Roosevelt. For the book's impact on the public see Edward A. Ross, *Seventy Years of It*, 106–7.

28. Ripley, "Race Progress and Immigration," 134.

29. Walker, *Restriction of Immigration*.

30. Sidney G. Fischer, "Has Immigration Dried Up Our Literature?" *Forum* 96 (January 1894): 562–67.

31. Fairchild, "Paradox of Immigration" and *Melting Pot Mistake*. For a discussion of "race suicide," see Goldenweiser, "Walker's Theory of Immigration."

32. Ripley, "Race Progress and Immigration," 133.

33. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 147.

34. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation*; Winant, *Racial Conditions*; Anthias, "Race and Class Revisited"; Goldberg, *Racial Subjects*; Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness*; Allen, *Invention of the White Race*; Frankenberg, *White Women*; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, *America in Black and White*; Fairclough, *Better Day Coming*; Alba, *Transformation of White America*; Appiah, "Race, Culture, Identity"; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*; Gossett, *Race*; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*; Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*; and Gould, *Mismeasure of Man*.

35. Merriam, *American Political Theories*, 305–33.

36. Edward A. Ross, "Causes of Race Superiority," 80.

37. Closson, "Hierarchy of European Races"; Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*.

38. See also Ripley, "Race Progress and Immigration," 130, and, among others, Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*, 139–52.

39. Quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 355.

40. Ripley, "Race Progress and Immigration," 130.

41. Ibid.

42. Theodore Roosevelt, *Strenuous Life*, 6–7. See, among others, Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 14–43, and Mowry, *Era of Theodore Roosevelt*. On Roosevelt and manliness see, among others, Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, chap. 5. On the subject of race see Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt*.

43. On the theme of public virility see Testi, "Gender of Reform Politics."

44. A speech by Beveridge to the Senate in 1899 is reported in Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 180. On the debate about imperialism see Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy*; Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*; Tom-

kins, *Anti-imperialism in the United States*; Aquarone, *Alle origini dell'impero Americano*; Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*; Ferrer, "Rethinking Race, Nation and Empire"; Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*, 223–34.

45. Veblen, *Theory of the Leisure Class*, 158.

46. Theodore Roosevelt, *Strenuous Life*, 6–9. See, among others, Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 14–43.

47. Edward A. Ross, "Causes of Race Superiority," 85.

48. John W. Burgess, "Ideal of the American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly* 10 (September 1895): 407.

49. Strong quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 316.

50. Axeen, "Heroes of the Engine Room."

51. Newman, *White Women's Rights*.

52. Lester Ward, "Our Better Halves."

53. Gossett, *Race*, 305; Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt*.

54. Gilman, *Man-Made World*, 217.

55. Goldenweiser, *Walker's Theory of Immigration*.

56. Coolidge, *Why Women Are So*, 60.

57. Edward A. Ross, "Western Civilization and Birth Rate," 614.

58. Commons, Phillips, Gilmore, Sumner, and Andrews, *Documentary History*; Commons, Saposs, Sumner, Mittelman, Hoagland, Andrews, Perlman, D. Lescohier, Brandeis, and Taft, *History of Labour*.

59. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 11–12.

60. Edward A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, 60.

61. Ibid.

62. Ripley, "Race Progress and Immigration," 131.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 136.

65. Ibid., 138.

66. Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, xiv–xv; see in particular 81–118; see, among others, Higham, *Send These to Me*, 43–54; Bender, "Geography of Historical Memory"; Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues*, 209–19.

67. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 21, 20.

68. For a somewhat different version of these themes, see Frezza, "Masses, Crowds, Mobs."

69. William James, review of *The Crowd*, by Gustave Le Bon, *Psychological Review* 4 (May 1897): 313–14.

70. Apfelbaum, "La psychologie des foules," 175–81.

71. As the historian Erika Apfelbaum observes about this controversy: "Without getting into the details of the different stages of the debate it must be remembered that Bernheim's thesis gained on the strictly scientific level . . . while Charcot's position becomes more fragile . . . at the same time it will have a wider

audience among psychologists, anthropologists, criminologists. Charcot's fame has contributed to the importance widely given to the paradigm of suggestion" ("La psychologie des foules et les theories de la suggestion," 178, my translation).

72. See also Sighele, *L'intelligenza della folla*.

73. Apfelbaum, "La psychologie des foules," 175–81.

74. Sighele, *La folla delinquente*; Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*; Tarde, "Foules et sects."

75. For the political use of the terms "masses" and "crowds," see also Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society*, 354–55, and "Masses," in *Keywords*.

76. Apfelbaum, "La psychologie des foules," 175–76.

77. Tarde, "Foules et sects," 349–87. See also among others, Donzelli, "Psicologia della folla," in *Folla e politica*, 9–21; Petrucci, "Dalla sociologia alla interpsicologia," 122.

78. Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 8–12; Giner, *Mass Society*, 57.

79. Freud, "Group Psychology"; Moscovici, *L'âge des foules*, 13.

80. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, 46, my translation.

81. McPhail, *Myth of the Madding Crowd*, xxi.

82. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, 50.

83. Nye, *Origins of Crowd Psychology*; Gerard, "Gustave Le Bon."

84. Taine, *Les origines*. For a view of the moderate liberal Taine, see Pozzi, "Alle origini della psicologia," and *H. Taine*.

85. Giner, *Mass Society*, 57.

86. Le Bon, *Lois psychologiques de l'evolution,* and *Psychologie du socialism*. Within a year Macmillan had the two volumes translated into English and published them.

87. On Taine's influence with respect to the establishment of a moderate liberal tradition in France in the 1880s and 1890s, see Pozzi, *Alle origini della psicologia*; Salvati, *Vecchio e nuovo ordine*.

88. Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 10–12.

89. George E. Vincent, review of *The Psychology of Peoples*, by Gustave Le Bon, *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (January 1899): 147, 554–56.

90. William James, review of *The Crowd*, 313.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., 314.

93. Sumner, *Folkways*, 19.

94. Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 295.

95. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 149–50.

96. Arthur F. Bentley, review of *The Crowd*, by Gustave Le Bon, *American Journal of Sociology* 3 (1897): 613–14.

97. Ibid., 614.

98. William James, review of *The Crowd*, 314.

99. Ibid.

100. Vincent, review of *The Psychology of Peoples*, 554–56.

101. George H. Mead, review of *The Psychology of Socialism*, by Gustave Le Bon, *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (November 1899): 409.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Tarde, "Foules et sectes."

105. Ibid., 11.

106. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 43–61.

107. Ibid., 56.

108. Ibid., 11–62.

109. Ibid., 45.

110. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology," 721–846.

111. See Tarde, *L'opinion et la foule*; for an analysis of Tarde's reception in the United States, see Faina, *L'abbraccio della folla*, 77–88.

112. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 64–65.

113. Edward A. Ross, "Moot Points in American Sociology," 363.

114. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 64–65. By the same author see also *Social Control*, 72.

115. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 53.

116. Ibid.

117. Park, *The Crowd and the Public*. See, among others, Raushenbush, *Robert Park*, and Esteve, *Aesthetics and Politics*, 110.

118. Cesare Lombroso's school of criminal anthropology was widely known in the United States. See Kellor, "Criminal Anthropology." This topic was part of the debate about the influence of the individual on the environment and of the environment on the individual.

119. Park, *The Crowd and the Public and Other Essays*, 229.

120. Testi, *La politica dell'esclusione*, 13–23.

121. Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 48.

122. Renan quoted in ibid., 16.

123. Ferrero, *La vecchia Europa e la nuova*, quoted in Sasso, *Tramonto di un mito*, 82.

124. Mangoni, *Una crisi di fine secolo*, 14–16.

125. See also Commons, *Proportional Representation*, 54 and passim.

126. Ibid., 31.

127. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 165.

128. Edward A. Ross, *Social Control* (1905), 351.

129. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*, 146.

130. Ibid., 147.

131. Ibid., 147.
132. Commons, *Proportional Representation*, 31.
133. Ibid., 32.
134. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*.
135. Commons, *Representative Democracy*, 22.
136. Ibid., 127.
137. Ibid., 84.
138. On the debate relative to the alienation of voters in the poorest social strata, from the beginning of the twentieth century, see the first analyses conducted by the social scientists of the Chicago school in Merriam and Gosnell, *Non-voting*. See also McGerr, *Decline of Popular Politics*; Piven and Cloward, *Why Americans Don't Vote*; Testi, *La politica dell'esclusione*.

Chapter 3. The Mob Stereotype

1. Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 31.
2. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 190–92; Apfelbaum, "La psychologie des foules," 176.
3. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 46.
4. Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres*.
5. Clarke, *Building of a Brain*, 20.
6. Gustave Le Bon, "Recherches anatomiques et mathématiques sur le lois des variations du volume du cerveau et sur leurs relations avec l'intelligence," *Revue d'Anthropologie*, series 2, vol. 2 (1879): 60–61.
7. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 71.
8. Gould, *Mismeasure of Man*, 142–51.
9. G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, 2:649. For his influence in the United States, in the playground movement especially, see Lorini, "Progressives' Rhetoric on National Recreation."
10. Cope, *Origin of the Fittest*, 135–36.
11. Edward A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, 60.
12. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, 57.
13. Franklin H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 135–36.
14. Higham, "Reorientation of American Culture." See also Nash, *Wilderness in the American Mind*, 141–60.
15. Christopher Wilson, *Labor of Words*, 93.
16. Ibid., 92.
17. Upton Sinclair deals with the realities of the Chicago stockyards in his novel *The Jungle*.
18. Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive*.
19. Blake, *Beloved Community*, 271.

20. Theodore Roosevelt, *Strenuous Life*, 6–7.

21. Quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 313.

22. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, 57.

23. James is quoted in Eugene E. Leach, "Mental Epidemics," 22.

24. Starobinski, *Il rimedio del male*, 15.

25. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*. On the subject of race and children's education, see, among others, Linda Gordon, *Great Arizona Orphan Abduction*.

26. See, among others, Ellen C. Du Bois, *Women Suffrage and Women's Rights*, and *Feminism and Suffrage*; Kraditor, *Ideas of the Women Suffrage Movement*; Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*; Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter*; Cott, *Grounding of Modern Feminism*; Rossi Doria, *La libertà delle donne*; Jones, *Labor of Love*; Paula Baker, "Domestication of Politics"; Marilley, *Woman Suffrage*; Mary Ryan, *Civic Wars*; Clinton, *Other Civil War*; Kerber, *No Constitutional Right*; Hine, *Black Women*; and Gordon, *Pitied but Not Entitled*.

27. Newman, *White Women's Rights*; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 136.

28. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 16.

29. Thomas quoted in Rosenberg, *Beyond Separate Spheres*, 468.

30. Thomas, "Mind of Women," 469.

31. Ibid.

32. The practice of lynching as a system of direct popular justice, avoiding the normal legal procedures of the state and federal government, took its name from Colonel Charles Lynch, who during the years of the American Revolution organized informal juries to direct summary trials of Tories and criminals in Virginia (Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 80–84).

33. For these statistics see Zangrando, *NAACP Crusade against Lynching*, 4–8. Different figures are reported by the *Chicago Tribune*, which estimated the number of lynchings between 1882 and 1937 as 5,112, of whom 3,687 were African Americans. See Gilje, *Rioting in America*, 101; Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*.

34. Zangrando, *NAACP Crusade against Lynching*, 6. For an analysis of the principal literary works contemporary with the period of the lynchings, see Gunning, *Race, Rape, and Lynching*.

35. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 18.

36. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*; Lorini, *Rituals of Race*. See also Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 17–48; Fredrickson, *Black Image*; Williamson, *Crucible of Race*; Carter, *Scottsboro*; Fairclough, *Better Day Coming*. On whiteness see Goldberg, *Racial Subjects*; David Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness*; Allen, *Invention of the White Race*; Frankenberg, *White Women*. See also Brown, *Southern Honor*. For the code of honor dealing with female sexuality see Jacqueline Dowd Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry*; Hodes, *Black Women, White Men*; and J. William Harris, "Etiquette, Lynching, and Racial Boundaries."

37. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Philadelphia Negro*.

38. Lorini, quoting W. E. B. Du Bois, *Rituals of Race*, 143.

39. In regard to the continuity-change theme in the history of the South, only by an analysis of the specific circumstances in the various states—the economic transformations in different sectors, the changes in customs resulting from the women's rights movements, which was sensed as a threat to the sexist patriarchal order—is it possible to understand why "mobs executed more blacks in central Georgia than in the low country of South Carolina," or why racial violence remained so long in Mississippi, when this practice was declining in North Carolina (Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 13). See also Howard N. Rabinovitz, *Race Relations*, and "More Than the Woodward Thesis"; Singal, *War Within*; Doyle, *New Men, New Cities, New South*; Raper, *Tragedy of Lynching*. For this same kind of interpretation see also Howland and Sears, "Minor Studies of Aggression." For an interpretation of the frustration-aggression theme, see Dollard, *Caste and Class*; Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression*; and Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*.

40. Cox, *Caste, Class and Race*; Barbara J. Fields, "Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America," *New Left Review* 181 (1990): 95–119.

41. Geertz, "Thick Description," in *Interpretation of Cultures*, 3–30.

42. Allen et al., *Without Sanctuary*. For the subsequent discussion see Lorini, "Cartoline dall'inferno."

43. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 72.

44. Ibid, 3.

45. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 281–325.

46. Ibid., 207–16. See also Fredrickson, *The Black Image*, 251–52.

47. Stocking, *Race, Culture, and Evolution*, 42–68.

48. Fredrickson, *Black Image*.

49. Thomas H. Huxley, "Emancipation—Black and White," *Science and Education* (1896): 66–67.

50. Gossett, *Race*, 262–63.

51. Fredrickson, *Black Image*, 91–96.

52. Edward W. Gilliam, "The African in the United States," *Southern Review* 15 (January 1874): 443, quoted in Fredrickson, *Black Image*, 240.

53. Tourgée, *Appeal to Caesar*.

54. Francis A. Walker, "The Colored Race in the United States." *Forum* 2 (July 1891).

55. Fredrick L. Hoffmann, *Race Traits and Tendencies*; Walter F. Wilcox, "Southern Society for the Promotion of the Study of Race Conditions and Problems in the South," Proceedings of the First Annual Conference, Richmond, Va., 1900, pp. 155–56.

56. Fredrick L. Hoffmann, "Vital Statistics of the Negro," *Arena* 5 (April 1892): 542.

57. Joseph A. Tillinghast, "The Negro in Africa and in America," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3rd series, May 1902, quoted in Fredrickson, *Black Image*, 253.

58. Foner, *Reconstruction*. For a critical discussion about the historiography of the Reconstruction see xix–xxvii.

59. Henderson, "Rural Police," 231.

60. Henderson M. Somerville, "Some Cooperating Causes of Negro Lynching." *North American Review* 177 (1903): 506–12.

61. More than one hundred African Americans were lynched every year from 1893 to 1904. See Gossett, *Race*, 269.

62. Haygood, "Black Shadow in the South."

63. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 295 and passim.

64. Haygood, "Black Shadow in the South," 169.

65. Quoted in Litwack, 213.

66. Ibid.

67. Gunning, *Race, Rape, and Lynching*, 11.

68. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 295 and passim.

69. Ibid., 298.

70. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 44.

71. Ames, "Editorial Treatment of Lynching," 77–79.

72. Thomas N. Page, *Negro*, 100.

73. Quoted in Logan, *Negro in North Carolina*, 186.

74. Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 206.

75. Ben Tillman, "Black Peril," quoted in Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 302–3.

76. Tillman quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 271.

77. Lester Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 76–77.

78. Andrew Sledd, "The Negro: Another View." *Atlantic Monthly* 90 (July 1902): 70–71.

79. Dreiser, "Nigger Jeff," 174.

80. Ibid., 176.

81. Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 41.

82. Dreiser, "Nigger Jeff," 163.

83. Lorini, "Cartoline dall'inferno." About Wells see Holt, "Lonely Warrior"; Litwack, *Trouble in Mind*, 424 and passim; Bederman, "Civilization."

84. Wells-Barnett, *On Lynchings*, 69–76.

85. Ibid. See also Cutler, *Lynch Law*. Cutler uses the *Chicago Tribune* as a source for compiling a list up to 1903. For the collection of data see also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, *Thirty Years of Lynching*; Esteve, *Aesthetics and Politics*, 120–23.

86. Wells-Barnett, *On Lynchings*, 88.

87. Ibid., 90.

88. Ibid., 95.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., 91–92.

91. Wells-Barnett, *Crusade for Justice*, 70; Esteve, *Aesthetics and Politics*, 137–41.

92. Wells-Barnett, *Crusade for Justice*, 70.

93. Ibid., 71.

94. Ibid.

95. Lorini, *Rituals of Race*, 137–38.

96. Ibid., 138–40, and Lorini, "Cartoline dall'inferno"; Gunning, *Race, Rape, and Lynching*, 11.

97. Gunning, *Race, Rape, and Lynching*, 49. In Dreiser's "Nigger Jeff," the character of Jeff, the lynched man, is described through the eyes of the whites as "a groveling, foaming brute," while in an indistinct domestic setting made almost invisible by the color black, the mother and daughter figures do not emerge with the same clear individuality as the white victim (175, 179–81). For this topic see Gunning, *Race, Rape, and Lynching*, 51–76. For a discussion of self-representation by African Americans in the years following Reconstruction, see Gates, "Trope of a New Negro."

98. Wells-Barnett, *On Lynchings*, 42.

99. Lorini, *Rituals of Race*, 117–50; Zangrando, *NAACP Crusade against Lynching*.

100. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Discussion," 834–35.

101. Ibid., 838.

102. See the declarations of N. S. Shaler reported in Stone, "Is Race Friction . . . Growing?" 683–84.

103. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Discussion," 838.

104. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Souls of Black Folk*, 45.

105. Ibid. On W. E. B. Du Bois, see, among others, the two-volume biography by David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois*.

106. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Discussion," 838.

107. Ibid.

108. Lorini, *Rituals of Race*, 143–44.

109. Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 47–73.

110. Boas, *Mind of the Primitive Man*, 227. This book was burned by the Nazis in 1933.

111. Boas and U.S. Immigration Commission, *Changes in Bodily Form*.

112. Ibid.

113. A student of Boas, Otto Klineberg, demonstrated through tests given to the children of an Indian tribe enriched by the discovery of oil how much the increase of intelligence quotient was related to socioeconomic influences. See Klineberg, *Experimental Study*.

114. Boas, introduction to Mary Ovington, *Half a Man*, vi–viii. On the same

subject, see Boas, "Negro and the Demands," 85–88; Boas, "Human Faculty as Determined by Race."

115. Boas, "Mind of Primitive Man," 1–11.

116. Ibid., 11.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., 10–11.

119. Ibid., 11.

120. Lorini, *Rituals of Race*, 56.

121. Raushenbush, *Robert E. Park*, 7.

122. Park would not change his position until the beginning of World War II, when he came closer to favoring racial integration, both nationally and internationally, as the means to lessening racial prejudice.

123. Pillsbury, "Federal Remedy for Lynching," 206.

124. Gruening and W. E. B. Du Bois, "National Association."

125. Zangrando, *NAACP Crusade against Lynching*, 12. On the different interpretations of lynching and on their gradual disappearance see Brundage, *Lynching in the New South*, 2–16.

Chapter 4. The Paradox of a Conformist Democracy

1. The definition of "the paradox of a conformist democracy" was suggested to me by Professor Tom Bender.

2. Edward A. Ross, "Mob Mind," 395. Ross included that essay in *Foundations of Sociology*, 100–115. See, among others, Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*, on the Spanish-American War.

3. For the impact of modern American "distribution revolution" on the European scene, see de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 132–83.

4. Frezza, "Informazione o propaganda."

5. Blake, *Beloved Community*. Note how this perspective is at odds with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's post–World War II school of thought about the "managed self," which is guided from the outside in the consumer society, and with Riesman's idea of the externally directed single atom in *The Lonely Crowd*.

6. Livingston, "Strange Career." See, by the same author, *Pragmatism and the Political Economy*.

7. Livingston, "Strange Career."

8. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 329.

9. Quandt, *From the Small Town*, 87; see also R. Jackson Wilson, *In Quest of Community*.

10. Durkheim, *La division du travail*; Simmel, *Über sociale Differenzierzierung*. The latter was translated in part by Albion W. Small, "Superiority and

Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 3 (September 1896): 167–89; and (November 1896): 392–415. For the influence of Simmel, Durkheim, and Ratzenhofer on American sociology, see Bentley, "Simmel, Durkheim and Ratzenhofer."

11. Dewey, *Public and Its Problems*, 151. See also McClay, *Masterless*.

12. Mark Baldwin quoted in Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*, 80. See also Noble, *The Progressive Mind*.

13. Small, "Scope of Sociology," 210.

14. The writer often referred to by progressive social scientists was the English social scientist Graham Wallas. In *The Great Society* he stressed the new global dimensions of social and intellectual environment. Wallas, *Great Society*, 3.

15. According to Small, a multicausal explanation could be defined as "vortex causation"; this could be described as a series of factors directed toward the center, moving from the circumference of a circle drawn by a compass. The phrase is quoted in Haskell, *Emergence of Professional Social Science*, 253.

16. George H. Mead, review of *The Psychology of Socialism*, by Gustave Le Bon, *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (November 1899): 409. See also George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*.

17. Small, "Scope of Sociology," 202.

18. Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*, 80, and *Progressive Mind*.

19. Sklansky, "Corporate Property and Social Psychology."

20. Cooley, *Human Nature*, 121.

21. Ibid., 366.

22. Ibid., 7–8. See also George H. Mead, "Cooley's Contribution," 696.

23. Cooley, *Human Nature*, 61, 62.

24. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 23.

25. Casalini, "Costruzione."

26. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 61–62.

27. Ibid.

28. Tom Bender pointed out that the particular characteristic of the "primary group" is not included in the classical perspective of development, from a *Gemeinschaft* toward a *Gesellschaft*, according to the famous theory of Ferdinand Tönnies. Instead of representing only a characteristic of preindustrial rural society, the primary group can be placed directly in the modern age. See Bender, *Community and Social Change*. On the intellectual environment during the Progressive Era in New York, see Bender, *New York Intellect*.

29. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 24.

30. Bentley, *Process of Government*. The works of German writers such as Ludwig Gumplowitz and Rudolf von Jhering had particular relevance in Bentley's formation. See Gumplowitz, *Outlines of Sociology*; Jhering, *Law as a Means*.

31. Charles Beard, review of *The Process of Government*, by Arthur F. Bentley, *Political Science Quarterly* 23 (December 1908): 739–41.

32. Löwi, *End of Liberalism*, 31–41.

33. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 330–39.

34. Bentley, *Process of Government*, 208–9.

35. Dewey, *Lectures in China*, 65; Caspary, *Dewey and Democracy*.

36. Dewey, *Lectures in China*, 132. On English pluralistic thought see Hirst, *Pluralist Theory of the State*.

37. This point of view is supported especially by Dewey in *Lectures in China*. For this and Dewey's subsequent separation from the pluralistic position, see Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 225–318. On the success of the pluralist theory in the United States, see Garson, "On the Origins."

38. Garson, "On the Origins." See in particular the criticism formulated by Walter Shepard about the pluralists at the end of World War I: Shepard, review of *Authority in the Modern State*, by Harold Laski, *American Political Science Review* 13 (August 1919): 493.

39. For an analysis of this aspect of Dewey's thought, see Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 452–76.

40. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 114.

41. Croly quoted in Noble, *Paradox of Progressive Thought*, 63. About Herbert Croly within the New York intellectual community, see Bender, *New York Intellect*, 222–27. See also Stettner, *Shaping Modern Liberalism*; Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 132–35.

42. Bergamini, *Un esercito per la nazione*.

43. Donnelly, *Caesar's Column*, 37.

44. See Esteve, *Aesthetics and Politics*, 136.

45. Crane, *Red Badge of Courage*, 30.

46. See Frezza, "Public Boundaries," 165–84.

47. Hubbard, "Message to Garcia." See also, among others, Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*; Axeen, "Heroes of the Engine Room."

48. Hubbard, "Message to Garcia," 115.

49. Croly, *Promise of American Life*, 24.

50. Haskell, *Emergence of Professional Social Science*, 255.

51. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 315.

52. Croly, *Progressive Democracy*, 226.

53. Ibid. Within this "exceptionalist" view Croly also envisioned the "validity of colonial expansion even for a democracy." Later, however, he took a more realistic view of the human and material costs of expansionism in relation to the benefits, as in the case of the annexation of the Philippines (Hansen, *Lost Promise of Patriotism*, 132–35).

54. Sidis, "Study of the Mob."

55. Sidis, *Psychology of Suggestion*, 304.

56. Ibid., 311–13.

57. Ibid., introduction by William James, vi–vii.

58. Sidis, *Psychology of Suggestion*, 312.

59. For a critical review of Edward A. Ross's *Social Psychology*, see George E. Vincent, review, *American Journal of Sociology* 14 (July 1908–May 1909): 681–87.

60. Edward A. Ross, "Mob Mind," 394.

61. Ibid., 390–91.

62. Ibid., 393; Edward A. Ross, "Moot Points in American Sociology," 371.

63. Edward A. Ross, "Mob Mind," 393.

64. Ibid., 394.

65. Ibid., 397.

66. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 58.

67. Ibid., 78–79.

68. De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 226–83.

69. Sinclair, *Metropolis*, 321–22.

70. Ibid., 342.

71. Royce, *Problem of Christianity*, 82. See also Royce, *Race Questions*.

72. Royce, *Race Questions*, 98.

73. Edward A. Ross, "Mob Mind," 398.

74. Edward A. Ross, *Social Control* (1913), 440.

75. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 231.

76. Edward A. Ross, *Social Control* (1913), 3.

77. Edward A. Ross, "Social Control," *American Journal of Sociology* 3 (May 1897): 822.

78. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 248.

79. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*.

80. J. Mark Baldwin, *Mental Development*.

81. Tarde, *Les lois sociales*, 47. See the review by Albion W. Small, *American Journal of Sociology* 4 (July 1898–May 1899): 395–400.

82. Tarde, *Les lois de l'imitation*, 95.

83. Tarde, *Les lois sociales*, 61.

84. J. Mark Baldwin, "Process of Social Organization," 65.

85. Small, review of *Les lois sociales*. For the influence of Tarde on U.S. social sciences, see Hayden, "Social Will." See also J. Mark Baldwin, "Process of Social Organization"; Bosanquet and Mark Baldwin, "Discussion"; Ellwood, "Theory of Imitation"; Lester Ward, "Contemporary Sociology"; and French, "Discussion."

86. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 209–27; Cooley, *Human Nature*, 309; Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 147–94. William Bagehot also spoke of imitation as instinct in *Physics and Politics*.

87. Small, review of *Principles of Sociology*, by Franklin Giddings, *American Journal of Sociology* 2 (July 1896–May 1897): 295–96.

88. Bosanquet and Mark Baldwin, "Discussion," 405.

89. French, "Discussion," 138.
90. Quandt, *From the Small Town*; Wiebe, *Search for Order*; Bender, *Community and Social Change*.
91. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 244–50.
92. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 89 and passim.
93. Dewey, *Public and Its Problems*, 160.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., 141.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 142.
98. Ibid., 159–60.
99. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 42.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., 61.
102. Ibid., 198.

Chapter 5. Criticism of Mass Democracy after World War I

1. Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 47–73; *New York Times* quoted in Novick, *That Noble Dream*, 135–36.
2. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 349 and pasim; Novick, *That Noble Dream*.
3. Beard and Lewis, "Representative Government in Evolution," 236.
4. See among others, Lorini, "Portrait of a Lady."
5. Becker, "Every Man His Own Historian," 234.
6. Ibid., 221.
7. See, among others, Toland, *No Man's Land*; Kennedy, *Over Here*; Gilbert, *First World War*; Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy*; Knox, *To End All Wars*.
8. Douglas, *Terrible Honesty*, 4.
9. Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 105.
10. Rossini, *Il mito americano*, 75–86; Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines*; Fasce, "Advertising America," and *La democrazia degli affari*, 92; de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 238–39.
11. See also Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*.
12. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*.
13. Brinton, *Ideas and Men*, 677.
14. Doob, *Propaganda*, 3.
15. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*.
16. "War and Reorientation," in Seligman and Johnson, *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*, 1:189.
17. Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 4.

18. Doob, *Propaganda*, 3.

19. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, 33 and passim; Henry F. May, *End of American Innocence*, 393 and passim; Susman, *Culture as History*.

20. Douglas, *Terrible Honesty*. On Harlem and primitivism see, among others, Esteve, *Aethetics and Politics*, 152–71.

21. Bender, *New York Intellect*, 247.

22. Edmund Wilson, *Shores of Light*, 132. See also Aaron, *Writers on the Left*, 72–77; Blake, *Beloved Community*, 269–70.

23. Strout, *Pragmatic Revolt*; Marcell, *Progress and Pragmatism*; Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science*; Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*; Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*; Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*; Diggins, *Promise of Pragmatism*; Schlosberg, "Resurrecting the Pluralist Universe."

24. Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 251–56.

25. Doob, *Propaganda*, 18.

26. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 311–13.

27. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, 329 and passim.

28. Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 592.

29. Dorothy Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, 390.

30. Galton, "Studies in Eugenics," 24.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 25.

33. Ibid.

34. See Kellor, "Criminal Anthropology," 515–27; Sheffield, "So-Called Criminal Type," 381–90.

35. Gossett, *Race*, 381.

36. Danielson and Davenport, "Hill Folk."

37. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 162.

38. Lester Ward, "Eugenics, Euthenics, Eudemics," 754.

39. For the general terms of the debate see Francis Galton, "Eugenics" and the following "Discussion."

40. Boas and U.S. Immigration Commission, *Changes in Bodily Form*.

41. Henry F. Osborn, "The Address to Welcome the Second International Congress of Eugenics," New York, 22–28 September 1921, quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 388.

42. See also Stoddard, *Rising Tide of Color*.

43. Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 47, and *Send These to Me*, 43–58; Ludmerer, "Immigration Restriction Act of 1924"; Kazal, "Revisiting Assimilation"; Christopher Lash, *True and Only Heaven*, chap. 10.

44. Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 105, 108–9.

45. Harry H. Laughlin, "Analysis of America's Melting Pot," hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 6th Congress, 3rd

sess. Washington Government Printing Office, 1922, 755, quoted in Ludmerer, "Immigration Restriction Act of 1924," 67.

46. Osborn quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 388.

47. Ibid.

48. The survey results were collected in Kenneth Lewis Roberts, *Why Europe Leaves Home* (quoted in Gossett, *Race*, 402).

49. McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* 135.

50. Gould, *Mismeasure of Man*, 260–63.

51. Ludmerer, "Immigration Restriction Act of 1924," 59–81, quote on 79.

52. Horace M. Kallen, "Morals," 10:643.

53. Martin, *Behavior of Crowds*, 241.

54. Martin, *Behavior of Crowds*, 108–9.

55. Ibid., 243.

56. Ibid., 286–87.

57. Martin, *Liberty*, 263. See also Martin and Bernays, "Are We Victims of Propaganda?" On this entire question see my "Informazione o propaganda," and, among others, de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 262.

58. Bernays, *Biography of an Idea*, 252 and passim. About Bernays, see Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*, 113 and passim. About Freud's trip to the United States in 1909, see Gay, *Freud*, 187–93.

59. De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 226–83; Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*; Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness*, and *PR!*; Thelen, *Becoming Citizens*; Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream*; William Leach, *Land of Desire*; Lears, *Fables of Abundance*.

60. Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*, 123.

61. Allbig, *Modern Public Opinion*, 297; Gallup and Rae, *Pulse of Democracy*, 27 and passim.

62. Horace B. English, "Psychology of Slogans," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 27, no. 1 (1932): 402.

63. Frezza, "Mass media e consenso," 91–93.

64. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 54.

65. Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream*, 10–12; de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 135.

66. Scott, *Psychology of Advertising*.

67. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 26.

68. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 50.

69. Doob, *Propaganda*, 195; Bernays, *Biography of an Idea*, 459 and passim. On the Light's Golden Jubilee see, among others, Frezza, "Self-Representation of Power."

70. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, 3.

71. Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*, 146.

72. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 105.

73. Ibid., 28.

74. Ibid., 52.

75. Gould, *Mismeasure of Man*, 189–214.

76. Brigham, *Study of American Intelligence*.

77. Spitz, *Patterns of Antidemocratic Thought*; Hirschman, *Rhetoric of Reaction*.

78. Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 570.

79. Gosnell and Merriam, *Non-Voting*. See also Gosnell, "Some Practical Applications."

80. Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence*, 573–75. For the whole picture see Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 96–113.

81. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 26.

82. Ibid., 105.

83. Merriam quoted in Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 123; see also Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science*, 77–81.

84. Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*, 123.

85. Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*; Mencken, *Notes on Democracy*.

86. These were, according to the observations of Edmund Wilson in the *New Republic* (15 December 1926), "particular incarnations of the great American stupidity, evidently inspired by Henry Mencken." The quotation appears in Frederick John Hoffman, *Twenties*, 306–7.

87. Sinclair Lewis, *Babbitt*, 293.

88. Babbitt, *Democracy and Leadership*, 243.

89. Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence*, 573; Adam Lipsky, "Goose Stuffing," *Saturday Evening Post* 196 (March 15, 1924): 6. See also Lipsky, *Man the Puppet*.

90. Gosnell and Merriam, *Non-Voting*; Meier, "Motives in Voting," 210–12.

91. Herring, "Prescription for Modern Democracy," 138; Shepard, "Democracy in Transition," 18.

92. Gosnell, "Some Practical Application," 742 et passim.

93. Quoted in Spitz, *Patterns of Antidemocratic Thought*, 41.

94. Lippman, *Public Opinion*, 311.

95. Ibid., 406.

96. Lippmann, *Phantom Public*, 180.

97. Ibid.

98. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 282.

99. Lippmann, *Phantom Public*, 180.

100. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*, 4.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., 221.

103. Ibid.

104. For the intellectual portrait of Mary Parker Follet, whose participative-democratic position was close to Dewey's, see Baritono, *La democrazia vissuta*.

105. John Dewey, review of *Public Opinion*, by Walter Lippmann, *New Republic* 30 (1922): 286.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, 144.

109. Dewey, *Individualism Old and New*. For this aspect see Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 308–18; Alan Ryan, *John Dewey*.

110. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, 160.

111. Ibid., 208.

Chapter 6. From the Factory to the Nation: Leadership or Domination

1. Lewisohn, *New Leadership in Industry*, 207.

2. Ibid.

3. Edison quoted in Viteles, *Psychology and Industry*, 144.

4. Mayo, *Human Problems*, 167.

5. Mayo, foreword to *Management and Morale*, xviii; Roethlisberger and Dickson, *Management and the Worker*. See on this subject Kessler-Harris, "Home and Work," 331–50.

6. Mayo, foreword to *Management and Morale*, xix.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society*, 231.

10. Mayo, *Human Problems*, 167.

11. Among the many works on the subject, see Montgomery, *Fall of the House*, 242, 300–302, 438–39, 454–57; Bernstein, *Lean Years*, 144–89; Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 48–81.

12. Bernstein, *Lean Years*, 83–143.

13. Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 59.

14. Bernstein, *Lean Years*, 170.

15. Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 58; quoted in Bernstein, *Lean Years*, 170.

16. The number of industrial relations departments at the end of the 1920s was 50 percent in establishments of more than two thousand workers, 30 percent in establishments with the number of workers between five hundred and two thousand, and 6.5 percent in those with fewer than five hundred workers. See Brody, *Workers in Industrial America*, 59.

17. Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society*, 91–92.

18. Lewisohn, *New Leadership in Industry*, 98–99.

19. Mayo, *Human Problems*, 72.

20. R. B. Wolfe, "Securing the Initiative of the Workman," *American Economic Review* 9, Supplement, 120–21, cited in J. M. Williams, *Foundations of Social Sciences*, 106.

21. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?*, 367.

22. Moreno and Jennings, "Statistics of Social Configurations," 342–74.

23. Jennings, "Structure of Leadership Development," 139.

24. See *Personnel Journal* 6 (1927): 124–28. The Personnel Research Federation had been founded in 1921 to promote research of personnel management in light of the new theorizing by entrepreneurs about welfare capitalism. See Bernstein, *Lean Years*, 176. The Taylor Society for the promotion of scientific management was named by Fredrick Winslow Taylor, the pioneer in this field.

25. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 10. See also Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 12.

26. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 7.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 9.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 15.

31. Ibid., 4.

32. Lewisohn, *New Leadership in Industry*, 229.

33. Ibid., 92–93, 204–6.

34. Hunt, Tyron, and Willis, *What the Coal Commission Found*, 206.

35. Lewisohn, *New Leadership in Industry*, 229.

36. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, 2.

37. Robert C. Brooks, "Reflections on the World Revolution," *American Political Science Review* 35 (1941): 349.

38. William W. Biddle, "Psychological Definition of Propaganda," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 25 (1931): 290.

39. Ibid., 292.

40. Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, 321.

41. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 3.

42. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*.

43. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 3.

44. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 10.

45. Mapheus Smith, "Leadership," 353.

46. Doob, *Propaganda*, 108–14. See also by the same author on this subject *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, 55–58.

47. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 10.

48. Parten, "Leadership among Preschool Children." The research was done in 1927, at the Nursery School of the Institute of Child Welfare, University of Minnesota.

49. Cowley, "Three Distinctions," 144.

50. Ibid., 152. For the "theory of conjuncture," see C. M. Case, "Leadership and Conjuncture: A Sociological Hypothesis." *Sociology and Social Research* 17 (1933): 510–13.

51. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership*, 278–80.

52. Ibid., 278. The example proposed by Bogardus is that of the prison as an agent of conditioning prisoners, which instead of better adapting them to the society further radicalizes them.

53. Nafe, "Psychological Description of Leadership," 252.

54. See Thrasher, *The Gang*.

55. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership*, 278–80.

56. Bogardus defines the propulsive aspect of leadership thus: "Leadership is the setting by one person of unusual or original behavior patterns which are responded to, accepted, or adopted by other persons" ("World Leadership Types," *Sociology and Social Research* 12, 1928: 573). See also Bernard, *Instinct*, 11; Nafe, "Psychological Description of Leadership"; Mapheus Smith, "Leadership"; Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society*.

57. Nafe, "Psychological Description of Leadership," 249.

58. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 88. On the importance of the boss figure in American political life, see the 1930 study conducted by Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States*.

59. See Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 117, 123.

60. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 322.

61. Ibid., 16.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 74.

64. Tead, *Art of Leadership*, 20.

65. Lundholm, "Mark Antony's Speech."

66. Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 19–21.

67. Lundholm, "Mark Antony's Speech," 304.

68. Ibid.

69. Filene, *Leadership in These New Times*, 5.

70. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale*, 193. A series of 1936–41 lectures and conferences by the author comprise this book.

71. Ibid.

72. Lippitt and White, "Experimental Study of Leadership," 280; A. Bavelas and K. Lewin, "Training in Democratic Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 37 (1942): 195.

73. In the years after World War II this would be the object of further analyses, such as the famous research by Adorno et al., *Authoritarian Personality*. The work of White and Lippitt was republished at the end of the 1950s in a Cold War climate. They compared the Communists to the Fascists with the common designation of totalitarian regimes in comparison to Western democracies: White and

Lippitt, *Autocracy and Democracy*, 258–69. For a reconstruction of the concept of totalitarianism in the United States from the 1930s to the 1950s, see Adler and Paterson, "Red Fascism."

74. White and Lippitt, *Autocracy and Democracy*, 258–69.

75. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 95; see also Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*, 143.

76. Bernays, *Propaganda*, 96.

77. Ibid., 100.

78. Ibid., 107.

79. Casey, "Party Campaign Propaganda," 103.

80. Ibid.

81. Michelson quoted in Casey, "Party Campaign Propaganda," 103.

82. Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics*, 227. Merriam's approach came very close to Bentley's "organized pressure groups," which I discussed in chapter 2.

83. Mayo, "Irrational Factor in Human Behavior," 117, 123.

84. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 36.

85. Lasswell, Casey, and Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, 19.

86. Lasswell, *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, 184, 295–96. For a critical appraisal of Lasswell, see, among others, my "Public Boundaries."

87. Rabinowitz, "Political Truth and Pulp Fiction."

88. Lasswell, *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, 212–14.

89. Ibid., 189.

90. Ibid.

91. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*.

92. Lasswell, *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, 211.

Chapter 7. The International Challenge

1. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 103–33. See also, among others, Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 13–218; Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science*, 57–109; Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*; idem., *Virtues of Liberalism*; Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists*. For the 1930s and the New Deal, see among others Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*; Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*; Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*; Vaudagna, *Il New Deal*; Badger, *New Deal*; Zieger, *CIO*; Fraser and Gerstle, *Rise and Fall*; Brinkley, *End of Reform*; idem., *Liberalism and Its Discontents*; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, chap. 9; Terkel, *Hard Times*; Brinkley, *Voices of Protest*; McElvaine, *Great Depression*; idem., *Down and Out*; Sitkoff, *New Deal for Blacks*; Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work*; Ware, *Beyond Suffrage*; idem., *Partner and I*; Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal*; Sullivan, *Days of Hope*. See also my "Guiding Light of Great Principles."

2. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis*, 46.

3. Quoted in Corwin, "Democratic Dogma," 575–76.

4. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 60.

5. Raoul Roussy de Sales, "Love in America," *Atlantic Monthly* 161 (May 1939): 645, reprinted in Susman, *Culture and Commitment*, 93.

6. Lynd and Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*.

7. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, *Nothing to Fear*, 89.

8. Bernays, "Public Education for Democracy," 124.

9. Stuart Chase, *Tyranny of Words*, 335.

10. Ibid, 337.

11. Gerstle, *Protean Character of American Liberalism*, 1043–73; Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*; R. Smith, "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz."

12. Ricci, *Tragedy of Political Science*, 72.

13. Arnold, *Folklore of Capitalism*, 15.

14. Flores, "Il mito dell'URSS," 131–35. On FDR's foreign policy, see, among others, Dalleck, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*; and Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 381–425. On the relationship between the United States and fascism, see Migone, *Gli Stati Uniti e il fascismo*; for an analysis of the regime from the U.S. point of view, see Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism*. For the progressive intellectuals' view of fascism, see Diggins, "Flirtation with Fascism," 488–94.

15. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 177 (September 1933).

16. Beard and Lewis, "Representative Government in Evolution," 236. This was not only a subject for scientific discussion, but one for popular magazines as well. See William Furant, "Is Democracy a Failure?" *Harper's Magazine* 153 (October 1926): 56–59. The financier O. Young called for greater presidential powers and an end to the theory of checks and balances. The journal *Forum* reported a debate on the theme of democracy: "Has Democracy Broken Down? A Debate" (vol. 37, January 1929).

17. Ira Williams, "Future of Democracy," 83.

18. Shepard, "Democracy," 98.

19. Ibid., 94.

20. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 129; See also Brinkley, "The New Deal Experiments," in *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 17–36.

21. Shepard, "Democracy in Transition," 1.

22. Ibid., 9.

23. Ibid., 26.

24. Herring, "Prescription for Modern Democracy," 138; idem., *Politics of Democracy*, 26.

25. Pendleton Herring, "Logomachy and Administration," *Journal of Social Philosophy* (1937): 236.

26. About different meanings of the concept of freedom tied to the development of American democracy, see Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 143–44.

27. Salvemini, "What Is Freedom?" 3.

28. Thomas V. Smith, "Voice of the People," 109.

29. Arnold, *Symbols of Government*, xiv; about Arnold, see Brinkley, *End of Reform*; by Brinkley see also "Antimonopoly Ideal" and *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 40–46. On the subject of political symbols in the New Deal, see Vaudagna, "Drammatizzare l'America!"

30. Arnold, *Symbols of Government*, xiv, 119.

31. Ibid., xv.

32. Ibid., 229.

33. Ibid., 125.

34. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, 234 and passim.

35. Arnold, *Symbols of Government*, 110, 165.

36. Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 46.

37. Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois*, 2:401.

38. FDR, *Public Papers and Addresses* (1941), 242–43.

39. Laski, "Democracy," 77, 83.

40. Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 206; see also Sullivan, *Days of Hope*, 41–42.

41. Steiner, "Fascism in America?" 821.

42. Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*, 3:15–129, 245–55; Brinkley, *Voices of Protest*; Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*.

43. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*, 3:246.

44. Ibid., 247.

45. The reaction provoked by Duffield, "Mussolini's American Empire," contributed to the demise of the "Lega." See Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism*, 86–95.

46. Walter Weyl, "The Khaki Shirts," *New Republic*, 21 September 1932; "Murder and the Khaki Shirts," *Nation*, 20 November 1933; S. D. McCoy, "Hitlerism Invades, Hitlerism Marches in America," *Today*, 9 March, 16 March 1935. See also Steiner, "Fascism in America?"; Doob, *Propaganda*, 290–301; Harry F. Ward, "Development of Fascism."

47. Steiner, "Fascism in America?" 821.

48. Roger Baldwin, "Red Scare," *Common Sense* (March 1935); H. Basso, "Mr. Hearst Sees Red," *New Republic* 16, no. 1 (1935): 269–71. For a history of the communist movement in the 1930s: Ottanelli, *The Communist Party*.

49. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*, 3:96, 98.

50. Ibid., 93.

51. Doob, *Propaganda*, 296–97.

52. Steiner, "Fascism in America?" 821–30.

53. Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 206; Fasce, *La democrazia degli affari*, 153.

54. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 214.

55. Floyd H. Allport, "Composition of Political Attitudes"; Thurstone and Chave, *Measurement of Attitude*.

56. Stagner, "Fascist Attitudes."

57. An analysis conducted during the war stressed how fascism, though combated by the Americans in Europe, was not recognized as racist toward minorities or in its White Supremacy, Christianity, and Americanism values. See Allen and Edwards, "Signs of Incipient Fascism"; Raskin and Cook, "Further Investigation"; Stagner and Katzoff, "Fascist Attitudes"; Katz and Cantril, "Analysis of Attitudes."

58. Dennis, *Is Capitalism Doomed?* and *Coming American Fascism*.

59. Doob, *Propaganda*, 296–97; Cremoni, "Populism and Nativism," 66–73.

60. Harry F. Ward, "Development of Fascism," 56.

61. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, 92.

62. N. Lemann, "The Not So Great Dictator," review of *The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey Long*, by W. I. Hair, *New York Review of Books*, 28 May 1992, 20; Brinkley, *Voices of Protest*, 11–81; idem., *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 151–63.

63. Thomas H. Williams, *Huey Long*, 700.

64. Ibid., 418.

65. Ibid., 70.

66. Ibid., 418.

67. Ibid., 705.

68. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 236.

69. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, 93.

70. Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*, 3:80; Thomas H. Williams, *Huey Long*, 414.

71. Sinclair Lewis, *It Can't Happen Here*, 17.

72. Ibid., 143.

73. Ibid., 143.

74. Quoted in Schlesinger, *Age of Roosevelt*, 3:94–95.

75. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, 119. On the Federal Writers Project, see among others, Mangione, *Dream and the Deal*.

76. See, among others, Tull, *Father Coughlin*; Brinkley, *Voices of Protest*, 82–123.

77. Lasswell, *Democracy through Public Opinion*, 36.

78. Quoted in Tull, *Father Coughlin*, 90.

79. Quoted in ibid., 91.

80. Quoted in ibid.

81. Sinclair Lewis, *Elmer Gantry*, 262–63.

82. Sinclair Lewis, *It Can't Happen Here*, 100.

83. Hypnosis theories in Moscovici, *L'age des foules*.

84. McClung Lee and Briant Lee, *Fine Art of Propaganda*, foreword, 22–25. For characteristics of the institute, see Stott, *Documentary Expression*.

85. McClung Lee and Briant Lee, *Fine Art of Propaganda*, foreword (unpaginated).

86. On the theory of Nazism as a defense against communism, a theory that Coughlin took from the Nazis themselves, the priest had an enthusiastic reception in the German press, as could be read in the *New York Times*, 27 November 1938. See McClung Lee and Briant Lee, *Fine Art of Propaganda*, 63 and passim.

87. Catlin, "Role of Propaganda," 224.

88. Doob, *Propaganda*, 266–301.

89. See Hughes, *Sea-Change*; Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants*; Fleming and Bailyn, *Intellectual Migration*; Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America*; Kent, *Refugee Intellectual*; Martin Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*; idem., *Permanent Exiles*; Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile*. For information about literature, see Della Terza, *Da Vienna a Baltimora*.

90. Quoted in H. Stuart Hughes, "La grande emigrazione intellettuale," *Rivista storica Italiana* (1970): 954.

91. Salvati, *Da Berlino a New York*, 49–51.

92. Tillich, "Mind and Migration," 296.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., 303.

95. See among the best known scholarship written in the years of exile: Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism*; Neumann, *Behemoth*; Lederer, *State of the Masses*; Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*.

96. Doob, *Propaganda*, 9. See also Doob, "Psychology and Propaganda." For an analysis of this subject in the years between the two world wars, see Frezza, "Informazione o propaganda."

97. Friedrich, "Education and Propaganda."

98. Bernays, "Molding Public Opinion."

99. Fritz M. Marx, "State Propaganda in Germany," 29.

100. Lasswell, "Psychology of Hitlerism," 374.

101. Ibid., 374.

102. Ibid.

103. Lasswell, "Nations and Classes."

104. Parsons, "Democracy and the Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology* 1 (1942): 96–114. For an analysis of Nazism as a lay religion, see Hayes, "Novelty of Totalitarianism."

105. Childs, *Introduction to Public Opinion*, 119.

106. Doob, *Propaganda*, 279. Childs, *Introduction to Public Opinion*, 186.

107. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*, 261. On Nazi Germany and American advertising, see De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 275–76.

108. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*, 261.

109. Fritz M. Marx, "State Propaganda in Germany," 29.

110. Sington and Weidenfeld, *Goebbels Experiment*, 23.

111. Ibid., 24.

112. Ibid., 25.

113. Hans Herma, "Goebbels' Conception of Propaganda," *Social Research* (1943): 205. Among the vast literature on the subject, see also R. B. Nelson, "Hitler's Propaganda Machine"; L. George Seldes, "Poisoned Springs of World News," *Harper's Magazine* 169 (November 1934): 719–31; George Zillboorg, "Propaganda from Within," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 198 (July 1938): 116–23; and Kandel, "Education in Nazi Germany."

114. Lerner, "Pattern of Dictatorship," 513. The essay was written in 1933, read in December 1933 at the American Historical Association, and first published in 1934 in the *Yale Review* as "The New Age of Despots."

115. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Scope of Research on Propaganda and Dictatorship," in Childs, *Propaganda and Dictatorship*, 105.

116. Kris, "Danger of Propaganda," 1 and passim.

117. For a critical analysis of Fromm and of this book in particular by American psychoanalysts, see the interview by Abraham Kardiner in "Psychoanalytic Oral History Project," ed. Bluma Swerdloff, Columbia University Health Sciences Library, Archives and Special Collections, Viola Wertheim Bernard Papers, 1918–2000, box 81.

118. See Enzo Collotti's introduction to the Italian version of Neumann's *Behemoth*, 15.

119. Langer and De Saussure, "Psychopathology of Adolf Hitler," 31 and passim; Langer, Kris, Lewin, *Psychological Analysis of Adolph Hitler*. The report was republished as Langer, *Mind of Adolf Hitler*. For a summary of psychoanalytic literature on the subject, see Louise Hoffmann, "Psychoanalytic Interpretations of A. Hitler."

120. See, among others, "Is Hitler Crazy?" *New Republic* (1938): 2; "Hitler's Personality Called: Paranoid, Infantile, Sadistic," *Science News Letter* 34 (1938): 227–28.

121. Schumann, *Nazi Dictatorship*, 106 and passim. See also Kecskemeti and Leites, *Some Psychological Hypotheses*.

122. Doob, *Propaganda*, 133.

123. About the concept of social attitude, see Stagner, "Fascist Attitudes." See also for the concept of mental attitude, Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*.

124. Kris, "Danger of Propaganda," 27.

125. Abel, *Why Hitler Came into Power*, 151.

126. Ibid., 153.

127. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, 56, 269.

128. Campbell quoted in Kühl, *Nazi Connection*, 35. See also Barkan, *Retreat*

of Scientific Racism. On the extent of eugenics in Nazi Germany, see Ricciardi von Platten, *Il nazismo*.

129. Barkan, *Retreat of Scientific Racism*, 325–28.

130. Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany*, 21.

131. Ibid.

132. Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois*, 2:398–400.

133. Ibid.

134. Schumann, *Nazi Dictatorship*, 79.

135. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 208. For Eleanor Roosevelt, see among others Blanche Wiesen Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt*; about Lorena Hickok's reports to Harry Hopkins see Lowitt and Beasley, *One Third of a Nation*.

136. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*.

137. Cantril, *Invasion from Mars*.

138. Ibid., 8.

139. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*, 74.

140. Ibid., 111.

141. Litwak, *Trouble in Mind*, 280 and passim.

142. Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*, 74.

143. Ibid., 78.

144. Ibid., 79.

145. Ibid., 99.

146. Ibid., 102.

147. Ibid., 102.

148. Ibid., 272.

149. Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany*, 27.

150. Quoted in Cantril, *Psychology of Social Movements*, 258.

151. Kris, "Danger of Propaganda," 38.

152. Mann, "That Man Is My Brother," 78–79.

153. Thomas Mann, *Doctor Faustus*, 40.

154. Freud, "Moses and Monotheism," 54.

155. Boas, "Mind of the Primitive Man," 228.

156. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, 102.

157. Boas, "Mind of Primitive Man," 228.

158. Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life*, 39.

159. Jung, "Psychology of Dictatorship," 341.

160. C. G. Jung, interview by H. R. Knickerbocker, in *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, January 1939, cited by Jackh, *War for Man's Soul*, 162.

161. Ibid.

162. Viereck, *Metapolitics*, 31, 312–13.

163. Chakotin, *Rape of the Masses*. On the importance of myth in Nazi ideology, see Rader, *Flight from Reason*, 625. Freeman, *Conquering the Man*.

164. Chakotin, *Rape of the Masses*, 118, 121.

165. Viereck also emphasized this aspect when he defined racism as "less a science or philosophy than a religion, an anti-Christian form of mysticism" (*Metapolitics*, 293).

166. Erickson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," 475–93, 475.

167. Ibid., 485.

168. Viereck, *Metapolitics*, 5.

169. Ibid., 484.

170. Ibid.

171. Bateson, "Cultural and Thematic Analysis."

172. Fromm, "On the Problems of German Characterology," 83.

173. Ibid. Fromm refers to a study undertaken before the advent of Nazism in which he said the characteristics of the German working class were profoundly different from those of the lower middle class. See "Project on Character," 14–15.

Chapter 8. The Defense of Democracy

1. Alan Brinkley, "The New Deal and the Idea of the State," in Fraser and Gerstle, *Rise and Fall*, 111–12; Brinkley, *End of Reform*; Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*.

2. Hook, *Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy*, 10.

3. Elliott cited in Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 110.

4. Robert H. Hutchins, "Education and Social Improvement: The Cult that Destroys," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 4 (1 June 1938): 500, quoted in Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 151.

5. Pound quoted in Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 162.

6. Emil Lederer, "Freedom and Science," *Social Research* 2 (1934): 218.

7. Ibid., 222.

8. Arnold Brecht, review of *Scholasticism and Politics*, by Jacques Maritain, *American Political Science Review* 35 (June 1941): 545.

9. See Robert McIver, "Some Reflections on Sociology During a Crisis," *American Sociological Review* 6 (February 1941); G. M. Sabine, "What Is a Political Theory?" *Journal of Politics* 1 (February 1939).

10. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 102; Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 435 and passim.

11. Lasswell, *Democracy through Public Opinion*, 73.

12. Gallup and Rae, *Pulse of Democracy*, 9.

13. Lasswell, "The Person," 189; Thomas V. Smith, *Voice of the People*, 109.

14. Lasswell, *Democracy through Public Opinion*, 22.

15. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 123.

16. Bernays, *Speak Up for Democracy*, 588–89, 632–39.

17. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 93–94.

18. Merriam, *New Democracy*, 246; Sussmann, *Dear FDR*, 51–165.

19. Merriam, *New Democracy*, 246.

20. Johnson, *Roosevelt*, 271. For a critical analysis of the analogies and of the distinctions between Nazi Germany and U.S. society during the years of the Great Depression, see John A. Garraty, "New Deal: National Socialism and the Great Depression," *American Historical Review* 78 (1973): 907–11."

21. Terkel, *Hard Times*, 289.

22. Vaudagna, *Drammatizzare l'America*, 86 and passim.

23. Cantril and Allport, *Psychology of Radio*, 21.

24. Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 1–16.

25. Lydgate, *What America Thinks*, 98–110.

26. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 38; Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox*, 183–91, 422–30.

27. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 38.

28. Beard, "Future of Democracy," 501.

29. Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents*, 37–62.

30. Laski, *American Presidency*, 13.

31. Herring, *Presidential Leadership*, 1.

32. Ibid., 8; Herring, "Prescription for Modern Democracy."

33. Herring, *Presidential Leadership*, 8.

34. Herring in ibid. had this to say about the democratic process: "Democracy can mean government of the people, by the people, and for the people only in a symbolic sense. It is sheer poetry and to be treasured for that reason. But when democracy is analyzed not in the language of its high prophets but in terms of its behavior we observe that it is a system and attitude of mind that tolerates many elites in many groups jostling and struggling" (18–19).

35. Merriam, *New Democracy*, 253.

36. Herring, "Prescription for Modern Democracy," 146, 136.

37. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* 211–12.

38. Charles R. Robinson, "Recent Developments in the Straw Poll Field," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1 (October 1937): 42–52. See also Harwood Childs, "Rule by Public Opinion," *Atlantic Monthly* (June 1936); Gordon W. Allport, "Toward a Science."

39. Habermas, *Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica*, 242.

40. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, xi–xii.

41. Rosten, *Washington Correspondents*; Rogers, "President Roosevelt's Press Conferences"; Pollard, "F. D. Roosevelt and the Press"; Graham J. White, *FDR and the Press*; Steele, "Pulse of the People." By Steele also see *Propaganda in an Open Society*.

42. Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion*, 152.

43. Barnow, *History of Broadcasting*, 135.

44. Cantril and Allport, *Psychology of Radio*, 62.

45. Hanson, "Official Propaganda and the New Deal"; on Roosevelt's problematic relationship with the press, see Graham J. White, *FDR and the Press*.

46. Mitchell, *Campaign of the Century*.

47. See David Pearson and R. S. Allen, "How the President Works," *Harper's Magazine* 173 (June 1936): 1–14; Michelson, *Ghost Talks*; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*; Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*.

48. Robert S. Schultz, "President Roosevelt's Vocabulary," *School and Society* (23 June 1934): 813–14; Louise Crowell, "Building of the Four Freedoms," *Speech Monographs* (November 1955): 266–83.

49. Vaudagna, "National Revival."

50. Barnow, *A History of Broadcasting*, 2:7.

51. See Walter W. Braden and E. Brandebourg, "Roosevelt Fireside Chats," *Speech Monographs* (November 1955): 290–302; Cantril, *Human Dimension*.

52. See John H. Sharon, "Fireside Chats, " *Franklin D. Roosevelt Collector* 2, no. 1 (November 1949): 3–20.

53. Macdonald, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, 285–87. See also Brinkley, *End of Reform*; Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*.

54. Daria Frezza, "Psychological Warfare."

55. Schlesinger, *Life in the Twentieth Century*, 241. For an analysis of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., see Mariano, *Lo storico nel suo labirinto*.

56. Steele, "Preparing the Public for War." For the impact of World War II on U.S. society, see among others Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*; Polenberg, *War and Society*; Blum, *V Was for Victory*; Keegan, *Second World War*; Terkel, *Good War*; Thomas J. Fleming, *New Dealers' War*.

57. Schlesinger, *Life in the Twentieth Century*, 242.

58. Catton, *War Lords of Washington*, 16; Hadley Cantril, "Public Opinion in Flux," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 219–21 (January–May 1942): 132–52.

59. See Salvati, *Da Berlino a New York*, 51–85. Also see the 1978 oral interview of Abraham Kardiner in "Psychoanalytic Oral History Project," ed. Bluma Swerdloff, Columbia University Health Sciences Library, Archives and Special Collections, Viola Wertheim Bernard Papers, 1918–2000, box 81.

60. Cedric Larson, "The Council of Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (summer 1942): 290.

61. FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., L. Mellet Papers, Official Correspondence, box 6, letter of Thomas Mann et al. To the President F. D. Roosevelt, 12 February 1942.The research at the FDR Library was part of my paper "Psychological Warfare."

62. FDR Library, L. Mellet Papers, Off. Corr., box 6, suggested plan, 2.

63. E. F. Frazier, "Ethnic and Minority Groups in Wartime, with Special Reference to the Negro," *American Journal of Sociology* 48, no. 6 (July 1942–May

1943): 375–77; C. L. R. James, Breitman, and E. Keemar, *Fighting Racism in World War II*.

64. The ACDIF had been set up by Franz Boas with the help of Ruth Benedict and other scholars at Columbia University in 1939 for the promotion of meetings on this subject.

65. During the McCarthy years the committee was investigated because of its communist members. See Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 198.

66. Barkan, *Retreat of Scientific Racism*, 336; Bayor, "Klans, Coughlinites, and Aryan Nations."

67. Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 182 and passim. On U.S. policy about refugee immigration see Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 411–25. See also Neil Baldwin, *Henry Ford and the Jews*, 288–89, 303–4.

68. Herskovits, *Franz Boas*, 180–205.

69. Boas quoted in Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 183.

70. For these activities of Boas, see ibid.

71. Under its auspices Otto Klineberg did his research on the importance of the environment in determining African Americans' mental character. Klineberg, *Experimental Study*.

72. Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 184. See also Boas, *Effects of American Environment*.

73. The principal associations were the American Association of University Professors, the National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Philosophical Society.

74. Quoted in Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 202.

75. *Manifesto on Freedom of Science*, pamphlet, Butler Library, Columbia University, ref. no. 308 Z, box 797, 4. The manifesto was signed by 1,284 scientists, three of them Nobel Prize winners, representing 167 universities and research institutions. Among Boas's collaborators, besides Ruth Benedict, was another Columbia student, Moses I. Finkelstein, future professor of ancient history with the name of Moses I. Finley, who immigrated to England in the wake of McCarthyism.

76. Boas quoted in Barkan, "Mobilizing Scientists against Racism," 203.

77. *Manifesto on Freedom of Science*, 4.

78. See about Laughlin in chapter 7 the section titled Racism in the United States and in Nazi Germany.

79. American Committee for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom, *Genetic Basis for Democracy*, 23–24.

80. In addition to the authors already cited, see Magil and Stevens, *Peril of Fascism*.

81. American Committee for Democratic and Intellectual Freedom, *Genetic Basis for Democracy*, 21.

82. Harold B. Hoskins, "American Unity and Our Foreign-born Citizens," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 219–21 (1942): 158.

83. FDR Library, L. Mellett Papers, box 6, Off. Corr., memorandum by H. Hoskins, Division of American Unity (28 July 1941): 1–2.

84. Quoted in Denning, *Cultural Front*, 9. See the discussion of Denning's book in *Labor History* 39 (1998): 311–36.

85. Sillen quoted in Denning, *Cultural Front*, 124.

86. Ibid., 123–36.

87. Garraty, *Unemployment in History*, 171.

88. The Social Science Research Council did comprehensive research of this subject. See Garraty, *Unemployment in History*, 165–87.

89. Lawrence Levine, *Unpredictable Past*, 206–91; Fox and Lears, *Power of Culture*; Staub, *Voices of Persuasion*; Aaron, *Writers on the Left*; Stott, *Documentary Expression and Thirties America*; Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*.

90. For the photo collections, see, among others, Hurley, *Portrait of a Decade*. Quotations by Dorman, *Revolt of the Provinces*, 72.

91. Gerstle, *American Crucible*, 180.

92. Baigell, *American Scene*.

93. Odum quoted in Stott, *Documentary Expression and Thirties America*, 110–11.

94. Cappetti, *Writing Chicago*, 31.

95. Quoted in Stott, *Documentary Expression and Thirties America*, 59; Lawrence Levine, "American Culture and the Great Depression," in *Unpredictable Past*, 208–30.

96. Sherwood Anderson, *Puzzled America*, 110.

97. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 61–62.

98. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, 103, 54–55.

99. Purcell, *Crisis of Democratic Theory*, 10.

100. See Social Science Research Council, "Memorandum on Research in Competition and Cooperation."

101. Margaret Mead, ed., *Cooperation and Competition*.

102. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, 103. Chase had taken part in the Regional Planning Association of America from 1923, along with the writer on architecture, Lewis Mumford (Blake, *Beloved Community*, 275–78). Chase described his visit to a Mexican village in articles that appeared in 1931 in the *New Republic* and that were then republished in the best seller *Mexico: A Study of Two Americas*. For the concept of community see Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, 96–150. Chase took this village as an example of a perfectly balanced and fairly integrated community, able to satisfy the basic needs of its members. The author saw the village in strong contrast to U.S. society, where the

needs of the individual were always subordinated to the drive for profit. See also Robert Cantwell, "America and the Writers Project," *New Republic* 98 (26 April 1939): 325, quoted in Susman, *Culture and Commitment*, 199; Lewis Mumford, *Culture of the Cities*, 281, 382.

103. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, 103.

104. Lynd and Lynd, *Middletown*. See also, by the same authors, *Middletown in Transition*.

105. Friedrich, "Role and the Position," 421.

106. Arnold, *Folklore of Capitalism*, 5–6.

107. Ibid., 8.

108. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*.

109. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 30.

110. Ibid., 139.

111. Max Lerner, "Democracy and the Scientific Spirit," *American Journal of Ortopsychiatry* (October 1940): 440.

112. Ibid.

113. Becker quoted in Robert Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* 57.

114. Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, 47.

115. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* 212.

116. Becker, *Modern Democracy*, 64.

117. Kenneth Burke, "War and Cultural Life," *American Journal of Sociology* 48 (May 1943): 405.

118. Riesman, "Government Education for Citizenship," 198 and passim.

119. Friedrich, "Role and the Position."

120. Wallace quoted in Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 232–33.

121. Francis L. Burdette, "Education for Citizenship," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6 (summer 1942): 271.

122. Riesman, "Government Education for Citizenship," 198. The observations of John Maynard Keynes deserved special attention concerning the need for public ceremonies in democratic societies as "a source of strength" compared to the "authoritarian states of Russia, Germany and Italy." See Keynes, "Art and the State."

123. Riesman, "Government Education for Citizenship."

124. Bernays, "Public Education for Democracy," 124.

125. Ibid., 126.

126. Childs, *Introduction to Public Opinion*, 96.

127. Bernays, "Public Education for Democracy," 126.

128. Monaghan, *Official Guide Book*.

129. "A Road to Victory: A Procession of Photographs of the Nation at War," *Bulletin of the Museum of Modern Art* 9, June 1942.

130. FDR, "Four Liberties Speech," in *Public Papers and Addresses*, 9:665 (Macmillan).

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